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3	Abstract		 In	 recent	 years,	 a	 number	 of	 democratic	 theorists	 have	 suggested	 a	 range	 of	principles	 that	parties	and	partisans	should	 follow	to	make	a	positive	contribution	 to	liberal	democracy,	thus	establishing	a	normative	ideal	for	democratic	partisanship.	This	thesis	 addresses	 two	 questions.	 First,	 to	 what	 extent	 does	 real-world	 partisanship—understood	 as	 the	 array	 of	 practices	 and	 discourses	 that	 are	 attached	 to	 party	leadership,	 membership	 or	 identification—meet	 these	 theoretical	 standards	 of	
democratic	partisanship?	 Second,	how	can	we	explain	variations	 in	 the	extent	 to	which	
real-world	partisans	uphold	these	standards?		I	focus	on	two	specific	standards	for	democratic	partisanship.	Partisans	should	first	 demonstrate	 cohesiveness,	 defined	 as	 the	 capacity	 to	 put	 forth	 programs	 of	government	 grounded	 in	 clearly	 defined	 normative	 commitments	 and	 distinct	 from	those	 of	 their	 opponents.	 Second,	 partisans	 should	 display	 a	 commitment	 to	 political	
pluralism,	 demonstrating	 respect	 for	 political	 opponents	 and	 endorsing	 the	ineliminable	character	of	political	disagreement.	To	answer	my	first	research	question,	I	refine	these	two	standards	into	a	series	of	more	specific	criteria,	and	assess	the	extent	to	which	grass-root	partisan	discourse	in	two	country	case	studies,	France	and	Hungary,	meet	 these	criteria.	 I	draw	on	original	data	from	28	focus	groups	conducted	in	2013	with	a	total	of	118	young	party	activists	from	four	different	parties.	The	data	is	analysed	using	the	text-analysis	software	NVivo,	on	the	basis	of	a	coding	scheme	derived	from	my	theoretical	framework.		The	 analysis	 of	 the	 coded	 data	 shows	 that	 French	 partisans	 fare	 better	 than	Hungarian	partisans	on	 the	 criteria	 established.	 I	 also	 find	variations	 in	 the	extent	 to	which	partisans	within	each	country	uphold	 the	standards.	 In	response	 to	 the	second	research	 question,	 I	 develop	 some	 tentative	 explanations	 on	 the	 reasons	 for	 these	variations.	 The	 qualitative	 analysis	 of	 the	 interview	 transcripts	 reveals	 that	 certain	types	 of	 cultural	 resources	 and	 external	 events	 inhibit	 democratic	 forms	 of	 partisan	discourse,	while	others	enable	them.					
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14		Introduction		In	 recent	 years,	 a	 number	 of	 democratic	 theorists	 have	 suggested	 a	 range	 of	principles	 that	parties	and	partisans	should	 follow	to	make	a	positive	contribution	 to	liberal	democracy,	thus	establishing	a	normative	ideal	for	democratic	partisanship.	This	thesis	 addresses	 two	 research	 questions.	 First,	 to	 what	 extent	 does	 real-world	
partisanship	-	understood	as	the	array	of	practices	and	discourses	that	are	attached	to	party	 leadership,	 membership	 or	 identification	 -	meet	 these	 theoretical	 standards	 of	
democratic	partisanship?	 Second,	how	can	we	explain	variations	 in	 the	extent	 to	which	
real-world	partisans	uphold	these	standards?		To	 answer	 these	 questions,	 I	 focus	 on	 two	 specific	 standards	 for	 democratic	partisanship	 discussed	 by	 this	 literature	 in	 democratic	 theory.	 I	 derive	 a	 series	 of	operationalizable	criteria	from	these	standards,	and	then	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	grass-root	partisan	discourse	in	two	country	case	studies	-	France	and	Hungary	-	meets	these	 criteria.	 For	 this	 purpose,	 I	 draw	 on	 original	 data	 from	 28	 focus	 groups	 that	 I	conducted	 in	 2013	 with	 a	 total	 of	 118	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 young	 party	 activists.	They	 were	 all	 members	 of	 the	 two	 main	 government	 parties	 in	 France	 (the	 Parti	
Socialiste	 and	 Union	 pour	 un	 Mouvement	 Populaire),	 and	 Hungary	 (the	 Magyar	
Szocialista	Párt	and	the	Fiatal	Demokraták	Szövetsége).1			The	 overarching	 objective	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 act	 as	 a	 bridge	 between	 the	empirical	study	of	political	parties	and	the	expanding	branch	of	normative	democratic	theory	that	takes	partisanship	as	its	object.	My	premise	is	that	both	sub-disciplines	gain	from	 engaging	 in	 greater	 dialogue.	 Party	 studies	 can	 benefit	 from	 being	 approached	from	 an	 explicitly	 normative	 perspective,	 and	 normative	 democratic	 theory	 can	 be	refined	by	being	more	directly	confronted	with	actual	manifestations	of	partisanship.	I	thus	introduce	this	thesis	by	situating	it	in	this	broader	literature.	In	the	three	following	sections,	I	emphasise	the	existing	links	between	the	empirical	study	of	political	parties	and	 contemporary	democratic	 theory,	 and	highlight	 the	necessity	 of	 greater	 dialogue	between	 these	disciplines.	 In	 the	 last	section	of	 the	 introduction	 I	 show	how	my	own																																									 																					
1	The	UMP	changed	its	name	to	Les	Républicains	on	May	28,	2015.		
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project	 bridges	 both	 literatures,	 and	 outline	 the	 path	 I	 have	 chosen	 to	 answer	 my	research	questions.		
I.	PARTY	STUDIES	AND	DEMOCRATIC	THEORY:	A	DIVORCE	PERPETUATED	
1.	The	isolation	of	party	studies	from	contemporary	democratic	theory	
a.	Normative	assumptions	in	the	party	literature	
Nancy	 Rosenblum	 has	 spoken	 of	 political	 parties	 as	 the	 "darlings	 of	 political	science"	(Rosenblum,	2008,	p.	3).	The	industry	of	party	and	electoral	studies	has	grown	consistently	 since	 the	beginning	of	 the	20th	century,	booming	 in	 the	early	1950s	and	still	thriving	today	(for	quantitative	assessments	of	these	trends,	see	Caramani	&	Hug,	1998;	Reiter,	2006).	The	greater	share	of	the	contemporary	literature	takes	interest	in	two	 distinct	 aspects	 of	 partisan	 practice.	 First,	 patterns	 of	 voting	 behaviour	 and	partisan	 attachments	 among	 mass	 publics.	 Second,	 the	 behaviour	 of	 parties	 in	 both	parliamentary	 and	 governmental	 institutions,	 including	 patterns	 of	 coalition-building	and	parliamentary	voting.		This	academic	interest	 flows	from	the	integral	role	political	parties	play	in	the	functioning	of	representative	democracy.	They	are	present	and	indispensable	at	every	step	of	the	electoral	process:	to	organise	and	raise	funds	for	campaigns,	to	offer	citizens	platforms	 capable	 of	 aggregating	 their	 dispersed	 preferences,	 and	 for	 the	 effective	translation	 of	 electoral	 majorities	 into	 governing	 coalitions.	 They	 are	 also	 central	agents	of	government	 in	democratic	polities,	 controlling	 the	political	 agenda,	 forming	majorities	in	parliament	to	support	the	government	in	power,	and	keeping	majorities	in	check	 when	 in	 opposition.	 Without	 parties	 these	 processes	 would	 be	 incoherent,	disorganised,	 and	 incomprehensible	 for	 the	 lay	 citizen	 (Goodin,	 2008,	 pp.	 204-223).	Independent	 representatives	 would	 have	 no	 common	 platform	 to	 campaign	 on	 with	others,	 governments	would	be	perpetually	unstable,	 and	majorities	would	need	 to	be	re-negotiated	over	each	new	bill.		If	parties	fulfil	such	irreplaceable	functions,	this	also	implies	that	what	they	do	or	 fail	 to	 do	 has	 consequences	 for	 the	 vitality	 of	 modern	 democracy.	 The	 empirical	studies	that	document	changes	in	party	organisation	and	appeals	over	the	last	decades	have	repeatedly	made	this	point.	Consider,	for	instance,	the	literature	on	'catch-all'	and	'cartel'	 parties,	 which	 has	 described	 the	 weakening	 of	 European	 parties'	 ideological	
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profile	 and	 the	 disapearances	 of	 mass-membership	 based	 partisan	 organisations	(Dalton	&	Wattenberg,	2000;	Katz	&	Mair,	1995,	2009;	Kirchheimer,	1966;	Mair,	2003a).	Many	 accounts	 picture	 these	 transformations	 as	 fuelling	 an	 increasingly	 acute	democratic	 deficit	 in	 contemporary	 societies.	 Those	 who	 endorse	 the	 cartel-party	thesis,	for	instance,	often	present	these	new	partisan	forms	as	"too	blunt	an	instrument	to	act	as	a	connection	between	society	and	the	state,	and	they	question	parties’	general	contributions	 to	 democracy’s	 well-being"	 (Allern	 &	 Pedersen,	 2007).	 Some	 scholars,	such	as	Mair	or	Hay,	have	linked	the	retreat	of	citizens	from	the	political	sphere	to	the	disengagement	 of	 elites	 from	 their	 functions	 of	 representation	 and	mobilisation,	 and	argued	that	these	dynamics	are	mutually	re-enforcing	over	time	(Hay,	2007,	pp.	54-60;	Mair,	2003a,	pp.	13-14;	2006,	pp.	48-51).		Changes	 in	 the	 style	 of	 partisan	 communication	 have	 also	 been	 criticised	 for	their	 negative	 impact	 on	 democratic	 processes.	 The	 fact	 that	 political	 elites	 in	established	democracies	increasingly	engage	in	aggressive,	personal	and	empty	attacks	against	 political	 adversaries	 has	 also	 been	 associated	 with	 societal	 trends	 in	 citizen	disengagement	and	radicalisation		(Adam	&	Maier,	2010;	Ansolabehere,	Iyengar,	Simon,	&	Valentino,	1994;	Kahn	&	Kenney,	1999;	McAllister,	2007;	 J.	B.	Thompson,	2000,	pp.	111-113).	Finally,	contemporary	sociology	has	recurrently	 justified	its	 interest	 in	new	forms	 of	 political	 participation	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 traditional	 institutions	 of	representation	are	now	failing	to	fulfil	their	past	functions	(Della	Porta	&	Rucht,	2013;	Della	Porta	&	Tarrow,	2004;	Norris,	2002,	1999).	Part	of	this	literature	has	given	up	on	parties	altogether,	arguing	that	local	and	transnational	participatory	forms	of	political	activism	can	 form	the	basis	of	a	new	democratic	model,	one	 that	 is	better	adapted	 to	the	post-industrial	age	(see	for	instance	Warren,	2002).		These	 accounts	 of	 partisan	 change	 are	 in	 essence	 normative:	 scholars	 do	 not	simply	describe	what	is,	but	instead	critically	account	for	contemporary	partisanship	in	light	 of	 what	 they	 believe	 ought	 to	 be.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 for	 any	 assessment	 of	 the	democratic	 character	 of	 a	 given	 actor,	 or	 for	 any	 assessment	 of	 the	 democratic	consequences	 of	 an	 actor's	 doings.	 Indeed,	 as	 explained	 by	 Skinner,	 democracy	 is	always	an	 "evaluative-descriptive"	 term.	To	use	 this	 term	 is	 "not	only	 to	describe	 the	state	 of	 affairs,	 but	 also	 (and	 eo	 ipso)	 to	 perform	 the	 speech-act	 of	 commending	 it"	(Skinner,	 1973,	 p.	 298).	 If	 we	 view	 democracy	 as	 desirable	 for	 its	 own	 sake,	 if	 we	assume	that	parties	are	central	to	democracy,	then	it	is	also	crucial	that	we	be	able	to	formulate	rigorous	assessments	on	the	democratic	contributions	of	political	parties.		
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b.	A	structural	bias	against	normative	theorizing	
In	 practice,	 however,	 the	 basis	 and	 criteria	 on	 which	 party	 scholars	 make	assessments	of	the	democratic	contribution	of	political	parties	fail	to	be	made	explicit.	What	 authors	 consider	 as	 the	 end-result	 of	 these	 changes	 in	 partisan	 appeals	 and	organisation,	 for	 instance	 the	disengagement	or	 radicalization	of	 citizens,	 is	generally	taken	as	sufficient	proof	of	their	problematic	nature.	It	remains	unclear	what	standard	is	being	used	when	scholars	speak	of	partisanship	as	either	conducive	to,	or	impinging	on,	the	vitality	of	contemporary	democracy.	The	main	reason	for	this	lies	in	the	widespread	divide	that	still	exists	between	empirical	 studies	 of	 politics	 and	 normative	 theorizing.	Much	 of	 the	 political	 sciences	still	 see	 their	 role	 as	 engaging	 in	 facts,	 not	 values,	 as	 one	 of	 description	 and	 not	prescription.	As	stated	by	Gerring	and	Yesnovits,	 “(o)ne	either	studies	 'democracy'	or	empirical	 instances	of	democracy,	but	not	both”	 (Gerring	&	Yesnowitz,	2006,	p.	103).	Importantly,	this	division	is	particularly	present	in	the	study	of	political	parties	(for	an	overview,	see	Allern	&	Pedersen,	2007;	Shapiro,	2002;	van	Biezen	&	Saward,	2008).	As	expressed	by	Katz,	"although	scholars	of	parties	often	make	introductory	reference	to	their	 centrality	 to	 modern	 democracy,	 they	 rarely	 go	 beyond	 this	 to	 consider	 the	distinctions	among	varieties	of	normative	democratic	theories"	(Katz,	2006,	p.	44).		The	acuteness	of	 this	divorce	 can	 first	be	explained	by	 the	 fact	 that,	 since	 the	behavioural	 revolution	 of	 the	 1960s,	much	 of	 the	 empirical	work	 on	 political	 parties	relies	on	the	minimalist	theories	of	democracy	that	flourished	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	(see	for	instance	Dahl,	1956;	Downs,	1957;	Eckstein,	1961;	Schumpeter,	1956	[1942]).	One	characteristic	 that	 these	 theories	have	 in	common	 is	 to	claim	anormativity	 (for	a	critical	 overview,	 see	 Pateman,	 2007	 [1970];	 Skinner,	 1973).	 They	 endeavour	 to	account	for	democracy	as	it	 is,	rather	than	how	it	should	be,	and	thus	conceive	it	as	a	system	 of	 well-designed	 institutions	 within	 which	 political	 leadership	 is	 chosen	 and	regularly	renewed	through	competitive	elections.	In	this	configuration,	political	parties	are	no	more	than	coalitions	of	self-interested	politicians	in	open	competition	to	attract	the	 favours	 of	 self-interested	 citizens	 with	 fixed	 preferences.	 As	 for	 partisans	respecting	the	minimal	rules	of	the	democratic	game,	it	is	seen	to	depend	on	the	prior	existence	 of	 a	 well-designed	 system	 of	 institutional	 incentives	 as	 well	 as	 sustained	partisan	 competition	 (for	 a	 critical	 overview,	 see	 Herman,	 2015;	 for	 an	 emblematic	example	of	this	argument,	see	Przeworski,	1991).	
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It	is	of	some	consequence,	then,	that	the	majority	of	party	studies	relies	on	these	theoretical	 frameworks.	Minimalist	 democratic	 theory	 has	 shaped	 the	ways	 in	which	parties	 have	 been	 studied:	 as	 institutions	 of	 the	 state	 and	 electoral	 machines	 rather	than	 as	 "ideational	 facts"	 (Goodin,	 2008,	 p.	 214).	 The	 more	 affective	 and	 symbolic	functions	 parties	 perform	 as	 institutions	 of	 political	 linkage	 have	 been	 subject	 to	 far	less	 empirical	 examination	 (Kitschelt,	 2010;	 van	 Biezen	 &	 Saward,	 2008).	 Indeed,	 if	political	 parties	 are	 "merely	 coalitions	of	 individuals	 seeking	 to	 control	 government",	their	 values	 and	 policies	 serve	 first	 and	 foremost	 "to	 maximise	 their	 share	 of	 the	popular	vote,	or	to	perhaps	create	a	minimum	winning	coalition	of	parties"	(Vassalo	&	Wilcox,	 2006,	 p.	 414).	 By	 relying	 on	 such	 frameworks,	 party	 scholars	 also	 implicitly	endorse	 the	 idea	 that	 in	 a	 modern,	 representative	 democracy,	 nothing	 more	 can	 be	expected	from	parties	than	the	perpetuation	of	a	competitive	struggle	for	the	attention	of	 free,	 independently	 minded	 voters.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	 deprive	 themselves	 of	 the	means	to	 formulate	theoretically	 informed	assessments	of	 the	extent	to	which	parties	uphold	democratic	standards	beyond	the	fulfilment	of	these	minimal	functions.		
2.	Partisanship	as	an	object	of	theoretical	enquiry	
a.	The	place	of	party	in	deliberative	and	participatory	democratic	theory	
However,	 contemporary	 democratic	 theory	 also	 carries	 responsibility	 for	 the	lack	 of	 interest	 that	 the	 empirical	 political	 sciences	 have	 shown	 towards	 it.	 Until	recently,	 democratic	 theory	 has	 provided	 party	 studies	 with	 little	 tools	 to	 conduct	rigorous	evaluations	of	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship.	Much	of	the	democratic	theory	 that	emerged	 in	 reaction	 to	 the	minimalist	 turn	of	 the	1960s	has	 taken	a	gear	towards	establishing	radical	ideals	for	democracy,	be	they	participatory	or	deliberative.	In	 this	 movement,	 democratic	 theory	 has	 also	 disconnected	 itself	 from	 empirical	concerns	and	findings	and	thus	taken	limited	interest	in	parties	and	partisanship.		The	renewed	 interest	 in	direct	and	participatory	democracy	during	 the	1970s	and	 early	 1980s	 ignored	 or	 even	 explicitly	 shunned	 traditional	 institutions	 of	representation,	 and	 focused	 instead	 on	 local,	 small-scale	 models	 of	 decision-making	(see	for	example	Barber,	1984;		and	the	articles	collected	in	Saward,	2007,	part	VII).	A	similar	 statement	 applies	 to	 Rawlsian	 political	 theory	 and	 much	 of	 the	 'deliberative	turn'	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	(see	for	instance	Benhabib,	1996;	Dryzek,	2000;	Gutmann	&	Thompson,	1996;	Rawls,	 1993).	These	more	 abstract	philosophical	 accounts	 give	 a	limited	role	to	partisanship.	Deliberative	accounts	of	democracy	for	instance	have	only	
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rarely	cast	parties	as	potential	vehicles	of	deliberation,	or	discussed	the	possibility	or	implications	 of	 intra-party	 deliberation	 (for	 a	 critical	 overview,	 see	 Chambers,	 2009;	Rosenblum,	 2008,	 pp.	 254-317;	 van	 Biezen	 &	 Saward,	 2008).	 While	 an	 increasing	number	of	studies	attempt	to	apply	deliberative	principles	to	'real-life'	situations,	much	of	 this	 research	 is	 either	 based	on	 experimental	 studies	with	 random,	 representative	samples	 of	 citizens,	 or	 focuses	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 deliberation	 on	 local,	 small-scale	decision-making	processes	(for	examples,	see	Baccaro,	2001;	Fishkin,	Luskin,	&	Jowell,	2000;	Roberts,	1997).	Fewer	studies	use	deliberative	principles	for	studying	aspects	of	the	 representative	 process,	 and	 national	 level	 'mass	 politics'	 more	 generally	 (for	exceptions,	see	Chambers,	1998;	Steiner,	Bächtiger,	Spörndli,	&	Steenbergen,	2004).		Contemporary	 democratic	 theory	 has	 not	 only	 sidelined	 political	 parties	 as	objects	of	enquiry,	it	has	also	cultivated	a	form	of	suspicion	towards	partisanship.	The	'ideal	 speech'	 situation	 of	 deliberative	 democrats	 would	 involve	 actors	 with	 flexible	positions,	 capable	of	 compromise	 for	 the	 sake	of	 the	public	 good.	At	 first	 glance,	 this	ideal	 sits	 uncomfortably	 with	 partisans'	 a	 priori	 commitment	 to	 a	 given	 political	identity	 (Gundersen,	 2000;	 Muirhead,	 2010).	 In	 a	 similar	 line	 of	 thought,	 Rawls	distantiated	his	'high'	political	liberalism	from	the	'great	game	of	politics'.	In	his	work,	party	politics	are	associated	with	partiality,	 irrationality,	and	intransigence,	and	these	characteristics	 are	 hardly	 compatible	 with	 offering	 'public	 reasons'	 to	 justify	 one's	claims,	or	more	generally	determining	with	others	the	 'common	good'	(Bonotti,	2014;	Muirhead	&	Rosenblum,	2006,	p.	99).		These	 concerns	 are	 in	 line	 with	 a	 longer	 tradition	 of	 anti-partisan	 defiance:	since	 the	18th	century,	Western	political	 thought	has,	with	 few	exceptions,	presented	partisanship	 as	 a	 form	of	 factionalism	breeding	 unnecessary	 political	 divisions	 (for	 a	detailed	 overview,	 see	 Rosenblum,	 2008,	 pp.	 23-163).	 These	 suspicions	 also	 echo	 a	more	 pervasive	 contemporary	 culture	 of	 anti-partyism.	 Political	 representation	 in	general,	 and	 political	 parties	 in	 particular,	 are	 rarely	 celebrated	 for	 their	 own	 sake.	They	 are	 the	 second-best	 solutions	 for	 large-scale	 democratic	 government	 that	 one	grudgingly	resigns	to.	In	contrast,	direct	and	deliberative	models	of	democracy	embody	higher,	nobler	ideals	that	citizens	can	yearn	towards.					
b.	An	emerging	theoretical	literature	on	parties	and	partisanship	
Since	the	mid-2000s,	a	number	of	democratic	theorists	have	thought	to	address	these	 shortcomings,	 and	 take	 the	 traditional	 institutions	of	 representative	democracy	as	 objects	 of	 normative	 theorizing.	 These	 works	 have	 for	 instance	 analysed	 the	
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functions	 that	 representation	 plays	 in	 democratic	 societies	 and	 the	 conditions	 under	which	claims	to	representation	or	the	actions	of	representatives	can	more	generally	be	deemed	democratic	(see	 for	 instance	Disch,	2011;	Dovi,	2007;	Gutmann	&	Thompson,	2010,	 2012;	 J.	 Mansbridge,	 2003;	 Saward,	 2009,	 2010;	 Urbinati,	 2000,	 2006;	 Young,	2000).	Within	this	larger	body	of	work,	a	smaller	number	of	theorists	have	addressed	the	place	and	contribution	of	parties	and	partisanship	in	democratic	societies	from	an	explicitly	 normative	 perspective	 (see	 Bonotti,	 2011;	 Bonotti,	 2012,	 2014;	 Muirhead,	2006,	2014;	Muirhead	&	Rosenblum,	2006,	2012;	Rosenblum,	2008,	2014;	White,	2014;	White	 &	 Ypi,	 2010,	 2011;	 Wolkenstein,	 2015).	 This	 literature	 constitutes	 a	 first	theoretical	basis	on	which	empirical	party	studies	can	rest	to	formulate	more	rigorous	normative	 assessments	 of	 real-world	 instances	 of	 political	 representation	 in	 general,	and	partisanship	 in	 particular.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 briefly	 outline	 some	of	 the	main	tenants	these	recent	works	in	democratic	theory	have	in	common.2		A	first	common	premise	of	this	literature	is	to	challenge	the	basic	assumptions	of	minimalist	theories	of	democracies.	For	the	latter,	representation	is	conceived	under	the	 principal-agent	 model,	 in	 which	 political	 parties	 compete	 to	 attract	 the	 votes	 of	segments	of	the	population	with	different	fixed	preferences	(Downs,	1957).	The	recent	theoretical	literature	on	political	representation	and	partisanship	questions	this	“image	of	 representation	 as	 substitution	 or	 identification”	 (Young,	 2000,	 p.	 123).	 Political	participation,	at	both	elite	and	citizen	level,	is	seen	to	derive	not	solely	from	individual	rationality,	 but	 also	 from	 a	 form	 of	 affective	 attachment	 to	 collective	 values.	 As	 for	political	representation,	 it	 is	conceived	as	the	product	of	ongoing	interaction	between	representatives	 and	 constituents.	 Representatives	 do	 not	 simply	 mirror	 already	existing	 political	 identities	 in	 the	 electorate.	 Rather,	 the	 process	 of	 representation	 is	one	 in	 which	 the	 identities	 of	 both	 representative	 and	 citizens	 are	 mutually	 and	continuously	constituted	(Saward,	2010;	Urbinati,	2000).	By	casting	wide	appeals	and	promoting	 coherent	programs,	parties	 especially	 are	 seen	 to	 'give	 form'	 to	otherwise	shapeless	political	identities,	and	put	forth	normative	ideals	that	a	multitude	of	citizens	with	disparate	ideas	or	interests	can	converge	on	and	identify	with	(White	&	Ypi,	2010).		In	conceptualizing	representation	as	a	dialogue	rather	than	a	mirror,	the	recent	theoretical	literature	on	representation	and	partisanship	also	challenges	the	conceptual	boundaries	 that	 have	 traditionally	 separated	 models	 of	 representative,	 direct	 or	deliberative	 democracy.	 More	 specifically,	 representative	 democracy	 is	 only	 seen	 to																																									 																					
2	In	 Chapter	 1	 I	 will	 return	 to	 this	 literature	 in	 greater	 detail	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 establishing	 my	 own	theoretical	framework.		
	
21	
fulfil	its	potential	where	citizens	effectively	engage	this	dialogue,	and	respond	with	acts	of	direct	participation	and	deliberation	to	the	representative	claims	that	parties	suggest	(Urbinati,	 2006,	 pp.	 223-228;	 Young,	 2000,	 pp.	 129-133).	 At	 the	 level	 of	 normative	theorizing	 therefore,	 "party	 democracy	 and	 popular	 democracy	 belong	 together	 and	need	no	reconciliation:	fundamentally,	they	are	aligned"	(Muirhead	&	Rosenblum,	2012,	p.	100).		From	 this	 particular	 conception	 of	 representative	 democracy	 flow	 more	ambitious	 functions	 for	 political	 parties	 than	 those	 set	 out	 by	minimalist	 theories	 of	democracy.	If	representation	is	a	creative	process,	then	the	position	of	political	parties	in	the	public	sphere—with	privileged	access	to	financial	resources,	media	attention	and	state	power—lends	them	a	considerable	amount	of	influence	on	the	contours	of	public	deliberation.	 As	 Schattschneider	 suggested	 over	 half	 a	 century	 ago,	 "the	 definition	 of	the	 alternatives	 is	 the	 supreme	 instrument	 of	 power"	 (Schattschneider,	 1960,	 p.	 66).	And	 when	 power	 is	 exercised	 in	 democratic	 societies	 this	 exercise	 comes	 with	 its	particular	 obligations.	 The	 next	 task	 that	 this	 theoretical	 literature	 fulfils	 is	 thus	 to	define	the	nature	and	content	of	the	specific	responsibilities	that	fall	on	partisans.		Schematically,	 these	responsibilities	can	be	grouped	in	two	distinct	categories,	which	I	will	return	to	in	more	detail	in	later	chapters.	First,	as	intermediaries	between	citizens	 and	 the	 state,	 political	 parties	 should	 act	 as	 effective	 agents	 of	 political	representation,	and	thus	 justify	their	normative	ideals	and	policies	 in	such	a	way	that	citizens	can	engage	with	them	(White	&	Ypi,	2010,	2011).	To	this	extent,	parties	need	to	be	'bilingual':	to	speak	not	only	the	language	of	the	state	but	also	the	language	of	civil	society	 (Bonotti,	 2011,	 pp.	 20-22;	 Muirhead	 &	 Rosenblum,	 2006,	 p.	 104).	 Second,	partisans	 in	 democratic	 societies	 are	 expected	 to	 defend	 their	 own	 convictions	 with	respect	to	the	principles	of	political	pluralism.	To	this	extent,	they	should	renounce	the	holistic	ideal	of	imposing	their	own	viewpoint	on	society	at	large,	and	acknowledge	the	legitimacy	 of	 other,	 rival	 claims	 to	 representation	 in	 their	 own	 party	 system.	 This	pluralistic	outlook	is	central	to	a	number	of	theories	of	partisanship.	Rosenblum	speaks	of	it	as	the	'moral	distinctiveness	of	Party	ID',	Muirhead	describes	this	pluralist	outlook	as	 the	 main	 characteristic	 of	 'ethical	 partisanship'	 and	 for	 Bonotti,	 it	 is	 the	 central	'normative	 criteria'	 to	 establish	 the	 democratic	 character	 of	 partisanship	 (Bonotti,	2011;	Muirhead,	2006,	pp.	22-25;	Rosenblum,	2008,	pp.	362-368).	The	purpose	of	 these	accounts	 is	avowedly	normative	rather	 than	descriptive.	In	other	words,	the	above-mentioned	traits	are	not	conceived	as	default	characteristics	of	real-world	partisanship.	As	Muirhead	warns	us,	"(o)ur	appreciation	of	partisanship	
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should	not	extend	 to	 its	every	manifestation"	 (Muirhead,	2014).	The	 literature	rather	serves	the	function	of	setting-up	standards	that	real-world	partisans	can	live	up	to,	or	fail	to	uphold.	Partisanship	is	thus	conceived	as	a	double-edged	sword	for	democracy.	If	the	 vitality	 of	 representative	democracy	depends	on	parties	 fulfilling	 these	 functions,	then	 the	 failures	 and	 pathologies	 of	 partisanship	 bring	 their	 own	 democratic	 perils.	Parties	 can	 exercise	 the	 power	 they	 dispose	 of	 for	 the	 best	 -	 engaging	 citizens	 and	promoting	 political	 pluralism	 -	 or	 for	 the	 worse	 -	 fuelling	 disengagement	 and	 the	radicalisation	 of	 political	 passions.	 Far	 from	 being	 apologetic	 of	 real-world	 parties,	these	theories	offer	tools	for	a	constructive	criticism	of	their	actual	doings.3	Finally,	these	theories	of	partisanship	are	not	utopian:	they	do	not	aim	to	set	up	models	 that	 would	 be	 unreachable	 in	 practice,	 and	 would	 serve	 a	 function	 only	 as	distant	 ideals.	Their	accounts	are	not	only	grounded	 in	abstract	principles	of	political	philosophy,	but	on	an	understanding	of	the	role	that	parties	have	played	in	the	history	of	 established	 democracies.	 In	 the	 19th	 and	 early	 20th	 century,	 party	 systems	socialised	 the	citizens	of	 the	Western	world	 into	mass	democracy,	and	contributed	 to	structure	the	ways	in	which	we	still	understand	politics	(Campbell,	Converse,	Miller,	&	Stokes,	1960;	Rokkan	&	Lipset,	1967).	The	gradual	institutionalisation	of	party	systems	throughout	 the	 modern	 era	 is	 also	 inseparable	 from	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 pluralist	worldview	 and	 the	 sidelining	 of	 holistic	 conceptions	 of	 the	 common	 good	 (Daalder,	2002;	Sartori,	1976;	Scarrow,	2006).	If,	as	Schattschneider	stated	"(t)he	political	parties	created	 democracy	 and	modern	 democracy	 is	 unthinkable	 save	 in	 terms	 of	 parties",	then	it	is	reasonable	for	us	to	be	demanding	of	them	(Schattschneider,	2009	[1942],	p.	1).	 The	 theoretical	 literature	 on	 parties	 and	 partisanship	 thus	 seeks	 to	 highlight	 the	potential	of	actual	partisanship	to	contribute	to	representative	democracy	and	to	raise	as	 a	model	what	 partisans	 can	 do	at	 their	best.	 Faced	with	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 real-world	partisans,	we	can	stop	dreaming	of	a	democracy	that	would	work	without	them.	We	 are	 given	 the	 theoretical	 means	 to	 ask	 for	 "not	 less	 partisanship,	 but	 better	partisanship"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	109).																																									 																					
3	To	 this	 extent,	 it	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 theorists	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 Atlantic	 insist	 most	 on	 those	characteristics	of	partisanship	that	they	see	missing	in	their	own	political	environment.	American	theorists	are	 especially	 aware	 of	 the	 dangers	 of	 extreme	 partisan	 polarisation	 and	 widespread	 disrespect	 for	political	opponents	(see	for	instance	Gutmann	&	Thompson,	2010,	pp.	1132-1134;	Muirhead	&	Rosenblum,	2012,	pp.	102-103).	This	also	explains	why	their	theories	are	more	directly	centred	on	the	importance	of	partisans	upholding	a	pluralist	ethic.	On	the	other	hand,	European	authors	show	more	preoccupation	for	the	 failings	 of	 parties	 to	 put	 forward	 meaningful	 and	 clearly	 differentiated	 platforms	 (see	 for	 instance	Bonotti,	2011,	p.	23;	White	&	Ypi,	2010,	pp.	821-822;	2011,	pp.	391-392).	It	is	also	in	this	light	that	one	can	read	their	theoretical	focus	on	questions	such	as	partisan	political	justification,	or	the	crucial	role	of	parties	in	engaging	citizens	in	democratic	politics.			
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3.	The	case	for	greater	interdisciplinary	dialogue		Neither	 the	empirical	political	 sciences,	nor	normative	democratic	 theory,	 can	on	their	own	bring	answers	to	the	questions	this	thesis	raises:	to	what	extent	does	real-
world	partisanship	meet	democratic	standards?	and	How	can	we	explain	variations	in	the	
extent	 to	 which	 real-world	 partisans	 upholds	 these	 standards?	 While	 the	 above-mentioned	 theorists	 have	 set	 forth	 tools	 that	 would	 allow	 empiricists	 to	 assess	 the	practical	contribution	of	political	parties	to	democracy,	this	theoretical	literature	is	still	largely	divorced	 from	 the	 empirical	 study	of	political	 parties.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 briefly	discuss	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 both	 sub-discipline	 in	 answering	 these	 questions	within	their	 own	 confines,	 and	 emphasise	 the	 necessity	 of	 establishing	 a	 dialogue	 between	them	for	this	very	purpose.	In	this,	I	join	a	number	of	authors	who	have	already	argued	that	 more	 exchanges	 between	 the	 empirical	 political	 sciences	 and	 contemporary	democratic	theory	would	benefit	both	disciplines	(Allern	&	Pedersen,	2007;	Gerring	&	Yesnowitz,	2006;	Reiter,	2006,	p.	617;	Shapiro,	2002;	van	Biezen	&	Saward,	2008).		As	 emphasised	 earlier,	 party	 studies	 cannot	 rigorously	 evaluate	 the	contribution	of	political	parties	to	democracy	without	relying	on	normative	theorizing.	Given	the	widespread	use	of	normative	assumptions	in	the	party	studies,	a	more	solid	engagement	 with	 democratic	 theory	 would	 be	 justified	 first	 and	 foremost	 from	 the	perspective	of	 academic	 rigor	 and	 transparency.	 It	would	 enable	 empiricists	 to	make	explicit	 the	 criteria	 and	 reasons	 according	 to	 which	 one	 ascribes	 the	 adjective	'democratic'	to	the	actions	of	political	parties,	or	to	their	consequences.	As	summarised	by	Gerring	and	Yesnowitz,	“(t)here	is	nothing	to	be	gained,	and	potentially	a	great	deal	to	 be	 lost,	 by	 smuggling	 in	 normative	 assumptions	 through	 the	 back	 door.	 Inexplicit	normative	theorizing	is	apt	to	be	slipshod	and	escapes	counter-arguments,	 for	it	rests	beneath	the	surface”	(Gerring	&	Yesnowitz,	2006,	p.	108).			Yet,	 relying	on	normative	 theory	would	not	only	allow	party	 studies	 to	 justify	their	 normative	 assumptions.	 A	 more	 solid	 theoretical	 basis	 would	 also	 allow	empiricists	to	address	questions	that	they	have	until	now	sidelined,	or	only	addressed	indirectly.	 This	 normative	 basis	 is	 necessary	 to	 rigorously	 assess	 the	 contribution	 of	real-world	 partisanship	 to	 democracy.	 As	 emphasised	 above,	 the	 young	 democratic	theory	on	partisanship	provides	the	principles	on	the	basis	of	which	party	studies	can	derive	more	specific,	operationalizable	criteria	to	assess	real-world	partisanship.	Once	these	standards	are	refined,	and	a	methodology	designed	to	apply	them,	numerous	new	questions	 become	 open	 to	 empirical	 examination.	 We	 could	 then	 enquire	 into	 the	reasons	 that	 determine	 empirical	 variations	 on	 the	 standards	 established,	 or	 assess	
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correlations	 between	 the	 quality	 of	 partisanship	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 democracy	 in	various	countries.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 normative	 theories	 of	 partisanship	 would	 also	 gain	 from	being	applied	empirically.	We	only	have	an	 imprecise	 idea	of	how	well	 the	 standards	set	up	 in	 the	 literature	are	met	 in	reality.	Theorists	can	point	 to	examples	of	extreme	deviances	from	the	ideal	or	to	examples	of	model	partisan	behaviour.	But	even	in	these	cases	they	neither	 justify	nor	operationalise	their	criteria	 in	the	rigorous	manner	that	political	 science	 requires.	 Broader	 assessments	 of	 the	 capacity	 of	 partisans	 to	 reach	these	standards	are	necessarily	cautious,	and	are	of	a	very	general	nature.	Given	 that	real-world	variations	 in	the	extent	to	which	partisans	uphold	these	standards	are	also	not	evaluated	as	a	result,	these	theories	have	little	to	say	on	the	potential	reasons	that	could	 explain	 variations	 in	 the	 democratic	 quality	 of	 partisanship	 across	 different	parties	 or	 countries.4	These	 are	 all	 empirical	 questions	 that	 do	 require	 a	 research	design,	 careful	 case-selection	 and	 the	 nitty-gritty	 analysis	 of	 data	 that	 political	scientists—rather	than	theorists—carry	out.		Some	of	the	shortcomings	of	these	theories	of	partisanship	come	from	the	fact	that	 they	 have	 not	 been	 subjected	 to	 empirical	 examination.	 Our	 lack	 of	 empirical	knowledge	 about	 the	 democratic	 merits	 of	 actual	 partisanship	 sets	 limits	 to	 the	normative	contribution	of	 these	theories.	 If	we	do	not	know	the	extent	 to	which	real-world	partisans	meet	the	standards,	it	 is	also	harder	to	know	where	to	set	the	bar	for	them.	 This	might	 partly	 explain	why	 theories	 of	 partisanship	 often	 seem	 to	 oscillate	between	 the	 normative	 and	 descriptive.	 At	 times	 they	 describe	 the	 democratic	functions	that	parties	have	fulfilled	or	are	currently	fulfilling,	at	others	they	set	an	ideal	that	partisans	should	strive	towards.	When	theorists	speak	of	partisans	'at	their	best',	do	 they	mean	 to	 say	 democratic	 forms	 of	 partisanship	will	 always	 be	 exceptional	 in	empirical	 practice?	 Or	 are	 they	 setting	 a	 standard	 that	 we	 can	 hope	 and	 expect	 all	partisans	to	reach?		The	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 partisanship	 and	 democracy	 remains	insufficiently	 specified	 as	 a	 result.	 Given	 our	 lack	 of	 empirical	 knowledge	 on	 these	questions,	existing	theories	cannot	be	so	specific	as	to	tell	us	what	are	the	normal	and	acceptable	 failings	 of	 partisanship,	 and	 conversely,	 at	 what	 point	 do	 these	 failings																																									 																					
4	Some	works	nevertheless	draw	hypotheses	on	this	last	issue.	Rosenblum	for	instance	argues	that	we	can	expect	more	 compliance	on	 the	 standards	 she	 sets	up	 among	 lay	 supporters	 than	among	elites	 or	party	members	 (Rosenblum,	 2008,	 pp.	 356-368).	 Gutmann	 and	 Thomson	 distinguish	 between	 periods	 of	campaigning	 and	 periods	 of	 governing,	 the	 latter	 being	more	 conducive	 to	 respectful	 behavior	 towards	opponents	than	the	former	(Gutmann	&	Thompson,	2010,	2012).		
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become	problematic	 for	 democracy	 itself.	 The	 literature	 gives	 us	 categorical	 answers	on	 extreme	 cases,	 where	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 is	 sufficiently	 blatant.	 Parties	 that	resort	 to	 violence,	 for	 instance,	 are	 considered	 as	 harmful	 to	 democracy	 (see	 for	instance	 Bonotti,	 2011,	 p.	 20;	 Rosenblum,	 2008,	 p.	 363).	 More	 borderline	 cases,	however,	 are	 addressed	 in	 far	 more	 vague	 terms.	 	 At	 what	 point	 does	 a	 populist	rhetoric	 of	 disrespect	 for	 opponents,	 for	 instance,	 become	 a	 problem	 for	 democracy?	What	are	the	mechanisms	by	which	democracy	is	affected	by	such	a	discourse?	These	theoretical	refinements	would	also	require	to	study	empirically	the	existing	dynamics	between	the	quality	of	democracy	and	the	quality	of	partisanship.	Finally,	an	empirical	application	of	these	theories	could	sensitize	this	literature	to	 contextual,	 and	 especially	 cultural,	 factors.	 Theories	 of	 partisanship	 are,	 to	 a	 large	extent,	 'culture-blind'.	 They	 often	 draw	 on	 examples	 or	 counterexamples	 from	 their	own	 political	 environment,	 predominantly	 the	 established	 democracies	 of	 the	United	States	 and	Europe.	 But	 they	 only	 rarely	 discuss	 the	 particular	 context	 of	 established,	liberal	democracies	within	which	these	examples	are	set,	or	the	impact	of	this	context	on	 the	 terms	 of	 their	 frameworks.	 It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen,	 for	 instance,	whether	 these	frameworks	 would	 be	 applicable	 in	 emergent	 and	 less	 established	 democracies.	 Or	whether	 cultural	 factors	 could	 influence	 the	 extent	 to	which	 real-world	 partisanship	upholds	 the	 standards	 established.	 These	 issues	 can,	 again,	 only	 be	 resolved	 with	 a	more	thorough	examination	of	the	conditions	within	which	'good	partisanship'	thrives	or	recedes	in	the	real	world.		As	 appears	 from	 this	 section,	 a	 dialogue	 between	 empirical	 party	 studies	 and	normative	 political	 theory	 would	 be	 beneficial	 to	 both	 disciplines.	 It	 would	 serve	 to	"trace	and	express	links	between	democracy	as	an	existing	practice	and	democracy	as	an	 unfilled	 ideal"	 (van	 Biezen	 &	 Saward,	 2008,	 p.	 21).	 These	 disciplinary	 exchanges	would	 further	 our	 empirical	 knowledge	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 political	 parties	contribute	to	democracy,	as	well	as	help	us	refine	the	theoretical	premises	on	which	we	can	evaluate	these	contributions.	In	the	following	section	of	this	chapter,	I	explain	how	I	intend	 to	 initiate	 this	 dialogue	 and	 present	 the	 steps	 I	 have	 taken	 to	 answer	 my	research	questions.		
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III.	BUILDING	THE	BRIDGE:	A	STUDY	OF	THE	DEMOCRATIC	MERITS	OF	REAL-WORLD	
PARTISANSHIP	
To	 re-iterate,	my	 study	addresses	 two	main	 research	questions.	 First,	 to	what	
extent	does	real-world	partisanship	 -	 loosely	 understood	 as	 the	 array	 of	 practices	 and	discourses	 that	 are	attached	 to	party	 leadership,	membership	or	 identification	 -	meet	
theoretical	standards	of	democratic	partisanship?	Second,	how	can	we	explain	real-world	
variations	 in	 which	 real-world	 partisans	 uphold	 these	 standards?	 To	 answer	 these	questions,	I	set	up	a	series	of	specific	criteria	on	the	basis	of	the	theoretical	 literature	on	 parties	 and	 partisanship.	 I	 then	 apply	 them	 to	 the	 study	 of	 grass-root	 partisan	discourse	in	two	country	case	studies	-	France	and	Hungary.	By	establishing	a	dialogue	between	the	empirical	study	of	political	parties	and	normative	theories	of	partisanship,	my	 thesis	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 both	 bodies	 of	 literature.	 In	 the	 following	 sections	 I	provide	an	outline	of	the	remainder	of	the	thesis.		
1.	Theoretical	framework	The	 first	 step	 is	 to	 set	up	sufficiently	 specific	 criteria	on	 the	basis	of	which	 to	assess	the	contribution	of	partisanship	to	democracy.	This	is	the	objective	of	Chapter	1.	As	 emphasised	 above,	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 on	 parties	 and	 partisanship	 is	 not	designed	 to	 be	 applied	 empirically.	 It	 rather	makes	 a	 broad	 defence	 of	 the	 role	 that	parties	 can	and	 should	play	 in	 a	 representative	democracy,	 and	 thus	present	us	with	broad	guidelines	of	appreciation	of	partisanship.	One	task	this	thesis	performs	is	thus	to	confront	these	different	accounts	in	the	literature,	and	categorize	their	arguments.	I	then	 refine	 their	 propositions	 and	 on	 their	 basis	 suggest	 a	 series	 of	 limited	 and	operationalizable	criteria	to	evaluate	the	democratic	merits	of	real-world	partisanship.		In	 line	 with	 the	 recent	 theoretical	 literature	 on	 political	 representation,	 I	conceptualise	democracy	in	a	more	stringent	way	than	the	minimalist	frameworks	that	most	party	studies	rely	on.	There	are	two	characteristics	that	I	focus	on	especially.	First,	the	vitality	of	representative	democracy	requires	the	participation	and	deliberation	of	its	 citizens	 and,	more	 generally,	 their	 belief	 in	 "the	worth	of	 engaging	with	 collective	political	 agency	 so	 as	 to	 exercise	 the	 fundamental	 democratic	 principle	 of	 collective	self-rule"	 (White	 &	 Ypi,	 2010,	 p.	 809).	 Second,	 the	 endurance	 of	 liberal	 democracy	requires	 that	 a	 pluralist	 ethos	 or	 'way	 of	 life'	 be	 shared	 by	 its	 members	 and,	 more	specifically,	that	they	consider	the	free	expression	of	a	plurality	of	values,	opinions	and	beliefs	as	legitimate	or	even	desirable.		
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According	to	contemporary	democratic	theory,	parties	play	a	key	role	in	both	of	these	 aspects	 of	 democracy.	 The	main	 argument	 here,	 already	 emphasised	 above,	 is	that	 they	 do	 more	 than	 simply	 reflect	 the	 fixed	 preferences	 of	 citizens:	 they	 also	contribute	 to	 shape	 them.	 They	 thus	 have	 the	 power	 to	 further	 citizens’	 political	engagement,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 a	 pluralist	 ethos,	 but	 they	 can	 conversely	 fuel	citizen	 disengagement	 and	 the	 radicalization	 of	 political	 passions.	 To	 this	 extent,	 the	vitality	and	endurance	of	 representative	democracy	 is	partly	dependent	on	partisans'	doings	and	failings.			My	 first	 chapter	 summarizes	 the	different	 suggestions	of	 theorists	 concerning	what	parties	can	do	to	contribute	positively	to	these	dimensions	of	liberal	democracy.	On	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 literature,	 I	 focus	 on	 two	 specific	 standards	 for	 democratic	partisanship.	First,	to	further	citizen	engagement,	parties	should	campaign	on	the	basis	of	claims	that	display	the	general	quality	of	cohesiveness.	To	be	cohesive,	parties	should	articulate	 a	 strong	 idea	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 common	 good	 with	 a	 program	 of	government,	both	of	which	should	be	clearly	differentiated	from	the	ideas	and	policies	of	 their	 opponents.	 Second,	 to	 further	 democracy	 as	 a	 way	 of	 life	 parties	 should	themselves	display	a	 form	of	commitment	to	political	pluralism	 both	 in	 their	attitudes	towards	 political	 opposition	 and	 in	 their	 attitudes	 towards	 political	 disagreement.	Starting	 from	 these	 two	 general	 characteristics,	 I	 derive	 more	 specific	 criteria	 to	evaluate	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 real-world	 partisanship	 upholds	 these	 democratic	standards.		
2.	Research	design	
Chapter	2	sets	up	a	research	design	appropriate	to	the	empirical	application	of	this	 theoretical	 framework.	The	main	 challenge	 that	 I	 had	 to	 address	 stems	 from	 the	very	 problem	 that	motivates	 this	 study:	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 established,	well-accepted	scale	for	evaluating	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship.	The	Freedom	House	ratings,	for	 instance,	 provide	 such	 a	 scale	 for	 measuring	 the	 institututional	 performance	 of	democracies:	 they	 attribute	 the	 highest	 possible	 score	 to	 the	 most	 advanced	democracies	 in	 the	 world,	 and	 the	 lowest	 possible	 score	 to	 the	 most	 authoritarian	regimes.	We	can	assume	that	the	extent	to	which	partisans	will	uphold	the	standards	of	democratic	partisanship	will	also	vary	across	different	countries,	parties	or	individuals.	Yet	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 available	 data	 on	 this	 question,	 we	 do	 not	 know,	 unlike	institutional	 performance,	 what	 the	 'maximum'	 and	 'minimum'	 of	 democratic	
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partisanship	look	like.	This	also	means	that	if	we	consider	a	given	partisan	at	random,	we	cannot	locate	the	democratic	merits	of	his	discourse	in	a	broader	universe	of	cases.		To	address	this	challenge	I	adopt	a	comparative	approach:	I	compare	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	across	four	different	parties	in	two	different	countries.	I	choose	two	European	 countries—France	 and	 Hungary—which	 score	 very	 differently	 on	institutional	 standards	 of	 democracy.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 available	 comparative	 data,	 I	make	 an	 informed	 guess	 and	 expect	 variations	 on	 institutional	 indicators	 for	democracy	to	be	mirrored	by	variations	in	the	democratic	quality	of	partisan	discourse.	With	 this	 choice	 of	 case	 studies,	 I	 aim	 to	 provide	 an	 initial	 estimate	 of	 the	 degree	 of	variation	in	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship	within	the	common	political	space	of	the	 EU.	 Given	 that	 France	 fares	 among	 the	 highest	 on	 institutional	 standards,	 and	Hungary	 among	 the	 lowest,	 we	 can	 also	 expect	 partisanship	 to	 be	 among	 the	 most	democratic	 in	 France	 and	 the	 least	 in	 Hungary.	 To	 this	 extent,	 the	 absence	 of	 an	established	scale	justifies	selecting	my	cases	on	the	dependent	variable.		I	 chose	 to	 organise	 28	 group	 discussions,	 seven	 groups	 in	 each	 party,	 each	involving	between	three	and	six	young	members	from	the	same	local	party	branch.	This	amounted	to	a	total	of	117	participants,	and	produced	a	considerable	quantity	of	data.	The	discussions	lasted	between	one	and	two	hours	and	were	structured	around	a	series	of	 twelve	 cards	 each	 representing	 a	 specific	 area	 of	 public	 policy.	 The	 discussion	guidelines	 were	 designed	 to	 encourage	 a	 conversation	 in	 which	 participants	 would	have	 as	much	 autonomy	 as	 possible.	 I	 thus	 chose	 to	 encourage	 a	 general	 discussion	over	my	participants'	assessments	of	partisan	agreements	and	disagreements	on	these	twelve	areas	of	public	policy	they	were	asked	to	consider.	I	also	sought	to	obtain	data	that	 would	 allow	 me	 to	 evaluate	 democratic	 partisanship	 without	 having	 to	 ask	participants	 directly	 about	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	 uphold	 its	 standards.	 Asking	my	participants	to	discuss	the	different	cards	I	gave	them	to	examine,	I	could	then	analyse	the	ways	in	which	they	justified	the	positions	of	their	own	party	on	different	issues,	and	examine	the	ways	they	talked	about	their	political	opponents	in	this	process.		The	28	 group	discussions	were	 transcribed	verbatim,	 and	 analysed	 through	 a	process	 of	 coding.	 This	 process	 was	 carried	 out	 using	 NVivo,	 a	 Computer	 Assisted	Qualitative	 Data	 Analysis	 Software	 (CAQDAS).	 As	 I	 explain	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 the	 coding	scheme	 applied	 to	 the	 transcripts	 is	 directly	 based	 on	 the	 theoretical	 framework	outlined	 earlier.	 In	 extracting	 results	 from	 this	 coding	 process,	 I	 compared	 the	occurrence	and	co-occurrences	of	different	codes	according	to	nationality	(whether	the	groups	 were	 conducted	 in	 France	 or	 Hungary)	 and	 according	 to	 partisan	 affiliation	
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(whether	the	groups	were	affiliated	with	the	PS,	the	UMP,	the	MSzP	or	the	Fidesz).	To	this	extent,	it	was	possible	to	establish	variations	in	patterns	of	speech	across	partisan	groupings	of	different	nationalities	and	political	affiliation.		My	choice	of	 case	studies	and	my	 focus	groups	were	also	designed	 to	provide	tentative	answers	to	my	second	research	question:	how	can	we	explain	variations	in	the	
extent	to	which	real-world	partisanship	uphold	democratic	standards?	As	 I	 emphasised	earlier,	 we	 can	 expect	 the	 discourse	 of	 French	 partisans	 to	 be	 more	 in	 line	 with	standards	of	democratic	partisanship	than	the	discourse	of	Hungarian	partisans.	It	still	remains	 to	 be	 determined	 not	 only	 to	 what	 extent	 this	 is	 the	 case	 empirically	 (see	above),	but	also	how	and	why	this	would	be	the	case.		The	 research	 design	 for	 this	 thesis	 does	 not	 allow	 me	 to	 validate	 or	 refute	hypotheses	on	 the	reasons	 that	explain	variations	 in	patterns	of	discourse	among	 the	four	 groups	 of	 partisans	 under	 study.	 Methodological	 rigor	 would	 require	 a	 large-n	study	 for	 this	 purpose.	 However,	 the	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 partisan	 discourse	nevertheless	 allows	 me	 to	 draw	 some	 tentative	 explanations	 for	 the	 variations	 I	uncover.	As	I	explain	in	the	conclusion	of	this	thesis,	these	explanations	could	then	be	further	explored	by	future	research.			For	 the	 purpose	 of	 formulating	 these	 explanations,	 I	 take	 as	 a	 given	 that	 the	extent	 to	which	partisans	meet	 the	 criteria	 set	out	 in	 the	preceding	 chapter	does	not	only	depend	on	their	good-will	or	intrinsic	morality,	but	that	they	are	also	constrained	by	the	environment	in	which	they	operate.	More	specifically,	I	establish	two	categories	of	 factors	 that	are	 likely	 to	act	as	either	opportunities	or	 constraints	on	 the	ability	of	partisans	to	develop	a	cohesive	and	pluralist	discourse.	First,	the	cultural	"tool-kit"	that	partisans	have	 at	 their	 disposal	 in	 formulating	 their	 claims	 (Pateman,	 1971).	 Second,	the	 'external	 events'—political,	 economic	 or	 social—that	 occur	 out	 of	 parties'	 direct	control	and	that	they	need	to	provide	an	answer	to.	To	this	extent,	France	and	Hungary	also	 constitute	 good	 choices	 from	 this	 perspective,	 precisely	 because	 they	 function	within	 two	 highly	 differentiated	 cultural	 contexts,	 yet	 within	 a	 partly	 overlapping	external	environment.		These	 categories	 are	 very	 general,	 and	 do	 not	 in	 themselves	 constitute	explanations	for	any	given	outcome.	It	is	the	empirical	analysis	that	will	serve	to	make	inferences	as	to	whether,	how	and	which	specific	factors	influence	the	degree	to	which	partisans	uphold	standards	of	democratic	partisanship	in	the	concrete	cases	I	analyse.	Political	 discourse	 is	 a	 particularly	 good	 source	 of	 evidence	 to	 uncover	 these	 factors.	From	the	 interpretative	perspective	 that	 this	analysis	adopts,	discourse	 is	 indeed	one	
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place	where	 the	meaning	 that	 subjects	 give	 to	 their	 environment	 is	most	 visible	 and	amenable	to	study	(for	an	extensive	defence	of	this	argument,	see	White,	2009).		
3.	Empirics	
Chapters	 3,	 4	 and	 5	 cover	 my	 empirical	 analysis.	 They	 are	 organised	thematically,	 each	 chapter	 comparing	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 French	 and	 Hungarian	partisans	 uphold	 the	 different	 standards	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 set-out	 in	 the	theoretical	 framework.	 In	 Chapter	 3	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 standard	 of	 cohesiveness,	 and	 in	Chapters	 4	 and	 5	 on	 the	 standard	 of	 commitment	 to	 pluralism.	 More	 specifically,	Chapter	4	deals	with	partisan	attitudes	towards	political	opponents	and	Chapter	5	with	their	 attitudes	 towards	 political	 agreement	 and	 disagreement.	 Each	 chapter	 is	organised	 in	 the	same	way.	 I	 start	with	an	operationalisation	of	my	criteria,	and	 then	present	 my	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 France	 and	 Hungary	 in	 turn.	 I	 rely	 on	 the	quantitative	data	produced	from	the	coding	process	and	on	a	large	number	of	examples	from	the	 interviews	as	my	primary	evidence.	On	 this	basis,	 I	discuss	 the	evidence	 for	democratic	 partisanship	 on	 the	 different	 criteria	 established	 in	 Chapter	 1.	 I	 also	 pay	particular	 attention	 to	 the	 specific	 cultural	 resources	 and	 external	 events	 that	participants	refer	to,	the	ways	in	which	partisans	use	these	in	their	discourse,	and	the	functions	 these	 references	 serve.	 I	 conclude	 each	 empirical	 chapter	 by	 comparing	patterns	 of	 partisan	 discourse	 across	 countries	 and	 partisan	 affiliation	 and	 discuss	possible	explanations	for	the	variations	I	uncover.	In	my	Conclusion,	I	summarize	my	results	and	highlight	how	they	contribute	to	our	 empirical	 knowledge	 of	 political	 parties	 and	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 on	partisanship.	In	addition,	I	discuss	the	implications	of	my	results	for	both	partisans	and	external	political	actors	and	outline	avenues	for	future	research.			 			 		
	
31		Chapter	1:	Setting	standards	for	real-world	partisanship		In	this	chapter,	I	define	the	two	main	standards	for	democratic	partisanship	on	the	basis	of	which	I	will	evaluate	French	and	Hungarian	partisan	discourse	in	Chapters	3,	 4	 and	5.	These	 	 standards	overlap	with	 the	 two	main	qualities	 that	 the	 theoretical	literature	on	parties	and	partisanship	attributes	to	partisans	at	their	best.		I	 call	 the	 first	 standard	partisan	cohesiveness,	 a	 quality	 that	 is	 attached	 to	 the	claims	that	partisans	make	in	favor	of	their	party's	platform.	Partisans	are	cohesive	in	their	claims	when	they	can	develop	a	program	of	government	that	is	firmly	achored	in	a	certain	 idea	 of	 the	 common	 good,	 and	 is	 clearly	 distinct	 from	 the	 platform	 of	 their	opponents.	 To	 this	 extent,	 cohesiveness	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 coherence	 of	 partisans'	ideas,	 and	 the	 strength	with	which	 they	 communicate	 them	 to	 others.	 This	 quality	 is	necessary	 for	partisans	 to	 fulfil	 their	 role	 as	 intermediaries	between	 citizens	 and	 the	state,	 and	more	 specifically,	 for	 them	 to	 convince	 citizens	 of	 "the	 worth	 of	 engaging	with	collective	political	agency	so	as	to	exercise	the	fundamental	democratic	principle	of	collective	self-rule"	(White	&	Ypi,	2010,	p.	809).		The	 second	 standard	 is	 partisan	 commitment	 to	 political	 pluralism.	 Partisans	uphold	 this	 standard	when	 their	 discourse	 and	 practices	 are	 aligned	with	 a	 pluralist	conception	 of	 the	 political	 realm.	 These	 discourses	 and	 practices	 should	 express	respect	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 plurality	 of	 legitimate	 interpretations	 of	 the	fundamental	 principles	 that	 constitute	 the	 common	 good	 and	 that	 their	 party's	 own	positions	 is	 only	 one	 among	 them.	 This	 quality	may	 be	 seen	 to	 form	 part	 of	 a	more	general	 contribution	 that	 partisans	 -	 as	 opinion	 leaders	 and	 agents	 of	 the	 state	 -	 can	make	to	sustaining	liberal	democracy	as	a	way	of	life	or	as	a	political	ethos	and	thus	to	the	long-term	consolidation	of	the	democratic	regime	itself.		
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I.	LINKING	CITIZENS	AND	THE	STATE:	THE	COHESIVENESS	OF	PARTISAN	CLAIMS	
This	first	part	of	this	chapter	aims	at	establishing	criteria	on	the	basis	of	which	to	evaluate	the	democratic	merits	of	the	claims	French	and	Hungarian	partisans	make	in	support	of	their	party's	platform.	I	take	as	a	starting	point	the	idea	that	parties	are	essential	 bridges	 between	 civil	 society	 and	 the	 state	 in	 representative	 democracies.	More	specifically,	 they	have	a	responsibility	 to	 foster	 the	engagement	of	citizens	with	public	life.	I	define	'civic	engagement'	broadly,	as	an	affective	orientation	that	disposes	individuals	 towards	 feeling	 concerned	 for	 the	 good	 of	 their	 political	 community	 and	towards	 taking	 action	 in	 order	 to	 contribute	 to	 this	 good.	 Civic	 engagement	 thus	corresponds	 closely	 to	 what	 White	 and	 Ypi	 have	 termed	 the	 'democratic	 ethos':	 "a	positive	 conviction	 among	 citizens	 of	 the	 worth	 of	 engaging	 with	 collective	 political	agency	 so	 as	 to	 exercise	 the	 fundamental	 democratic	 principle	 of	 collective	 self-rule"	(White	&	Ypi,	2010,	p.	809).		The	literature	on	parties	and	partisanship	offers	reasons	for	why	parties	may	be	unique	 in	their	capacity	 to	 further	this	sense	of	civic	engagement.	 It	argues	especially	that	unlike	other	political	actors,	parties	campaign	on	the	basis	of	coherent	accounts	of	the	common	good,	linking	a	variety	of	issues	within	a	given	normative	framework.	They	also	 stand	 out	 because,	 once	 in	 government,	 they	 dispose	 of	 the	 direct	 use	 of	 state	power	 to	 put	 these	 claims	 into	 effect.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 on	partisanship,	I	argue	that	partisans	should	uphold	the	standard	of	cohesiveness	in	their	discourse	and	practices.	I	break	down	this	standard	in	three	specific	criteria	to	assess	the	claims	of	French	and	Hungarian	partisans.		
1.	Representative	government	as	popular	self-rule			If	we	are	 to	make	 the	claim	 that	parties	have	an	essential	 role	 in	encouraging	civic	 engagement,	 it	 first	 needs	 to	 be	 established	why	 the	 latter	would	matter	 to	 the	effective	 functioning	 of	 democracy	 in	 a	 representative	 system.	This	 is	 the	 function	 of	this	first	section.			
a.	The	traditional	divorce	between	representation	and	participation		
The	 relation	 between	 civic	 engagement	 and	 political	 representation	 has	 long	been	uncomfortable	and	ambiguous.	Democratic	 theory	has	 traditionally	conceived	of	representative	democracy	as	 a	 form	of	 government	which,	 in	 contrast	 to	deliberative	and	direct	forms	of	democracy,	does	not	require	strong	involvement	from	its	citizens.	It	
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is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 representative	 government	 has	 long	 been	 considered	 more	appropriate	 for	 large	and	complex	communities,	where	citizens	have	neither	the	time	nor	 leisure	 to	 take	 care	 of	 public	 affairs.	 In	 one	 of	 the	 early	 descriptions	 of	 the	principles	of	representative	democracy,	Constant	defines	the	'freedom	of	the	ancients'	as	characteristic	of	small-scale	communities	(Constant,	2010		[1819]).	Here	citizens	are	directly	 involved	 in	 political	 decision-making	 but	 sacrifice	 in	 return	 much	 of	 their	freedom	 in	 the	 private	 sphere.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 'freedom	 of	 the	 moderns'	 is	characteristic	 of	 large-scale	 societies	 where	 political	 influence	 is	 reduced	 to	 the	designation	 of	 representatives.	 Citizens	 lesser	 political	 influence	 is	 traded	 against	greater	freedom	in	the	private	sphere.	This	distinction	was	widely	shared	among	early	modern	democratic	 theorists,	 from	 the	 views	Madison	made	 explicit	 in	 the	 federalist	papers	 to	Tocqueville's	account	of	democracy	 in	America	 (Hamilton	&	Madison,	1948		[1788]	;	Tocqueville,	1945	[1835]).		In	 the	 post-war	 period,	 democratic	 theory	 systematised	 the	 idea	 according	 to	which	 representative	 democracy	 can	 function	 with	 only	 minimal	 civic	 engagement.	Influential	theorists	such	as	Dahl,	Eckstein	or	Downs	adopted	Schumpeter's	procedural	approach	 to	 democracy	 (Dahl,	 1956;	 Downs,	 1957;	 Eckstein,	 1961).	 With	 him,	 they	defined	 democracy	 as	 those	 "institutional	 arrangements	 for	 arriving	 at	 political	decisions	 in	 which	 individuals	 acquire	 the	 power	 to	 decide	 by	 the	 means	 of	 a	competitive	struggle	for	the	people's	vote"	(Schumpeter,	1956	[1942],	p.	269).	The	role	of	citizens	was	reduced	to	a	minimum:	instead	of	the	extensive	participation	demanded	by	 classical	 ideals	 of	 democracy,	 their	 limited	 involvement	 required	 casting	 a	 ballot	during	elections.		According	 to	 Pateman,	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 the	 post-war	 era	 goes	 far	 to	explain	the	rise	of	these	minimalist	conceptions	of	democracy,	their	questioning	of	the	very	 ideal	 of	 maximum	 participation,	 and	 their	 primary	 concern	 for	 the	 question	 of	political	 stability	 (Pateman,	 2007	 [1970],	 p.	 118).	 For	 many	 at	 the	 time,	 the	 two	totalitarianisms	 were	 a	 demonstration	 that	 democracy	 as	 Rousseau	 understood	 it,	democracy	 conceived	 as	 requiring	 extensive	 mobilisation	 from	 its	 citizens,	 was	 a	potential	gateway	to	holistic	ideals	and	authoritarian	rule	(as	a	paradigmatic	example,	see	Berlin,	1969).	As	Pateman	also	 insists,	 the	post-war	development	of	survey	based	studies	offered	additional	arguments	against	the	widespread	participation	of	citizens	to	the	 political	 process.	 These	 revealed	 widespread	 disinterest	 for	 politics	 and	authoritarian	 views	 among	 the	 disenfranchised.	Mass	 participation	 thus	 appeared	 no	only	 unrealistic,	 but	 potentially	 harmful	 to	 democracy	 itself.	 In	 this	 context,	 those	
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avowedly	normative	ideas	of	democracy	that	set	the	empowerment	of	citizens	through	political	 participation	 as	 an	 ideal	 were	 sidelined.	 In	 their	 place,	 modern	 democratic	theory	 could	 be	 "scientific"	 and	 "empirically	 grounded	 (in	 the)	 facts	 of	 political	 life"	(Pateman,	2007	[1970],	p.	119).		
b.	The	role	of	civic	engagement	in	representative	democracy	
There	has	been	a	substantial	change	in	context	since	the	post-war	era.	Indeed,	a	consistent	drop	in	all	indicators	of	political	participation	and	interest	characterizes	the	past	four	decades	across	established	democracies	(Biezen	van,	Poguntke,	&	Mair,	2012;	Hay,	2007;	Mair,	2006).	The	share	of	voting	citizens	has	declined,	and	those	taking	up	party	or	 trade	union	memberships	are	 fewer	and	 fewer.	The	negative	 implications	of	this	empirical	reality	for	democracy	in	Europe	have	also	become	apparent.	Citizens	are	not	 simply	 retreating	 to	 the	 private	 sphere.	 A	 growing	 number	 of	 them	 feel	unrepresented	and	distrustful	of	traditional	political	institutions.	Far-right	parties	have	capitalised	on	this	situation,	drawing	support	from	those	disaffected	with	mainstream	partisanship.	The	trend	towards	disengagement	in	established	democracies	appears,	in	large	 part,	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 civic	 frustration,	 one	 that	 can	 create	 its	 own	 forms	 of	political	and	social	instability.			There	 is	 therefore	cause	 to	 re-visit	 the	 traditional	mantra	according	 to	which	representative	democracy	can	be	singled-out	 from	other	democratic	 forms	 -	direct	or	deliberative	 -	 and	 conceived	 as	 the	 regime	 that	 can	 most	 easily	 do	 away	 with	 the	engagement	 of	 its	 citizens.	 In	 this	 line	 of	 thought,	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 have	 taken	representation	 as	 an	 object	 of	 normative	 theorizing	 over	 the	 past	 two	 decades	 (see	especially	J.	Mansbridge,	2003;	Saward,	2010;	Urbinati,	2006;	Young,	2000).	One	of	the	noteworthy	 contributions	 of	 this	 scholarship	 consists	 in	 challenging	 the	 traditional	conceptual	 barriers	 that	 exist	 between	 representative,	 direct,	 and	 deliberative	understandings	 of	 democracy.	 Some	 of	 these	 works	 have	 complexified	 traditional	understandings	 of	 representation	 itself,	 insisting	 that	 the	 active	 involvement	 of	 the	
represented	is	necessary	for	the	representative	to	fulfil	his	democratic	purpose.		Young	 for	 instance	 depicts	 ideal	 representation	 as	 a	 movement	 between	moments	of	authorisation	and	moments	of	accountability,	both	of	which	involve	citizen	participation	 and	 deliberation	 (Young,	 2000,	 pp.	 129-133).	 For	 this	 representative	process	to	effectively	enable	popular	self-rule,	constituents	will	need	to	have	organised	and	 discussed	 in	 anticipation	 of	 an	 upcoming	moment	 of	 authorisation.	 Following	 it,	citizens	discuss	in	recollection	of	debates	that	led	to	this	authorisation,	and	anticipate	
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future	moments	of	authorisation.	Thus,	in	Young's	words,	"(u)nder	normative	ideals	of	communicative	democracy,	representative	institutions	do	not	stand	opposed	to	citizen	participation,	but	require	such	participation	to	function	well”	(op.	cit.,	p.	126).	Similarly,	in	 her	 understanding	 of	 'representation	 as	 advocacy',	 Urbinati	 has	 stressed	 the	importance	of	opinion	and	consent	formation,	the	process	of	representation	necessarily	involving	 forms	of	deliberation	between	representatives	and	constituents,	and	among	constituents	 themselves	 (Urbinati,	 2000;	 2006,	 pp.	 223-228).	 Similarly	 to	 Young,	 she	contends	 that	 “elections	 (…)	 make	 responsible	 and	 limited	 government,	 but	 not	representative	 government”	 (Urbinati,	 2006,	 p.	 224),	 one	 essential	 factor	 being	 the	circumstances	under	which	citizens	who	are	part	of	the	representative	process	come	to	make	political	judgements.		To	 this	extent,	 the	 involvement	of	 lay	citizens	 in	 the	 representative	process	 is	essential	to	the	democratic	 legitimacy	of	this	very	process.	Put	more	bluntly,	claiming	that	 representative	 government	 enables	 democratic	 self-rule	 amounts	 to	 a	 fiction,	 if	those	 who	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 sovereign	 do	 not	 feel	 represented.	 As	 Kateb	 has	emphasised,	 "there	 would	 be	 no	 political	 authority	 at	 all	 without	 the	 willing	participation	of	the	people	in	the	electoral	system.	There	would	be	no	person	or	group	who	could	properly	claim	 it	or	confer	 it	or	validate	 it	 if	 the	people	did	not	 take	part"	(Kateb,	1981,	p.	371).	The	engagement	of	citizens,	in	this	sense,	is	necessary	if	we	are	to	conclude	 with	 Kateb	 that	 "(i)mprecisely	 put,	 but	 not	 metaphorically,	 the	 electoral	system	is	a	form	of	people's	self-rule"	(Kateb,	1981,	ibid).	
2.	The	role	of	partisanship	
a.	The	partisan	dimension	of	civic	engagement	
If	 the	 engagement	 of	 citizens	 is	 essential	 to	 representative	 democracy,	 it	 is	necessary	to	enquire	into	the	conditions	under	which	such	engagement	can	emerge	and	thrive.	One	essential,	albeit	 insufficient	condition	for	citizens	to	take	interest	in	public	life	is	that	they	hold	political	convictions,	that	they	have	certain	ideas	about	the	nature	of	the	common	good.	As	expressed	by	White	and	Ypi,	citizens	should	hold	"normatively	grounded,	powerful	notions	of	the	possibility	of	a	better	society"	to	engage	with	public	life,	or	in	other	words,	they	should	believe	that	"there	are	political	goals	that	deserve	to	be	pursued,	 and	 that	 there	 is	 a	 relationship	between	 them	such	 that	 they	need	 to	be	pursued	as	part	of	a	more	or	less	coherent	whole"	(White	&	Ypi,	2010,	p.	811).		
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If	 engaged	 citizenship	 requires	 a	 certain	 understanding	 of	 the	 common	 good,	this	 understanding	 is	 always	 partisan	 in	 the	minimal	 sense.	 The	 engaged	 citizen	 does	not	necessarily	identify	with	a	party	stricto	sensu,	but	the	type	of	conviction	that	leads	to	 engagement	 does	 involve	 taking	 sides,	 and	 does	 involve	 standing	 with	 others	 in	defence	 of	 this	 conviction.	 	 First,	 political	 conviction	 discriminates	 among	 the	 causes	that	are	worth	fighting	for,	and	rests	on	a	partial	interpretation	of	foundational	values.	The	engaged	citizen	resembles	Mill's	'one-eyed	man',	convinced	"that	some	principle	or	cause	in	the	political	world	is	right	and	something	else	wrong,	something	is	better	and	something	else	is	worse"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	99).	Second,	defending	one's	convictions	in	 the	public	realm	is	not	a	solitary	enterprise	 -	 it	 involves	standing	with	others	 for	a	certain	 idea	 of	 the	 common	 good	 (Muirhead,	 2014,	 ch.	 5;	 Rosenblum,	 2008,	 pp.	 340-348).	To	prompt	engagement,	normative	goals	have	to	be	pursued	with	the	idea	that	it	is	 a	matter	 for	 "us"	 to	 do	 so,	 that	 there	 is	 a	 collective	 responsibility	 to	 pursue	 these	goals	which	are	in	some	way	"ours"	(White	&	Ypi,	2010,	p.	812).	The	 civic	 value	 of	 partiality	 and	 collective	 loyalty	 can	 also	 be	 highlighted	 by	dispelling	 the	 myth	 of	 'independence'	 as	 good	 citizenship	 (Rosenblum,	 2008,	 ch.	 7).	Independents'	 rebuttal	 of	 partisan	 commitments	 puts	 these	 citizens	 outside,	 rather	than	 above,	 public	 life,	 depriving	 them	 of	 the	 passions	 that	 drive	 citizens	 to	 get	informed	and	take	part	 in	collective	action.	Their	absence	of	 loyalty	will	 likely	 lead	to	"weightlessness",	 "detachment"	 and	 "unconcern	 for	 power"	 rather	 than	 more	 astute	and	informed	reasoning	(Rosenblum,	2008,	p.	351).	And	if	independents	stand	only	for	themselves,	there	is	little	reason	for	them	to	engage	with	public	life.5	As	summarised	by	Muirhead,	"the	path	to	independent	judgement,	and	a	discerning	appraisal	of	practical	affairs	needs	to	'go	through'	the	partisan's	perspective.	To	dispense	with	the	partisan's	insight	is	not	to	arrive	at	some	pure	independence	or	'view	from	nowhere'—it	is	likely	to	avoid	politics	altogether"	(Muirhead,	2006,	p.	723).		
b.	The	creative	role	of	political	parties	
If	 civic	 engagement	 requires	 both	 normatively	 grounded	 convictions	 and	identification	 with	 a	 group	 that	 shares	 these	 convictions,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 stress	 that	neither	exist	prior	to	the	political	process	itself.	As	Muirhead	emphasises,	"somewhere	
																																								 																					
5	This	 divide	 between	 self-declared	 partisans	 and	 independents	 finds	 empirical	 grounding.	 Self-declared	independents	are	less	knowledgeable	about	politics	and	less	capable	of	taking	in	new	political	information.	They	are	likely	to	be	less	interested	in	politics	more	generally	and	spend	less	time	informing	themselves.	They	are	also	less	likely	to	vote	or	take	part	in	civic	life	(Blais,	2006;	Keith	et	al.,	1992).	
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the	 variety	 of	 individuals	 sentiments,	 interests	 and	 convictions	 needs	 to	 be	 collected	(...)	 The	 point	 is	 that	 this	 has	 to	 happen	 somewhere:	 a	 group	 large	 enough	 to	 claim	democratic	legitimacy	does	not	exist	spontaneously	(...)	It	must	be	created"	(Muirhead,	2006,	 p.	 719).	 Such	 a	 view	 runs	 counter	 to	 both	 the	 rational-choice	model	 of	 voting	behaviour	-	which	supposes	that	citizens	make	political	choices	based	on	a	set	of	pre-defined,	 personal	 interests	 -	 and	 the	 cleavage-based	 model	 -	 which	 views	 political	cleavages	 as	 the	 translation	 of	 socio-economic	 lines	 of	 division.	 Both	 of	 these	 classic	models	endorse,	with	different	premises,	 the	“image	of	representation	as	substitution	or	identification”	(Young,	2000,	p.	123).	Representation	 thus	 plays	 a	 performative	 role	 in	 fuelling	 forms	 of	 political	conviction:	 political	 representation	 does	 not	 simply	 channel	 pre-existing	 claims,	 it	works	to	constitute	the	represented	themselves.	Excluding	the	case	of	strict	imperative	mandates,	 the	 interpretation	of	what	 voters	demand	 is	not	 only	 a	possibility	 open	 to	the	 representative—it	 is	 in	 fact	 inseparable	 from	 the	 act	 of	 representing	 itself.	 The	necessity	of	interpretation	in	the	representative	act	derives	from	the	fact	that	there	is	no	 “single	 common	 good	 that	 transcends	 the	 diversity	 of	 (constituents')	 interests,	experiences,	opinions”	(Young,	2000,	p.	126).	The	groups	to	be	represented	never	offer	themselves	 as	 homogenous,	 pre-defined	 entity	 with	 clear	 and	 encompassing	 sets	 of	interests.	This	is	why	the	representative	claims	of	political	agents	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	emergence	of	such	groups	(Bourdieu,	1991;	Disch,	2011;	Saward,	2010).6	The	 'bilingualism'	of	political	parties,	with	one	foot	 in	society	and	the	other	 in	the	state,	puts	 them	 in	a	privileged	position	 to	accomplish	 this	 role	 (Bonotti,	2011,	p.	20).	 This	 idea	 of	 democratic	 mediation	 is	 "implicit	 in	 many	 of	 the	 other	 functions	(generally	 associated	 with	 parties),	 such	 as	 representation,	 interest	 articulation	 and	aggregation,	participation	and	legitimisation"	(Widfeldt,	1999,	p.	15).	As	institutions	of	the	 state,	 parties	 have	 access	 to	 financial	 assets,	media	 attention	 and	 political	 power	that	social	movements	 -	 for	 instance	 -	do	not	dispose	of	 (White	&	Ypi,	2010,	pp.	817-818).	 As	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 parties	 use	 these	 resources	 to	 mobilise	 existing	members,	organize	support	and	generate	new	sympathies	(Ware,	1996).	If	the	partisan	enterprise	 is	particularly	 creative,	 it	 is	 also	because	of	 the	 form	 it	 takes:	 an	 agonistic																																									 																					
6	As	emphasised	by	Bourdieu,	 "(it)	 is	because	 the	representative	exists,	because	he	represents	 (symbolic	action),	 that	 the	 group	 that	 is	 represented	 and	 symbolised	 exists"	 (Bourdieu,	 1991,	 p.	 204).	 A	 similar	stance	 is	developed	by	Disch,	according	 to	whom	representation	"aims,	 then,	not	 to	reproduce	a	state	of	affairs	but	to	produce	an	effect:	to	call	forth	a	constituency	by	depicting	it	as	a	collective	with	a	shared	aim	(...)	 Political	 identities	 and	 demands	 do	 not	 emerge	 directly	 from	 social	 divisions,	 but	 rather	 (...)	 social	differences	and	the	politics	to	which	they	give	rise	are	influenced	by	elite	discourse"	(Disch,	2011,	pp.	107-108).	
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clash	 of	 opposing	 views.	 In	 this	 process,	 parties	 not	 only	 make	 claims	 to	 represent	citizens,	 they	 also	 'create	 the	 terms	of	 contest'	 and	 thus	 the	necessary	 conditions	 for	public	 deliberation	 over	 rival	 conceptions	 of	 the	 common	 good	 (Muirhead	 &	Rosenblum,	2006,	p.	103).7	
2.	The	cohesiveness	of	partisan	claims	Parties,	then,	are	among	those	institutions	best	placed	to	generate	the	types	of	political	 convictions	 that	push	citizens	 to	engage	with	public	 life.	This	does	not	mean	that	parties	necessarily	make	good	use	of	their	privileged	position	in	the	public	sphere.	The	 contemporary	 disaffection	 with	 representative	 politics	 in	 both	 established	 and	emerging	 European	 democracies	 suffices	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 parties	 can	well	 fail	 to	perform	this	 function	of	mobilisation	(for	detailed	accounts,	see	Farrell,	2000,	pp.	20-79;	 Hay,	 2007,	 pp.	 12-39;	 Mair,	 2006,	 pp.	 34-43;	 Pharr	 &	 Putnam,	 2000).	 If	 it	 is	acknowledged,	however,	that	parties	have	a	unique	responsibility	in	this	regard,	it	does	open	 the	 door	 for	 political	 theorists	 to	 isolate	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 they	 can	effectively	 generate	 such	 political	 loyalties.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 draw	 on	normative	political	theory	to	isolate	criteria	on	the	basis	of	which	to	evaluate	the	claims	of	political	parties	in	this	regard.		The	 general	 argument	 is	 that	 partisans	 should	 display	 cohesiveness	 in	 their	discourse	 and	 practices	 to	 convince	 citizens	 of	 the	 validity	 of	 their	 claims	 and	 of	 the	worth	of	political	engagement	more	generally.	This	quality	of	 cohesiveness	 is	defined	by	three	distinct	criteria.	First,	the	normative	criterion,	characterised	by	the	advocacy	of	 a	 coherent	 account	 of	 the	 common	 good.	 Second,	 the	 executive	 criterion,	characterised	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 links	 between	 the	 normative	 goals	 a	 party	promotes	 and	 their	 execution	 through	 the	 use	 of	 governmental	 power.	 Finally,	 the	condition	of	differentiation,	 characterised	by	 the	ability	of	parties	 to	establish	a	 clear	distinction	 between	 their	 party's	 normative	 goals	 and	 policies	 and	 those	 of	 their	opponents.	These	are	the	criteria	on	the	basis	of	which	I	will	evaluate	the	discourse	of	French	and	Hungarian	partisans	in	Chapter	3.		
																																								 																					
7	A	'contextualist'	turn	in	public	opinion	and	political	psychology	studies	is	providing	mounting	empirical	evidence	that	citizens	opinions	and	representation	do	indeed	shift	according	to	the	ways	in	which	political	parties	 frame	 issues	 (Chong	 &	 Druckman,	 2007;	 Druckman,	 2004;	 Manza	 &	 Cook,	 2002.;	 Sniderman	 &	Theriault,	 2004).	 Chong	 and	 Druckman	 have	 for	 instance	 demonstrated,	 using	 experimental	 data,	 that	party	frames	can	moderate	ideological	extremes	and	that	the	'relative	strength'	of	these	frames	does	affect	citizens'	engagement	with	them	(Chong	&	Druckman,	2007).	
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Criterion	1:	Standing	for	a	vision	of	the	common	good	The	 first	 requirement	 for	 political	 parties	 is	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 to	 the	political	 community	of	 the	ends	 that	 justify	 the	exercise	of	political	power	and	of	 the	principles	that	underlie	such	an	exercise.	It	demands	from	parties	that	they	stand	for	a	distinct	 vision	of	 the	 common	good,	 rooted	 in	 rival	 interpretations	of	 the	meaning	of	fundamental	 principals	 such	 as	 equality	 or	 freedom.	 This	 normative	 condition	 lies	 at	the	 heart	 of	 one	 of	 the	 very	 first	 definitions	 of	 party.	 Indeed,	 Burke	 accounted	 for	parties	as	"a	body	of	men	united,	for	promoting	by	their	joint	endeavours	the	national	interest,	 upon	 some	 particular	 principle	 in	 which	 they	 are	 all	 agreed"	 (Burke,	 1990	[1770],	p.	86).	This	partisan	enterprise	is	directed	towards	the	demos	as	a	whole,	and	is	therefore	fundamentally	distinct	from	what	factions	are.	Indeed,	the	latter	are	designed	to	further	the	interests	of	particular	groups	in	society	and	exhibit	"no	concern	to	justify	(their)	program	to	the	community	in	toto"	(White	&	Ypi,	2011,	p.	383).	Parties	 are	 bilingual	 agents	 of	 political	 linkage	 insofar	 as	 they	 link	 particular	segments	of	 society	with	 such	broader	 conceptions	of	 the	public	 good.	Muirhead	and	Rosenblum	summarize	this	idea:		"As	 shapers	 and	 articulators	 of	 public	 reason,	 parties	 speak	 to	all	 citizens	 as	citizens,	not	as	socially	situated	in	this	or	that	social	class	or	income	group	or	as	having	 a	 particular	 comprehensive	 doctrine.	 They	 refine	 and	 generalise	particularist	appeals	by	casting	them	in	terms	appropriate	to	public	reason.	As	agents	of	a	publicly	recognised	overlapping	consensus,	they	connect	particular	interests	with	general	principles"	(Muirhead	&	Rosenblum,	2006,	p.	104).	To	 this	 extent,	 the	 normative	 commitments	 of	 political	 parties	 locate	particularistic	 appeals	 in	 a	 broader	 understanding	 of	 the	 political	 world,	 coherently	connecting	its	different	aspects	across	time,	space,	and	subject	matter.		That	 parties	 advance	 such	 understandings	 is	 central	 to	 furthering	 citizens'	engagement	 with	 the	 political	 world.	 By	 weaving	 individual	 concerns	 together	 in	 an	overarching	 narrative,	 parties	 contribute	 to	 citizens	 making	 sense	 of	 their	 own	grievances	not	as	strictly	personal	dissatisfactions,	but	as	issues	of	political	relevance.	In	 the	 words	 of	White	 and	 Ypi,	 they	 provide	 citizens	 with	 the	 tools	 to	 formulate	 "a	critical	appraisal	of	their	joint	political	institutions,	(...)	to	form	judgements	on	matters	of	common	concern	and	to	articulate	such	judgements	in	a	way	that	could	appeal	to	the	understanding	of	all"	(White	&	Ypi,	2010,	p.	811).	By	highlighting	commonalities	across	the	 experiences	 of	 isolated	 individuals,	 they	 also	 give	 citizens	 the	 sense	 that	 their	grievances	 are	 shared	 by	 a	 circle	 wider	 than	 their	 own,	 thus	 facilitating	 group	
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identification	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 political	 constituencies	 (White	 &	 Ypi,	 2010,	 pp.	815-816).	This	 normative	 dimension	 is	 also	 central	 because	 political	 action	 needs	 to	 be	
justified	according	to	some	principles	citizens	can,	if	not	embrace	as	their	own,	at	least	accept	 as	 reasonable.	 Such	 acts	 of	 justification	 are	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 that	 coercive	power	 is	being	exercised	 in	a	non-arbitrary	 fashion,	and	more	generally,	 to	safeguard	the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 decision-making	 process	 (Chambers,	 2010).	 This	 requires	 that	parties	make	the	rationale	that	motivates	their	policies	explicit,	or	in	other	words,	that	they	 spell-out	 the	 values,	 interests	 and	 visions	 of	 the	 'good	 society'	 their	 legislation	intends	 to	 further	 (Bonotti,	 2014;	 White	 &	 Ypi,	 2011).	 Beyond	 the	 role	 normative	principles	 play	 in	 legitimizing	 political	 action,	 an	 overarching	 ratio	 is	 necessary	 for	making	party	programs	intelligible	to	citizens	and	to	win	the	adhesion	of	constituents.	As	 Muirhead	 emphasises,	 "the	 arcane	 and	 lawyerly	 details	 of	 alternative	 policies	(cannot)	excite	passions,	generate	loyalties,	or	sustain	lasting	commitments"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	67).		Fundamentally,	 then,	 it	 is	when	parties	put	 forward	normative	 conceptions	of	the	 common	 good	 that	 they	 can	 make	 a	 distinctive	 contribution	 to	 representative	democracy.	 If	 one	 considers	 'self-rule'	 as	 central	 to	 the	 democratic	 project,	 then	 its	realisation	entails	that	politicians	compete	for	office	over	distinct	understandings	of	the	common	good.	Were	 these	 to	 be	 abandoned,	 this	would	 lead	 to	 the	predominance	of	appeals	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 personality	 and	 group	 belonging,	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	clientelism	 and	 patronage,	 and	 a	 replacement	 of	 public	 policy	 by	 administrative	decision-making	 politics	 (Goodin,	 2008,	 pp.	 209-211).	 Even	 in	 a	 regime	 that	 would	uphold	 democracy's	 minimal	 procedural	 requirements,	 the	 'ratio'	 required	 for	 the	political	community	to	understand	itself	as	such,	and	thus	for	the	political	community	to	be	self-legislating,	would	be	absent.	A	democracy	without	parties	as	'ideational	facts'	would	be	no	democracy	at	all	(Goodin,	2008,	p.	213).		
Criterion	2:	Offering	means	for	the	realisation	of	normative	goals		The	second	requirement	 for	political	parties	 is	 that	 they	provide	citizens	with	the	sense	that	these	normative	goals	can	effectively	be	realised	through	the	use	of	state	power	 (White	 &	 Ypi,	 2010,	 pp.	 812-813,	 816).	 This	 entails	 that	 political	 parties	campaign	not	only	on	the	basis	of	conflicting	interpretations	of	the	common	good,	but	that	they	set	forth	a	series	of	policy	proposals	making	for	a	coherent	political	program.	Granted	 they	 obtain	 a	 parliamentary	 majority	 by	 popular	 suffrage,	 parties	 should	
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demonstrate	 that	 they	can	execute	 their	programs	through	 legal	means.	As	expressed	by	Bonotti,	 parties	 at	 their	 best	 "provide	 heuristic	 tools	which	 anticipate	 predictable	patterns	of	policy-making	 and	offer	 'packages'	 of	policies	 and	measures	which	 (they)	intend	to	implement	if	they	achieve	control	of	the	government"	(Bonotti,	2014,	p.	320).		It	 is	 precisely	 the	 role	 of	 political	 parties	 to	 give	meaning	 to	 both	 normative	objectives	 and	 governmental	 practices	by	making	 their	 interconnection	 intelligible	 to	citizens.	Normative	 thinking	without	 practical	 outlet	 is	 insufficient	 to	 engage	 citizens	with	 the	 political	 process.	 As	 emphasised	 by	 Muirhead	 and	 Rosenblum,	 "when	principles	of	justice	do	not	seem	to	have	a	connection	to	our	aims	and	purposes,	even	reasonable	 principles	 could	 not	 be	 rational	 for	 us	 personally,	 as	 concretely-situated	individuals"	 (Muirhead	 &	 Rosenblum,	 2006,	 p.	 103).	 It	 is	 by	 addressing	 particular	grievances	 through	policy-making	 that	parties	demonstrate	 the	practical	 relevance	of	their	normative	commitments	and	give	constituents	reasons	to	maintain	their	loyalty.		Another	way	of	phrasing	this	is	to	say	that	a	given	vision	of	the	common	good	can	 only	 properly	 be	 deemed	 political	 where	 it	 involves	 both	 choice	 and	 agency.	 As	rightly	emphasised	by	Hay,	"politics	and	the	political	involves	actors	doing	things	with	consequences.	 Politics	 occurs,	 and	 can	 only	 occur,	 in	 situations	 in	 which	 actors	 can	make	a	difference"	(Hay,	2007,	p.	66).	If	governments	cannot	exercise	their	agency	and	choose	 their	policies,	 the	replacement	of	one	majority	by	another	will	not	change	 the	legislation	 citizens	 are	 offered.	 Where	 parties	 demonstrate	 such	 impotency,	 citizens	will	 likely	 cease	 to	 believe	 in	 the	 possibility	 for	 their	 normative	 goals	 to	 be	 realised.	Parties	 will	 then	 breed	 not	 engagement	 with	 the	 political,	 but	 resignation	 at	 best,	animosity	at	worst.	This	 is	 all	 the	 more	 true	 because	 parties	 are	 the	 only	 political	 actors	 that	dispose	 directly	 of	 the	 coercive	 power	 and	 taxing	 capacity	 of	 the	 state.	While	 social	movements	may	offer	normative	objectives,	 their	 limited	 financial	 and	organisational	resources	 curtails	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 actions.	 Moreover,	 their	 exclusive	 anchorage	 in	civil	 society	 deprives	 them	 from	 the	 autonomous	 capacity	 to	 realise	 these	 objectives	through	direct	changes	in	legislation	(White	&	Ypi,	2010,	pp.	817-818).	It	thus	appears	necessary	 for	 political	 parties	 to	 put	 forward	 policy	 proposals	 they	 can	 effectively	implement	in	government	for	citizens	to	believe	in	the	reality	of	popular	self-rule	under	a	 representative	 government.	 As	 summarised	 by	 Connolly,	 "(i)f	 we	 wish	 to	 see	ourselves	as	 free,	 free	as	a	people,	we	must	believe	 that	state	 institutions	of	electoral	accountability	 carry	 with	 them	 sufficient	 efficacy	 to	 promote	 the	 collective	 ends	 we	most	 prize	 (...)	 Thus	 one's	 self-identification	 as	 a	 free	 individual	 is	 bound	 up	with	 a	
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common	 believe	 in	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 state	 to	 promote	 publicly	 defined	 purposes"	(Connolly,	1991,	p.	198).		
Criterion	3:	Distinguishing	normative	goals	and	policies	from	those	of	opponents	Finally,	 parties	 need	 to	 differentiate	 their	 platforms	 from	 that	 of	 their	opponents,	 and	 justify	 their	 value	 in	 a	 comparative	 fashion.	 In	 other	 words,	 parties	need	to	offer	citizens	distinct	normative	goals	and	policy	proposals.	This	is	essential	to	citizens'	 engagement	with	 the	 political	 process	 for	 several	 reasons.	 First,	 positioning	with	 regard	 to	 a	 political	 'other'	 is	 necessary	 for	 parties	 to	 assert	 their	 own	commitments,	 and	 to	 mobilise	 citizens	 on	 their	 basis.	 This	 squares	 with	 the	 post-structuralist	 notion	 of	 a	 'constitutive	 outside',	 according	 to	 which	 "difference	 is	 the	condition	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 constituting	 unity	 and	 totality	 at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 it	provides	its	essential	limits"	(Mouffe,	2000,	p.	33).	The	very	identity	of	partisans	-	as	all	other	forms	of	identity	-		can	only	but	be	constructed	through	differentiation.	Partisan	identities	strong	enough	to	mobilise	civic	passions	are	thus	adversarial	in	nature:	they	define	themselves	not	only	with	regard	to	what	they	are,	but	also	with	regard	to	how	they	diverge	from	other	partisan	identities.		The	 attachment	 of	 voters	 to	 particular	 parties	 only	 makes	 sense	 where	 such	differences	 exist	 and	 are	 asserted	 -	 indeed,	 "when	 parties	 do	 not	 stand	 for	 distinct	ideals	 and	 programs,	 what	 sense	 can	 it	 make	 to	 identify	 with	 one	 or	 the	 other?"	(Muirhead,	 2014,	 p.	 65).	 This	 explains	 why	 political	 parties	 are	 generally	 more	confrontational	in	their	stance	during	electoral	campaigns	than	they	are	in	government.	As	Guttmann	and	Thomson	 insist,	 "(t)heir	support	and	ultimately	 their	success	 in	 the	campaign	depend	on	reaffirming	their	uncompromising	commitment	to	core	principles,	and	 on	 distinguishing	 their	 positions	 sharply	 from	 those	 of	 their	 opponents.	 Voters	need	to	see	the	differences	between	the	candidates	as	clearly	as	possible"	(Gutmann	&	Thompson,	2010,	p.	1128)	Differentiation	 is	 necessary	 not	 only	 for	 parties	 to	 gain	 support,	 but	 also	 to	justify	to	citizens	their	claim	to	the	exercise	of	political	power.	White	and	Ypi	show	that	parties	 make	 an	 "important	 contribution	 to	 political	 justification"	 precisely	 because	they	 are	 more	 likely	 than	 other	 political	 agents	 to	 make	 claims	 that	 are	 both	
comparative	 and	adversarial	(White	&	Ypi,	2011,	p.	385).	Political	 justification	 should	be	 comparative	 because	 "to	 justify	 a	 political	 principle,	 an	 act	 of	 public	 policy,	 or	 a	political	 program	 is	 to	 show	what	makes	 it	 preferable	 to	 alternatives"	 (White	&	 Ypi,	2011,	p.	385).	Further,	the	quality	of	political	justification	is	dependent	on	its	potential	
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for	being	challenged	by	competitors,	thus	demanding	an	adversarial	context.	As	White	and	 Ypi	 insist,	 "only	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 (...)	 at	 least	 one	 other	 agent	 (who)	 seeks	 to	actively	assess	the	validity	of	a	political	proposal	and	where	disputing	arguments	are	in	turn	tested,	will	the	conditions	for	meaningful	political	justification	be	present"	(White	&	 Ypi,	 2011,	 p.	 386).	 To	 offer	 reasons	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 convince	 citizens	 of	 the	legitimacy	 of	 their	 normative	 and	 programmatic	 choices,	 political	 parties	 must	therefore	compare	and	contrast	them	with	those	of	their	opponents.		The	 final,	 and	 perhaps	 most	 straightforward	 case	 to	 be	 made	 in	 favour	 of	partisan	differentiation	 is	 that	 it	offers	 citizens	a	meaningful	 choice	between	political	alternatives.	This	idea	has	been	at	the	core	of	minimalist	theories	of	democracy,	which	cast	the	free	competition	of	political	parties	for	citizens'	votes	as	a	defining	feature	of	the	 democratic	 regime	 (Downs,	 1957;	 Przeworski,	 1999;	 Schumpeter,	 1956	 [1942]).	Only	when	offered	a	plurality	of	options	can	voters	 find	an	alternative	closer	 to	 their	own	interests	and	choose	a	different	majority	at	the	next	elections	if	their	expectations	are	disappointed.		This	 echoes	 the	 classic	 ideal	 of	 'responsible	 party	 government',	which	 gained	currency	 in	 the	post-war	American	context.8	The	central	claim	of	 this	model	 is	 that	 in	order	 for	 citizens	 to	 exercise	 self-rule	 in	 a	 representative	 democracy,	 parties	 should	offer	 them	 a	 real	 choice	 between	 alternative	 programs	 of	 government.	 The	 ideal	prescribes	 that	 parties	 in	 government	 exercise	 political	 agency	 to	 demonstrate	 the	credibility	of	their	political	promises	and	that	citizens	can	hold	them	accountable	when	they	do	not	demonstrate	such	credibility.	As	expressed	by	Muirhead,	"parties	that	take	clear	stands	in	campaigns,	and	that	muster	the	cohesion	to	enact	those	plans	when	they	are	in	power,	give	voters	a	clear	and	easy	way	to	express	or	withhold	their	approval	at	the	 next	 election"	 (Muirhead,	 2014,	 p.	 176).	 But	 the	 ideal	 of	 'responsible	 party	government'	also	creates	obligations	for	parties	in	the	opposition.	As	Hofstadter	spells	out:	 "(the	 opposition	 should	 contain)	 within	 itself	 the	 potential	 of	 an	 actual	alternative	government—that	is,	its	critique	of	existing	policies	is	not	simply	a	wild	attempt	to	outbid	the	existing	regime	in	promises,	but	a	sober	attempt	to	formulate	 alternative	 policies	 which	 it	 believes	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 execution	within	 the	 existing	 historical	 and	 economic	 framework,	 and	 to	 offer	 as	 its	executors	 a	 competent	 alternative	 personal	 that	 can	 actually	 govern."	(Hofstadter,	1969,	p.	4)																																									 																					
8	This	notion	was	most	 clearly	 spelled-out	 in	 the	work	of	 Schattschneider,	 and	 in	 the	American	Political	Science	Association's	1950	annual	report	(American	Political	Science	Association,	1950;	Schattschneider,	2009	[1942]).	
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Albeit	 from	 a	 very	 different	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 standing	 point,	agonistic	theories	of	democracies	also	value	the	confrontation	of	partisan	alternatives	as	the	condition	for	democratic	self-rule.	As	Mouffe	states,	"modern	democracy	calls	for	(...)	a	clear	divide	between	the	government	and	the	opposition,	and	this	supposes	that	clearly	differentiated	policies	are	on	offer,	 giving	 the	possibility	 for	 citizens	 to	decide	between	different	ways	of	organizing	society"	(Mouffe,	2005,	p.	120).		
II.	SUSTAINING	DEMOCRACY	AS	A	WAY	OF	LIFE:	THE	COMMITMENT	OF	PARTISANS	TO	PLURALISM	
In	 this	 second	 part	 of	 the	 chapter,	 I	 consider	 an	 additional	 set	 of	 conditions	drawn	 from	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 on	 parties	 and	 partisanship	 for	 evaluating	 the	contribution	of	partisanship	to	liberal	democracy.	I	argue	that,	in	addition	to	complying	with	the	standard	of	cohesiveness,	the	discourses	and	practices	of	partisans	should	also	be	 in	 line	 with	 a	 pluralist	 conception	 of	 the	 political	 community.	 Following	 Galston,	political	 pluralism	may	 be	 defined	 as	 an	 account	 of	 the	 political	 world	 according	 to	which	"there	is	no	single,	univocal	summum	bonum	that	can	be	defined	philosophically,	let	alone	imposed	politically"	(Galston,	2002,	p.	30).		I	justify	the	importance	of	partisan	commitment	to	political	pluralism	for	liberal	democracy	by	considering	the	theoretical	debate	on	the	conditions	for	the	emergence	and	preservation	of	liberal	democratic	regimes.	That	such	conditions	involve	a	minima	a	given	set	of	institutions	is	an	uncontroversial	starting	point	in	the	literature.	I	follow	the	perspective	of	 cultural	 institutionalists	 to	argue	 that	over	 time,	 the	compliance	of	elites	 and	 citizens	 to	 democratic	 rules	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 commitment	 of	 political	actors	 to	 these	 institutions	 (Dryzek	 &	 Holmes,	 2002;	 Hall	 &	 Taylor,	 1996;	 Herman,	2015;	Miller,	White,	&	Heywood,	1997;	Plasser,	Ulram,	&	Waldrauch,	1998;	Plattner	&	Diamond,	1996).	This	squares	with	a	tradition	in	political	philosophy	that	considers	the	democratic	regime	first	and	foremost	as	a	way	of	life	or	form	of	society	nourished	by	the	ethical	commitments	of	its	members	(Galston,	2002,	2005;	Kateb,	1981;	Lefort,	1988a;	Macedo,	1990;	Mouffe,	2000;	Rosenblum,	1998,	1989;	Ryn,	1978).		Theorists	of	parties	and	partisanship	are	in	line	with	these	approaches,	as	they	insist	on	the	particular	moral	obligations	that	 fall	on	partisans	 in	 liberal	democracies.	Indeed,	 as	 opinion-leaders	 and	 decision-makers,	 the	 discourse	 and	 practices	 of	partisans	 are	 more	 directly	 crucial	 to	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 the	 norms	 of	 liberal	democracy	 than	 the	 discourse	 or	 practices	 of	 lay	 citizens.	 I	 rely	 on	 these	 works	 to	define	more	specific	criteria	for	assessing	partisan	commitment	to	political	pluralism	in	
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two	 specific	 domains:	 partisan	 attitudes	 towards	 political	 opponents,	 and	 partisan	attitudes	 towards	 political	 agreement	 and	 disagreement.	 It	 is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 these	criteria	 that	 the	 discourse	 of	 mainstream	 partisans	 in	 France	 and	 Hungary	 will	 be	evaluated	in	chapters	4	and	5.	
1.	Liberal	democracy	as	a	way	of	life	
a.	Institutions	and	ethics	
The	 idea	 according	 to	 which	 a	 well-designed	 set	 of	 institutions	 is	 the	necessary—if	 not	 sufficient—condition	 for	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 liberal	 democratic	regimes	is	deeply	grounded	in	Western	political	thought.	This	idea	is	intimately	linked	with	 the	 assumption	 that	 "liberal	 democracy	 (...)	 can	 function	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 civic	
virtue"	 (Rosenblum,	 1998,	 p.	 10).	 Enlightenment	 thinkers	 from	 Kant	 to	Montesquieu	emphasised	that	under	a	good	constitution,	the	private	vices	of	individuals	can	come	to	serve	the	common	good	(Rosenblum,	1998,	pp.	10-11).	Such	insights	also	presided	over	the	 making	 of	 the	 American	 constitution,	 the	 inbuilt	 checks-and-balances	 aiming	 to	channel	men’s	tyrannical	ambitions.9	This	 tradition	 still	 has	 a	 strong	 resonance	 today.	 Its	 clearest	 contemporary	expression	 can	 again	 be	 found	 in	 the	 procedural	 understandings	 of	 democracy	 that	have	flourished	since	the	1950s,	and	structure	much	of	contemporary	political	science	(Dahl,	 1956,	 1971;	 Downs,	 1957).	 According	 to	 proceduralists,	 well-designed	institutions	 and	 a	 highly	 competitive	 political	 arena	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 two	 defining	characteristics	 of	 a	 democratic	 regime,	 and	 form	 the	 essential	 conditions	 for	 its	perpetuation	 (for	 representative	 examples,	 see	 Alevizakos,	 2008;	 Clark,	 2002;	O'Donnell,	 Schmitter,	 &	Whitehead,	 1986;	 Przeworski,	 1991,	 1999;	 Schmitter	 &	 Karl,	1991;	Schneider	&	Schmitter,	2004).	Democracy	endures	in	such	a	setting	not	because	individuals	are	committed	 to	 the	regime	as	such,	but	because	a	well-designed	system	creates	 incentives	 towards	 its	 perpetuation.	 Individuals	 have	 a	 greater	 interest	 in	accepting	 limitations	 to	 their	 own	 power,	 and	 thus	 to	 play	 by	 the	 rules,	 than	 in	
																																								 																					
9As	Madison	asserts	 in	Federalist	No.10,	 "(it)	may	be	a	reflection	on	human	nature	 that	such	devices	(as	checks	and	balances)	should	be	necessary	 to	control	 the	abuses	of	government.	But	what	 is	government	itself	 but	 the	 greatest	 of	 all	 reflection	 on	 human	 nature?	 If	men	were	 angels,	 no	 government	would	 be	necessary"(cited	in	Williams,	2014,	p.	162).	
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attempting	to	subvert	the	system.10	Democratic	institutions	thus	act	like	Adam	Smith’s	invisible	hand,	turning	the	sum	of	selfish	interests	into	a	collective	good.		Insisting	on	the	unnecessary	character	of	human	virtue	 in	democratic	regimes	may	 function	 to	 alleviate	 a	 form	 of	 'liberal	 anxiety'	 (Rosenblum,	 1998,	 pp.	 10-15).	 A	system	that	requires	perfectly	virtuous	behaviour	from	all	citizens	at	all	times	is	bound	to	be	fragile,	while	one	that	accommodates	the	imperfect	nature	of	men	is	more	likely	to	endure.	This	perspective	nevertheless	eludes	 the	normative	meaning	 that	 the	 term	'democracy'	 unavoidably	 carries	 with	 it	 (Skinner,	 1973).	 As	 Ryn	 emphasises,	"(a)lthough	 considerable	 sophistication	 sometimes	 goes	 into	 the	 procedural	 type	 of	definition,	 the	 fundamental	 question	 is	 left	 unanswered.	 What	 is	 the	 ultimate	justification	 for	 the	 procedures	 that	 are	 endorsed?"	 (Ryn,	 1978,	 p.	 11).	 Indeed,	 if	 the	sum	 of	 selfish	 interests	 produces	 a	 common	 'good',	 this	 still	 begs	 the	 question:	 why	would	we	consider	a	democratic	regime	as	desirable	in	the	first	place?	Who	defines	this	good,	 and	 according	 to	what	 standard	 can	 it	 be	 said	 that	 the	 collective	well-being	 is	furthered	by	such	a	regime?	Collective	struggles	for	civil,	political	and	social	rights	are	central	to	the	history	of	first	wave	democracies	precisely	because	their	attainment	has	acted	 as	 an	 authoritative	 ideal	 for	 generations	 of	 citizens	 since	 the	 late	 18th	 century	(Huntington,	 1991;	 Marshall,	 1992).	 The	 historical	 emergence	 of	 democratic	institutions	 has	 been,	 to	 this	 extent,	 only	 the	 most	 visible	 expression	 of	 a	 more	profound	 reordering	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 societies	 conceive	 of	 legitimate	 power	relations	 (Lefort,	 1988b).	 The	 fact	 that	 so	 many	 scholars	 have	 taken	 an	 interest	 in	defining	democracy	and	assessing	the	conditions	for	its	emergence	and	perpetuation	in	itself	reveals	the	depth	of	our	societies'	commitment	to	this	new	order.			Cultural	 institutionalists	 have	 long	 been	 insistent	 that	 the	 functioning	 of	institutions	depends	not	only	on	the	rationality	of	self-interested	individuals,	but	on	the	internalisation	 by	 these	 actors	 of	 specific	 norms	 of	 behaviour	 and	 discourse	 (Hall	 &	Taylor,	 1996).	 This	 implies	 that	 institutional	 rules	 and	 procedures	 are	 conceived	 as	visible	expressions	of	such	underlying	norms,	rather	than	as	prior	external	constraints	that	 in	turn	influence	individual	behaviour.	Bevir	and	Rhodes	for	instance	analyse	the	functioning	of	the	British	State	under	New	Labour	government	as	a	complex	ensemble	of	 practices	 and	 discourse	 carried	 by	 its	 actors,	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 separate	 authority	imposing	itself	on	individuals	(Bevir	&	Rhodes,	2010).	If,	as	summarised	by	Mouffe,	it	is	because	they	"are	inscribed	in	shared	forms	of	life	and	agreements	in	judgements	that																																									 																					
10	This	is	because	the	uncertainties	and	costs	that	come	with	non-compliance	outweigh	the	certain	benefits	that	both	majorities	and	minorities	obtain	from	taking	part	in	the	democratic	game.	
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procedures	can	be	accepted	and	followed",	then	the	efficacy	of	democratic	procedures	themselves	 are	 also	 likely	 to	 depend	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 agreements	 in	 society	(Mouffe,	 2000,	 p.	 68).	 Such	 an	 insight	 is	 shared	 by	 scholars	 adopting	 a	 cultural	approach	to	democratisation	(see	for	instance	Dryzek	&	Holmes,	2002;	Herman,	2015;	Miller	et	al.,	1997;	Plasser	et	al.,	1998;	Plattner	&	Diamond,	1996).	They	 insist	on	 the	attitudinal	 transformation	 that	 are	 necessary	 at	 mass	 and	 elite	 level	 to	 ensure	 the	survival	 of	 democratic	 regimes	 on	 the	 long-run.	 According	 to	 this	 perspective,	 the	consolidation	 of	 democracy	 requires	 that	 "democracy	 becomes	 so	 broadly	 and	profoundly	legitimate	among	citizens	that	it	is	unlikely	to	break	down"	(Diamond,	1994,	p.	15).		Liberal	democracy	may	thus	be	adequately	described	as	a	way	of	life.	Following	Lefort,	 I	 understand	 under	 such	 a	 term	 "those	morals	 and	 beliefs	 that	 testify	 to	 the	existence	 of	 implicit	 norms	 determining	 notions	 of	 just	 and	 unjust,	 good	 and	 evil,	desirable	and	undesirable,	noble	and	ignoble"	(Lefort,	1988a,	pp.	2-3).	In	adopting	this	approach,	 I	 concur	 with	 a	 number	 of	 political	 and	 moral	 philosophers	 who	 have	insisted	 on	 the	ethical	 foundations	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 (Cruickshank,	 2014;	Galston,	2002,	2005;	Hallowell,	1954;	Kateb,	1981;	Lefort,	1988a;	Macedo,	1990;	Mouffe,	2000;	Rosenblum,	 1989;	 Ryn,	 1978).	 Ethics	within	 a	 given	 community	may	 be	 defined	 as	 a	shared	 system	 of	 beliefs	 that	 determines	 "the	 nature	 of	 ultimate	 value	 and	 the	standards	 by	which	 human	 actions	 can	 be	 judged	 right	 or	wrong"	 (Singer,	 2015).	 To	claim	 that	 liberal	 democracy	 has	 ethical	 foundations	 is	 thus	 to	 define	 it	 not	 only	 in	terms	of	 the	 institutions	that	compose	 it,	but	as	a	distinct	way	of	 life	-	or,	drawing	on	Lefort	again,	as	a	'form	of	society'	-	that	rests	on	its	members	sharing	a	certain	idea	of	the	common	good.11	In	 other	 words,	 well-designed	 institutions	 are	 a	 necessary	 but	 insufficient	condition	 to	 curb	 the	 potential	 excesses	 of	majority	 rule,	 or	 prevent	 the	 rebellion	 of	minorities	 in	 the	 democratic	 game.	 Democratic	 procedures	 fulfil	 their	 function	 not	merely	because	individuals	view	compliance	as	the	most	cost-effective	course	of	action,	but	because	they	attribute	value	to	these	procedures,	and	thus	view	compliance	as	the	
																																								 																					
11	Crucially,	 this	may	 also	 be	 characterised	 as	 a	 contextualist	 approach	 to	 democracy:	 it	 breaks	 not	 only	with	 institutionalist	perspectives,	but	also	with	universalistic	ones.	Rawlsian	political	 theory	for	 instance	tends	to	assume	that	there	exist	principles	that	would	be	considered	acceptable	by	any	reasonable	person,	and	 that	 it	 is	 thus	possible	 to	establish	an	 ideal	of	 justice	based	on	such	principles	 (Rawls,	2001,	2005).		Contextualists	 such	 as	Walzer	 or	 Rorty	 are	 on	 the	 contrary	more	 likely	 to	 agree	with	Mouffe	when	 she	asserts	 that	 "the	 normative	 dimension	 inscribed	 in	 political	 institutions	 (...)	 always	 refers	 to	 specific	practices,	depending	on	particular	contexts,	and	(...)	is	not	the	expression	of	a	universal	morality"	(Mouffe,	2005,	p.	121).		
	
48	
right	 course	of	action.	As	summarised	by	Hollowell,	 "(c)onstitutional	government	 is	a	kind	of	self-restraint	which	the	people	in	a	democracy	impose	upon	themselves;	(...)	its	continued	presence	depends	less	upon	the	institutional	checks	provided	than	upon	the	commonly	 shared	 knowledge	 that	 there	 are	 restraints	 and	 upon	 the	 willingness	 of	individuals	voluntarily	to	submit	to	those	restraints"	(Hallowell,	1954,	p.	64).		
b.	Setting	limits	to	the	democratic	ethos	
The	 ethical	 requirements	 that	 we	 demand	 from	 citizens	 need	 to	 be	 both	carefully	 justified	 and	 limited	 in	 scope.	 Understanding	 democracy	 as	 a	 way	 of	 life	cannot	imply	that	perfectly	virtuous	behaviour	is	expected	from	all	citizens	at	all	times.	This	would	be	an	unrealistic,	utopian	claim,	and	would	set	an	unattainable	standard	for	democratic	societies.	To	claim	that	ethical	commitments	are	necessary	 for	democracy	to	function	properly	is	not	to	assume	that	all	citizens	should	be	irreproachably	ethical.	Indeed,	 it	 is	 arguable	whether	 institutions	would	 be	 necessary	 at	 all	 if	 this	were	 the	case.12	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 stress	 that	 the	 ethical	 qualities	 that	 make	 democracy	possible	 are	 not	 either	 present	 or	 absent	 within	 a	 given	 society	 depending	 on	 the	irrevocable	 cultural	 traits	 that	 characterize	 it.	 The	 logic	 of	 democratic	 ethics	 is	essentially	dynamic.	Ethical	requirements	are	an	ensemble	of	norms	that	require	to	be	perpetually	defended,	promoted	and	diffused	by	an	array	of	actors	in	society,	from	lay	citizens	 to	 the	 media. 13 	Democratic	 institutions	 for	 instance,	 do	 guide	 individual	behaviour.	 By	 formalizing	 the	 norms	 of	 acceptable	 and	 unacceptable	 behaviour,	 and	giving	legal	authority	to	ethical	precepts,	 institutions	contribute	over	time	to	socialise	individuals	into	ethical	behaviour.		To	 this	 extent,	 the	 existence	 of	 opposite	 pulls,	 the	 persistence	 of	 unethical	behaviour	within	 society,	but	also	of	unethical	 tendencies	within	each	citizen,	 is	both	unavoidable	 and	 unproblematic.	 Demanding	 their	 complete	 elimination	 is	 not	 only	unrealistic,	 but	 would	 prove	 dangerous	 to	 liberal	 democracy	 itself.	 In	 requiring	demonstrations	 of	 virtue	 from	 its	 citizens,	 the	 state	 can	 easily	 come	 to	 impose																																									 																					
12	Even	 Rousseau	 came	 to	 concur	 that	 democracy	 as	 conceived	 in	 the	 Social	 Contract	 would	 require	 a	'nation	of	gods'	to	function	properly	(Zeitlin,	1997,	pp.	173-174).			13	As	 emphasised	by	Connolly,	 it	 is	 for	 instance	necessary	 that	 "the	news	media,	 judiciary,	 and	 electoral	system	 function	 to	 keep	 the	 terms	 of	 contestation	 among	 coalitions	 reasonably	 open	 and	 to	 protect	elemental	 rights	 to	 life,	 a	 significant	degree	of	 personal	 self-governance,	 freedom	of	 expression,	 and	 full	citizenship	in	a	representative	government."	(Connolly,	1991,	p.	213).	In	a	similar	vein,	Mouffe	states	that	"(d)emocratic	 individuals	 can	 only	 be	made	 possible	 by	multiplying	 the	 institutions,	 the	 discourses,	 the	forms	of	life	that	foster	identification	with	democratic	values"	(Mouffe,	2005,	p.	96).	
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limitations	on	the	civil	and	political	freedoms	that	are	constitutive	of	liberal	democratic	regimes	(Rosenblum,	1998,	pp.	13-14).		What	we	need	to	establish,	then,	are	the	limits	within	which	democratic	ethics	should	express	themselves	in	order	for	democracy	as	a	way	of	life	to	thrive.	There	are	two	separate	sets	of	questions	here.	The	 first	 concerns	 the	actors	 that	 should	display	such	ethical	dispositions:	 if	one	cannot	require	virtuous	behaviour	from	all	citizens	in	all	 spheres	 of	 activity,	 then	 one	 should	 establish	 principles	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 to	formulate	 more	 nuanced	 and	 modest	 requirements.	 The	 second	 set	 of	 questions	concerns	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 ethical	 requirements	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 criteria	according	to	which	we	can	recognise	ethical	behaviour	and	discourse	 in	a	democratic	society.	 It	 is	beyond	 the	scope	of	 this	 thesis	 to	offer	 comprehensive	answers	 to	 these	vast	questions.	The	purpose	of	 the	 following	sections	will	be	more	 limited:	 to	explain	how	understanding	 democracy	 as	 a	way	 of	 life	 affects	 the	 obligations	 of	mainstream	partisan	actors	specifically.	 I	will	 first	argue	 that	more	stringent	ethical	 requirements	fall	on	partisans	as	compared	to	lay	citizens	given	the	particular	functions	they	perform	within	 the	political	system.	 I	will	 then	outline	what	 is	 to	be	understood	by	an	 'ethical	conscience'	as	applied	to	partisans.		
2.	The	role	of	partisanship		
a.	The	contours	of	pluralist	partisanship	
A	number	of	 theorists	have	argued	 that	 specific	 ethical	 responsibilities	 fall	 on	partisans	 in	 liberal	 democracies.	 The	 clearest	 expression	 of	 this	 thesis	 has	 been	formulated	 by	 Bonotti,	 who	 discusses	 these	 in	 light	 of	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 on	political	 obligation	 (Bonotti,	 2012).	 According	 to	 Bonotti,	 partisanship	 is	 associated	with	a	number	of	positional	duties.	Positional	duties	may	be	defined	as	the	specific	legal	and	 non-legal	 obligations	 that	 are	 attached	 to	 a	 given	 public	 office.	 While	 legal	obligations	are	associated	with	 formal	sanctions,	 the	non-legal	obligations	that	 fall	on	partisans	are	first	and	foremost	of	a	moral	nature.14	Rosenblum	and	Muirhead	adopt	a	slightly	different	approach	by	discussing	the	virtues	that	partisans	display	at	their	best		in	 liberal	 democracies.	 In	 this	 context,	 Rosenblum	 speaks	 for	 instance	 of	 the	 "moral	
																																								 																					
14	As	 Bonotti	 insists	 himself,	 legal	 and	 non-legal	 obligations	 may	 overlap,	 the	 degree	 of	 overlap	 partly	depending	 on	 how	 extensively	 and	 formally	 legal	 obligations	 are	 defined	 (Bonotti,	 2012,	 p.	 155).	 For	instance,	while	the	degree	to	which	hate	speech	is	prosecuted	in	 liberal	democratic	countries	varies,	one	may	still	assert	that	partisans	have	a	moral	obligation	not	to	promote	intolerance	towards	minority	groups.		
	
50	
distinctiveness	of	party	ID"	(Rosenblum,	2008,	p.	363).	She	uses	this	term	to	describe	the	qualities	 that	partisans	display	when	 they	not	 only	 "operate	within	 an	 agreed-on	constitutional	 framework"	 but	 are	 instead	 "active,	 avowed,	 intentional	 agents"	 in	support	 of	 the	 liberal	 democratic	 regime	 (Rosenblum,	 2008,	 pp.	 124,	 363).	Muirhead	also	 uses	 the	 term	 "ethical	 partisanship"	 to	 designate	 cases	 where	 partisans	 fulfil	obligations	that	are	of	a	moral	rather	than	legal	nature.	These	include	demonstrating	"a	willingness	 to	 contemplate	 the	 possibility	 that	 one's	 own	 views	might	 not	 constitute	the	whole	truth"	and	thus	to	"decide	political	questions	without	allowing	that	decision	to	overwhelm	one's	critical	capacities"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	98).	What	 most	 of	 these	 authors	 emphasise,	 is	 how	 important	 it	 is	 to	 uphold	 a	
pluralist	 conception	of	 the	political	 community.15	A	commitment	 to	political	pluralism	may	be	seen	as	the	mother	of	all	democratic	virtues	or,	as	Rosenblum	insists,	the	first	"condition	 for	 developing	 moral	 capacities"	 (Rosenblum,	 1998,	 p.	 18). 16 	Political	pluralism	may	be	defined	as	an	account	of	the	political	world	according	to	which	"there	is	 no	 single,	 univocal	 summum	 bonum	 that	 can	 be	 defined	 philosophically,	 let	 alone	imposed	 politically"	 (Galston,	 2002,	 p.	 30).	 To	 this	 extent,	 it	 is	 a	moral	 stance	 rather	than	 a	 descriptive	 concept.	 It	 is	 prescriptive	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 defines	 a	 goal	 to	 be	attained,	a	type	of	ethics	that	needs	to	be	infused	in	the	spirit	of	democracy.	Pluralism	asserts	itself	as	a	specific	ethos	that	is	opposed	to—and	should	be	defended	against—holistic	 or	 monistic	 accounts	 of	 the	 moral	 universe.	 These	 claim	 that	 the	 latter	 is	ordered	 according	 to	 a	 unique,	 definitive	 and	 exclusive	 account	 of	 the	 common	good	(Galston,	2002,	p.	6).			 For	partisans	 to	 further	 a	pluralistic	 account	of	 the	political	world,	 they	 should	have	what	Muirhead	has	termed	negative	capacity:	a	form	of	self-restraint	with	regard	
																																								 																					
15	At	this	point,	 it	 is	important	to	specify	that	I	do	not	understand	commitment	to	political	pluralism	as	a	deep,	 psychosocial	 disposition	 that	 motivates	 individuals.	 When	 I	 say	 that	 a	 partisan	 is	 committed	 to	political	pluralism,	I	am	stating	that	his	discourse	and	practices	conform	to	the	moral	obligations	that	fall	on	partisans	in	a	liberal	democracy—I	am	not	making	a	claim	about	his	intentions	or	motives.	I	explain	in	more	detail	the	reasons	for	this	in	Chapter	2,	Part	I,	2,	a.			16	It	is	important	to	emphasise	here	that	there	is	no	agreed-on	set	of	civic	virtues	in	the	literature	and	that	different	 authors	 insist	 on	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 ethical	 life	 (see	 Rosenblum,	 1998,	 pp.	 12-13	 for	 a	discussion).	 I	 insist	 here	on	 these	 two	particular	dimensions	not	 only	because	 they	 are	 recurrent	 in	 the	literature	on	partisanship,	but	because	they	are	arguably	at	the	basis	of	a	number	of	other	virtues	that	the	more	general	theoretical	literature	has	discussed.		
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to	their	own	convictions	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	106).17	Partisans	endorse	pluralism	-	and	are	therefore	ethical	from	a	democratic	perspective	-	when,	retaining	their	own	views,	they	 still	 see	 that	 they	 cannot	 impose	 them	on	 others.	 They	 accept	 that	 their	 party's	status	 is	 that	 of	 a	 part	 in	 the	 polity,	 and	 that	 it	 cannot	 claim	 to	 represent	 the	whole	(Bonotti,	2011;	Sartori,	1976,	ch.	1).	As	democratic	subjects,	their	task	is	thus	to	resist	the	"drive	towards	dogmatism"	and	"reject	 the	clean,	consistent	stance	of	subjugating	difference	 merely	 because	 it	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 identities	 (they)	 live	 and	 endorse"	(Connolly,	1991).		 This	negative	capacity	is	a	fundamental	endorsement	of	political	pluralism	as	the	moral	 worldview	 of	 liberal	 democracy.	 As	 famously	 argued	 by	 Lefort,	 "the	revolutionary	 and	 unprecedented	 feature	 of	 democracy	 (is	 that)	 the	 locus	 of	 power	becomes	an	empty	place	(...),	it	cannot	be	occupied—it	is	such	that	not	individual	and	no	group	 can	 be	 consubstantiated	 with	 it"	 (Lefort,	 1988a,	 p.	 16).	 At	 the	 heart	 of	 this	mutation	 of	 symbolic	 power	 is	 a	 moral	 revolution,	 "instituted	 and	 sustained	 by	 the	dissolution	 of	 the	 markers	 of	 certainty"	 (Lefort,	 1988a,	 p.	 19).	 Power	 cannot	 be	permanently	 occupied	 in	 a	world	 characterised	 by	 indeterminacy,	where	 no	 claim	 to	the	good	 is	accepted	as	 complete	and	definitive.	The	negative	 capacity	of	partisans	 is	thus	an	endorsement	of	 the	most	basic	principle	of	 liberal	democracy:	 that	 the	moral	universe	 is	characterised	by	a	plurality	of	 legitimate	claims	 to	 the	common	good,	and	that,	 consequently,	 the	 political	 authority	 devolved	 through	 elections	 to	 a	 party	representing	only	one	of	these	claims	is	necessarily	and	always	of	a	provisional	nature.		
b.	Moral	obligation	and	the	democratic	functions	of	partisans	
If	more	stringent	moral	obligations	weigh	on	partisans	than	on	lay	citizens,	it	is	because	 their	 discourse	 and	 practices	 have	 greater	 consequences	 for	 the	 polity	 as	 a	whole.	 Tthe	 position	 of	 partisans	 in	 the	 public	 sphere—with	 privileged	 access	 to	financial	 resources,	media	attention	and	 state	power—lends	partisans	much	 leverage	for	 shaping	 the	contours	of	a	public	deliberation.	As	Schattschneider	emphasised,	 the	definition	of	 alternatives	by	political	 parties	 is	de	facto	 an	 exercise	of	political	 power	
																																								 																					
17	This	idea	of	self-restraint	is	recurrent	in	the	literature.	Ryn	argues	that	"man's	ethical	conscience	(...)	is	better	described	as	a	principle	of	self-examination	or	censure	set	apart	from	particular	human	feelings	and	actions",	and	that	the	politician	must	thus	entertain	"the	possibility	that	his	own	view	of	how	the	moral	end	can	be	promoted	by	government	 is	mistaken.	(Ryn,	1978,	pp.	14,	174).	Muirhead	speaks	of	 the	 'negative	capacity'	of	partisans	who	"stand	for	something,	but	(...)	see	that	theirs	is	not	the	only	reasonable	place	one	can	 take	a	stand"	 (Muirhead,	2014,	p.	106).	Kateb	speaks	of	 the	 'constitutional	delicacy'	of	 the	politician	who	 "wants	 to	win	 but	 only	 in	 accordance	with	 rules,	 only	 after	 a	 fight,	 only	 after,	 perhaps,	 aiding	 the	antagonist	to	become	equal"	(Kateb,	1981,	p.	362).	
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(Schattschneider,	 1960,	 p.	 66).	 If	 representation	 is	 performative	 and	 partisans	contribute	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 political	 identities	 within	 a	 given	 citizenry,	 then	 the	extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 are	 committed	 to	 political	 pluralism	 is	 key	 to	 the	development	and	endurance	of	pluralist	ethics	within	society	at	large.	To	this	extent,	it	is	also	essential	to	the	more	general	perpetuation	of	democracy	as	a	'way	of	life'.		Yet	 partisans	 that	 campaign	 on	 holistic	 rather	 than	 pluralistic	 platforms	 not	only	 encourage	 the	 development	 of	 non-ethical	 tendencies	 within	 a	 given	 citizenry.	They	also	represent	a	threat	to	the	integrity	of	democratic	 institutions	once	in	power.	As	 state	 actors,	 partisans	 form	 governments,	 decide	 on	 policy,	 and	 hold	 key	administrative	 positions.	 As	 emphasised	 above,	 checks-and-balances	may	well	 create	positive	 incentives	 for	 state	 actors	 towards	 compliance.	But	 if	 only	material	 interests	are	at	stake,	it	is	a	matter	of	time	before	a	party	receives	a	sufficient	majority	to	grant	itself	undue	power	through	constitutional	reform	at	the	detriment	of	its	opposition.18	For	 partisan	 actors	 to	 choose	 institutionalised	 competition	 over	 radical	constitutional	 reforms,	 it	 is	 thus	 necessary	 that	 they	 comply	 not	 only	 with	 the	 legal	obligation	 of	 following	 existing	 procedures,	 but	 with	 the	 moral	 obligation	 of	 not	exploiting	 the	 system's	 institutional	 loopholes	 (Herman,	 2015).	 For	 this	 reason,	theorists	 of	 democratic	 consolidation	 have	 long	 emphasised	 that	 the	 survival	 of	democratic	regime	requires	the	absence	of	actors	that	are	both	disloyal	to	democracy	and	in	a	position	to	obtain	a	parliamentary	majority	(Linz,	1978;	Linz	&	Stepan,	1996).	The	 survival	 of	democracy's	 institutional	 framework	 is	 thus	not	only	dependent	on	a	well-designed	 system	 of	 incentives,	 but	 on	 the	 inner-check	 of	 partisans.	 They	 should	recognise	that	they	cannot	claim	to	hold	the	whole	truth	on	the	nature	of	the	common	good,	 and	 refrain	 from	 denying	 their	 opponents	 any	 legitimacy	 in	 representing	 the	political	community.		
3.	The	commitment	of	partisans	to	pluralism:	two	domains	of	expression	In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	will	 focus	 on	 two	 domains	 in	which	 partisans	 can	demonstrate,	 or	 fail	 to	 demonstrate,	 commitment	 to	 pluralism.	 The	 first	 domain	concerns	 the	 relation	 of	 partisans	 to	 their	 opponents,	 and	 especially,	 the	 extent	 to	
																																								 																					
18In	 first-wave	 democracies,	 political	majorities	 have	 undoubtedly	modified	 constitutional	 rules	 to	 their	own	advantage	-	 from	the	common	act	of	gerrymandering	to	the	modification	of	electoral	systems	(Boix,	1999).	Constitutional	reforms	that	have	challenged	democracy	'procedural	minimum'	-	free	elections	and	the	 guarantee	 of	 citizens'	 basic	 civil	 and	 political	 rights	 -	 are	 nevertheless	 the	 exception,	 not	 the	 rule	(Alexander,	2001).	There	is	a	case	to	be	made	here	that	a	deeper	commitment	of	partisan	to	the	system	of	regulated	rivalry	has	also	contributed	to	the	stabilisation	of	first-wave	democracies.		
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which	they	demonstrate	respect	for	political	opposition.		The	second	concerns	the	ways	in	which	partisans	relate	to	the	question	of	political	agreement	and	disagreement.	For	both,	 I	will	establish	criteria	 to	evaluate	the	pluralist	nature	of	French	and	Hungarian	partisan	discourse	in	Chapter	4	and	5.	
a.	Partisan	attitudes	towards	political	opponents	
Studying	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 partisans	 relate	 to	 opponents	 is	 essential	 for	evaluating	 their	commitment	 to	political	pluralism	and	 their	capacity	 to	exercise	self-restraint.	As	emphasised	 in	 the	 first	part	of	 this	 chapter,	 to	 suggest	 cohesive	political	programs	 to	 citizens	 -	 and	 thus	give	 them	reasons	 to	engage	with	politics	 -	partisans	need	 to	offer	 alternative	normative	 ideals,	 as	well	 as	 an	 indication	of	 the	means	 they	intend	 to	 use	 for	 executing	 these.	 In	 trying	 to	 convince	 voters	 of	 the	 validity	 of	 their	claims,	 it	 is	 thus	necessary	 for	partisans	 to	 compare	 their	platforms	 to	 those	of	 their	opponents	 (White	 &	 Ypi,	 2011).	 They	 will	 argue	 for	 the	 superiority	 of	 their	 own	program	and	criticise	their	opponents'	platform.	More	fundamentally	perhaps,	the	very	engagement	of	partisans	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 conviction	 that	 their	own	 ideas	and	policies	are	superior	to	those	of	their	opponents.	At	the	basis	of	partisan	identity	there	is	thus	a	story	of	"why	'we'	deserve	to	govern,	and	why	'they'	do	not"	(Rosenblum,	2008,	p.	358).	As	Rosenblum	continues,	 "Party	 IS	 in	part	negative	 association.	Unlike	other	political	identities,	party	 IS	mutually	exclusive;	one	cannot	be	both	Democrat	and	Republican"	(Rosenblum,	2008,	ibid).		Partisans	 commited	 to	 political	 pluralism	 will	 engage	 in	 such	 necessary	opposition	while	recognising	the	legitimacy	of	opponents	in	formulating	contradictory	claims.	 This	 is	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 the	 exercise	 of	 negative	 capacity:	 placing	 our	opponents'	right	to	disagree	above	our	conviction	in	the	superiority	of	our	own	claims.	Partisans	 that	 uphold	 pluralist	 standards	 can	 hold	 both	 propositions	 together.	 They	want	to	win,	yet	are	sufficiently	conscious	of	the	partiality	of	their	claims	to	not	desire	a	'complete'	 victory.	They	 can	be	 impassioned	and	principled,	 yet	know	 that	 that	 there	are	other	legitimate	reasons	to	be	impassioned	and	principled	than	their	own.	To	sum-up,	 partisans	 ideally	 exercise	 loyal	 opposition:	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 disagree	with	 other	partisans	should	not	alter	the	respect	they	have	for	them.		Respect	is	not	the	simple	toleration	that	stems	from	grudgingly	resigning	to	co-existence.	 It	 is	a	more	voluntary	 "reciprocal	positive	regard"	between	opponents	 that	consider	 each-other	 as	 equals	 in	 an	 inclusive	 and	 pluralist	 political	 community	(Gutmann	 &	 Thompson,	 2010,	 pp.	 1129-1130).	 The	 importance	 of	 maintaining	 such	
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respectful	attitudes	towards	political	and	moral	opposition	is	a	central	feature	of	both	agonistic	 and	 deliberative	 approaches	 to	 democracy.	 The	 former	 contend	 that	democracy	 rests	on	 the	nurturing	of	 agonistic	 rather	 than	antagonistic	 relations	with	political	opponents.	According	to	Mouffe,	opponents	are	thus	first	and	foremost	aware	of	their	"shared	adhesion	to	the	ethico-political	principles	of	liberal	democracy"	in	this	configuration	(Mouffe,	2000,	pp.	101-102).	This	then	makes	it	possible	for	"the	 'them'	(to	 be	 constructed)	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 perceived	 as	 an	 enemy	 to	 be	destroyed,	but	as	an	 'adversary'	 that	 is,	 somebody	whose	 idea	we	combat,	but	whose	right	 to	 defend	 those	 ideas	 we	 do	 not	 put	 into	 question"	 (Mouffe,	 2000,	 ibid).	Deliberative	 approaches	 also	 view	 'reciprocity'	 as	 a	 key	 condition	 for	 democratic	subjects	 to	 deliberate	 in	 the	 face	 of	 moral	 disagreement,	 a	 condition	 that	 involves	viewing	 opponents	 as	 both	 'competent	 subjects'	 and	 'moral	 and	 political	 equals'	 in	Habermasian	vocabulary	(Gutmann	&	Thompson,	1996,	p.	17).	In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 offer	 three	 criteria	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 one	 can	distinguish	between	respectful	and	disrespectful	attitudes	towards	political	opponents.	Partisans	 respect	 their	 political	 opponents	 when	 they	 criticise	 them	 on	 the	 basis	 of	their	practices	and	discourses	 rather	 than	on	 their	 intentions	 (Criterion	1),	 recognise	that	 the	 position	 of	 opponents	 is	 anchored	 in	 a	 distinct	 interpretation	 of	 shared	fundamental	 principles	 (Criterion	 2),	 and	 consider	 their	 opponents	 as	 moral	 agents	that	are	oriented	towards	the	common	good	(Criterion	3).		
Criterion	1:	Criticising	opponents	on	practices,	not	intentions	The	 first	 criterion	 concerns	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 partisans	 formulate	 criticism	towards	their	opponents.	To	respect	political	opponents,	rival	partisans	should	refrain	from	engaging	 in	what	Gutmann	and	Thomson	have	coined	 'motive-cynicism':	 raising	doubts	 on	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 reasons	 opponents	 have	 to	 say	 or	 do	 something	(Gutmann	 &	 Thompson,	 2010,	 p.	 1133).	 For	 instance,	 to	 accuse	 opponents	 of	 being	moved	 by	 their	 own	 private	 interest—or	 of	 being	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 private	interests—is	 typical	of	 this	 type	of	 rhetoric.	 Such	accusations	may	 range	 from	simple	references	 to	 the	 vote-seeking	 attitude	 of	 opponents,	 to	more	 serious	 accusations	 of	being	corrupt	and	moved	solely	by	material	gain.		Partisans	need	not	 ignore	 that	 their	opponents	strategically	 target	voters,	and	that	a	certain	measure	of	corruption	exists	in	even	the	most	established	democracies	of	the	world.	Commitment	to	political	pluralism	does	not	amount	to	naivety.	It	is	rather	a	recognition	that,	if	the	motives	of	those	who	engage	with	politics,	including	their	own,	
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are	always	mixed,	then	questioning	the	full	integrity	of	their	opponents'	motives	is	both	hypocritical	 and	 destructive	 to	 the	 political	 debate.	 Not	 only	 are	 attacks	 on	 motives	often	 grounded	 in	 assumptions	 rather	 than	 facts,	 they	 also	 preclude	 the	 constructive	criticism	of	opponents’	discourse	and	practices	 that	should	 form	the	basis	of	partisan	debates.	 In	 this	 context,	 pluralist	 partisans	 may	 instead	 use	 their	 own	 normative	assumptions	as	a	basis	for	criticising	their	opponents.	A	pro-choice	partisan	could,	for	instance,	criticise	anti-abortion	policies	for	leading	to	a	restriction	of	the	freedom	and	well-being	 of	 women	 in	 society,	 rather	 than	 accuse	 their	 opponents	 of	 catering	 to	 a	radical	fringe	of	their	electorate.	This	argument	is	indeed	compatible	with	recognising	pro-life	activists	as	moral	agents	motivated	by	legitimate	principled	commitments.		
Criterion	2:	Considering	opponents	as	principled	The	second	criterion	for	respectful	political	discourse	is	an	acknowledgement	of	the	 principled	 nature	 of	 opponents'	 positions.	 Partisans	 should	 assume	 that,	 even	 if	they	disagree	with	their	rivals'	stances,	these	"act	not	only	for	their	own	political	gain	but	also	out	of	a	desire	to	do	what	they	think	is	right"	(Gutmann	&	Thompson,	2010).		Assuming	 the	 'mixed	motives'	of	opponents	 is	 thus	 to	see	 that,	while	 these	are	partly	moved	by	the	desire	to	win	elections	and	gain	office,	opponents	are	also	committed	to	advance	a	set	of	principles	they	believe	in.		Assuming	that	opponents	act	on	principle	is	a	straightforward	sign	of	respect,	to	the	 extent	 that	 principled	 political	 commitment	 carries	 intrinsically	 positive	connotations.	 To	 say	 that	 a	 politician	 has	 principles	 and	 stands	 by	 them	 is	 in-and-of	itself	 a	 recognition	 of	 political	merit.	 Pushing	 this	 argument	 further,	 to	 recognise	 the	principled	nature	of	opposition	may	also	be	seen	to	derive	from	partisans'	belief	in	the	morality	of	opposition.	As	Gutmann	and	Thomson	emphasise,	 to	"treat	(a)	position	as	expressing	 a	 moral	 rather	 than	 a	 purely	 strategic,	 political	 or	 economic	 view"	 also	involves	that	"an	opponent's	position	is	based	on	moral	principles	about	which	people	may	 reasonably	 disagree"	 (Gutmann	 &	 Thompson,	 1996,	 p.	 82).	 Indeed,	 why	 would	disagreements	 persist	 in	 the	 face	 of	 joint	 commitment	 to	 the	 common	 good?	 The	pluralist	 -	 and	 thus	 ethical	 -	 response	 to	 this	 question	 attributes	 the	 persistence	 of	political	disagreements	to	different	understandings	of	the	exact	content	of	the	'common	good',	and	of	its	practical	implications.		While	 pluralist	 partisans	 know	 that	 they	 may	 share	 with	 opponents	 a	commitment	 to	 freedom	 and	 equality,	 they	 are	 also	 aware	 that	 their	 opponents	disagree	on	the	exact	definition	of	these	principles,	on	their	practical	implications,	or	on	
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the	relation	of	these	principles	to	one	another.	As	Connolly	insists,	these	principles	are	'essentially	 contested'	 precisely	 because	 they	 are	 both	 appraisive	 -	 that	 is	 valued	 as	social	 goods	 -	 and	 internally	 complex	 (Connolly,	 1993,	 p.	 10).	 In	 his	 own	 words,	"(p)olitics	 involves	 the	 clash	 that	 emerges	 when	 appraisive	 conceptions	 are	 shared	widely	but	imperfectly,	when	mutual	understanding	and	interpretation	is	possible	but	in	 a	 partial	 and	 limited	 way,	 when	 reasoned	 argument	 and	 coercive	 pressure	commingle	 precariously	 in	 the	 endless	 process	 of	 defining	 and	 resolving	 issues"	(Connolly,	1993,	p.	40).	By	recognising	that	opponents	have	different	understandings	of	shared	 principles,	 partisans	 are	 recognising	 the	 essentially	 contested	 nature	 of	 these	concepts,	and	thus,	the	ethical	necessity	of	political	pluralism.		
Criterion	3:	Viewing	opponents	as	oriented	towards	the	common	good	Finally,	the	most	outright	and	basic	sign	of	respect	for	opponents	is	to	recognise	that	they	are	'moral	agents'	and	thus	fundamentally	committed	to	advancing	the	good	of	 the	 political	 community.	 This	 is	 ultimately	 the	 imperative	 to	which	 both	 previous	criteria	 lead	 to.	 While	 the	 'common	 good'	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 overly	 general	 and	impractical	 concept,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 plluralist	 forms	 of	 partisanship.	 It	amounts	 to	 a	 belief	 that	 adversaries	 are	 committed	 to	 addressing	 widely	 accepted	societal	 problems	 (sickness,	 poverty,	 crime),	 and	 that	 their	 action	 is	 guided	 by	 a	concern	 for	 fundamental	principles	such	as	 freedom,	equality	and	the	preservation	of	democracy's	 'procedural	minimum'	(Galston,	2013).	In	other	words,	partisans	need	to	believe	that	they	share	with	their	adversaries	a	will	to	better	the	political	community,	that	despite	their	divergences	they	have	a	common	good	to	defend.	As	Muirhead	insists,	"this	 is	 the	basis	of	 good	 faith	and	civic	 respect;	 it	 is	what	makes	 the	permanent	and	peaceful	disagreement	of	rival	partisans	possible"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	251).		Indeed,	 the	 opposite	 scenario	 would	 consist	 in	 believing	 that	 opponents	 are	fundamentally	 oriented	 towards	harming	the	political	 community	 and	 thus,	 that	 they	are	outside	the	sphere	of	common	morality.	Gutmann	and	Thomson	raise	the	example	of	pro-life	activists	that	depict	pro-choice	activists	as	being	'in	favour	of	killing	babies'	(Gutmann	 &	 Thompson,	 1996,	 p.	 80).	 To	 say	 that	 opponents	 are	 proponents	 of	 the	death	of	infants	is	essentially	to	suggest	that	they	are	fundamentally	immoral.	It	would	be	similarly	unethical	if	a	pro-choice	activist	attributed	a	desire	to	encourage	teen	rape	pregnancies	to	pro-life	activists.	If	they	have	such	base	intentions,	opponents	are	then	
de	facto	illegitimate	to	govern.	They	also	fail	to	meet	the	very	basic	condition	for	being	included	in	a	political	discussion.	
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b.	Partisan	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement	
Partisans'	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 question	 of	 political	 agreement	 and	disagreement	 also	 provide	 an	 adequate	 ground	 for	 assessing	 their	 commitment	 to	political	pluralism,	and	 thus	 their	 capacity	 towards	self-restraint.	 If	partisans	were	 to	only	follow	their	own	convictions	without	exercising	a	form	of	'negative	capacity',	they	would	wish	 for	 an	 absolute	 and	 irrevocable	 consensus	 to	 be	 established	 in	 favour	 of	their	 own	 views.	 As	 Muirhead	 emphasises	 "partisans	 in	 their	 most	 pure	 and	 most	ambitious	 form	do	not	want	 contestation	 to	 endure	but	 to	be	 settled	 in	 their	 favour"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	70).	Indeed,	if	a	partisan	believes	that	his	own	conception	of	justice	is	 superior	 to	 his	 opponents',	 why	would	 he	 not	wish	 for	 his	 own	 views	 to	 triumph	completely	and	indefinitely?	As	emphasised	above,	the	commitment	of	ethical	partisans	to	 the	 principles	 of	 political	 pluralism	 should	 act	 as	 a	 break	 on	 these	 holistic	 drives.	Beyond	 respect	 for	 political	 opponents,	 ethical	 partisans	 will	 also	 have	 a	 certain	appreciation	 of	 the	 value	 and	 limits	 of	 partisan	 agreement	 and	 disagreements	 in	 a	pluralistic	 political	 community.	 At	 their	 best,	 partisans	 value	 and	 argue	 in	 favour	 of	what	Sartori	has	 termed	 'pluralistic	unanimity':	 "the	coexistence	of	a	unitary	political	framework	and	a	pluralism	of	parties	pursuing	particular	goals	without	threatening	the	fundamental	values	and	institutions	of	the	framework	itself"	(Sartori,	1976,	p.	16).		I	 will	 discuss	 two	 criteria	 for	 evaluating	 the	 commitment	 to	 pluralism	 that	partisans	show	in	their	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement.	First,	pluralist	partisans	appreciate	the	necessity	of	shared	principles	across	partisan	lines	in	maintaining	a	coherent	political	community.	Second,	pluralist	partisans	recognise	that,	within	 the	 limits	 of	 these	 shared	 principles,	 political	 contestation	 is	 not	 only	unavoidable,	but	perhaps	also	valuable	for	its	own	sake.		
Criterion	1:	Acknowledging	the	necessity	of	shared	principles	Commitment	 to	 political	 pluralism	 first	 involves	 allegiance	 to	 a	 non-partisan	and	suprapartisan	idea	of	the	political	community.	This	means	not	only	that	the	loyalty	of	partisans	to	the	political	community	should	have	precedence	over	their	allegiance	to	the	party,	but	that	they	should	also	refrain	from	equating	allegiance	to	their	party	with	allegiance	to	the	community.	In	other	words,	partisans	should	be	dedicated	to	an	idea	of	the	political	community	that	includes	all	parties,	yet	transcends	them.	The	dedication	to	the	political	community,	in	all	its	plurality	and	complexity,	is	what	acts	as	a	break	on	the	 selfish	 drives	 of	 partisan	 conviction.	 As	 Rosenblum	 emphasises,	 ethical	commitments	 "arise	 from	 'identification'	with	 the	political	 community	and	 feelings	of	
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belonging:	 we	 are	 affiliated	 and	 therefore	 morally	 obligated,	 not	 vice-versa"	(Rosenblum,	 1998,	 p.	 52).	 Ryn	 goes	 even	 further	 to	 equate	 ethical	 conscience	 with	communal	 allegiance.	 According	 to	 him,	 "community	 can	 emerge	 only	 in	 a	 society	where	the	forces	of	egotistical	interests	are	tempered	by	concern	for	the	common	good.	In	disposing	us	against	what	is	merely	arbitrary	and	selfish,	ethical	conscience	disposes	against	what	separates	us	from	others"	(Ryn,	1978,	p.	83).		The	political	community	starts	with	the	idea	of	the	common	good.	What	makes	the	political	community	is	what	we	share	with	others	that	transcends	particular	group	interests	and	our	defence	of	particular	convictions.	Following	Galston,	we	can	identify	three	 separate	 components	 of	 the	 'common	 good'	 in	 democratic	 societies	 (Galston,	2013).	 The	 first	 refers	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 'matters	 of	 common	 concern',	 issues	 that	should	be	 considered	 collectively	because	 they	 result	 from	social	 linkage.	The	health,	education	and	security	of	citizens	may	be	seen,	 for	 instance,	as	 'common	goods':	 they	are	 among	 the	 societal	 objectives	 that	 partisans	 will	 claim	 they	 wish	 to	 achieve,	regardless	 of	 their	 position	 on	 the	 political	 spectrum.	 What	 these	 objectives	 exactly	entail,	their	relative	importance	to	one	another,	and	the	means	by	which	they	should	be	achieved,	 will	 remain	 a	 topic	 of	 constant	 contestation.	 Pluralist	 partisans	 will	nevertheless	know	that	the	community	is	partly	defined	by	a	common	concern	for	the	realisation	of	these	objectives.		Second,	the	idea	of	political	community	is	grounded	in	a	series	of	fundamental	principles	that	define	the	common	good	at	large.	Even	agonistic	theories	of	democracy,	that	 give	 a	 central	 role	 to	 political	 contestation,	 recognise	 the	 need	 for	 a	 "certain	amount	of	consensus"	and	more	specifically,	"a	shared	adhesion	to	the	ethico-political	principles	of	 liberal	democracy"	 (Mouffe,	 2000,	p.	 103).	 Such	principles	 are	 generally	listed	 in	 the	 Preamble	 of	 a	 democracy's	 constitution.	 While	 some	 of	 these—justice,	equality	or	freedom—are	common	to	most	democratic	constitutional	frameworks,	their	order	 and	 emphasise	may	diverge	 from	one	 to	 another.	 Some	principles	may	 also	be	particular	to	certain	constitutional	arrangements.19	In	any	case,	this	mutual	ground	for	partisanship	does	not	preclude	very	different	 interpretations	of	 the	meaning,	 relative	importance	 and	 implications	 of	 each	 principle.	 But	 partisans'	 allegiance	 to	 these	principles,	 and	 awareness	 of	 a	 common,	 suprapartisan	 allegiance	 to	 these	 principles,	should	trump	their	dedication	to	particular	interpretations.	In	the	words	of	Muirhead,	
																																								 																					
19	As	Galston	emphasises,	"(e)very	political	community	assumes	a	distinctive	form	and	identity	through	its	constitution.	 A	 constitution,	 we	 may	 say,	 represents	 an	 authoritative	 partial	 ordering	 of	 public	 values"	(Galston,	2002,	p.	66).	
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"(w)hat	matters	is	that	the	principles	at	some	general	level	are	taken	(by	partisans)	as	a	given"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	239).		Finally,	 the	 institutions	 of	 a	 democracy	may	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 common	 good.	They	 provide	 the	 framework	 within	 which,	 and	 procedures	 with	 which,	 collective	decisions	can	be	made	and	implemented,	disputes	settled	and	the	voices	of	minorities	protected.	In	other	words,	"(i)f	the	Preamble	states	the	ends	of	the	union,	the	body	of	the	Constitution	sets	forth	the	institutional	means	for	achieving	them"	(Galston,	2013,	p.	13).	The	institutions	of	democracy	are	therefore	both	suprapartisan	and	non-partisan:	they	 put	 every	 party	 on	 an	 equal	 level,	 and	 thus	 ensure	 that	 partisan	 contestation	remains	open	and	the	place	of	power	 'empty'.	This	 is	also	why	constitutional	drafting	and	 major	 constitutional	 amendments	 are	 generally	 seen	 to	 require	 the	 assent	 of	 a	multiplicity	of	parties.	To	be	accepted	by	all,	 rules	should	be	seen	as	belonging	to	 the	common	and	not	as	favouring	one	particular	group	over	another.		That	 partisans	 consider	 these	 different	 components	 of	 the	 common	 good	 as	foundational	 of	 the	 political	 community	 at	 large	 is	 a	 key	 condition	 for	 their	commitment	 to	 pluralism.	 As	 emphasised	 above,	 partisans	 can	 only	 respect	 their	opponents	if	they	see	them	as	oriented	towards	the	common	good,	and	therefore	if	they	see	their	opponents	as	one	legitimate	part	of	the	political	community.	In	the	absence	of	this	 common	 symbolic	 space,	 partisans	 are	 deprived	 of	 a	 vocabulary	 with	 which	 to	settle	disputes.	Respected	adversaries	then	turn	into	dangerous	enemies.	The	unity	and	stability	 of	 democracy	 depends	 on	 partisans	 recognising	 this	 common	 good.	 As	emphasised	 by	 Bonotti,	 "(p)arties	 do	 not	 normally	 question,	 for	 example,	 whether	justice,	 freedom,	 equality,	 etc.	 are	 valuable	 goals	 that	 ought	 to	 be	 pursued	 by	 the	government	 in	charge",	and	they	refrain	from	challenging	the	institutional	 framework	that	regulates	partisan	contestation	(Bonotti,	2011,	pp.	21-22).		Finally,	partisans	should	not	only	avoid	challenging	the	content	of	this	'common	good',	but	also	its	consensual	nature.	Where	they	fail	to	do	so,	they	lose	sight	of	the	fact	that	"for	democracy	to	exist,	no	social	agent	should	be	able	to	claim	any	mastery	of	the	foundation	 of	 society"	 (Mouffe,	 2000,	 p.	 21).	 Indeed,	 partisan	 contestation	 over	 the	foundations	of	the	political	community	entails	the	confrontation	of	holistic	rather	than	
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pluralistic	appeals.	At	best,	this	leads	to	a	polarised	political	debate,	at	worst	to	a	state	of	civil	war.20		
Criterion	2:	Endorsing	the	ineliminability	of	disagreement	That	 partisans	 accept	 the	 idea	 of	 such	 shared,	 foundational	 agreements	 does	not	 preclude	 their	 attachment	 to	 partisan	 contestation.	 In	 fact,	 such	 foundational	agreements	are	the	primary	condition	for	them	to	endorse	dissent	as	a	permanent	and	even	 beneficial	 characteristic	 of	 a	 democratic	 society.	 These	 common	 principles	establish	a	 frame	within	which	contestation	does	not	 threaten	to	destroy	the	political	community.	Once	accepted,	 they	 instead	provide	an	opportunity	 for	 the	expression	of	alternative	 partisan	 convictions.	 Foundational	 principles	 do	 not	 therefore	 settle	arguments.	They	are	an	opportunity	to	disagree,	they	provide	the	terms	within	which	disagreement	 may	 become	 a	 permanent	 feature	 of	 the	 polity,	 and	 therefore	 within	which	democracy	is	made	possible.		Partisans	committed	to	political	pluralism	should	therefore	know	that	political	disagreement	over	the	meaning	and	implications	of	these	common	principles	is	not	only	ineliminable	in	a	liberal	democracy,	but	core	to	its	perpetuation.	As	underlined	earlier,	foundational	 principles	 are	 "essentially	 contested	 concepts"	 (Connolly,	 1993).	 Their	normative	weight	and	internal	complexity	entails	that	no	single	agent	can	ever	account	for	 them	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 all	 will	 agree.	 Any	 identity	 built	 around	 a	 given	interpretation	 of	 these	 principles	 will	 exclude	 other	 identities	 built	 on	 diverging	interpretations,	and	thus	cause	disagreement.21	From	 the	 ambivalence	 of	 foundational	 principles	 flows	 the	 inevitability	 of	partisan	 disagreements.	 Partisans	 will	 disagree	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 those	principles	and	societal	objectives	that	constitute	the	common	good.	They	will	also	offer	different	solutions	to	the	inevitable	tensions	that	arise	from	holding	together	multiple	principles	 and	 thus	 prioritise	 some	 principles	 over	 others.	 From	 these	 diverse	interpretations	 and	 ordering	 of	 goods,	 partisans	 will	 rank	 societal	 objectives	 in	different	ways.	 Finally,	 partisans	will	 consequently	 disagree	 over	 the	means	 that	 are																																									 																					
20	Muirhead	 accurately	 describes	 the	 unravelling	 of	 such	 a	 dark	 scenario,	 where	 partisanship	 becomes	destructive	 to	 the	 political	 community:	 "(w)hen	 partisanship	 runs	 too	 deep,	 it	 threatens	 to	 expose	 (our	foundational)	settlements	and,	in	the	process,	to	weaken	the	agreement	that	stands	at	the	base	of	modern	politics"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	73).	 In	such	circumstances,	 "losers	may	decide	that	violence	or	secession	 is	preferable	to	peaceful	opposition	and	constitutional	obedience"	(Muirhead,	2014,	pp.	2-3).	21	Theorists	of	deliberative	democracy,	such	as	Gutmann	and	Thomson,	have	also	stressed	the	unavoidable	persistence	 of	 such	 forms	 of	 moral	 disagreements,	 deliberation	 only	 making	 possible	 the	 mutual	understanding	 necessary	 for	 finding	 common	 solutions	 to	 practical	 problems	 (Gutmann	 &	 Thompson,	1996,	2012).	
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most	appropriate	for	realizing	given	societal	objectives,	as	policy-solutions	will	also	be	driven	 by	 diverse	 interpretations	 of	 the	 common	 good	 (Galston,	 2013,	 pp.	 11-14;	Schmidt,	2008).	For	any	given	question,	partisan	disagreement	on	"the	specification	of	ends	as	well	as	the	choice	of	means"	is	thus	unavoidable,	and	this	because	"(a)	situation	requiring	 choice	 will	 typically	 present	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 genuine	 but	 heterogeneous	human	goods,	not	all	of	which	can	be	attained	(or	maximised)	simultaneously"	(Galston,	2002,	p.	90).		Pluralist	partisans	are	aware	of	this	moral	indeterminacy	and	do	not	attempt	to	foreclose	it.	They	accept	the	partial	nature	of	their	claims	-	and	thus	the	fact	that	these	spur	opposition	and	contestation	-	as	a	permanent	and	necessary	fact.	This,	according	to	Rosenblum,	 is	 the	 "categorical	moral	 distinctiveness	of	 party	 ID":	 ethical	 partisans	"do	not	want	or	expect	 the	elimination	of	political	 lines	of	division"	because	 they	are	committed	to	the	"system	of	regulated	rivalry	that	defines	representative	democracy"	(Rosenblum,	2008,	p.	364;	362).	They	fight	while	accepting	the	impossibility	of	a	final	victory,	without	hope	that	their	struggle	will	end	future	contestation	and	bring	about	a	permanent	consensus	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	107).	Beyond	the	incentives	created	by	well-designed	 institutions,	 this	 commitment	 is	what	 enables	 partisan	majorities	 to	 accept	the	 provisional	 nature	 of	 political	 authority	 and	 partisan	 minorities	 to	 accept	 their	status	as	temporary	losers	of	the	democratic	game.				 						
	
62		CHAPTER	2:	A	research	design	for	studying	partisanship		In	the	following	chapter,	I	provide	a	justification	for	the	research	design	chosen	for	this	study.	The	empirical	contribution	of	this	thesis	consists	of	a	textual	analysis	of	28	 group	 discussions	 conducted	 in	 2013	 with	 a	 total	 of	 117	 French	 and	 Hungarian	young	party	activists.	These	group	discussions	were	held	with	three	to	six	participants	at	 a	 time	 in	 the	 local	 sections	 of	 the	 two	 main	 centre-right	 and	 centre-left	 party	organisations	in	the	countries	considered.	In	France,	these	included	the	Parti	Socialiste	(PS)	and	Union	pour	un	Mouvement	populaire	(UMP),	in	Hungary	the	Magyar	Szocialista	
Párt	 (MSzP)	 and	Fiatal	Demokraták	Szövetsége	 (Fidesz).	 I	 explain	my	 epistemological	standpoint,	defend	my	case	study	selection,	and	justify	the	specific	methodology	for	this	project	 in	 light	 of	 my	 two	 main	 research	 questions:	 to	 what	 extent	 does	 real-world	
partisanship	 meet	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	 partisanship?	 and	 how	 can	 we	 explain	
variations	in	the	extent	to	which	partisans	upholds	these	standards?		
I.	STUDYING	PARTISANSHIP	THROUGH	PARTISAN	DISCOURSE	
In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 explain	 the	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	standpoints	 for	 this	 study.	 First,	 I	 situate	my	 study	 in	 the	broader	 literature	 that	 has	argued	 for	 an	 interpretative	 approach	 to	 politics,	 studying	 political	 phenomena	 and	change	through	the	practices	and	discourses	of	political	subjects.	In	the	second	section,	I	emphasise	why	I	choose	to	study	partisanship	by	focusing	on	partisan	discourse	and	what	 I	 mean	 when	 I	 say	 that	 a	 given	 partisan	 upholds	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	partisanship.	Finally,	 I	explain	how	this	 thesis	will	approach	and	explain	variations	 in	the	extent	to	which	partisans	uphold	these	standards.			
1.	Text	and	practice-oriented	approaches	to	politics		The	 choice	of	 a	 relevant	 research	design	 essentially	depends	on	 the	nature	of	one’s	object	of	 study	and	research	question	 (Silverman,	1993,	p.	25).	Considering	 the	focus	of	 this	 research—the	extent	 to	which	partisans	uphold	 theoretical	 standards	of	
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democratic	 partisanship—interpretative	 approaches	 to	 politics	 appear	 most	appropriate.	Interpretative	approaches	 to	politics	accommodate	a	variety	of	methods,	 from	discourse	analysis	to	participant	observation,	while	sharing	an	interest	for	the	ways	in	which	 meaning	 is	 created,	 negotiated	 and	 transmitted	 within	 society.	 Their	 main	assumption	 is	 that	 the	understanding	 individuals	have	of	 their	environment	 is	crucial	to	what	they	do	and	to	the	ways	in	which	they	themselves	influence	their	environment.	A	central	 focus	 is	 therefore	placed	on	the	 interactions	between	the	 individual	and	his	milieu,	with	cultural	resources	especially	acting	both	as	constraints	and	opportunities	for	the	production	and	negotiation	of	meaning	(Gamson,	1992;	Pateman,	1971;	Swidler,	1986;	 White,	 2009).	 Typically,	 instances	 of	 meaning-making	 activities	 constitute	 the	main	 object	 of	 interpretative	 studies.	 They	 are	 thus	 generally	 divided	 between	 those	that	 focus	on	 language,	with	 approaches	 including	 frame	analysis,	 discourse	 analysis,	dialogical	analysis,	etc.,	and	 those	 that	 focus	on	practice,	 the	main	method	here	being	that	of	participant	observation	(for	an	overview	as	applied	to	the	study	of	mass	politics,	see	White,	2009).		Interpretative	studies	remain	in	minority	in	the	political	sciences,	but	they	have	enjoyed	wider	 recognition	 in	 the	 last	 ten	years	 (Bevir	&	Rhodes,	 2010;	 Schatz,	 2009;	White,	 2009;	 Yanow	&	 Schwartz-Shea,	 2006).	 Interpretative	 approaches	 are	 relevant	precisely	 because	 they	 allow	 scholars	 to	 address	 questions	 that	 cannot	 be	 answered	through	 quantitative	 or	 classic	 comparative	 methods.	 Interpretative	 methods	 can	escape	 accusations	 of	 anecdotism	 and	 idiosyncrasy	 through	 the	 application	 of	 both	procedural	 rigor	 (involving	 careful	 case	 selection,	 and	 explicit,	 transparent,	 and	replicable	methods	of	data	interpretation)	and	philosophical	rigor	(involving	logic	and	argumentation)	(see	Seale,	1999;	Silverman,	1993,	chapter	8).	Under	these	conditions,	interpretative	 studies	 may	 claim	 to	 uncover	 'immanent'	 or	 'emergent'	 forms	 of	causality,	 in	 which	 the	 material	 and	 the	 discursive	 affect	 one	 another	 in	 a	 loop-like	fashion	(Gofas	&	Hay,	2007).	According	to	this	logic,	events	trigger	ideas	and	discourse	about	 them.	 Ideas	 and	 discourse	 structure	 and	 give	 meaning	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	individuals	decide	to	take	action	on	the	basis	of	these	events.	Finally,	these	actions	give	rise	 to	 new	 events.	 In	 Tønder's	 words,	 "as	 the	 idea	 engages	 the	world,	 causing	 it	 to	follow	this	or	that	(...)	path,	 the	 ideational	 itself	becomes	that	which	gives	meaning	to	the	outcome	of	this	path"	(Tønder,	2007,	p.	69).		
	
64	
2.	Partisan	discourse	and	democratic	partisanship	In	the	broader	context	of	these	types	of	approaches,	I	emphasise	the	status	and	meaning	I	give	to	the	notion	of	democratic	partisanship.	I	then	outline	how	I	apprehend	and	explain	the	empirical	variations	I	uncover	in	the	democratic	merits	of	partisans.	
a.	The	status	of	democratic	partisanship	
In	 assessing	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 uphold	 standards	 of	 democratic	partisanship,	 I	do	not	claim	that	 I	uncover	 the	nature	of	partisans'	deep	morality	and	reveal	their	hidden	psychological	dispositions.	When	I	say	that	a	partisan	is	committed	to	political	pluralism,	 for	 instance,	 I	am	stating	that	his	discourse	and	practices	are	 in	line	with	a	pluralistic	conception	of	the	political	realm.	I	am	not	making	a	claim	about	his	intentions	or	motives.	There	are	three	main	reasons	for	this.		First,	 social	 scientists	 have	 only	 imperfect	 access	 to	 the	 intentions	 or	 'deep	beliefs'	of	individual	subjects	-	what	is	accessible	to	our	analysis	is	what	our	subjects	do	or	 say	 (White,	 2009).	 To	 this	 extent,	 discourse	 can,	 and	 perhaps	 should,	 be	 analysed	independently	from	the	reasons	that	push	partisans	to	formulate	it.	Second,	it	would	be	unrealistic	 to	 understand	 commitment	 to	 pluralism	 as	 'pure	 virtue',	 or	 conceive	 of	pluralist	 partisans	 as	 'honest'	 politicians	 solely	 motivated	 by	 the	 common	 good.	Machiavelli's	legacy	guards	us	against	applying	the	standards	of	private	ethics	to	assess	the	morality	of	those	choosing	to	pursue	political	power	(D.	F.	Thompson,	1987).	Even	theorists	 that	 insist	 on	 the	 virtues	 of	 partisanship	 do	 not	 deny	 that	 politicians	 have	'mixed	 motives',	 and	 therefore	 that	 they	 are	 at	 least	 partly	 motivated	 by	 their	 own	personal	ambition	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	18;	Muirhead	&	Rosenblum,	2006).		Finally,	 and	perhaps	most	 importantly,	 it	 is	unnecessary	 for	partisans	 to	have	pure	ethical	motives	to	fulfil	their	moral	obligations.	What	is	of	primary	interest	for	this	study	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 support	 democracy	 in	 their	 discourse.	 While	 it	 is	plausible	 to	 suppose	 a	 connection	 between	 democratic	 speech	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	ethical	 motives	 on	 the	 other,	 this	 connection	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 my	 argument.	 A	partisan	could,	in	principle,	campaign	on	the	basis	of	a	perfectly	pluralist	discourse	not	because	 he	 believes	 in	 his	 own	 words,	 but	 because	 he	 is	 convinced	 that	 voters	 will	endorse	 this	 discourse.	 By	 contributing	 to	 the	 diffusion	 of	 these	 ethical	 norms,	 by	legitimizing	them,	he	would	nevertheless	be	contributing	to	their	reinforcement	within	society	and	thus,	to	the	perpetuation	of	democracy	as	a	way	of	life.		
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b.	 An	 approach	 to	 empirical	 variations	 in	 the	 democratic	 merits	 of	
partisanship	
This	thesis	aims	not	only	at	assessing	the	degree	to	which	real-world	partisans	live	up	to	the	standards	of	democratic	partisanship,	but	also	at	providing	explanations	for	the	reasons	that	can	explain	the	more	specific	variations	I	will	uncover.	Indeed,	if	we	agree	 that	 partisan	 respect	 for	 the	 criteria	 detailed	 in	 Chapter	 1	 is	 desirable	 for	democracy,	 then	 it	 is	 also	 necessary	 to	 inquire	 into	 the	 conditions	 that	 would	make	such	respect	more	widespread.		The	 research	 design	 for	 this	 thesis	 does	 not	 allow	 me	 to	 validate	 or	 refute	hypotheses	on	the	reasons	that	explain	variations	in	the	democratic	merits	of	the	four	groups	of	partisans	under	study.	Methodological	rigor	would	 indeed	require	a	 large-n	study	 for	 this	 purpose.	 The	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 partisan	 discourse	 nevertheless	allows	me	to	set	forth	tentative	explanations	in	response	to	this	question,	explanations	that	can	then	be	further	substantiated	using	other	methods	or	focusing	on	other	cases.			In	 line	with	the	interpretative	approaches	outlined	earlier,	 I	 take	as	a	starting	point	 that	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 fulfil	 the	 criteria	 set	 out	 in	 the	 preceding	chapter	does	not	only	depend	on	their	good-will	or	intrinsic	morality,	but	that	they	are	also	constrained	by	 the	environment	 in	which	 they	operate.	As	emphasised	by	Lewis,	"(while)	actors	are	the	only	efficient	causes	or	sources	of	activity	in	the	political	world,	social	structures	are	material	causes	that	influence	political	affairs	by	conditioning	the	course	 of	 action	 that	 actors	 choose	 to	 pursue"	 (P.	 A.	 Lewis,	 2002,	 p.	 22;	 see	 also	Haughton,	2005,	pp.	7-12;	Sibeon,	1999).	To	this	extent,	partisans	are	both	the	bearers	of	 previously	 existing	 structures,	 and	 core	 political	 actors	with	 sufficient	 agency	 and	power	 to	 contribute	 over	 time	 to	 the	 gradual	 transformation	 of	 these	 structures.	Whether	or	not	partisans	uphold	the	standards	established	in	Chapter	1	will	thus	partly	be	 dependent	 on	 the	 environment	 in	 which	 they	 evolve.	 To	 explain	 variations	 in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse,	we	will	therefore	need	to	take	into	account	the	structure	of	constraints	and	opportunities	that	fall	on	partisans.		In	the	following	sections,	I	establish	two	categories	of	factors	that	are	likely	to	act	as	such	opportunities	or	constraints	on	whether	partisans	develop	a	cohesive	and	pluralist	discourse.	First,	the	cultural	"tool-kit"	that	partisans	have	at	their	disposal	 in	formulating	 their	 claims.	Second,	what	 I	 call	 "external	events"	 -	political,	 economic	or	social	 -	 that	parties	do	not	 fully	 control,	 yet	need	 to	 respond	 to.	These	categories	are	very	general,	and	do	not	in	themselves	constitute	explanations	for	any	given	outcome.	
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It	 will	 be	 the	 task	 of	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 to	 determine	 whether,	 how	 and	 which	specific	factors	influence	partisan	cohesiveness	and/or	pluralism	in	the	concrete	cases	I	analyse.		
Cultural	resources	In	its	semiotic	understanding,	culture	functions	as	a	'tool-kit',	an	array	of	signs,	symbols,	ideas,	memories,	that	are	available	to	actors	and	of	which	they	can	make	use	in	 their	 discourses	 and	 practices	 (Gamson,	 1992;	 Pateman,	 1971;	White,	 2009).	 The	symbolic	political	resources	offered	by	history,	what	Nora	has	termed	a	polity's	"lieux	
de	 mémoire"	 (Nora,	 1996),	 are	 fundamental	 in	 that	 they	 give	 sense	 to	 partisanship	beyond	 the	 defence	 of	 circumstantial	 and	 transitory	 interests.	 The	 boundaries	 of	collective	memory	will	thus	have	a	bearing	on	the	type	of	discourse	that	will	resonate	within	a	given	population,	and	which	partisans	will	adopt.	In	their	discourse,	partisans	are	 both	 empowered	 and	 limited	 by	 their	 cultural	 context.	 Gamson,	 for	 instance,	 has	spoke	 of	 the	 "cultural	 resonance"	 of	 particular	 political	 claims,	 arguing	 that	 “some	frames	 have	 a	 natural	 advantage	 because	 their	 ideas	 and	 language	 resonate	 with	 a	broader	political	culture"	(Gamson,	1992,	p.	135).	Saward	makes	a	very	similar	point,	insisting	 that	 “the	cultural	moment	(...)	 sets	 the	 limits	or	parameters	 for	 the	aesthetic	possibilities”	 of	 representative	 claims,	 as	 these	 “tap	 into	 existing	 understandings	 of	what	might	make	for	a	successful	(i.e.	accepted)	representative	claim	in	a	given	context”	(Saward,	2010,	pp.	75-77).		Within	 one	 and	 the	 same	 polity,	 rival	 parties	 are	 likely	 to	 draw	 on	 different	cultural	resources	to	build	their	own	claims.	This	also	means	that	they	are	constrained	in	 different	ways	 by	 the	 cultural	 context	 they	 have	 in	 common.	 Indeed,	 partisanship	itself	 is	 intricately	 bound	with	 political	memory.	 Rival	 partisans	 are	 likely	 to	 ground	their	 commitments	 and	 build	 their	 appeals	 on	 resources	 provided	 by	 the	 history	 of	their	 own	 political	 family:	 the	 types	 of	 ideas	 that	 their	 camp	 has	 promoted	 since	 its	inception,	 and	 the	 personalities,	 events,	 achievements,	 hymns	 and	 symbols	 that	 have	shaped	the	political	 tradition	they	are	committed	to	(Marlière,	2007;	Muirhead,	2014,	pp.	 128-130;	 Rosenblum,	 2008,	 p.	 355).	 While	 these	 resources	 will	 not	 strictly	determine	whether	partisanship	is	cohesive	or	pluralist	in	a	given	polity,	we	can	expect	the	 resources	 that	 partisans	 dispose	 of	 to	 be	 more	 or	 less	 favourable	 to	 their	development	of	cohesive	or	pluralist	claims.	
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External	events	'External	 events'	 constitute	 another	 main	 source	 of	 constraints	 and	opportunities	 for	 partisan	 discourse.	 Under	 this	 term,	 I	 understand	 the	 political,	economic	and	social	phenomena	that	happen	outside	of	the	full	control	of	parties	and	that	partisans	need	to	respond	to	(for	an	example	of	event-based	analysis,	see	Berezin,	2009).	Socio-economic	crises,	 terrorist	attacks,	political	scandals,	natural	disaster,	 the	actions	of	political	allies	or	opponents,	or	 the	decisions	of	 international	organisations	would	fall	under	this	category.	External	events	may	also	cover	more	diffuse	and	long-term	processes	 that	 affect	 the	 doings	 of	 nation-states,	 such	 as	 financial	 globalisation,	global	warming,	long-term	trends	of	immigration	or	regional	integration.		These	events	or	series	of	events	prompt	partisans	to	take	a	stand.	Partisans	will	thus	draw	on	them	to	form	their	own	political	discourse.	Different	types	of	events	may	either	 facilitate	 or	 inhibit	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 uphold	 the	 standards	 of	democratic	partisanship.	Like	cultural	resources,	they	may	affect	the	patterns	of	speech	of	different	groups	of	partisans	in	different	ways.	While	no	event	will	in	itself	determine	the	response	of	partisans,	we	can	nevertheless	expect	that	certain	events	will	be	more	or	less	favourable	to	rival	partisans	developing	cohesive	or	pluralist	responses.	
Partisanship	and	democratic	change	I	 conclude	 this	 section	 with	 some	 thoughts	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	quality	 of	 democracy	 in	 a	 given	 country	 and	 the	 above-mentioned	 sources	 of	constraints	and	opportunities	on	partisan	discourse.	As	made	explicit	in	Chapter	1,	the	upholding	 by	 partisans	 of	 democratic	 standards	 has	 the	 potential	 of	 nourrishing	 the	faith	of	citizens	in	collective	political	agency	and	the	ethical	norms	that	should	ground	democracy	as	a	way	of	life.	If	partisans	are	constrained	in	the	extent	to	which	they	can	uphold	these	standards	by	the	cultural	symbols	and	external	events	they	can	draw	on,	then	these	will	affect	democratic	progress	or	recession	indirectly,	via	the	political	actors	that	interpret	and	use	these	resources.	This	 also	 means,	 however,	 that	 neither	 the	 past	 nor	 the	 present	 context	condemn	 a	 democracy	 to	 failure,	 stagnation,	 survival	 or	 success.	 If	 partisans	 are	constrained	 in	 the	 discourse	 they	 develop,	 they	 still	 need	 to	 choose	 which	 cultural	resources	and	events	to	focus	on,	they	still	need	to	interpret	them	and	they	still	need	to	combine	 the	 multiple	 elements	 that	 constitute	 their	 available	 'tool-kit'.	 Over	 time	cultural	 change	 happens	 because	 these	 resources	 acquire	 new	 collective	 meaning	through	 the	 uses	 they	 generate.	 Events	 also	 come	 to	 be	 read	 in	 a	 different	 light	 as	 a	
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result.	 Any	 process	 of	 democratic	 change	 especially	 is	 likely	 to	 involve	 a	 gradual	transformation	of	 the	meaning	given	to	cultural	resources	and	external	events	by	key	political	actors,	including	partisans.		
II.	COMPARING	FRANCE	AND	HUNGARY	
In	 this	 section,	 I	 first	 argue	 that	 studying	partisanship	 in	France	and	Hungary	provides	a	good	estimate	for	variations	in	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship	within	the	common	political	space	of	the	European	Union.	I	then	show	that	these	two	cases	are	appropriate	to	formulate	explanations	on	the	reasons	for	the	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	I	uncover	in	my	study.		
1.	Assessing	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship	There	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 strong	 variations	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 real-world	partisans	meet	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	 partisanship.	 If	 the	 democratic	merits	 of	partisanship	are	likely	to	vary	across	different	countries,	parties	or	individual	partisans,	this	means	 that	 there	 is	 no	general	answer	 to	 the	 question:	 to	what	extent	does	 real-
world	partisanship	meet	the	theoretical	standards	of	democratic	partisanship?	Given	the	qualitative	nature	of	this	study	especially,	I	can	only	answer	this	question	for	a	limited	number	of	specific	cases.		One	 of	 the	 main	 challenges	 that	 my	 research	 design	 has	 to	 address	 in	 this	regard	 stems	 from	 the	 very	 problem	 that	 motivates	 this	 study:	 the	 absence	 of	 an	established,	well-accepted	 scale	 on	which	 to	 locate	 specific	 instances	 of	 partisanship	according	to	their	democratic	merit.	The	Freedom	House	ratings,	for	instance,	provide	such	 a	 scale	 for	 measuring	 the	 institututional	 performance	 of	 democracies:	 they	attribute	 the	 highest	 possible	 score	 to	 the	most	 advanced	 democracies	 in	 the	world,	and	the	lowest	possible	score	to	the	most	authoritarian	regimes.	As	emphasised	above,	we	 can	assume	 that	 the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship	will	 vary	 across	 countries,	parties	or	individual	partisans.	Yet	in	the	absence	of	available	data	on	this	question,	we	do	not	know,	unlike	institutional	performance,	what	the	'maximum'	and	'minimum'	of	democratic	partisanship	look	like.	This	also	means	that	if	we	consider	a	given	partisan	at	 random,	 we	 have	 no	 way	 of	 locating	 the	 democratic	 merits	 of	 his	 discourse	 in	 a	broader	universe	of	cases.		In	 response	 to	 these	 challenges,	 I	 adopt	 a	 comparative	 approach	 across	 four	different	parties	 in	 two	different	countries.	 I	choose	two	European	countries—France	
	
69	
and	 Hungary—which	 score	 very	 differently	 on	 more	 widely	 accepted,	 institutional	standards	 for	 democratic	 compliance.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 available	 comparative	 data,	 I	make	 an	 informed	 guess	 and	 expect	 variations	 on	 institutional	 indicators	 for	democracy	to	be	mirrored	by	variations	in	the	democratic	quality	of	partisan	discourse.	That	 such	 correspondences	 exist	 is	 plausible,	 and	 this	whether	we	 consider	 that	 the	good	health	of	democratic	institutions	is	conditional	on	the	quality	of	partisanship	itself,	or	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 partisanship	 depends	 on	 the	 prior	 existence	 of	 a	 democratic	tradition	in	a	given	society.		To	 compare	 patterns	 of	 partisan	 discourse	 in	 an	 established	 and	 a	 less	established	 democracy—and	 thus	 to	 choose	 cases	 on	 which	 we	 can	 expect	 a	 wide	variation	in	the	degree	to	which	partisans	meet	democratic	standards—is	a	good	choice	for	 this	 particular	 study.	 This	 comparison	will	 provide	 a	 first	 estimate	 of	 how	much	actual	variation	 in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	we	 find	between	countries	 that	 fare	very	 differently	 on	 institutional	 standards	 of	 democratic	 performance.	 By	 choosing	France	 and	Hungary,	 I	 can	more	 specifically	 provide	 a	 first	 estimate	 of	 the	 degree	 of	variation	in	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship	within	the	common	political	space	of	the	EU.			 Within	the	European	Union	itself,	France	is	indeed	among	the	countries	that	fare	the	best	on	institutional	standards	of	democratic	performance,	and	Hungary	among	the	countries	 that	 fare	 the	 worst	 on	 these	 standards.	 Consider	 for	 instance	 Freedom	House's	Nations	in	Transit	Democracy	Score,	a	measure	that	is	only	applied	to	countries	of	the	former	Soviet	bloc.	Experts	attribute	a	score	to	each	country,	with	a	scale	varying	from	1	for	most	democratic	to	7	for	 least	democratic	(for	details	on	the	methodology,	see	Freedom	House,	2014).22	Table	1	offers	an	overview	of	 the	NIT	democracy	scores	for	the	10	post-communist	countries	that	joined	the	EU	in	2004	and	2007.	From	2011	to	 2014	Hungary's	NIT	 scores	were	worse	 than	 the	 regional	 average.23	The	 only	 two	countries	 that	 scored	 higher	 than	 Hungary	 in	 these	 three	 years	 are	 Romania	 and	Bulgaria.				 																																								 																					
22	The	NIT	Democracy	 score	 is	 a	 global	 indicator	 that	 aggregates	 five	 different	measures	 for	 democratic	performance:	 transparency	 of	 electoral	 process,	 freedom	 of	 civil	 society,	 independence	 of	 the	 media,	national	 democratic	 governance,	 local	 democratic	 governance,	 judicial	 independence	 and	 corruption.	Experts	 attribute	 a	 score	 to	 each	 country	 on	 all	 five	 indicators,	 with	 a	 scale	 varying	 from	 1	 for	 most	democratic	to	7	for	least	democratic	(for	details	on	the	methodology,	see	Freedom	House,	2014).	23	Each	year's	NIT	Democracy	Scores	corresponds	 to	 the	countries'	performance	 in	 the	preceding	year.	 I	am	therefore	particularly	interested	in	the	2014	democracy	score,	which	estimates	the	performance	of	CEE	democracies	in	2013,	the	year	in	which	I	conducted	my	interviews.	
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Table	1:	Freedom	House	NIT	Democracy	scores	from	2005	to	2014	
	 Source:	https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Data%20tables.pdf	While	the	NIT	ratings	are	particular	to	post-communist	countries	in	Eurasia	and	the	 Balkans,	 we	 can	 compare	 France	 and	 Hungary's	 democratic	 performance	 on	Freedom	 House's	 general	 ratings	 for	 Civil	 Liberties	 and	 Political	 Freedom	 that	 also	range	from	1	for	most	democratic	to	7	for	least	democratic24.	For	France,	from	2005	up	to	2015	both	ratings	remained	at	a	high	1	(Freedom	House,	2015a).	If	we	consider	the	same	 data	 for	 Hungary,	 Freedom	 House	 has	 ranked	 Hungary's	 Civil	 Liberties	 rating	down	 to	 2	 since	 2012,	 and	 its	 Political	 Freedom	 rating	 down	 to	 2	 since	 201525	(Freedom	 House,	 2015b).	 Other	 common	 indicators	 for	 democratic	 performance	display	 a	 significant	 gap	 between	 both	 countries.	 In	 2014,	 the	 Global	 Democracy	Ranking	 project	 for	 instance	 ranked	 France	 as	 the	 world's	 15th	 most	 democratic	country	in	the	world,	and	ranked	Hungary	as	36th	(Global	Democracy	Ranking,	2014).	The	Economist	Intelligence	Unit	Democracy	index	for	2014	similarly	positioned	France	as	 24th	 and	Hungary	 as	 51th,	 labelling	 the	 first	 a	 'Full	 Democracy'	 and	 the	 second	 a	'Flawed	Democracy'	(The	Economist	Intelligence	Unit,	2014).		If	the	only	relevant	criteria	to	be	considered	were	ratings	on	these	scores,	one	could	 nevertheless	 claim	 that	 there	 would	 have	 been	 better	 cases	 to	 choose.	Scandinavian	 countries,	 but	 also	 Canada	 or	 New	 Zealand	 for	 instance,	 are																																									 																					
24	Following	 the	 same	 system	 of	 expert	 ranking	 both	 ratings	 combine	 a	 series	 of	 indicators.	 The	 Civil	Liberties	 ratings	 combine	 four	 different	 sub-categories	 of	 indicators:	 Freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 belief,	Associational	 and	 organisational	 Rights,	 Rule	 of	 Law,	 and	Personal	 autonomy	 and	 individual	 rights.	 The	Political	 Freedom	 rating	 combines	 three	 different	 indicators:	 Electoral	 process,	 Political	 pluralist	 and	participation,	and	functioning	of	government	(for	details	on	the	methodology,	see	Freedom	House,	2015c).	25	Here	again	each	rating	corresponds	to	an	expert	assessment	of	the	country's	democratic	performance	in	the	previous	year:	the	2012	rating	evaluates	the	year	2011;	the	2013	rating	evaluates	the	year	2012,	etc.		
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systematically	ranked	higher	than	France	by	these	different	rating	agencies.	Similarly,	there	 is	 a	 long	 list	 of	 countries	 in	 the	world	 that	 are	 doing	 far	worse	 than	Hungary.	Choosing	France	and	Hungary	in	particular	thus	requires	more	thorough	justification.		First,	there	is	the	practical	-	yet	non-trivial	-	argument	for	choosing	countries	of	which	 I	 master	 the	 language:	 I	 am	 fluent	 in	 French,	 and	 have	 a	 strong	 working	knowledge	 of	 Hungarian.	 As	 described	 later	 in	 this	 chapter,	 partisan	discourse	 is	 the	primary	 empirical	 source	 of	 this	 thesis.	 My	 empirical	 work	 involved	 recruiting	 and	conducting	group	discussions	with	participants	in	their	mother	tongue	and	conducting	a	 close	 textual	 analysis	 of	 the	 transcripts	 of	 these	 interviews.26	Conducting	 these	interviews	 in	English	would	have	had	strong	 limitations	given	 the	uneven	mastery	of	the	 English	 language	 by	 European	 party	 members.	 The	 political	 norms	 that	characterize	 a	 given	 political	 community	 are	 also	 embedded	 within	 a	 particular	language.	 Mastery	 of	 the	 native	 tongue	 of	 my	 interviewees	 was	 thus	 an	 essential	requirement	for	choosing	any	country	case	study.		There	is,	however,	a	more	general	case	to	be	made	in	favour	of	these	particular	cases.	 Despite	 uneven	 levels	 of	 democratic	 consolidation,	 the	 political	 systems	 of	France	and	Hungary	display	a	number	of	characteristics	that	facilitate	the	comparison	of	partisanship	across	their	national	borders.	First	of	all,	political	and	civil	rights	are	at	least	 minimally	 upheld	 in	 both	 countries	 under	 study.	 This	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 prior	condition	 for	 French	 and	Hungarian	partisanship	 to	 be	 broadly	 comparable	 and	 thus	evaluated	according	to	the	same	criteria.	A	country	like	Russia	certainly	fares	worse	on	democratic	 standards	 as	 compared	 to	 Hungary,	 but	 the	 lack	 of	 effective	 political	competition	 between	 Russian	 parties	 would	 also	 make	 Russian	 partisanship	 more	difficult	to	compare	with	partisanship	in	an	established	European	democracy.		Second,	 the	party	systems	of	France	and	Hungary	display	a	number	of	 similar	traits.	Both	electoral	systems	have	a	strong	majoritarian	component,	resulting	in	highly	polarised	 dynamics	 between	 the	 two	 main	 governmental	 parties	 and	 a	 series	 of	secondary,	 satellite	 parties	 on	 their	 left	 and	 right	 flanks.	 In	 this	 regard,	Hungary	 has	also	displayed	more	robust,	bipolar	patterns	of	party	competition	as	compared	to	many	other	CEE	countries	 (Grzymala-Busse,	2002,	2007).	This	 trait	has	been	considered	as	particularly	 favourable	 to	 the	 rooting	 of	 parties	 in	 society.	 Indeed,	 the	 Hungarian	political	landscape	has	displayed	comparatively	lower	electoral	volatility,	higher	levels																																									 																					
26	I	transcribed	the	French	interviews	on	my	own.	Given	the	time-consuming	nature	of	this	process,	I	then	delegated	 the	 transcription	of	 the	Hungarian	 interviews	 to	 three	different	Hungarian	research	assistants	(see	Acknowledgements).		
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of	 party	 identification,	 and	 higher	 turnout	 rates	 than	 most	 other	 post-communist	democracies	(P.	G.	Lewis,	2006;	Rose	&	Mishler,	1998).	Partisanship	is	thus	likely	to	be	more	meaningful	 in	Hungary,	and	more	comparable	to	partisanship	in	France,	than	in	many	other	post-communist	countries	that	have	shown	less	regularity	in	their	patterns	of	 party	 competition	 over	 the	 last	 20	 years	 (Casal	 Bértoa	 &	Mair,	 2010;	 P.	 G.	 Lewis,	2006;	Rose	&	Mishler,	1998;	Sikk,	2005).		Finally,	the	fact	that	both	France	and	Hungary	are	EU	members	not	only	means	that	 they	 need	 to	 uphold	 a	 procedural	 minimum	 with	 regard	 to	 human	 rights,	democracy,	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 but	 also	 that	 their	 societies,	 and	 economies	 are	subjected	 to	 similar	 external	 pressures.	 Both	 countries	 also	 have	 the	 landmarks	 of	European	 history	 as	 a	 common	 cultural	 heritage.	 As	 I	 will	 develop	 in	 the	 following	section,	 this	 is	 important	 because	 it	 allows	 to	 keep	 some	 variables	 constant	 in	providing	explanations	 for	the	empirical	variations	this	 thesis	uncovers	 in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse.		
2.	Explaining	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	As	I	emphasised	earlier,	we	can	expect	French	partisans	to	comply	better	with	democratic	standards	than	Hungarian	partisans.	The	empirical	analysis	will	determine	whether	 this	 is	 actually	 the	 case.	 In	 addition,	 I	 will	 suggest	 a	 range	 of	 potential	explanations	 to	 account	 for	 variations	 in	 patterns	 of	 partisan	 discourse.	 More	specifically,	I	seek	to	determine	whether,	how,	and	which	specific	cultural	resource	or	external	events	act	as	constraints	or	opportunities	in	the	cases	under	analysis.		For	 this	purpose,	France	and	Hungary	appear	 to	be	particularly	good	cases	 to	study.	 Indeed,	 the	 political	 history	 of	 both	 countries—and	 therefore	 the	 'tool-box'	 of	cultural	resources	that	partisans	dispose	of—are	very	dissimilar.	There	is	nevertheless	a	share	of	overlap	in	the	types	of	events	that	French	and	Hungarian	partisans	have	to	respond	to.	This	particular	balance	should	facilitate	my	analysis,	and	the	identification	of	relevant	constraints	or	opportunities	for	democratic	forms	of	partisan	discourse.		
a.	Contrasts	in	French	and	Hungarian	political	history	
France		 France	is	rather	uncontroversially	considered	as	one	of	the	historical	models	of	a	liberal,	 consolidated	 democracy.	 It	 was	 the	 first	 European	 country	 to	 see	 a	 liberal	democratic	revolution	in	the	late	18th	century,	an	event	that	proved	hugely	influential	
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for	 both	 modern	 political	 thought	 and	 the	 course	 of	 19th	 century	 European	 history	(Hunt,	2010).	The	history	of	French	democracy	has	not	been	linear	since	then.	Between	1789	and	1870,	the	country	experienced	three	different	revolutions	leading	to	regime	changes.	 This	 process	 involved	 alternations	 between	 several	 different	 periods	 of	constitutional	monarchy	(1789-1791,	1814-1848),	Republican	rule	(1792-1804,	1848-1852),	and	Empire	(1804-1814,	1852-1870).	This	initial	regime	instability	led	Furet	to	speak	of	the	French	Revolution	as	a	process	that	lasted	a	century,	only	ending	with	the	beginning	of	the	Third	Republic	in	1875	(Furet,	2011a,	2011b).	This	date	signalled	the	start	of	the	longest	period	of	regime	stability	since	the	absolute	monarchy,	lasting	until	1940.			 After	 being	 defeated	 by	 Nazi	 Germany	 in	 May	 1940,	 France	 experienced	 an	authoritarian	relapse	under	the	collaborationist	Vichy	regime	(1940-45).	Following	the	Second	World	 war,	 the	 country	 actively	 participated	 in	 refounding	 the	 international	and	 European	 order.	 It	 became	 a	 permanent	 member	 of	 the	 UN	 Security	 Council	 in	1945	and	was	one	of	the	founding	members	of	the	European	Communities	from	1953	onwards.	 After	 unstable	 years	 under	 the	 fourth	 Republic	 (1946-1957),	 the	 fifth	Republic	started	with	what	has	often	been	interpreted	as	a	constitutional	coup	from	the	President	 of	 the	 French	 Council	 of	 Ministers,	 Charles	 de	 Gaulle.	 In	 1957,	 he	 pushed	through	 a	 new	 constitution	 in	 the	 period	 of	 turmoil	 of	 the	 Algerian	 war	 of	decolonisation	and	in	1962	obtained	that	the	Presidential	office	become	electable.		Following	 this	 period,	 France	 has	 experienced	 a	 period	 of	 relative	 political	stability.	 In	 the	 late	 1970s,	 the	 Socialist	 Party	 started	 to	 moderate	 its	 views	 and	managed	 to	 absorb	 the	 rather	 powerful	 French	 Communist	 Party.	 The	 party	won	 its	first	general	election	in	1981,	after	several	decades	of	being	relegated	to	the	opposition.	Since	 then,	 the	 socialist	 party	 and	 those	 parties	 that	 carry	 the	 Gaullist	 legacy	 have	alternated	in	power.		
Hungary	While	Hungary	saw	several	liberal	and	democratic	uprisings	between	1848	and	1956,	these	all	resulted	in	a	quick	relapse	into	authoritarian	rule	(for	an	overview,	see	Kende,	 2004;	Molnár,	 2007).	 The	 1848	 revolution	 against	 Habsburg	 domination	was	crushed	 in	 the	spring	of	1849,	 following	a	war	of	 independence.	The	country	became	fully	independent	only	after	World	War	I	and	the	dismantling	of	the	Austro-Hungarian	Empire.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 country	 lost	 two-thirds	 of	 its	 territory	 and	 half	 of	 its	population	under	the	1920	treaty	of	Trianon.	The	inter-war	period	was	dominated	by	
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the	 authoritarian	 regency	 of	 Miklós	 Horthy	 (1920-1944).	 The	 nationalist	 and	conservative	 elite	 at	 the	 time	 mourned	 the	 loss	 of	 Hungarian	 territories	 to	 its	neighbouring	 countries,	 and	 championed	 an	 anti-semitic	 worldview	 in	 which	Hungarian	Jews	were	seen	to	undermine	the	nation's	true	interests.	These	were	cast	as	responsible	for	the	1919	Communist	Revolution,	which	gave	way	to	Bela	Kun's	short-lived	 Hungarian	 Soviet	 Republic	 (March-August	 1919).	 The	 Jewish	 elite	 was	 also	resented	for	its	economic	and	cultural	influence,	which	led	Miklós	Horthy's	regency	to	enact	 the	 first	 anti-Jew	 laws	 in	 Europe's	 inter-war	 history	 in	 1920.	 In	 the	 last	 six	months	of	World	War	II,	the	Arrow	Cross	of	Ferenc	Szálasi	orchestrated	a	coup	with	the	help	of	Nazi	Germany,	accelerating	the	genocide	of	Hungary's	Jewish	population.	Following	 World	 War	 II,	 Hungary	 experienced	 a	 brief	 Second	 Republic	 from	1946	 to	 1949	 under	 Soviet	 supervision	 and	 in	 1949	 became	 the	 Socialist	 People's	Republic	of	Hungary.	Following	a	period	of	 terror	and	 repression,	 a	 revolution	broke	out	 on	 October	 23,	 1956.	 The	 uprising	 was	 then	 brutally	 repressed,	 Soviet	 tanks	causing	the	death	of	10	000	civilians	 in	Budapest	alone.	Between	1956	and	1988,	 the	country	was	ruled	by	the	General	Secretary	János	Kádár.	He	practiced	what	came	to	be	known	 as	 'Goulash	 Communism'	 from	 the	 early	 1960s	 onwards,	 adopting	 a	 more	market-oriented	approach	to	economics,	and	a	more	liberal	approach	to	human	rights	than	in	most	other	countries	of	the	Soviet	Bloc.		Hungary's	first	extended	experience	of	democracy	started	at	the	end	of	socialist	rule,	 with	 democratic	 elections	 held	 in	 May	 1990,	 following	 a	 two-year	 period	 of	democratic	transition.	Since	then,	the	country	has	been	a	major	and	emblematic	actor	of	 the	 region's	 'return	 to	Europe'.	 It	 is	a	 leading	member	of	 the	Visegrád	group	since	1991	and	was	one	of	the	first	beneficiaries	of	the	EU's	pre-accession	PHARE	program	in	1989.	It	applied	for	EU	membership	in	1994	and	started	accession	negotiations	in	1998	(for	 an	 overview,	 see	 Batory,	 2008;	 Grabbe,	 2006).	 As	 part	 of	 the	 2004	 round	 of	 EU	accession,	 it	 was	 until	 recently	 considered	 by	 most	 analysts	 and	 diplomats	 as	 the	paradigmatic	 example	 of	 a	 newly-formed,	 yet	 consolidated,	 Central	 European	democracy	(see	for	instance	King,	2000,	pp.	166-169).		These	positive	trends	in	Hungarian	democratisation	nevertheless	came	to	a	halt	after	2010.	With	a	supra-majority	in	Parliament,	the	party	Fidesz	has	enacted	a	series	of	 constitutional	 and	 legal	 measures	 that	 have	 contributed	 to	 undermine	 the	
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procedural	basis	of	Hungarian	democracy	(Dani,	2013;	Herman,	2015).27	Table	2	below	shows	 Hungary's	 ranking	 on	 the	 seven	 different	 scales	 that	 make	 for	 the	 NIT	Democracy	 Score	 between	 2006	 and	 2014.28	According	 to	 this	 measure,	 Hungary's	democratic	performance	has	considerably	declined	over	the	last	decade,	and	even	more	so	since	2011.		
	
Table	2:	Detail	of	Freedom	House's	NIT	scores	for	Hungary	from	2006	to	2014	
Source:	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/hungary		 *	*	*	France	 has	 a	 long	 history	 of	 democracy	 and	 has	 played	 a	 leading	 role	 in	international	politics	in	the	past	two	centuries.	In	contrast,	Hungary's	history	has	been	dominated	 by	 authoritarian	 regimes	 of	 different	 political	 orientations	 up	 to	 1989.	 It	was	also	long	dominated	by	other	powers	and	still	remains	somewhat	at	the	margins	of	European	politics.	Given	these	divergent	historical	paths,	 if	cultural	resources	and	the	ways	in	which	cultural	resources	are	used	by	partisans	matter	to	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship,	then	this	should	be	apparent	in	the	discourse	of	French	and	Hungarian	partisans.	 It	 will	 be	 part	 of	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 to	 determine	which	 resources	 are	used	by	partisan	discourse	and	how	their	use	affects	partisan	discourse.			
																																								 																					
27	I	account	for	these	changes	in	more	detail	when	describing	each	of	my	four	parties	later	in	this	chapter	(see	part	II,	1,	b).		28	On	Freedom	House's	NIT	score,	see	footnotes	22	and	23.		
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b.	A	partly	shared	external	environment		
Despite	these	different	cultural	contexts,	there	is	a	share	of	overlap	in	the	types	of	 events	 that	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 partisans	 have	 had	 to	 respond	 to	 in	 the	 past	decades.	More	generally,	both	countries	are	affected	by	similar	long-term	processes.		In	France,	the	post-war	decades	had	brought	economic	growth	and	allowed	the	foundation	 of	 a	 strong	 welfare	 state.	 The	 economic	 downturn	 that	 has	 affected	advanced	democracies	since	the	oil	and	currency	crisis	of	1976	have,	however,	deeply	affected	the	French	economy.	Since	this	period,	France	has	been	faced	with	high	rates	of	 unemployment	 (between	10%	and	15%)	 and	 low	economic	 growth.	Overall,	 these	trends	 have	 strained	 the	 state	 in	 its	 capacity	 to	 provide	 welfare	 and	 fulfill	 its	 social	functions.	Privatisations,	budgetary	cuts	and	market	liberalisation	measures	have	thus	characterised	 much	 of	 France's	 economic	 policy	 since	 the	 1980s.	 The	 negative	economic	 downturn	 has	 continued	 in	 the	 past	 decade	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 2007	financial	 crisis	 and	 increasingly	 stringent	budgetary	 requirements	agreed	upon	at	EU	level.	 In	this	respect,	there	are	parallels	with	the	Hungarian	situation.	Hungary	been	deeply	 strained	 by	 economic	 hardship	 since	 the	 early	 1990s	 and	 has	 had	 to	consequently	dismantle	 the	strong	 instruments	of	welfare	set	up	 in	socialist	 times.	 In	the	1990s,	the	region	was	under	strong	external	pressure	from	international	creditors,	such	as	the	IMF,	and	political	organisations	such	as	the	EU,	to	reach	stringent	economic	benchmarks	in	a	relatively	short	period	of	time	(Barr,	2005;	Roland,	2001).	This	lead	to	tough	reforms,	including	mass	privatisation,	market	liberalisation	and	a	tight	monetary	policy	 (Begg,	 1997;	 Brada,	 1996).	 The	 social	 consequences	 were	 a	 drastic	 rise	 in	unemployment	and	economic	 inequality	and	 the	 inability	of	 the	 state	 to	 fulfil	 its	past	social	functions	(Janos	Kornai,	1994;	János	Kornai,	2006).	The	economic	crisis	of	2007	hit	Hungary	particularly	 hard,	 forcing	Hungary	 to	 ask	 for	 a	 $25	billion	 loan	 from	 the	IMF,	World	Bank	and	EU	in	2008.		
This	shared	context	should	facilitate	my	analysis.	It	 is	 likely	that	partisans	will	need	to	respond	to	similar	types	of	'external	events',	for	instance	engage	the	question	of	the	 2007	 economic	 crisis	 or	 decide	 how	 to	 position	 themselves	 with	 regard	 to	particular	 EU	decisions.	 If	 partisans	 draw	on	 similar	 events	 in	 their	 discourse,	 it	will	also	make	it	easier	to	compare	their	responses	and	the	degree	to	which	their	responses	comply	 with	 democratic	 standards.	 This	 should	 help	 to	 more	 clearly	 distinguish	 the	independent	effects	of	cultural	resources	and	external	events	on	the	democratic	quality	
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of	partisan	discourse.	 If	similar	events	generate	responses	 that	comply	very	unevenly	to	the	democratic	standards,	this	would	hint	at	other	explanations	for	the	variations	we	notice.	 If	 similar	 events	 generate	 responses	 that	 uphold	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	partisanship	 unevenly,	 this	 could	 suggest	 that	 these	 types	 of	 events	 do	 influence	 the	democratic	merits	of	partisan	discourse.		
c.	A	large	number	of	potential	cultural	resources	and	external	events	
Some	 last	 points	 in	 conclusion	 to	 this	 section.	 First,	 while	 partisans	 in	 both	countries	arguably	have	fewer	cultural	resources	in	common	to	draw	on	than	events	in	common	 to	 respond	 to,	 this	 dichotomy	 remains	 an	 obvious	 simplification.	Hungarian	and	 French	 partisans	 do	 have	 many	 cultural	 resources	 in	 common.	 The	 landmark	events	of	European	history	for	instance	have	affected	both	countries	in	the	past.	On	the	other	 hand,	 there	 are	 also	 many	 events	 that	 are	 particular	 to	 the	 national	 political	context	of	each	country.	Finally,	although	both	countries	are	subject	to	similar	external	pressures,	 these	 trends	 nevertheless	 remain	 far	 more	 dramatic	 in	 the	 Hungarian	context.	Hungary	has	not	 just	 cut	down	on	 the	welfare	 state,	 it	dismantled	a	 socialist	economy.	It	has	not	only	beared	the	pressures	of	the	EU	as	one	of	its	members,	but	had	to	enact	radical	changes	to	go	through	the	tough	process	of	EU	accession.	Ultimately,	 there	 is	 a	 large	 number	 of	 potentially	 relevant	 cultural	 resources	and	 events	 for	 partisan	 discourse.	 There	 are	 also	 a	 large	 number	 of	 potential	interpretations	that	could	be	given	by	partisans	of	these	resources	and	events.	As	I	will	develop	in	later	sections,	this	is	exactly	why	an	inductive	analysis	of	partisan	discourse	is	warranted.	We	cannot	know	which	resources	partisans	will	use,	which	events	 they	will	draw	on,	and	what	effects	 these	uses	will	have	on	 the	democratic	merits	of	 their	discourse	without	conducting	this	analysis.		Second,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	these	resources	and	events	can	also	play	a	role	in	variations	in	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship	within	the	French	and	Hungarian	political	systems.	As	underlined	above,	different	groups	of	partisans	within	a	given	country	will	have	a	'tool-box'	of	cultural	resources	that	in	part	differ	from	those	of	 their	 opponents.	 They	 may	 also	 not	 interpret	 the	 resources	 that	 they	 have	 in	common	in	the	same	way.	As	a	result,	parties	may	also	provide	very	different	responses	to	 the	same	external	events.	An	economic	crisis,	 for	 instance,	will	not	mean	 the	same	think	 for	 a	 right-wing	 partisan	 as	 for	 a	 left-wing	 partisan	 (White,	 2013).	 Finally,	 the	actions	of	 either	mainstream	parties	also	act	as	 'external	 events'	 for	 their	opponents.	Partisans	have	very	limited	control	over	their	rivals'	discourse	and	practices,	and	they	
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will	 need	 to	 respond	 to	 what	 their	 opponents	 do	 or	 say.	 To	 a	 certain	 extent,	 these	actions	also	act	as	'external	event'	for	the	party	that	initiated	them:	they	will	generate	consequences	that	the	initiating	party	will	need	to	deal	with.		
III.	THE	FOCUS	ON	YOUNG	PARTY	MEMBERS	IN	THE	POLITICAL	MAINSTREAM	
As	outlined	in	the	introduction	to	this	thesis,	I	define	partisanship	loosely	as	the	array	of	practices	and	discourses	that	are	attached	to	party	leadership,	membership	or	identification.	The	inductive	character	of	this	work	and	its	focus	on	political	discourse	means	 that	 I	 cannot	 study	 all	 different	 categories	 of	 partisan	 actors,	 or	 all	 parties	represented	in	the	French	and	Hungarian	Parliament.	I	decided	to	focus	in	my	empirical	analysis	on	the	discourse	of	young	members	of	 the	main	governmental	parties	on	the	left	and	right	side	of	the	political	spectrum.		In	 the	 following	 sections	 I	 offer	 some	 background	 on	 the	 four	 parties	 under	study,	and	justify	why	I	focus	on	the	political	mainstream	in	both	countries.	I	give	some	information	on	the	more	specific	population	of	partisans	that	I	interviewed	and	stress	the	benefits	of	studying	young	party	members	over	other	potential	groups	of	partisans.		
1.	The	choice	of	mainstream	political	parties	
a.	The	four	parties	under	study	
The	French	PS	and	UMP	France	has	known	regular	alternations	of	power	between	two	main	party	blocs	since	the	decline	of	the	powerful	communist	party	in	the	early	1980s.	At	the	time	of	my	interviews	 in	2013,	 these	parties	were	named	 the	Parti	 Socialiste	 (PS)	and	 the	Union	pour	un	Mouvement	Populaire	(UMP)29.	The	PS	was	created	during	the	1969	Congress	of	Alfortville	as	successor	to	the	
Section	Française	de	l'Internationale	Socialiste	(SFIO).	It	won	its	first	majority	in	1981,	a	second	 in	 1988,	 a	 third	 in	 1997,	 and	 a	 fourth	 in	 2012.	 In	 2013,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 my	interviews,	the	PS	was	thus	in	government	under	the	presidency	of	François	Hollande.		While	the	French	PS	has	gone	through	many	episodes	of	crisis	and	renewal	 in	the	 course	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 it	 is	 responding	 with	 considerable	 difficulty	 to	 the																																									 																					
29	The	UMP	changed	its	name	to	Les	Républicains	on	May	28,	2015.		
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challenges	 economic	 integration	 have	 raised	 more	 generally	 for	 European	 social	democracy	over	 the	past	 few	decades	 (Goetschel	&	Morin,	 2007;	 Lefebvre	&	Sawicki,	2006).	Since	it	accepted	governmental	responsibilities	in	the	early	1980s,	the	party	has	been	 deeply	 divided	 between	 its	 left-wing,	 that	 has	 argued	 for	 continued	 state-interventionism	 and	 a	 Keynesian	 economic	 policy,	 and	 its	 reformist	 wing,	 which	advocates	 that	 the	 party	 endorse	 a	 version	 of	 the	 German	 SPD	 approach	 to	 social-democracy.30	The	 division	 of	 the	 party	 during	 the	 2005	 referendum	 campaign	 on	 the	European	 constitutional	 treaty	 or	 the	 lack	 of	 cohesive	 internal	 support	 for	 the	 2007	presidential	 candidate,	 Ségolène	 Royal,	 are	 two	 of	 the	most	 striking	 examples	 of	 the	PS's	 internal	 dissensions	 (Blier,	 2008;	 Crespy,	 2008;	Wagner,	 2008).	 These	 divisions	have	 also	 been	 expressed	 acutely	 since	 François	 Hollande's	 election	 in	 2012,	 who	stands	for	the	more	centrist	wing	of	his	own	party.	A	sizeable	left-wing	minority	in	the	PS	 parliamentary	 group	 has	 thus	 regularly	 voiced	 opposition	 to	 the	 current	governments'	economic	policy-choices	(for	a	recent	example,	see	Bekmezian,	2014).	In	parallel	 to	 these	 increasingly	 acute	 ideological	 divisions,	 the	 party	 has	 steadily	 lost	 a	substantial	share	of	its	membership:	from	a	high	204	172	members	in	1989	to	less	than	150	000	 in	2015	 (Desmoulières,	Bonnefous,	Chapuis,	 Faye,	&	Goar,	 2015;	Lefebvre	&	Sawicki,	2006,	p.	158).		Its	main	centre-right	opponent,	the	UMP,	was	created	in	November	2002	out	of	an	alliance	between	De	Gaulle's	Rassemblement	pour	la	République	(RPR)	and	two	other	parties	 of	 the	 centre-right,	 Démocratie	 Libérale	 and	 the	 Union	 pour	 la	 Démocratie	
Française	 (UDF)	 (Haegel,	2012).	 In	 the	past	 three	decades,	 the	 centre-right	has	had	a	parliamentary	majority	in	the	periods	1986-1988,	1993-1997,	and	2002-2012.		Until	 the	 late	 1990s,	 the	 French	 centre-right	 was	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 its	Gaullist	 heritage.	 Despite	 adopting	more	 pro-market	 positions	 than	 its	main	 socialist	opponents,	 it	 remained	 attached	 to	 the	 French	 tradition	 of	 strong	 social	 policy	 and	emphasised	the	importance	of	public	services.	In	the	last	decade,	the	French	UMP	has	adopted	more	 stringent	 positions	 on	 budgetary	 stability	 and	 defended	 the	 economic	liberalisation	 brought	 by	 the	 accelerated	 pace	 of	 European	 economic	 integration.	Responding	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 far-right	 FN,	 the	 party	 has	 also	 initiated	 a	much-noted																																									 																					
30	The	 main	 current	 in	 the	 PS,	Mobiliser	 les	 Français,	 obtained	 67.9%	 of	 all	 votes	 during	 the	 2012	 PS	Congress	 of	 Toulous.	 This	 current	 brings	 together	 a	 very	 large	 majority	 of	 party	 members,	 and	personalities.	These	have	ranged	from	Dominique	Strauss-Kahn	and	Manuel	Valls	on	the	right	flank	of	the	party,	to	Martine	Aubry	and	Laurent	Fabius	on	its	left.	The	motion	also	stands	for	a	rather	loose	agenda	as	a	result.		
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shift	 to	 the	 right	 on	 questions	 related	 to	 immigration,	 justice	 and	 security,	 since	 the	early	2000s	(Haegel,	2012,	pp.	239-297).	This	shift	has	been	most	clearly	embodied	by	the	personality	of	Nicolas	Sarkozy,	Minister	of	the	Interior	for	four	years	in	the	period	2002-2007,	 and	 President	 of	 the	 French	 Republic	 from	 2007	 to	 2012.	 Crucially,	 his	motion,	La	Droite	Forte,	has	become	dominant	in	the	UMP,	with	27,8%	of	internal	votes	during	 the	 2012	 UMP	 congress.	 At	 the	 height	 of	 its	 popularity	 after	 the	 2007	Presidential	 elections,	 the	 UMP	 counted	 close	 to	 370	 000	 members;	 in	 2015,	 this	number	had	dropped	to	200	000	(Desmoulières	et	al.,	2015;	Goar	&	Chapuis,	2012).		
The	Hungarian	MSzP	and	Fidesz	Since	 1994,	 power	 has	 regularly	 alternated	 between	 two	main	 party	 blocs	 in	Hungary,	 the	 Magyar	 Szocialista	 Párt	 (MSzP)	 and	 Szabad	 Demokraták	 Szövetsége	(SzDSz)	 on	 the	 liberal	 side	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	 and	 the	 Fiatal	 Demokraták	
Szövetsége	(Fidesz)	and	Kereszténydemokrata	Néppárt	(KDNP)	on	the	conservative	side	of	the	political	spectrum.		A	legacy	of	"national-consensus"	socialism	facilitated	the	early	conversion	of	the	Hungarian	communist	party	to	social	democracy,	giving	birth	to	the	MSzP	on	October	7,	1989	(Grzymala-Busse,	2002;	Kitschelt,	Markowski,	Mansfeldova,	&	Toka,	1999).	Like	other	reformed	communist	parties	in	CEE,	the	Hungarian	MSzP	was	eager	to	prove	that	it	 embraces	 the	 Western	 'way	 of	 life'	 (Grzymala-Busse,	 2002,	 2003).	 This	 not	 only	involved	 accepting	 the	 transition	 towards	 democratic	 rule,	 strongly	 committing	 to	European	 integration,	but	also	orchestrating	the	end	of	 the	socialist	economy	when	 it	assumed	 governmental	 responsibilities	 between	 1994	 and	 1998.	 Like	 in	 most	 other	Central	 European	 countries,	 the	 reformed	 communist	 party	 adopted	 a	 free-market	approach	to	economic	policy	(Evans	&	Whitefield,	1993,	1995;	Grzymala-Busse,	2003;	Kitschelt,	1995;	Kitschelt	et	al.,	1999;	Tavits	&	Letki,	2009).		The	MSzP	obtained	electoral	majorities	again	in	2002,	and	in	2006.	The	party's	involvement	in	a	number	of	scandals	since	the	mid-2000s	and	the	fact	it	had	to	manage	the	local	consequences	of	the	2007	financial	crisis,	has	induced	a	serious	loss	of	popular	support.	 The	MSzP	 only	 achieved	 19.30%	 of	 all	 votes	 in	 the	 2010	 national	 elections,	against	52.7%	for	the	Fidesz.	Following	this	defeat,	sections	of	the	MSzP	splintered	and	formed	 two	 alternative	 parties:	 the	Demokratikus	 Koalíció,	 led	 by	 Ferenc	 Gyurcsány,	and	Együtt	2014,	also	headed	by	an	ex-MSzP	nominated	Prime	Minister,	Gordon	Bajnai	(see	Saltman,	2012).	While	the	three	parties	reached	a	coalition	agreement	on	January	
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14,	 2014,	 following	 an	 arduous	 cycle	 of	 negotiations	 started	 in	 April	 2013,	 their	common	platforms	still	only	convinced	25.9%	of	voters	in	the	Spring	2014	elections.		The	 Fidesz	 has	 been	 the	main	 political	 opponent	 of	 the	MSzP	 since	 the	mid-1990s.	 Hungarian	 students	 founded	 the	 organisation	 in	 1988	 as	 a	 party	 of	 anti-communists	 and	 liberal	 democrats.	 After	 obtaining	 less	 than	 10%	 of	 the	 vote	 in	 the	1990	and	1994	elections,	the	party	initiated	a	turn	to	the	Right	and	adopted	a	primarily	national-conservative	 platform	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 1990s	 (Fowler,	 2004).	 The	party	 gained	 its	 first	majority	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 platform	 in	 1998.	 They	 have	 since	then	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 religion,	 tradition	 and	 family	 in	 society,	 and	adopted	 a	 strongly	 nationalistic	 rhetoric.	 Fidesz	 has	 been	 especially	 keen	 on	championning	the	rights	of	the	2.5	billion	Hungarian	minorities	abroad.	The	party	has	also	been	using	strong	anti-communist	rhetoric	to	criticise	its	main	political	opponents	(Bozóki	&	Kriza,	2008;	Palonen,	2006).		In	 opposition	 between	 2002	 and	 2010,	 the	 Fidesz	 further	 radicalised	 its	rhetoric.	 It	 started	 adopting	 strongly	 Eurosceptic	 stances	 following	 Hungary's	 entry	into	the	EU	in	2004.	The	party	also	developed	a	more	interventionist	stance	on	socio-economic	 issues,	 championing	 a	 form	 of	 economic	 patriotism	 in	 industrial	 and	agricultural	 issues	 especially	 (Centre	 for	 Fair	 Political	 Analysis,	 2013;	 Tavits	&	 Letki,	2009).	 During	 this	 time,	 the	 Fidesz	 developed	 strong	 organisational	 capacities	 and	 a	faithful	membership	basis	(Enyedi,	2015;	Enyedi	&	Linek,	2008).	While	MSzP	members	have	 been	 ageing	 and	 their	 number	 declining	 steadily	 since	 the	 early	 1990s,	 Fidesz	increased	 its	membership	 from	 less	 than	 5000	 in	 1990	 to	 40	 000	 in	 2011	 (Saltman,	2014,	pp.	105-106).		The	party	was	 granted	 a	 supra-majority	 in	 the	Hungarian	Parliament	 in	2010	and	2014,	obtaining	over	50%	of	 the	vote	 in	both	 cases.	Continuing	on	 its	 trajectory,	Fidesz	 has	 enacted	 a	 series	 of	 institutional	 changes	 during	 these	mandates	 that	 have	thoroughly	 recast	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 political	 game.	 The	 most	 controversial	 measures	enacted	 by	 this	 party	 have	 been	 a	 Media	 Law	 effective	 since	 early	 2011;	 a	 new	Constitution	 effective	 since	 early	 2012;	 five	major	 constitutional	 amendments	 to	 this	Fundamental	 law	 between	 2012	 and	 2014;	 and	 a	 large	 number	 of	 organic	 laws	 that	could	 only	 be	 changed	 with	 a	 new,	 supra-majority	 (Hungarian	 Parliament,	 2011;	Political	 Capital,	 2011).	 These	 measures	 have	 attracted	 criticism	 from	 a	 number	 of	independent	 international	 organisations	 for	 threatening	 the	 independence	 of	 the	judiciary,	the	freedom	of	the	press	and	the	impartiality	of	electoral	monitoring	bodies	(see	 Council	 of	 Europe,	 2013;	 European	 Parliament,	 2013;	 Norwegian	 Helsinki	
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Committee,	 2013;	 United	 States	 Commission	 on	 Security	 and	 Cooperation	 in	 Europe,	2013).	
b.	Why	focus	on	the	political	mainstream		
As	outlined	above,	I	study	partisan	discourse	in	the	political	mainstream	of	both	countries	under	consideration.	There	are	several	reasons	for	this	choice.	Parties	of	the	centre-left	 and	 of	 the	 centre-right	 in	 France	 and	Hungary	 are	 the	 ones	 that	 have	 the	potential	 to	 form	 a	 majority	 in	 Parliament	 and	 are	 primary	 partners	 in	 any	governmental	coalition.	These	parties	have	a	history	of	political	 leadership,	 they	have	greater	access	 to	 the	media,	 they	have	more	developed	networks	and	deeper	roots	 in	society	and	their	programs	have	the	potential	to	affect	policy	directly.	In	other	words,	parties	 in	 the	 mainstream	 hold	 the	 bulk	 of	 state	 power	 and	 dispose	 of	 the	 greatest	means	 to	 influence	 public	 opinion.	 For	 democracy	 as	 a	 whole,	 it	 is	 thus	 particularly	important	 that	 they	uphold	democratic	 standards	because	mainstream	parties	have	a	greater	potential	 to	directly	 affect	 the	 stability	 and	quality	of	 democracy.	 In	 contrast,	the	 norms	 that	 parties	 at	 the	 fringe	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	uphold	will	 necessarily	have	a	more	limited	effect	on	democracy	as	a	whole.	This	 point	 applies	 particularly	 well	 in	 newly-established	 democracies,	 where	parties	 have	 an	 even	 greater	 transformative	 power	 that	 in	 more	 consolidated	democratic	 regimes.	 In	 an	 institutional	 and	 legislative	 context	 that	 is	 relatively	malleable,	 mainstream	 parties	 are	 both	 the	 main	 political	 players	 and	 those	 who	determine	the	rules	of	the	game	(Grzymala-Busse,	2007).	The	extent	to	which	they	do	so	within	the	boundaries	of	democratic	standards	will	affect	the	successful	transition	to	a	democratic	regime	and	its	further	consolidation.	A	democratizing	society	is	also	one	in	 which	 new	 cleavages	 are	 defined	 and	 new	 political	 identities	 emerge.	 Jowitt	 for	instance	 speaks	 of	 the	 post-communist	 context	 as	 a	 “genesis	 environment”,	characterised	by	"the	dissolution	of	existing	boundaries	and	related	identities	and	the	corresponding	potential	 to	 generate	novel	ways	of	 life”	 (Jowitt,	 1992,	 p.	 266).	 In	 this	process,	 the	 attempts	 of	 parties	 to	 represent	 citizens	 and	 mobilise	 them	 around	competing	 platforms	 will	 have	 a	 strong	 influence	 on	 the	 stabilisation	 of	 political	identities.	Whether	mainstream	parties	uphold	democratic	standards	or	not	will	likely	influence	the	spread	and	consolidation	of	democratic	norms	within	society	at	large	and	this	even	more	so	than	in	consolidated	democracies.	The	 extent	 to	 which	 mainstream	 parties	 uphold	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	partisanship	 also	 provides	 precious	 information	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 parties	 in	
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general	 uphold	 these	 standards	 within	 a	 given	 political	 system.	 We	 can	 take	 the	democratic	quality	of	partisanship	within	the	political	mainstream	as	a	'median'	for	the	party	system	as	a	whole,	and	thus	assume	that	fringe	parties	are	more	radical	and	also	less	respectful	of	democratic	standards	than	mainstream	ones.	This	also	means	that	if	basic	 democratic	 norms	 are	 being	 infringed	 at	 the	 very	 centre	 of	 the	 party	 system,	where	one	would	expect	greater	moderation,	it	is	likely	that	these	norms	are	also	being	infringed	 in	more	 radical	 sectors	of	 the	polity.	 If	we	were	 to	 study	 fringe	parties	and	find	that	they	disregard	basic	democratic	norms,	this	would	not	only	be	unsurprising.	It	would	 tell	 us	 very	 little	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisanship	 at	 large	 upholds	 these	standards	within	a	given	political	system.		Finally,	there	is	a	case	for	studying	the	democratic	merits	of	partisan	discourse	on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum.	 Partisan	 identities	 are	 defined	 relationally:	partisans	respond	to	their	opponents	and	need	opposition	to	ground	and	 justify	 their	own	identities.	The	particular	dynamic	that	exists	between	both	mainstream	parties	is	thus	likely	to	affect	the	extent	to	which	their	partisans	uphold	democratic	standards.	As	a	 consequence,	 it	 seems	 important	 not	 to	 study	 a	 given	 partisan	 identity	 in	 isolation	from	 the	 other	 partisan	 pole	 it	 defines	 itself	 against.	We	need	 to	 understand	 specific	expressions	of	partisanship	within	a	broader	context	of	political	competition.		
2.	The	choice	of	young	party	members	
a.	The	population	under	study31		 I	 completed	 the	 fieldwork	 for	 this	 research	 in	 Paris	 during	 the	 Spring	 of	 2013,	and	 in	 Budapest	 during	 the	 Fall	 of	 2013.	 I	 analyse	 28	 of	 the	 group	 discussions	 I	conducted	during	this	period,	seven	discussions	on	each	side	of	the	political	spectrum	in	both	of	the	countries	under	study.	With	three	to	six	participants	in	each	group,	this	amounted	 to	 a	 total	 of	 117	 participants.32	This	 group,	 which	 I	 will	 refer	 to	 as	 young	
partisans	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 simplicity,	 is	 mainly	 composed	 of	 members	 of	 the	 youth	organisations	of	the	parties	under	study.33	Because	I	offered	a	guarantee	of	anonymity	to	participants	at	the	stage	of	recruitment,	I	will	only	offer	general	information	on	the	local	groups	of	partisans	that	accepted	to	participate	in	the	study.	For	this	reason,	I	also	use	fake	names	for	all	of	the	participants	I	quoted	in	my	empirical	chapters.																																										 																					
31	For	a	more	detailed	account	of	the	composition	of	my	groups,	see	Appendix	2.		32	In	 total	 I	 conducted	38	groups	of	 two	 to	 six	participants.	 For	 an	 explanation	of	 how	 I	 selected	 the	28	groups	analysed	here,	see	Appendix	1,	footnote	154.		33	The	total	sample	includes	two	partisan	sympathisers	who	were	not	members.		
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My	 recruitment	 strategy	 consisted	 in	 initially	 contacting	 grass-root	 partisans	with	 a	 sufficient	 level	 of	 responsibility	 within	 a	 given	 group	 of	 party	 members,	 for	instance	 the	 heads	 of	 local	 sections	 of	 the	 youth	 party	 organisations	 in	 Paris	 and	Budapest.	I	asked	them	to	act	as	intermediaries	between	myself	and	a	potential	group	of	participants.	I	obtained	many	of	my	contacts	in	Paris	and	Budapest	by	searching	the	websites	of	the	four	main	youth	party	organisations.	As	I	started	conducting	groups,	I	also	 participated	 in	 different	 types	 of	 political	 events,	 including	 local	 town	 hall	meetings,	general	assemblies,	conferences,	and	meetings	of	party	elites	and	grass-roots	activists.	 In	 this	 process,	 I	 met	 more	 party	 members	 who	 either	 accepted	 to	 be	contacted	directly	about	the	project,	or	gave	contacts	they	thought	would	be	useful.			 A	 large	majority	 of	 groups	were	 comprised	of	members	of	 the	 local	 sections	of	four	partisan	youth	organisations:	the	PS's	Mouvement	des	Jeunes	Socialistes	(MJS),	the	UMP's	Jeunes	Populaires	(JP),	the	MSzP's	Societas,	and	the	Fidesz's	Fidelitas.	In	Hungary,	the	 atomisation	 of	 the	 current	 opposition	 to	 Fidesz	 required	 that	 I	 adopt	 a	 loose	definition	of	the	current	mainstream	left.	I	therefore	contacted	not	only	MSzP	activists	participate,	but	also	members	of	Együtt	2014/PM	and	DK,	 their	coalition	partners	 for	2014	 (see	 section	 III,1,a	 of	 this	 chapter).	 On	 the	 right-side	 of	 the	Hungarian	 political	spectrum,	a	large	majority	of	participants	were	activists	of	the	Fidesz,	with	only	a	few	members	from	their	close	electoral	ally,	the	KDNP.	Figure	1	below	gives	an	indication	of	the	distribution	of	participants	according	to	partisan	affiliation.		
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Figure	1:	Distribution	of	participants	according	to	partisan	affiliation		 While	most	participants	were	recruited	from	local	sections	of	the	different	youth	organisations	listed	above,	I	also	targeted	a	number	of	other	partisan	structures	where	I	was	likely	to	find	young	party	members.	These	included	local	party	sections	that	had	young	demographics,	party	university	sections,	and	 the	newly	recruited	staff	of	party	headquarters.	A	large	majority	of	my	participants	were	therefore	in	their	20s.	Figure	2	below	 reveals	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 28	 groups	 according	 to	 the	 specific	 types	 of	partisan	organisation	that	participants	in	these	groups	were	recruited	from.		
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Figure	 2:	 Distribution	 of	 groups	 according	 to	 the	 type	 of	 partisan	 organisation	 their	
participants	were	recruited	from		
b.	A	disproportionately	radical	cohort?		
In	justifying	to	focus	on	the	discourse	of	party	members	specifically,	rather	than	elites	or	 supporters,	 I	 first	need	 to	address	an	obvious	objection	 that	 could	be	 raised	against	 this	 choice:	 the	 radical	 positions	 of	 activists	 as	 compared	 to	 those	 of	 other	groups	of	partisans.	The	idea	according	to	which	grass-root	activists	are	more	extreme	than	both	 leaders	and	voters	was	systematised	by	May	in	the	1970s,	and	is	known	as	the	'law	of	curvilinear	disparity'	(May,	1973).		The	 available	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 the	 political	 attitudes	 of	 party	members,	and	the	evidence	supporting	May's	law	more	specifically,	is	both	scarce	and	mixed	(for	a	 review	 of	 the	 literature,	 see	 Heidar,	 2006,	 pp.	 308-309).	 In-group	 deliberation	 has	been	argued	to	produce	polarisation	and	radicalisation,	and	some	empirical	studies	in	the	 American	 political	 context	 especially	 have	 supported	 May's	 law	 in	 this	 regard	(Fiorina,	1999;	Sunstein,	2002).	But	a	number	of	empirical	studies	also	provide	a	more	nuanced	 picture	 of	 these	 questions.	 Norris's	 study	 of	 the	 British	 Labour	 and	Conservative	parties	in	the	1992	elections	shows	that	leaders	and	activists	are	subject	to	mixed	ideological	and	electoral	incentives	(Norris,	1995).	Narud	and	Scare's	study	of	several	Norwegian	 parties	 also	 found	 that	 the	 law	 applied	 inconsistently	 to	 different	parties	and	issues	(Narud	&	Scare,	1999).	Finally,	a	more	recent	study	of	the	Irish	Fine	Gael	 finds	that	the	positions	of	party	activists	are	 in	fact	very	close	to	those	of	a	 loyal	voter,	and	far	more	moderate	than	one	would	expect	(Gallagher	&	Marsh,	2004).	May's	 law	 also	 tends	 to	 overestimate	 the	 ideological	 homogeneity	 of	 party	memberships	and	the	ideological	'correctness'	of	party	members.	As	expressed	by	van	
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Haute,	"the	 literature	on	party	membership	often	takes	 for	granted	that	members	are	happy,	loyal	and	love	and	support	their	party"	(van	Haute,	2011,	p.	170).	Her	work	on	party	members	in	Belgium	reveals	a	far	more	complex	picture,	with	surveys	revealing	"a	substantial	proportion	of	respondents	who	were	very	critical	about	their	own	party"	(op.	 cit.,	 p.	 170;	 see	 also	 van	 Haute	 &	 Carty,	 2012).	 	 More	 generally,	 little	 data	 is	available	on	how	members	reflect	on	and	position	themselves	vis-à-vis	the	identity	and	strategies	 of	 their	 own	 party.	 The	 study	 of	 partisan	 discourse	 is	 necessary	 for	partisanship	 to	be	 analysed	 in	 all	 of	 its	nuances,	 details	 and	 contradictions,	 and	 little	work	of	this	type	has	been	conducted	so	far	(for	some	exceptions,	see	Marlière,	2007;	Weltman	&	Billig,	2001).		The	literature	on	the	attitudes	of	young	party	members	is	even	more	scarce	(for	exceptions,	see	Bargel,	2009;	Bruter	&	Harrison,	2009a,	2009b;	Cross	&	Young,	2008),	and	it	gives	little	indication	on	how	their	attitudes	might	be	different	from	the	opinions	of	their	elders.	While	young	people	are	often	associated	with	more	radical	ideas,	this	is	not	 necessarily	 to	 be	 expected	 from	 young	 party	 members.	 As	 Bruter	 and	 Harrison	have	 shown	 in	 their	 survey-based	 study	 of	 youth	 party	membership	 in	 six	 European	countries,	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 young	 party	 activists	 in	 Europe,	 26%,	 are	'professional	minded'	 (Bruter	&	Harrison,	 2009b,	 p.	 1272).	 This	means	 that	 they	 are	primarily	motivated	 by	 achieving	 a	 political	 career,	 rather	 than	 advancing	 particular	political	ideas,	and	that	they	are	also	less	ideological	than	the	average	party	member.		
b.	A	meaningful	group	for	studying	partisanship	at	large	
For	 the	 reasons	 outlined	 above,	 we	 can	 assume	 that	 we	 will	 obtain	 a	 fairly	accurate	image	of	French	and	Hungarian	partisanship	in	general	by	taking	the	positions	of	 young	 party	members	 as	 a	 proxy.	 But	 there	 are	 other	 reasons	 for	 choosing	 party	members	 over	 elites	 or	 supporters.	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 discourse	 of	 young	 activists	 will	arguably	offer	a	more	faithful	image	of	the	general	programs	that	parties	campaign	on	as	 compared	 to	 the	 discourse	 of	 lay	 voters.	 Indeed,	 activists	 are	more	 intensely	 and	frequently	 in	 contact	 with	 the	 discourse	 of	 their	 leaders,	 and	 will	 regularly	 seek	information	 on	 their	 party's	 policies	 and	 ideas.	 To	 this	 extent,	 one	 could	 cautiously	endorse	de	Swaan's	assertion	that	"the	best	overall	indicator	of	a	party's	policy	position	in	the	long	run	would	be	the	attitudes	of	its	activists"	(cited	in	Mair,	2001,	p.	15).		The	 opinions	 of	 younger	 activists	may	 be	 even	more	 revealing	 in	 this	 regard.	Indeed,	 they	will	be	most	 influenced	by	 the	norms	that	party	elites	currently	carry	 in	both	 countries	 under	 study.	 Because	 political	 socialisation	 happens	 early	 in	 the	 life	
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cycle,	 older	 cohorts	 	 may	 hold	 ideas	 that	 are	 outdated	 and	 will	 loose	 their	 present	relevance	with	generational	renewal	(Hooghe	&	Stolle,	2003;	Hyman,	1969).	A	related	argument	 is	 that	 young	 members	 are	 the	 depositary	 of	 the	 future	 of	 parties	 and	therefore	of	partisanship.	At	the	most	prosaic	 level	 it	 is	among	their	ranks	that	future	party	 elites	 will	 emerge	 (Bruter	 &	 Harrison,	 2009a,	 pp.	 211-222;	 2009b,	 pp.	 1284-1285).	These	 last	points	are	particularly	relevant	 in	post-communist	countries,	where	young	 partisans	 represent	 the	 first	 generation	 that	 has	 been	 socialised	 within	 a	formally	 democratic	 system.	 In	 this	 regard,	 they	 are	 both	 the	 children	 of	 a	 period	 of	political	 transition	 in	 which	 parties	 have	 been	 crucial	 and	 a	 cohort	 that	 holds	responsibility	for	the	future	consolidation	of	democracy.34	Party	 activists	 are	 also	 worth	 studying	 precisely	 because	 they	 are	 the	 actors	that	 deliver	 the	 party's	message	 directly,	 and	 in	 person,	 to	 the	 citizenry	 at	 large.	 As	outlined	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 it	 is	 because	 party	 organisations	 are	 unique	 intermediaries	between	citizens	and	the	state	that	their	democratic	merits	have	consequences	for	the	vitality	 and	 endurance	 of	 democracy	 at	 large.	 In	 this	 regard,	 grass-root	 activists	 are	closely	 associated	 with	 partisan	 functions	 of	 democratic	 linkage.	 As	 Poguntke	emphasises,	members	 are	 'the	most	 tightly	 knit	 connection	 between	 party	 elites	 and	voters'	(Poguntke,	2002,	p.	9).	Crouch	has	similarly	stated	that	a	"major	function	of	the	intermediate	circles	is	to	link	political	leaders	to	the	electorate	in	a	two-way	interaction	via	 the	 various	 levels	 of	 the	 party"	 (Crouch,	 2004,	 pp.	 70-71).	 It	 is	 thus	 precisely	because	 the	party	 on	 the	 ground	has	 this	 function	of	mediation	 that	 it	 is	 particularly	important	for	grass-root	activists	to	uphold	democratic	standards.	They	are	among	the	political	actors	best	positioned	to	communicate	these	norms	to	citizens	in	person.	For	this	 reason,	 but	 also	 because	 party	 members	 have	 more	 actively	 and	 voluntarily	embraced	their	status	as	partisans	compared	to	lay	supporters,	we	can	argue	that	party	members	 have	 a	 greater	 and	more	 direct	moral	 responsibility	 to	 uphold	 democratic	standards	than	supporters	(Bonotti,	2012).		Finally,	 there	 are	 practical	 reasons	 for	 choosing	 to	 focus	 on	 young	 party	members.	As	I	will	explain	below,	they	are	more	suited	to	the	focus-group	methodology	that	I	have	chosen	for	this	study.	Young	grass-root	partisans	are	more	'social-minded'	than	their	elders,	and	 local	sections	more	 likely	 to	be	spaces	of	socialisation	 for	 them	(Bruter	&	Harrison,	2009b,	p.	1272).	This	sociability	served	the	study	in	several	ways.																																									 																					
34	It	is	worth	specifying	that	party	memberships	are	quite	young	in	newly	formed	democracies	compared	to	Western	European	trends	and	that	young	people	are	playing	an	essential	role	in	the	current	evolution	of	Central	European	party	systems	(on	the	Hungarian	case	especially,	see	Saltman,	2014;	see	also	Scarrow	&	Gezgor,	2006,	p.	9).	
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First,	 I	had	to	attend	party-organised	events	to	meet	potential	participants.	The	range	of	 activities	 organised	 by	 youth	 party	 organisations	 in	 both	 countries	 typically	made	the	youth	 far	more	accessible	 than	older	generations.	 Second,	 it	was	essential	 for	 the	discussions	 to	 take	place	 among	 individuals	 that	were	 familiar	with	one	 another	 and	were	 engaged	 in	 day-to-day	 political	 activism	 together.	 Organizing	 such	 groups	 was	thus	also	facilitated	by	the	fact	that	youth	party	organisations	act	as	strong	peer-groups	for	many	of	these	grass-root	members	(on	French	youth	party	organisations,	see	Bargel,	2009;	on	Hungarian	youth	party	organisations,	see	Saltman,	2014).	Because	I	was	part	of	the	same	age	group	as	participants,	they	also	related	to	me	more	easily.	This	is	likely	to	have	made	them	feel	more	comfortable	and	has	facilitated	the	conduction	of	group	discussions.	 Finally,	 party	 elites	 would	 have	 been	 more	 concerned	 with	 their	 public	image	than	grass-root	partisans	with	few	responsibilities	in	the	party	hierarchy.	To	this	extent,	 we	 can	 also	 expect	 the	 discourse	 of	 young	 activists	 to	 be	 less	 contrived	 and	more	genuine	than	the	one	of	elites.			
IV.	METHODOLOGICAL	CHOICES	
In	 this	 last	 part	 I	make	 the	 case	 for	 using	 focus-group	methodology	 to	 study	partisan	discourse	and	offer	a	more	specific	account	of	the	discussion	guidelines	used	in	my	focus	groups.	I	then	describe	how	I	processed	and	analysed	the	transcripts	of	my	interviews	to	answer	my	research	questions.	
1.	Studying	partisanship	in	group	discussions	
a.	The	benefits	of	focus-group	methodology	
In	line	with	the	interpretative	approaches	to	politics	outlined	earlier,	my	use	of	focus	group	methodology	rests	on	the	idea	that	political	attitudes	are	best	studied	not	as	 fixed	and	attached	 to	an	 individual,	but	as	 resulting	 from	a	process	 through	which	meaning	about	public	affaires	is	constructed	with	others.	In	this	sense,	the	group	is	not	merely	 an	 occasion	 to	 study	 a	 collection	 of	 individual	 opinions.	 It	 allows	 to	 explore	socially	shared	knowledge	and	places	of	dissensus,	reasoning	and	argument,	and	more	generally,	 political	meaning	 in	 construction	 (Belzile	 &	 0berg,	 2012,	 p.	 467;	Marková,	2007;	White,	2011b,	pp.	40,	45).	As	expressed	by	White,	focus	groups	find	their	best	use	for	 exploring	 "common-sense	 assumptions	 and	 routinised	 discursive	 practices	which	underlie	 these,	 in	 which	 the	 terms	 of	 debate	 are	 set	 and	 the	 possibilities	 for	
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subjecthood	 and	 political	 understanding	 laid	 out"	 (White,	 2011b,	 p.	 40).	 Discussions	among	 partisans	 are	 thus	 likely	 to	 be	 places	 where	 the	 norms	 that	 underlie	partisanship	 are	 both	 defined	 in	 common	 and	 expressed.	 As	 phrased	 by	Gamson,	 "to	talk	 about	 issues	 with	 others,	 people	 search	 for	 a	 common	 basis	 of	 discourse	 (...)	Finding	a	mode	of	discourse	in	conversation	means	finding	a	working	frame	that	can	be	shared	by	the	other	participants"	(Gamson,	1992,	pp.	191-192).		Observing	partisans	talking	among	themselves	thus	provides	a	site	to	study	the	norms	that	they	share	and	construct	in	common.	Focus	group	methodology	is	also	more	appropriate	than	other	methods	for	subsequently	explaining	the	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	that	I	uncover.	As	this	task	is	done	inductively,	by	focusing	on	the	cultural	resources	and	events	that	participants	choose	to	draw	on,	participants	should	also	be	as	little	constrained	as	possible	in	these	choices	by	the	research	setting	itself.	As	a	point	of	comparison,	one-on-one	interviews	provide	a	context	in	which	the	power	of	the	 moderator	 over	 the	 conversation	 is	 far	 greater,	 and	 participants	 are	 also	 more	constrained	by	the	frame	of	the	question	itself	in	the	points	they	develop	(Steiner	et	al.,	2004,	p.	54;	White,	2011b,	p.	45).	This	is	even	more	of	an	issue	in	survey-based	studies,	as	 the	 closed	 nature	 of	 questionnaires	 tends	 to	 considerably	 foreclose	 the	 answers	obtained	(Bourdieu,	1993).	In	 the	context	of	 this	 study,	 it	 is	nevertheless	an	asset	 that	participants	are	at	least	minimally	constrained	by	the	focus-group	setting	and	especially	that	they	have	a	clear	 audience:	 me	 as	 moderator	 and	 you	 as	 reader.	 Indeed,	 the	 group	 discussions	thereby	acquire	a	semi-public	character.	The	norms	at	play	will	partly	be	the	ones	that	participants	 use	 in	 regular	 sociable	 interaction,	 but	 also	 those	 they	 consider	 the	moderator,	as	well	as	the	audience	of	the	study,	are	likely	to	respect	(Gamson,	1992,	pp.	18-21).	We	can	thus	expect	partisans	 to	adopt	at	 least	 in	part	 the	discourse	 that	 they	consider	is	expected	from	them	'publicly'.		To	 this	 extent,	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 discourse	 of	 partisans	 complies	 with	democratic	 standards	 also	 reveals	 what	 partisans	 consider	 to	 be	 a	 'correct'	 political	discourse,	 and	 which	 are	 the	 norms	 that	 they	 believe	 they	 should	 uphold.	 My	participants	will	 have	 tried	 to	 give	 a	 certain	 impression	 to	 their	 audience.	What	 they	
chose	 to	 say	 in	 front	of	 their	 fellow	party	members,	 in	 front	of	 the	 researcher,	 and	 in	front	of	those	who	will	read	this	research	is	what	they	thought	would	produce	the	best	possible	impression	on	all	three	audiences.	This	public	dimension	of	partisan	discourse	is	 important	 precisly	 because	 I	 do	 not	 seek	 to	 study	 partisanship	 stripped	 from	 its	
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attempts	 at	 convincing	 and	 persuading	 others. 35 	Rhetoric	 and	 strategy	 are	consubstantial	to	the	'great	game	of	politics',	and	are	by	the	same	token	an	integral	part	of	 the	public	 face	of	 partisanship	 (Disch,	 2011,	 pp.	 109-110;	Muirhead	&	Rosenblum,	2006,	p.	104).	 It	 is	 also	within	 this	very	public	 sphere	 that	 the	discourse	of	partisans	has	the	greatest	impact	and	is	therefore	of	greatest	interest	to	this	study.		
b.	Organising	the	focus	groups	
As	 emphasised	 by	 Gamson,	 "the	 sociable	 interaction	 component	 (of	 a	 group	discussion)	 is	variously	encouraged	or	discouraged	by	the	facilitator	style,	group	size,	setting,	and	topic"	(Gamson,	1992,	p.	193).	I	designed	the	group	discussions	with	this	in	mind.	 First,	 the	 discussions	 were	 purposefully	 conducted	 with	 a	 small	 number	 of	participants,	a	minimum	of	three	and	a	maximum	of	six.	Small	groups	are	more	adapted	to	 the	 exploratory	 nature	 of	 this	 research,	 as	 they	 spur	 discussions	 of	 greater	 depth,	and	 are	 more	 inclusive	 than	 larger	 ones	 (see	 Gamson,	 1992;	 Krueger,	 1998,	 p.	 73;	White,	 2011b).	 Choosing	 grass-root	 activists	 with	 few	 responsibilities	 in	 the	 party	hierarchy	 meant	 that	 partisans	 would	 be	 less	 worried	 about	 the	 direct	 political	consequences	of	 their	discourse.	The	relatively	young	age	of	my	participants,	most	of	them	being	in	their	mid-20s,	also	made	them	more	open	to	sociable	interaction.		In	 addition,	 the	 recruitment	 process	 allowed	 to	 increase	 this	 sociability.	 As	already	emphasised,	I	asked	one	partisan	with	some	authority	to	invite	other	activists	in	 his	 own	 political	 circle.	 This	means	 that	 I	 assembled	 participants	who	 knew	 each	other	and	were	used	to	talking	politics	with	each	other.	I	also	invited	my	intermediaries	to	suggest	a	place	to	meet,	and	suggested	that	it	be	in	a	public	place,	generally	a	bar	or	café,	where	the	group	was	used	to	go	together.		I	 made	 sure	 that	 participants	 did	 not	 know	 more	 than	 they	 needed	 on	 the	nature	of	the	study	itself	and	the	questions	they	would	be	asked	before	the	meeting.	If	I	had	 presented	 the	 study	 as	 one	 seeking	 to	 assess	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 uphold	democratic	standards,	this	would	have	certainly	biased	my	results.	Participants	would	have	 been	 tempted	 to	 pre-empt	my	 results,	 and	 calibrate	 their	 own	 answers	 to	 this	effect.	 I	 thus	 presented	 the	 project	 in	 far	more	 general	 terms,	 emphasising	 that	 I	 am	undertaking	 a	 comparative	 study	 of	 the	 political	 opinions	 of	 French	 and	 Hungarian	young	party	members.	This	 is,	 for	 instance,	how	I	presented	the	project	 in	the	email	 I	
																																								 																					
35	If	this	were	my	goal,	I	could	use	participation	observation	methods,	spending	time	in	party	headquarters	and	witnessing	partisans'	day-today	interaction.	
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sent	to	potential	group	leaders,36	or	when	I	encountered	potential	participants	in	local	party	events.		
c.	Discussion	guidelines37	
I	started	each	discussion	by	presenting	the	project	to	my	participants,	assuring	them	that	their	anonymity	would	be	respected	and	asking	them	for	the	authorisation	to	record	them.	I	would	then	ask	participants	to	tell	me	a	bit	about	themselves	and	their	background.38	I	would	sometimes	ask	participants	a	 few	additional	questions	on	their	local	 party	 structure,	 day-to-day	 activism,	 or	 the	 structure	 of	 their	 party's	 youth	organisation.39	After	 these	 presentations,	 I	 gave	 each	 of	 them	 an	 identical	 series	 of	twelve	cards	matching	twelve	different	areas	of	public	policy	particularly	debated	over	the	 last	 few	years	 in	France	and	Hungary40.	Each	area	of	public	policy	was	 illustrated	with	 an	 image:	 in	 France	 a	 saturical	 drawing	 by	 Plantu,	 published	 in	 the	 journal	 Le	
Monde;	in	Hungary	more	illustrative	pictures	(see	Figure	3	and	4	below).	
																																								 																					
36	For	my	template	emails,	see	Appendix	3.		37	For	a	verbatim	account	of	the	discussion	guidelines,	see	Appendix	4	38	This	part	of	the	discussion	was	removed	from	the	transcripts	and	NVivo	file	made	available	to	examiners	to	secure	the	anonymity	of	participants	(for	access	 to	 the	raw	data,	see	Appendix	7).	All	names	given	by	participants	at	this	point	of	the	discussion	were	also	changed	to	preserve	their	anonymity.	This	applies	to	the	examples	cited	in	this	thesis,	and	the	data	made	available	to	examiners.	39	This	was	mostly	to	further	my	own	knowledge	of	the	internal	workings	of	the	parties,	but	I	scarcely	used	this	information	in	my	thesis.	40	10	out	of	12	cards	were	equivalent	in	both	countries.	The	two	cards	that	were	particular	to	both	national	contexts	were,	in	France	'Sexual	minorities	and	social	change'	and	'Legal	and	illegal	immigration'	(Card	4	and	6	from	left	to	right	in	Figure	3)	and	in	Hungary	'Institutional	reforms'	and	'The	place	of	the	nation	in	politics'	(Card	4	and	7	from	left	to	right	in	Figure	4).		
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Figure	3:	Visual	prompts	for	the	French	group	discussions		
From	left	to	right:	Card	1:	Maintaining	and	reforming	the	public	service,	Card	2:	Relations	to	the	EU,	
Card	3:	Religious	and/or	national	minorities,	Card	4:	Sexual	minorities	and	social	change;	Card	5:	Justice	and	
security,	 Card	 6:	 Legal	 and	 illegal	 immigration;	 Card	 7:	 The	 fight	 against	 unemployment	 and	 employment	
policy,	Card	8:	Public	morality,	Card	9:	 Industrial	and/or	agricultural	politics,	Card	10:	Fiscal	Policy,	 social	
policy	and	redistribution	of	wealth,	Card	11:	Financing	the	public	debt	and	deficit/improving	public	accounts,	
Card	12:	Environmental	politics.		
	
Figure	4:	Visual	prompts	for	the	Hungarian	group	discussions	
From	left	to	right:	Card	1:	Maintaining	and	reforming	the	public	service,	Card	2:	Relations	to	the	EU,	
Card	3:	Religious	and/or	national	minorities,	Card	4:	Institutional	reforms;	Card	5:	Justice	and	security,	Card	
6:	The	fight	against	unemployment	and	employment	policy,	Card	7:	The	place	of	the	Nation	in	Politics,	Card	8:	
Public	 morality,	 Card	 9:	 Industrial	 and/or	 agricultural	 politics,	 Card	 10:	 Fiscal	 Policy,	 social	 policy	 and	
redistribution	of	wealth,	Card	11:	Financing	the	public	debt	and	deficit/improving	public	accounts,	Card	12:	
Environmental	politics.	
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If	I	chose	satyrical	images	in	France	and	more	illustrative	pictures	in	Hungary,	it	is	because	I	could	not	 find	an	equivalent	to	the	French	 illustrator	Plantu	 in	Hungary	-	both	in	terms	of	notoriety	and	relative	partisan	neutrality.	While	Plantu	is	clearly	from	the	centre-left,	he	remains	critical	towards	both	left	and	right-wing	personalities.	He	is	also	one	of	the	most	famous	contemporary	satirists	in	France,	and	I	was	confident	that	his	drawings	would	not	be	perceived	as	a	biased	choice	by	participants.	I	could	not	find	a	 Hungarian	 equivalent	 to	 Plantu,	 a	 satirist	 that	 would	 not	 have	 appeared	 first	 and	foremost	as	a	partisan	to	my	participants.	I	do	not	believe,	however,	that	using	satirical	drawings	 in	 France	 and	 images	 in	Hungary	 fundamentally	 influenced	 the	 outcome	of	this	 research.	 Indeed,	 the	 images	were	presented	 as	mere	 illustrations	 of	 the	 themes	under	discussion,	and	were	only	marginally	the	direct	object	of	commentary	from	my	participants.		Once	the	cards	were	distributed	and	participants	had	had	the	chance	to	look	at	them,	they	were	asked	to	take	the	time	to	establish	a	classification	of	the	different	cards.	They	were	to	do	this	on	their	own	and	not	in	discussion	with	others.	More	specifically,	they	 were	 asked	 to	 classify	 the	 cards	 according	 to	 how	 much	 disagreement	 they	
perceived	 to	exist	between	 their	own	party	and	 their	main	opponents	on	 these	different	
issues.	Interviewees	were	explicitly	encouraged	to	organise	cards	 in	the	way	they	saw	fit:	 in	 a	 number	 of	 categories	 (for	 instance,	 topics	 of	 agreement	 and	 topics	 of	disagreement),	 or	 on	 one	 given	 scale	 (from	 the	 most	 consensual	 topic	 to	 the	 most	conflictual	one).	They	were	also	told	that	they	were	free	not	to	classify	certain	cards	if	these	did	not	fit	in	the	categories,	or	in	the	scale,	that	they	had	established.		Once	 they	 had	 finished	 this	 classification,	 the	 discussions	 were	 schematically	divided	into	three	parts.		Part	1:	 In	 the	 first	 and	main	part	of	 the	discussion,	which	 took	up	about	 two-thirds	 of	 the	 total,	 partisans	were	 invited	 to	 talk	 about	 the	 different	 cards	 and	 their	classification,	 starting	 from	 the	 most	 consensual	 cards	 and	 going	 towards	 the	 most	conflictual	ones.	 I	would	start	with	a	question	such	as:	"would	someone	like	to	tell	us	about	 a	 one	 of	 the	 topics	 he	 found	 most	 consensual?"	 A	 participant	 would	 then	generally	 volunteer,	 and	 after	 being	 prompted,	 would	 describe	 the	 forms	 taken	 by	political	 agreement	 on	 a	 certain	 topic,	 or	 offer	 a	 justification	 for	 why	 he	 chose	 to	classify	a	given	topic	as	'consensual'.	At	that	point	I	would	open	up	the	discussion	and	ask	 if	 the	others	agreed	with	 the	 first	 speaker,	and	 told	 them	they	should	 feel	 free	 to	give	their	opinion.	Once	everybody	had	had	a	chance	to	say	what	they	wanted,	I	asked	again	if	someone	would	like	to	suggest	a	second	card,	still	among	the	more	consensual	
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ones.	This	process	continued	until	the	most	conflictual	cards	had	been	discussed.	Very	soon	 I	did	not	need	 to	ask	 these	questions	anymore:	participants	would	 suggest	new	cards	for	discussion	when	a	topic	had	been	discussed	at	sufficient	length,	and	react	to	each	others'	classifications	without	being	prompted.		Part	 2:	 At	 the	 end	 of	 this	 process,	 I	 asked	participants	 an	 additional	 series	 of	questions.	 I	 aimed	 at	 getting	 participants	 to	 express	 a	 normative	 judgement	 on	 the	overall	 balance	 of	 agreement	 and	 disagreement	 on	 the	 issues	 they	 had	 to	 discuss.	 I	would	sometimes	start	by	asking	a	question	such	as:	"Do	you	feel	like	overall	there	are	more	 topics	of	agreement	or	disagreement	between	 the	 two	main	political	parties?"	 I	would	 then	 ask	 questions	 such	 as:	 "If	we	 consider	 your	 classification	 of	 these	 topics	overall,	 do	 you	 think,	 in	 your	 personal	 opinion,	 that	 the	 balance	 between	 areas	 of	agreement	 and	 areas	 of	 disagreement	 is	 right	 between	 political	 parties?"	 or	 "Do	 you	think	 that	 your	 political	 system	 would	 need	 more	 political	 disagreement	 between	political	 parties?	 Or	 would	 your	 political	 system	 rather	 need	 less	 disagreement	 and	more	areas	of	consensus	between	political	parties?"41	Part	3:	The	third,	and	final,	series	of	questions	related	to	participants'	personal	experiences	 of	 encounters	 with	 political	 opponents.	 I	 would	 first	 ask	 participants	whether	they	had	opportunities	in	their	everyday	life	to	discuss	politics	with	people	of	different	 political	 opinions	 than	 their	 own.	 I	 would	 then	 ask	 in	 what	 circumstances	these	 encounters	 occurred,	 and	 whether	 these	 discussions	 generally	 went	 well,	 or	whether	they	were	problematic.			 This	 discussion	 protocol	 served	 several	 purposes.	 First,	 it	 allowed	 me	 to	minimise	 my	 influence	 in	 the	 discussion	 and	 enhanced	 partisans'	 interaction.	 In	 the	best	 of	 cases,	 these	 guidelines	 allowed	 to	 generate	 quasi-autonomous	 group	discussions,	 in	which	my	interventions	were	reduced	to	a	minimum.	The	use	of	visual	prompts	 served	 this	 purpose	 particularly	 well	 (for	 other	 examples	 of	 focus	 group	studies	using	visual	prompts,	see	Gamson,	1992;	Meinhof,	2004;	White,	2011b).	Indeed,	using	 this	 protocol	 had	 the	 advantage	 of	 keeping	 participants	 on	 track	 without	foreclosing	the	discussion	altogether.	I	offered	considerable	freedom	to	participants,	in																																									 																					
41	In	 France,	 participants	 established	 a	 clearer	 separation	 between	 'consensual'	 and	 'conflictual'	 topics,	which	also	created	two	relatively	distinct	parts	in	the	discussion	of	the	cards	themselves.	For	this	reasons,	I	generally	 divided	 this	 second	 part	 of	 the	 discussion,	 on	 partisans'	 normative	 assessments	 of	 political	agreement	 and	 disagreement,	 in	 two	 parts	 in	 the	 case	 of	 France.	 For	 instance,	 once	 participants	 had	discussed	all	of	the	topics	that	they	considered	as	'consensual',	 	I	would	ask:	"If	we	consider	all	the	cards	that	 you	 classified	 as	 consensual,	 would	 you	 say	 that	 it	 is	 a	 good	 thing	 that	 there	 exists	 an	 agreement	between	mainstream	parties	on	these	topics?	Or	on	the	contrary	would	you	prefer	there	be	more	dissensus	between	the	two	main	parties	on	these	questions?"	These	questions	would	be	reversed	once	participants	had	discussed	the	topics	they	classified	as	conflictual.		
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how	they	chose	to	organise	the	cards,	in	the	topics	they	chose	to	discuss,	in	the	length	at	 which	 they	 decided	 to	 discuss	 them,	 and	 in	 the	 interpretation	 they	 gave	 of	 the	different	cards.			 Second,	this	protocol	also	ensured	that	participants	would	exercise	this	freedom	within	clearly	defined	boundaries,	and	without	me	having	to	intervene	in	order	to	reset	its	 terms.	The	ways	 in	which	participants	organised	 the	cards	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	discussion	acted	as	a	constant	and	physical	reminder	of	the	discussion	guidelines,	and	limited	the	possibility	for	conversations	going	off-track.	Focusing	on	the	same	topics42	and	 asking	 the	 same	 questions	 in	 all	 groups	 also	 ensured	 that	 I	 would	 be	 able	 to	compare	the	discourse	of	different	partisans	at	the	point	of	analysis.			 Finally,	 this	 protocol	 generated	 data	 that	 addressed	 my	 research	 questions	without	having	to	ask	participants	directly	about	the	cohesiveness	of	their	claims,	their	respect	 for	 opponents,	 or	 their	 tolerance	 of	 political	 disagreement.	 I	 obtained	 the	necessary	evidence	 to	examine	 the	extent	 to	which	partisans	uphold	 the	standards	of	democratic	partisanship	established	in	Chapter	1.	I	consider	these	standards	in	turn:	
• The	 cohesiveness	 of	 partisan	 claims:	 Part	 1	 of	 the	 discussion	 provided	 evidence	concerning	the	cohesiveness	of	partisan	claims.	To	justify	classifying	a	certain	card	as	a	topic	of	political	agreement	or	disagreement,	partisans	were	required	to	talk	about	their	 own	platforms	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	 resemble	 or	 differ	 from	 those	 of	their	opponents.	This	part	of	the	discussion	thus	allowed	me	to	analyse	the	ways	in	which,	 and	 the	 extent	 with	 which,	 partisans	 talked	 about	 their	 party's	 normative	goals,	 linked	 these	 goals	 to	 concrete	 programs	 of	 government,	 and	 differentiated	these	ideas	and	policies	from	those	of	their	opponents.		
• Pluralism	 in	 partisan	 attitudes	 towards	 opponents:	 Part	 1	 of	 the	 discussion	 also	provided	 evidence	 on	 partisans'	 respect	 for	 their	 political	 opponents.	 In	 talking	about	 what	 sets	 their	 own	 party	 apart	 from	 their	 opposition	 on	 the	 topics	 under	discussion,	participants	also	criticised	and	valued	their	opponents	in	different	ways.	This	allowed	me	 to	evaluate	 the	extent	 to	which	 they	criticised	opponents	on	 their	practices	 rather	 than	 their	 motives,	 recognised	 the	 principled	 nature	 of	 political	opponents,	and	recognised	the	orientation	of	opponents	towards	the	common	good.		
• Pluralism	in	partisan	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement:	Part	2	and	 3	 of	 the	 discussion	 were	 more	 directly	 relevant	 for	 assessing	 pluralism	 in	partisan	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement.	In	explaining	why																																									 																					
42	As	specified	in	footnote	40,	10	out	of	the	12	topics	under	discussion	were	equivalent	in	both	countries.		
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they	would	rather	welcome	more	partisan	disagreement	or	more	partisan	agreement	on	the	 issues	considered,	activists	also	expressed	a	 judgement	on	the	more	general	value	of	agreement	and	disagreement	within	their	polity.	In	accounting	for	their	own	experiences	 of	 interpartisan	 dialogue,	 partisans	 would	 give	 reasons	 for	 why	 they	attached	value	to	these	encounters,	or,	on	the	contrary,	failed	to	see	their	purpose.		
2.	The	analysis	of	partisan	discourse	The	 28	 group	 discussions	were	 transcribed	 verbatim	 and	 analysed	 through	 a	process	 of	 coding.	 Coding	 in	 qualitative	 analysis	 may	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 process	 by	which	codes,	or	key	words,	are	associated	with	portions	of	text—a	word,	a	sentence,	or	a	paragraph—throughout	the	data.	In	this	context,	a	code	is	generally	"a	word	or	short	phrase	 that	 symbolically	 assigns	 a	 summative,	 salient,	 essence-capturing,	 and/or	evocative	attribute"	to	the	portion	of	data	it	is	associated	with	(Saldaña,	2013,	p.	3).	The	same	 codes	 are	 used	 repeatedly,	 and	 different	 codes	 often	 used	 simultaneously	throughout	the	data-set.	Counting	these	occurrences	and	co-occurrences	allows	for	the	identification	 of	 recurrent	 patterns	 and	 themes,	 thus	 facilitating	 the	 formulation	 of	rules,	correlations	and	explanations	emerging	from	the	data.	It	also	allows	scholars	to	identify	variations	in	these	patterns	across	different	groups	of	speakers.			I	 carried	 out	 the	 coding	 using	 NVivo,	 a	 Computer	 Assisted	 Qualitative	 Data	Analysis	 Software	 (CAQDAS).	 Although	 similar	 software	 (Atlas	 TI	 and	 QDA	 minor	particularly)	 can	 be	 used	 to	 perform	 quantitative	 content	 analysis	 -	 for	 instance	through	 the	 investigation	 of	 statistical	 regularities	 in	 key-word	 usage,	 grammatical	constructions	 or	 word	 co-occurrences	 -	 this	 research	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 CAQDAS	 to	perform	 coding	 in	 any	 automatised	 way.	 This	 software	 nevertheless	 performs	important	 functions	 in	 my	 analysis	 of	 the	 transcripts.	 First,	 it	 facilitated	 a	 process	traditionally	 performed	with	pen	 and	pencil	 by	qualitative	 researchers:	 coding	 is	 not	only	 accelerated	 by	 the	 use	 of	 software,	 it	 is	 also	 rendered	 more	 systematic	 and	accessible	 for	 review.	 NVivo	 for	 instance	would	 allow	 for	 the	 systematic	 removal	 or	modification	of	a	given	code	throughout	the	dataset,	and	produces	a	neat	display	when	multiple	 codes	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 same	 unit	 of	 text.	 Second,	 once	 the	 cycles	 of	coding	 are	 complete,	 connecting	 codes	 and	 identifying	 patterns	 in	 the	 data	 is	 greatly	facilitated	by	the	use	of	such	software.	NVivo	for	instance	performs	'coding	queries'	to	identify	 portions	 of	 texts	 in	 which	 certain	 codes	 co-occur	 and	 variations	 in	 the	occurrences	of	given	codes	depending	on	the	speaker	or	source	analysed.		
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The	 theoretical	 framework	 detailed	 in	 Chapter	 1	 directly	 inspired	 the	 coding	scheme	 that	 I	 applied	 to	 the	 transcripts.43	To	 evaluate	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	 partisan	
claims,	 much	 of	 the	 coding	 process	 was	 for	 instance	 concerned	 with	 the	 types	 of	arguments	 that	 participants	 used	 to	 describe	 the	 position	 of	 parties.	 To	 offer	 some	examples,	I	associated	specific	codes	depending	on	whether	partisans	classified	a	given	topic	 as	 one	 of	 disagreement	 or	 agreement	 between	 political	 parties	 (coded	CONFLICTUAL	 or	 CONSENSUAL);	 depending	 on	 the	 types	 of	 actors	 that	 partisans	evoked	(coded	SELF-FOCUSED,	OPPONENT-FOCUSED	or	COMPARISON)	or	depending	on	 the	dimensions	of	party	programs	 that	participants	 talked	about	when	accounting	for	partisan	differences	or	similarities	(coded	IDEAS	or	POLICIES).		To	 evaluate	 respect	 for	 political	 opponents,	 I	 coded	 among	 other	 things	 the	types	of	criticisms	that	partisans	direct	towards	their	opponents	(for	instance	the	codes	ILL	 INTENTIONS	and	FLAWED	PRACTICES).	Finally,	 to	evaluate	partisans	attachment	to	 partisan	 agreement	 and	 disagreement,	 I	 coded	 instances	 where	 partisans	 formed	normative	judgements	on	these	issues	(for	instance	the	codes	VALUE	OF	AGREEMENT	or	VALUE	OF	DISAGREEMENT).	At	 the	beginning,	and	 in	 the	course	of	each	empirical	chapter,	I	will	offer	a	more	detailed	account	of	how	I	operationalise	each	of	the	criteria	established	in	Chapter	1.44	In	extracting	results	from	this	coding	process,	I	compared	the	occurrences	and	co-occurrences	 of	 different	 codes	 according	 to	 nationality	 (whether	 the	 groups	were	conducted	 in	 France	 or	 Hungary)	 and	 according	 to	 partisan	 affiliation	 (whether	 the	groups	were	affiliated	with	the	PS,	the	UMP,	the	MSzP	or	the	Fidesz).	To	this	extent,	it	was	possible	to	establish	variations	in	patterns	of	speech	across	partisan	groupings	of	different	nationalities	and	political	affiliation.	In	the	three	empirical	chapters	to	follow,	I	rely	on	these	numbers	and	on	examples	from	the	interviews	as	my	primary	evidence.	In	conjunction,	their	analysis	allows	to	highlight	variations	in	the	democratic	merits	of	different	 partisan	 groupings	 and	 thus	 to	 answer	my	main	 research	question:	 to	what	
extent	does	real-world	partisanship	meet	the	standards	of	democratic	partisanship?	In	 the	 process	 of	 this	 analysis,	 I	 also	 pay	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 specific	cultural	 resources	 and	 external	 events	 that	 participants	 refer	 to,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	and	ways	in	which	they	use	these	in	discourse.	The	empirical	analysis	of	partisan																																									 																					
43	For	a	detailed	account	of	how	I	developped	my	codebook	and	of	the	coding	process	itself,	see	Appendix	5,	part	1	and	2.		44	Appendix	5,	part	3	contains	my	codebook,	which	constitutes	a	detailed	description	of	all	of	my	codes,	and	the	types	of	arguments	and	discursive	content	they	refer	to.		
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discourse	detailed	 in	 chapters	3,	 4	 and	5	 thus	 involves	making	 frequent	 and	detailed	references	 to	 the	 cultural	 and	 external	 contexts	 of	 both	 countries.	 I	 focus	 on	 the	functions	 that	 specific	 events,	 traditions,	 and	 symbols	 serve	 in	 partisan	 discourse.	 I	especially	determine	whether	 the	patterns	 that	 characterize	partisans'	use	of	 cultural	resources	and	external	events	are	generally	in	line	or	in	contradiction	with	democratic	standards.	On	this	basis,	I	discuss	possible	explanations	for	the	more	general	variations	in	 patterns	 of	 partisan	 discourse	 that	 I	 uncover	 in	 the	 conclusions	 of	 each	 empirical	chapter.										 											
	
100		CHAPTER	3:	The	cohesiveness	of	partisan	claims		In	 this	 first	 empirical	 chapter,	 I	 assess	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 French	 and	Hungarian	partisans	uphold	 the	standard	of	cohesiveness.	As	argued	 in	Chapter	1,	 the	vitality	 of	 representative	 democracy	 is	 conditional	 on	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	 partisan	platforms.	This	is	what	allows	parties	to	act	as	a	bridge	between	citizens	and	the	state,	and	to	foster	civic	engagement	more	generally.		For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 analysis,	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 French	 and	Hungarian	 partisans	 talk	 about	 the	 platforms	 of	 rival	 parties	 when	 they	 account	 for	partisan	 agreements	 and	 disagreements	 on	 the	 twelve	 topics	 under	 discussion.	 In	chapter	 1,	 I	 offered	 three	 criteria	 to	 evaluate	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	 partisanship.	 I	summarize	these	below,	and	indicate	the	type	of	evidence	that	my	interviews	offer	for	each	criterion:		
Criterion	1:	The	normative	criterion:	First,	partisans	should	account	 for	 the	ends	that	 justify	their	party's	exercise	of	political	power,	and	for	the	principles	that	underlie	such	an	exercise.	Parties	should	stand	for	a	distinct	vision	of	the	common	good,	rooted	in	rival	 interpretations	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 fundamental	 principals,	 such	 as	 equality	 or	freedom.	By	weaving	 individual	 concerns	 together	 in	 an	 overarching	narrative,	 parties	contribute	 to	 citizens	 making	 sense	 of	 their	 own	 grievances	 as	 issues	 of	 political	relevance.	 The	 normative	 commitments	 of	 political	 parties	 thus	 contribute	 to	 locate	particularistic	appeals	in	a	broader	understanding	of	the	political	world.		The	 interviews	 provide	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 this	 criterion.	 When	 accounting	 for	partisan	 disagreements	 on	 the	 twelve	 cards	 under	 discussion,	 partisans	 where	 also	implictely	 invited	 to	 justify	 their	 assessment	 and	 offer	 examples	 of	 what	 sets	 parties	apart.	One	could	expect	from	cohesive	partisans	that	they	emphasise	on	this	occasion	the	ideas	 that	 their	own	party	puts	 forward,	and	especially	 the	value-systems	on	which	 its	program	 is	 based.	 I	 thus	 coded	 for	 instances	where	partisans	 talked	 about	 their	 ideas,	and	further	refined	this	coding	category	to	take	into	account	levels	of	abstraction	of	the	ideas	that	participants	evoked.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	discuss	the	patterns	of	speech	that	
	
101	
relate	 specifically	 to	 these	 instances	 among	 different	 groups	 of	 partisans.	 I	 will	 also	compare	 the	 relative	 emphasis	 that	 partisans	 place	 on	 ideas	 as	 compared	 to	 practices	and	policies.			
Criterion	2:	The	executive	criterion:	The	second	requirement	for	political	parties	is	that	they	provide	citizens	with	the	sense	that	normative	goals	can	effectively	be	realised	through	the	use	of	state	power.	This	entails	 that	political	parties	campaign	not	only	on	the	basis	of	conflicting	interpretations	of	the	common	good,	but	that	they	set	forth	policy	proposals	that	make	for	a	coherent	political	program.	Visions	of	the	'good	society',	even	utopian	ones,	are	relevant	precisely	because	they	can	provide	guidance	and	a	rationale	for	action.		When	 it	 comes	 to	 analysing	 the	 interview	 transcripts,	 we	 could	 expect	 a	 cohesive	partisan	 to	 link	 his	 party's	 normative	 goals	 to	 its	 practices	 and	 policies.	 I	 draw	 on	instances	where	partisans	do	so	in	this	chapter,	and	conversely	on	cases	where	partisans	fail	to	do	so	-	for	instance,	talking	about	policy	differences	without	providing	a	normative	rationale	for	them.		I	 also	 draw	 on	 instances	 where	 participants	 make	 a	 distinction	 between	 partisan	disagreements	on	ideas	and	values,	and	partisan	disagreements	on	practices	and	policies.	For	 instance,	 there	 were	 cases	 where	 partisans	 emphasised	 similarities	 with	 their	opponents	 on	 given	 ideas,	 but	 dissimilarities	 in	 their	 practices.	 In	 other	 cases,	participants	emphasised	similarities	on	 the	practices	of	partisans,	but	dissimilarities	 in	their	ideas.	In	using	such	arguments,	participants	also	demonstrate	their	ability	to	view	the	ideas	and	practice-related	dimensions	of	party	platforms	as	distinct,	and	to	establish	connnections	between	them.		
Criterion	 3:	 The	 criterion	 of	 differentation:	 Finally,	 parties	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	differentiate	 their	 platforms	 from	 that	 of	 their	 opponents,	 to	 offer	 citizens	 distinct	normative	goals	 and	policy	proposals.	This	 is	necessary	 for	parties	 to	make	 clear	 their	own	 commitments,	 mobilise	 citizens	 on	 their	 basis,	 and	 publicly	 justify	 their	 claim	 to	exercise	political	power	vis-à-vis	their	political	opponents.	Even	more	fundamentally,	it	is	this	 form	 of	 partisan	 differentiation	 that	 offers	 citizens	 a	 meaningful	 choice	 between	political	alternatives.		The	extent	 to	which	partisans	adopt	a	comparative	perspective	when	talking	about	 the	twelve	topics	under	discussion	-	rather	than	focus	mostly	on	their	own	platform	or	those	of	 their	 opponents	 -	 is	 the	 most	 straight-forward	 indicator	 for	 this	 criterion.	 Indeed,	when	participants	compared	party	platforms,	they	were	also	more	likely	to	make	explicit	
	
102	
points	 of	 convergence	 or	 divergence	 between	political	 parties,	 and	 thus	 to	 detail	what	exactly	differentiates	or	draws	together	political	parties	on	a	given	topic.		Participants	admitting	that	they	do	not	know	the	position	of	their	own	party,	or	of	their	opponents,	 on	a	 given	question	 is	 an	 indicator	 for	 lack	of	partisan	differentiation.	This	also	means	 that	 participants	 cannot	 say	 in	what	ways	 their	 own	platform	differs	 from	that	of	their	opponents.	A	related	indicator	is	the	extent	to	which	partisans	refer	to	their	personal	 expertise	 on	 a	 given	 subject	 to	 legitimate	 their	 discourse.	 This	 indicates	 that	knowing	about	partisan	differences	 in	a	certain	policy	area	 is	not	seen	to	belong	to	the	'common	knowledge'	of	partisans.		 *	*	*	The	first	section	below	sets	the	scene	for	the	rest	of	the	analysis.	It	aims	to	give	the	 reader	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 identify	 agreements,	 or	disagreements	between	political	parties	on	the	twelve	cards	they	were	asked	to	discuss.	This	 is	 an	 important	 starting	 point,	 because	 the	 justifications	 given	 by	 partisans	 for	these	 classifications	 constitute	 most	 of	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 programmatic	cohesiveness	 presented	 subsequently.	 Following	 this	 overview,	 I	 present	 both	 the	qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 evidence	 for	 both	 cases	 in	 turn,	 first	 the	 discourse	 of	French	partisans	from	the	UMP	and	PS,	and	then	the	discourse	of	Hungarian	partisans	from	 the	MSzP-Együtt	 and	 Fidesz-KDNP.	 In	 the	 final	 section,	 I	 discuss	 both	 country-cases	in	a	comparative	fashion	and	provide	tentative	explanations	for	the	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	that	I	uncover.		
I.	PERCEPTIONS	OF	POLITICAL	DISAGREEMENT	AMONG	FRENCH	AND	HUNGARIAN	
PARTISANS	
One	of	 the	most	striking	differences	between	French	and	Hungarian	groups	 is	that	 Hungarian	 participants	 have	 a	 far	more	 conflictual	 view	 of	 their	 political	 sytem	than	their	French	counterparts.	This	was	first	apparent	in	the	reactions	of	French	and	Hungarian	participants	to	my	instructions	concerning	how	to	classify	the	cards.		French	participants	often	appeared	amused	or	interested	by	the	cards,	making	remarks	comparing	the	discussion	to	a	game,	such	as	'Are	we	going	to	play	poker?'	or	'Are	you	going	to	give	us	good	and	bad	points?'	(instances	coded	POSITIVE	REACTIONS,	see	Table	3).	They	did	not	question	the	relevance	of	establishing	a	hierarchy	between	topics	 of	 'conflict'	 and	 'consensus'	 among	 political	 opponents.	 A	 number	 of	 PS	
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participants	 did	 ask	 questions	 concerning	 the	 instructions,	 but	 these	 were	 mostly	directed	at	the	criteria	according	to	which	cards	should	be	classified	(instances	coded	QUESTIONING	CRITERIA,	see	Table	3).	They	generally	suggested	two	different	logics	of	classification:	 one	 according	 to	 the	 ideals	 of	 political	 parties,	 the	 other	 according	 to	what	 they	 do	 in	 practice.	 For	 now	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 note	 that	 the	main	 problem	 for	French	 participants,	 if	 any,	was	 not	whether	 they	 could	 classify	 cards	 at	 all,	 but	how	they	were	supposed	to	do	so.		
	
Table	 3:	 Types	 of	 questions	 raised	 by	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 participants	 following	 the	
specification	of	discussion	rules		 	 The	Hungarian	groups	offered	a	clear	contrast	in	this	regard.	In	almost	all	of	the	Hungarian	groups,	at	least	one	participant	was	puzzled	by	the	very	idea	of	establishing	such	a	classification	and	emphasised	that	they	could	barely	identify	topics	of	agreement	between	mainstream	parties	 (instances	coded	NO	CONSENSUAL	CARDS)45.	Levente,	a	young	Hungarian	socialist,	thus	sighed	after	considering	the	cards	for	a	few	minutes:	"	In	 fact	 I	 cannot	 find	 anything	 on	 which	 we	 would	 even	 remotely	 agree	 (with	 the	Fidesz)!"	 Another	 MSzP	 member,	 Dávid,	 similarly	 expressed	 his	 confusion:	 "In	 truth	there	 is	 no	 topic	 for	 which	 I	 could	 say	 that	 we	 have	 a	 complete	 agreement”.	 The	exercise	 in	 itself,	 the	 very	 idea	 that	 parties	 could	 agree	 on	 some	 issues,	 seemed	unsettling	to	Hungarian	participants	-	as	if	what	I	was	asking	from	them	was	somewhat	provocative	and	made	them	feel	uncomfortable.			 	 These	differences	are	also	apparent	if	we	compare	patterns	of	card	classifications	between	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 groups	 (see	 Figure	 5).	 I	 associated	 the	 code	CONFLICTUAL	 when	 one	 or	 several	 participants	 considered	 a	 given	 topic	 as	 one	
																																								 																					
45	Appendix	5	contains	my	codebook,	which	constitutes	a	detailed	description	of	all	of	the	codes	referred	to	in	the	next	three	empirical	chapters,	and	the	types	of	arguments	and	discursive	content	they	refer	to.		
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breeding	disagreement	between	political	parties	and	the	code	CONSENSUAL	when	one	or	several	participants	argued	that	a	given	topic	garnered	agreement	between	political	parties.	 Finally,	 I	 coded	 as	 MIXED	 instances	 where	 partisans	 issued	 a	 qualified	judgement	on	the	consensual	or	conflictual	nature	of	a	given	topic,	emphasisising	both	similarities	and	differences	in	the	positions	of	political	parties	on	a	given	topic.		
	
Figure	 5:	 Assessments	 by	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 participants	 of	 the	 degree	 of	 partisan	
disagreement	on	the	topics	discussed		
N.B:	Given	that	most	of	my	Figures	follow	the	model	of	Figure	5,	I	will	explain	how	to	read	this	figure	
in	more	 detail	 here	 and	 refer	 back	 to	 this	 explanation	 under	 subsequent	 figures.	 The	 vertical	 axis	 always	
represents	the	number	of	individual	instances	of	partisan	discourse	with	which	I	associated	given	codes,	those	
codes	named	under	the	horizontal	axis.	In	this	case,	the	vertical	axis	represents	the	numbers	of	assessments	by	
French	and	Hungarian	participants	coded	either	'CONSENSUAL',	'MIXED'	or	'CONFLICTUAL'.		
A	code	is	applied	to	a	portion	of	text	(and	therefore	becomes	an	'instance	coded')	when	at	least	one	
participant	put	forward	a	substantiated	argument	that	supports	the	definition	of	the	code	(see	Appendix	5	for	
a	more	detailed	discussion	of	this	point).	For	instance,	if	a	participant	were	to	mention	in	passing	that	a	given	
topic	generates	disagreement,	without	justifying	his	claim,	this	portion	of	discourse	would	not	be	associated	
with	 an	 independent	 code	 'CONFLICTUAL'.	 If,	 however,	 a	 second	 participant	 developed	 this	 argument	 and	
justified	why	 the	 topic	could	be	considered	as	one	of	disagreement,	 then	 the	code	 'CONFLICTUAL'	would	be	
attributed	to	both	of	their	claims.	This	portion	of	the	transcript	would	then	be	counted	as	an	'instance	coded'	
in	Figure	5	above.				
In	all	 figures,	the	 'Total'	bar	adds	up	all	of	the	 instances	of	discourse	associated	with	either	one	of	
the	 codes	 under	 consideration	 in	 a	 given	 figure.	 Here,	 for	 instance,	 the	 Total	 bar	 includes	 all	 types	 of	
assessments	made	by	participants,	and	therefore	all	instances	coded	either	'CONSENSUAL',	'CONFLICTUAL'	or	
'MIXED'.		
The	percentage	indicated	at	the	top	of	each	bar	represents	the	share	of	instances	associated	with	a	
specific	 code	within	 the	 Total	 number	 of	 instances	 coded	 considered	 in	 the	 same	 figure.	 In	 this	 case,	 each	
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percentage	 indicates	 the	 share	 of	 any	 specific	 type	 of	 assessment	 by	 participants	 on	 the	 degree	 of	
disagreement	between	political	parties	within	the	total	number	of	assessments	that	they	issue.	For	instance,	in	
391	of	their	542	total	assessments,	or	in	72.1%	of	all	cases,	Hungarian	participants	argued	that	the	topics	at	
hand	generated	disagreement	between	political	parties.		French	 participants	 were	 equally	 prone	 to	 consider	 the	 topics	 under	discussions	as	garnering	agreement	or	partial	agreement	between	political	parties,	as	they	 were	 to	 consider	 them	 to	 fundamentally	 divide	 political	 parties	 (see	 Figure	 5).	French	participants	could	easily	establish	a	hierarchy	between	the	different	cards.	They	could	clearly	distinguish	between	the	topics	that	they	considered	to	be	conflictual,	and	those	 they	 considered	 to	 be	 consensual	 (see	 Figure	 6).	 The	 larger	 share	 of	 'Mixed'	assessments	within	French	groups	-	where	participants	produce	a	qualified	assessment	of	 either	 the	 consensual	 or	 conflictual	 nature	 of	 a	 given	 topic	 -	 also	 reflects	 a	 more	consensual	view	of	the	political	world.		
	
Figure	6:	Classifications	by	French	participants	of	the	different	topics	under	discussion		
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure.	As	 for	 Hungarian	 participants,	 only	 in	 27.9%	 of	 the	 cases	 did	 they	 judge	 the	issues	under	discussion	to	be	ones	of	agreement	or	partial	agreement	(see	Figure	5).	In	a	 majority	 of	 groups,	 only	 one	 or	 two	 themes	 were	 classified	 as	 unquestionably	consensual,	the	card	'Ecology'	generally	figuring	among	them	(see	Figure	7).	From	here,	participants	most	often	declared	that	they	could	not	find	any	more	consensual	themes	and	that	all	other	cards	were	topics	of	dispute	between	the	main	political	parties.	Most	of	the	times,	I	had	to	ask	repeatedly	whether	there	were	'any	more	consensual	topics'	
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to	be	discussed,	as	 they	 jumped	very	quickly	 to	what	 they	saw	as	more	controversial	issues.	This	is	an	illustrative	example,	taken	from	a	Fidesz	group:		Author:	And	there	are	no	more	consensual	themes?		Olivia:	In	Hungary?	Not	really,	this	is	not	that	kind	of	a	country..	Tamás:	Not	really,	unfortunately..	Hungarian	participants	then	displayed	several	strategies	to	classify	the	cards.	In	some	 cases,	 participants	 did	 distinguish	 between	 moderately	 and	 highly	 conflictual	topics,	but	this	distinction	was	not	coded	for	specifically.	In	many	other	cases,	they	did	not	 even	 establish	 a	 hierarchy	 among	 the	 cards,	 and	 proceded	 to	 explain	 why	 they	considered	 each	 topic	 to	 be	 one	 of	 major	 partisan	 disagreement.	 If	 we	 break	 down	these	assessments	topic	by	topic,	the	result	is	that	it	is	more	difficult	than	in	the	French	case	to	identify	those	cleavages	that	Hungarian	participants	considered	as	most	salient	(see	Figure	7).	Indeed,	7	out	of	12	topics	were	classified	as	'conflictual'	over	70%	of	the	time,	and	11	out	of	12	over	60%	of	the	time.	
	
Figure	7:	Classifications	by	Hungarian	participants	of	the	different	topics	under	discussion	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
*	*	*	As	 emphasised	 above,	 cohesiveness	 entails	 that	 partisans	 are	 able	 to	convincingly	 account	 for	 the	 disagreements	 that	 structure	 the	 party	 system.	 In	 the	
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following	sections,	I	analyse	in	turn	the	capacity	of	French	and	Hungarian	participants	to	do	so.		
II.	THE	FRENCH	CASE	
Here	 I	 examine	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 discourse	 of	 French	 participants	complies	with	the	three	criteria	of	partisan	cohesiveness:	 the	normative	criterion,	 the	executive	criterion	and	the	criterion	of	differentiation.		
1.	The	normative	criterion	French	 participants	 frequently	 referred	 to	 principles	 and	 values	 as	 structural	features	of	their	partisan	identity.	They	often	recognised	explicitely	the	importance	of	ideas	and	intellectual	traditions	for	their	movements.	This	is	apparent	from	the	coding-based	 evidence.	 When	 discussing	 their	 classification	 of	 each	 of	 the	 twelve	 cards,	participants	 offerred	 an	 account	 of	 the	 elements	 of	 their	 party's	 platform	 that	 they	considered	either	similar,	or	dissimilar	to	those	of	their	opponents.	I	coded	specifically	for	 instances	 where	 partisans	 insisted	 on	 either	 the	 different	 or	 similar	 ideas	 that	underlie	parties'	 positions	on	 a	 given	 issue	 (instances	 coded	 IDEAS).	 I	 also	 coded	 for	instances	 where	 participants	 insisted	 on	 the	 different	 or	 similar	 types	 of	 political	practices	 that	 parties	 defend	 or	 undertake	 (instances	 coded	 PRACTICES).	 As	 is	apparent	 from	 Figure	 8,	 French	 partisans	 rely	 on	 ideals	 and	 practices	 in	 a	 rather	balanced	way	to	justify	their	agreements	or	disagreements	with	political	opponents.		
	
Figure	 8:	 Dimensions	 of	 partisan	 platforms	 emphasised	 by	 French	 participants	 to	 justify	
their	card	classification	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
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In	 PS	 groups	 especially,	 it	 was	 not	 uncommon	 for	 participants	 to	 discuss	 the	meaning	and	relevance	of	socialism	as	an	intellectual	tradition.	The	following	dialogue	is	a	good	example	of	this.	René	is	answering	Didier,	who	just	emphasised	that	he	would	welcome	 institutional	 reforms	 that	would	allow	citizens	 to	 take	part	more	directly	 in	political	decision-making:	René:	Well	what	you	are	saying,	I	agree	with	you,	but	what	is	easy	to	see	is	that	you	are	quickly	going	to	confront	economic	problems.	Because	at	the	level	of...	all	right,	a	worker,	you	can..	lets	imagine,	we	establish	the	30	hour	week,	I	push	all	 economic	questions	 aside.	 The	worker	will	work	5	hours	 less	 every	week,	does	that	necessarily	mean	that	he	will	become	involved	in	local	councils,	etc?	So	you	get	to	a	bunch	of	questions	that	have	to	do	with	culture,	schooling,	etc,	with	 the	 democratisation	 of	 knowledge.	 You	 also	 get	 to	 economic	 questions,	what	will	be	 the	relation	of	 the	worker	 to	 the	 factory,	 to	his	work	 tool,	of	 the	cashier	in	the	supermarket,	etc.	And	what	you	end	up	saying	is	that	you	want	a	more	democratic	society,	and	to	reach	this	in	fact	you	get	to	socialism,	so	in	the	end...	honestly,	these	are	the	roots	of	(our)	engagement.		Didier:	 Fundamentally	 that	 is	 it,	 we	 agree.	 We	 completely	 agree.	 For	 me	socialism	 is	 a	project	of	 the	deepening	of	 the	democratic	project,	what	 Jaurès	used	 to	 say,	 democracy	 until	 the	 end,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 the	 capacity	 to	 deepen	democracy	untill...	its	most	extreme	point.	Insofar	as	possible	in	the	sense	that	we	live	in	a	society	of	60	million	inhabitants,	we	cant	do	direct	democracy.	But	there	are	other	 forms	of	participation	 to	 the	public	debate,	 and	not	 simply	of	participating	in	the	debate,	but	in	the	decision-making	process	(...)		 Such	 examples,	 where	 participants	 refer	 explicitely	 to	 the	 worldviews	 or	ideologies	 that	 underlie	 their	 engagement,	 were	 slightly	 more	 frequent	 among	 PS	groups	as	 compared	 to	UMP	groups.	This	 is	 also	verified	 in	 the	 coding	data.	 I	 further	refined	the	coding	categories	for	the	references	participants	make	to	ideas,	identifying	the	 levels	 of	 abstraction	 at	 which	 these	 were	 evoked.	 I	 associated	 the	 code	WORLDVIEWS	to	examples	where	participants	insisted	on	the	more	abstract	principles,	values	 and	 normative	 commitments	 that	 structure	 their	 commitment.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 I	 associated	 the	 code	DIAGNOSTICS/OBJECTIVES	when	participants	 referred	 to	the	 types	 of	 problems	 their	 party	were	 likely	 to	 identify	 as	 needing	 remedy	 through	policy,	or	the	types	of	objectives	that	their	party	wished	to	achieve	through	policy46.	
																																								 																					
46	This	 distinction	 echoes	 the	 one	 established	 by	 Schmidt	 in	 her	 own	 definition	 of	 political	 ideas.	 She	separates	 the	 level	 of	 'public	 philosophies'	 and	 that	 of	 'programmatic	 beliefs'	 (Schmidt,	 2008).	 "Public	philosophies"	according	 to	Schmidt	are	 the	 "ideas,	values,	and	principles	of	knowledge	and	society"	 that	undergird	"policies	and	programs"	(ibid,	p.	306);	this	is	the	more	abstract	core	of	parties'	normative	ideas.	As	for	'programmatic	beliefs'	they	"operate	in	the	space	between	worldviews	and	specific	policy	ideas"	and	include	"the	problems	to	be	solved	by	such	policies;	the	issues	to	be	considered;	the	goals	to	be	achieved"	(ibid,	p.	306).	
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Figure	9:	Ideational	dimensions	of	partisan	platforms	emphasised	by	French	participants	to	
justify	their	card	classification	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 9,	 French	 participants	 evoke	 more	 often	 the	 abstract	principles	 and	 values	 that	 underlie	 policy	 proposals	 than	 they	 do	 assessments	 of	problems	 to	be	 solved	by	government	or	 the	general	objectives	of	public	policies	 (on	average,	56.5%	and	43.5%	of	total	assessments	respectively).	PS	participants,	however,	emphasise	abstract	principles	slightly	more	often	than	their	UMP	counterparts	(59.8%	and	53.9%	of	total	assessments	respectively).	This	fits	with	the	characteristics	generally	associated	with	traditional	Left-Right	registers:	 the	 Left	 is	more	 idealistic	 and	 the	Right	more	pragmatic	 in	 its	 approach	 to	social	reality.	Both	PS	and	UMP	participants	saw	the	Left	as	more	ideologically	inclined	than	 the	 Right.	 This	 opposition	 comes	 out	 in	 the	 following	 discussion	 from	 an	 UMP	group,	where	Gilles	 sees	his	 own	party	 as	held	 together	by	 charismatic	personalities,	rather	 than	 ideas.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 group	 contrasts	 this	 tendency	 with	 the	 PS's	attachment	to	socialist	ideology:		Gilles:	We	tend	to	gather	more	around	someone	that	we	consider	to	be	the	most	pragmatic	at	a	given	moment,	but	we	do	not	have	an	ideology.	Well	actually	this	is	a	great	problem	at	the	moment,	that	we	are	incapable	of	redefining	ourselves	as	the	UMP.	Sarkozy47	is	gone,	what	else48?	Agnès:	But	this	is	the	great	question,	because	in	fact	what	is	the	UMP?	With	the	UMP,	the	problem	is	that	it	is	a	blend	that	does	not	hold	together,	well	there	are	people	that	are	too	different	within	it...	Nelson:	Well	you	know,	the	PS	also	have	very	different	people...	
																																								 																					
47	Nicolas	Sarkozy	was	Minister	of	 the	 Interior	under	 Jacques	Chirac's	presidency	(2002-2004	and	2005-2007)	and	then	as	President	of	the	Republic	(2007-2012).	At	the	time	of	my	interviews,	he	had	retreated	from	party	politics,	but	came	back	at	the	end	of	2014	as	President	of	the	UMP.		48	English	as	in	the	original	interview.	
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Agnès:	Yes,	I	don't	know...	I	think	it	is	worse	in	our	camp...	Gilles:	Yes	but	in	the	PS	you	tie	yourself	to	great	ideologies,	well..	you	can	also,	you	have	certain	authors..	Nelson:	Karl	Marx...	(laughter)	Gilles:	But	yes,	exactly!	Marx,	Mitterand,	Rocard...	These	are	people	that	have...	who	are	practically	 all	dead,	 except	 for	Rocard,	who	wrote	one	 last	book,	but	well...	 (laughter)	Well	 they	 are,	 it's...	 From	 that	 point	when	 the	 person	 is	 not	there	with	 you	 physically,	 it	 becomes	 ideology.	 They	 all	 have	 this	 ideological	worldview...	they	do	their	pilgrimage..	PS	participants	were	also	aware	of	 the	 common	opposition	between	 left-wing	idealism	and	right-wing	pragmatism.	In	the	following	discussion,	a	PS	group	discusses	the	respective	weight	of	principled	conviction	in	Left	and	Right	partisan	identities.	They	however	go	beyond	the	classic	description	of	the	idealist	Left	and	the	pragmatic	Right	to	emphasise	that	parties	attribute	more	or	less	importance	to	ideas	depending	on	the	issues	concerned:					Léonard:	Well	I	consider...	 I	think	the	Right	gives	precedence	to	efficiency..	we	sometimes	hang	on	to	principles,	sometimes	a	bit	foolishly...	Jean:	Well	no,	see	the	Burqua,	the	legalisation	of	cannabis...	Léonard:	Well	I	mean	on	economic	questions..	Madeline:	Yes,	I	also	agree	Léonard:	 ...	 I	 think	we	 are	 ready	 to	 cut	 back	 on	 economic	 growth	 in	 order	 to	redistribute,	to	ensure	principles	of	equality.		Sonia:	Yes,	and	this	is	what	we	were	saying..	we	were	discussing	this	the	other	day	with	 Justin,	we	 thought	 that	 this	 is	why...	we	also	 think	 that...	people	 that	are	left-wing	are	more	conscious	of	being	of	the	Left	than	people	who	are	Right-wing.	Because	the	Left	insists	more	on	values,	on	the	fact	that,	at	the	end	of	the	day,	 everything	 can	 be	 political...	 and	 that	we	 have	 certain	 values	 on	 the	 left,	something	which	is	less	emphasised	on	the	right...	This	 is	 not	 to	 say,	 however,	 that	 UMP	 participants	 did	 not	 consider	 ideas	 to	matter	 for	 their	own	political	 identity.	As	 is	apparent	 from	the	example	 from	an	UMP	group	cited	above,	these	participants	oscillate	between	shunning	the	PS	for	holding	on	to	what	 they	perceive	to	be	outdated	 ideas,	and	regretting	the	 looseness	of	 their	own	ideology.	In	the	following	example,	the	same	group	discusses	the	ideational	foundations	of	their	own	party.		Nelson:	 Well	 yes,	 I	 don't	 know...	 when	 you	 look	 at	 the	 different	 right-wing	traditions,	we	basically	have	three	of	them.	We	
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Legitimist	right,	and	the	Orléanist	right49.	Bonapartism	is	a	bit	like	Gaullism,	it	is	in	the	same	spirit.	Legitimism	is	more	the	Right	in	the	style	of	De	Villiers	and	the	Orleanists	 are	 the	 liberals.	 So	 I	 think	 that	we	 got...	 but	 yes,	 I	 don't	 know,	we've	 tried	so	hard	to	signify	 that...	 for	me	on	the	right	 it	 is	Gaullism	that	has	won,	completely.		Jeanne:	No,	no!	Not	in	practice..		Agnès	:	I	don't	think	either...	(...)	Jeanne	:	But	no,	it	is	the	liberals	that	have	won!	Are	you	kidding	me	or	what?		Bastien:	Well	no!	Nelson	:	Ah	he	is	real	liberal,	beware!	(speaking	of	Bastien	to	Jeanne)		Jeanne:	I	know	but...	Agnès	 :	 (agreeing	 with	 Jeanne)	 When	 you	 see	 what	 we	 are	 doing	 on	 the	economic	level...		Jeanne	:		Well	then	we	don't	have	the	same	definition	of...	for	me,	liberalism	has	triumphed	nevertheless!	Gilles	:	I	think	this	illustrates	it	well,	we	don't	know	where	we	stand	anymore...		The	discussion	reveals	a	strong	disagreement	between	participants	concerning	which	 main	 intellectual	 tradition	 structures	 the	 contemporary	 UMP.	 By	 the	 same	occasion,	 it	 also	 shows	 that	 the	 question	 of	 the	 UMP's	 value	 system	 matters	 to	participants.	In	other	words,	while	the	ideational	basis	of	right-wing	partisanship	may	be	looser	than	the	ideational	basis	of	left-wing	partisanship,	UMP	participants	can	still	recognise	the	importance	of	having	such	an	ideational	basis.		
2.	The	executive	criterion	and	partisan	differentiation	I	move	 to	consider	 the	executive	criterion	and	criterion	of	differentiation.	The	group	 discussions	 offer	much	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 partisans	 are	 both	 capable	 of	establishing	clear	links	between	their	party's	ideas	and	practices,	and	can	explain	how	these	characteristics	are	particular	to	their	own	party.	There	are	nevertheless	limits	to	partisan	cohesiveness	on	 these	criteria,	especially	among	PS	groups.	 Indeed,	while	PS	participants	 have	 a	 clear	 idea	 of	 what	 should	 distinguish	 their	 party's	 ideas	 and	practices	 from	those	of	 their	opponents,	 they	are	also	keenly	aware	 that	 reality	often	diverges	from	this	norm.		
																																								 																					
49		 Nelson	 refers	 here	 to	 the	 typology	 established	 by	 René	 Rémond	 in	Les	droites	 en	France,	 one	 of	 the	seminal	 works	 on	 the	 intellectual	 traditions	 that	 have	 structured	 right-wing	 partisan	 thought	 since	 the	French	Revolution	(Rémond,	1982)	
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a.	 Evidence	 for	 partisan	 cohesiveness	 on	 the	 executive	 and	 differentiation	
criteria	
Linking	partisan	practices	to	normative	goals	Generally	 speaking,	 French	 participants	 demonstrate	 coherence	 and	systematicity	 in	 linking	 political	 ideas	 to	 governmental	 practices.	 Importantly,	 the	topics	on	which	they	were	most	likely	to	emphasise	such	connections	were	also	those	which	 they	 considered	 to	 be	most	 conflictual	 between	 political	 parties	 (see	 Figure	 6	above):	 Fiscal	 Policy,	 Justice	 and	 Security,	 and	 Gender.	 These	 topics	 are	 also	 among	those	which	French	participants	spent	more	time	discussing	than	others	(see	Figure	10	below).		
	
Figure	10:	References	to	the	topics	under	discussion	by	French	participants	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure		The	 frequent	 association	of	 ideas	 to	 practices	 on	 the	 question	of	 Fiscal	 Policy	can	be	associated	with	 the	existence	of	 strong,	pre-established	Left-Right	oppositions	on	this	question.	Indeed,	PS	participants	generally	linked	the	principle	of	equality	and	the	weight	 of	 structural	 factors	 in	 impeding	 the	 realisation	 of	 this	 principle	with	 the	responsibility	of	the	state	 in	allieviating	role	of	these	factors	through	heavier	taxation	and	redistribution.	On	the	question	of	fiscal	policy,	UMP	participants	were	more	likely	to	 emphasise	 the	 centrality	 of	 economic	 freedoms	 and	 the	 role	 of	 personal	
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responsibility	in	accounting	for	social	success	or	failure	with	the	necessity	for	the	state	to	minimise	fiscal	interference	for	each	to	realise	their	full	potential.		I	offer	some	examples	below	which	illustrate	the	role	of	these	traditional	Left-Right	registers	in	allowing	participants	to	connect	partisan	ideas	and	practices.	In	this	first	example	from	an	UMP	group,	Pascal	talks	about	party	differences	in	the	role	they	assign	 to	 taxation.	 He	 links	 differences	 in	 the	way	 parties	 identify	 problems	 and	 set	objectives	on	the	one	hand	with	differences	in	the	types	of	policies	parties	set	forth	on	the	other	hand:	Pascal:	I	think	that	here	again,	it	is	strongly	a	matter	of	perception	on	the	part	of	activists	and	sympatisers.	For	example	on	taxation,	I	take	the	most	cleaving	existing	example,	 the	 least	 consensual	according	 to	me.	There	 is	a	profoundly	diverging	 conception	 of	 what	 taxation	 is,	 what	 is	 its	 role.	 For	 the	 Right,	historically,	it	is	about	contributing	to	the	functioning	of	the	state.	There	needs	to	be	a	State,	it	needs	to	function,	that	involves	(having)	means	(to	do	so),	so	we	pay	taxes.	On	the	Left	there	is	a	punitive,	restrictive	dimension	to	taxation.	We	see	this	with	the	75%	tax50,	taxes	have	the	vocation	to	rectify	unfair	inequalities.	This	dimension	is	basically	non-existent,	or	barely	present	on	the	right.	Yes,	we	agree	 that	 each	 should	 contribute	 according	 to	what	 they	 earn,	 but	 there	 are	limits.	 The	 Left	 gives	 the	 impression	 that	 they	 wouldn't	 mind	 taxing	 99%	 of	earnings	 over	 10	million	 euros.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day,	 they	 can	 pay,	 so	 they	should	(...)	Concerning	taxation,	we	really	don't	have	the	same	ends,	 the	same	objective.		In	 the	 following	 example	 from	 another	UMP	 group,	 participants	 talk	 not	 only	about	taxation,	but	also	about	the	question	of	education	and	labour	market	regulation.	Crucially,	 the	 traditional	 registers	 of	 Left	 and	 Right	 allow	 these	 participants	 to	 tie	partisan	oppositions	together	on	these	different	topics,	and	make	sense	of	them	within	a	broader	ideational	divide.	Gilles	and	Nelson	discuss	the	more	foudational	values	that	divide	political	parties	on	 the	question	of	equality	and	 freedom,	and	how	these	affect	partisan	practices	in	three	different	fields	of	public	policy:			Gilles	:	Well	yes,	if	we	consider	methods,	fundamentally	and	ideologically	there	is	 a	 huge	 difference	 in	 terms	 of	 methods.	 The	 Left	 has	 a	 tendency	 to	 want	equality,	which	concretely	means	that	any	head	above	another	gets	cut	off,	and	this	 (logic	 is	 applied)	until	 the	 level	 of	 the	 lowest	head.	Then	we	 redistribute	and...	well	in	general	it	is	more	of	a	system	of	redistribution.	Instead	of	equality,	the	 Right	 is	more	 likely	 to	want	 real	 equity,	which	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 everyone,	individually,	can	realise	her	full	potential.	We	see	this	clearly	when	it	comes	to	education.	When	it	comes	to	school,	 it's	really	simple,	the	discourse	is	that	we																																									 																					
50	During	the	Presidential	campaign	of	2012,	François	Hollande	promised	to	introduce	a	75%	taxation	on	revenues	 superior	 to	 a	 million	 euros	 per	 year.	 While	 this	 tax	 was	 introduced	 in	 2012,	 the	 French	Constitutional	 Council	 declared	 it	 unconstitutional	 in	December	 2012.	 A	 revised	 version	 of	 this	 tax	was	then	 introduced	 in	 October	 2013,	 but	 by	 October	 2014	 Prime	Minister	Manuel	 Valls	 announced	 that	 it	would	be	suspended	from	early	2015	onwards.		
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need	 to	 help	 the	 weakest,	 when	 in	 reality	 the	 discourse	 should	 be	 about	allowing	 each	 and	 everyone	 to	 go	 as	 far	 as	 possible.	 Some	 are	 really	 really	gifted,	but	are	held	back	by	the	relatively	slow	general	movement...	Nelson:	I	totally	agree	with	you,	but	you	said...	you	opposed	equality	and	equity,	and	 I	 would	 rather	 have	 opposed	 equality	 and	 freedom.	 I	 find	 that	 the	 Left	constrains	and	prevents	people	from	moving	forward,	I	think	there	is	a	will	to	constrain.	To	forbid	(people	from)	working	more	than	35	hours	(a	week),	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 put	 economic	 barriers	 to	 prevent	 (them)	 from	 doing	 it.	 On	 the	other	hand,	I	would	rather	be	like,	well	honestly,	if	you	want	to	work	45	hours	(a	 week)	 that's	 your	 problem,	 not	 mine.	 So	 I	 think	 it's	 more...	 well	 I	 would	rather	oppose	equality	and	freedom,	like,	be	free,	do	what	you	want,	while	the	Left	always	tries	to...	set	limits,	to	put	a	corset.		The	 role	 of	 Left-Right	 registers	 in	 providing	 participants	 with	 shortcuts	 to	associate	partisan	 ideas	and	practices	 is	also	particularly	apparent	on	 the	question	of	Justice	 and	 Security.	 On	 this	 issue,	 the	 Left	 has	 traditionally	 stressed	 the	 role	 of	structural	 factors	 in	 feeding	 criminality	 and	 thus	 tends	 to	 favour	 a	 public	 policy	 that	addresses	 the	 social	 roots	 of	 public	 disorder.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Right	 has	traditionally	stressed	that	citizens	carry	an	individual	responsibility	to	respect	the	law	and	 thus	 adopts	 more	 repressive	 policies	 to	 address	 public	 disorder.	 The	 following	example	 from	 a	 PS	 group	 reflects	 this	 Left-Right	 division.	 Didier,	 Philippe	 and	 Samir	discuss	parties'	different	assessments	of	the	causes	of	criminality		and	how	this	results	in	different	types	of	policy	prescriptions:		Didier:	(...)	For	the	Left,	public	order	is	not	only	about	the	police,	it	is	also	about	prevention.	This	 is	because	public	disorder	 is	also	caused	by	reasons	 that	are	social	and	economic,	and	it	is	by	addressing	these	social	and	economic	reasons,	it	 is	 first	 by	 addressing	 these	 social	 and	 economic	 questions	 that	 we	 can	contribute	 to	 constructing	 a	 policy	 of	 public	 order.	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 public	order	 is	 not	 only	 something	 that	 can	 be	 constructed	 through	 repression	 and	with	the	police.	This	is	part	of	it	because	there	are	thefts,	there	are..	etc,	but	it	is	not	only	through	treating	the	consequences,	it	is	also	necessary	to	deal	with	the	causes,	 and	 the	 causes	are	mostly	 social	 and	economic	 (...)	 I	 think	 that	 this	 is	where	we	find	the	cleavage	between	the	Left...	fundamentally,	between	the	Left	and	the	Right.	The	Right	will	have	a	vision..	I	will	not	say	simplisitc	because	that	would	be	a	bit...	Philippe	:	...of	a	caricature.	But	yes,	I	would	say	yes,	at	least	for	Sarkozy's	Right51	Samir:	It's	a	reactionary	type	of	politics	Didier:	It's	true	that	the	Right	is	mostly	(dealing	with	this)	through	reaction	and	through	the	repression	of	offences.		Last,	French	participants	were	particularly	prone	to	connect	ideas	with	policies																																									 																					
51	Philippe	refers	here	to	"la	droite	Sarkozyste",	which	finds	no	exact	translation	in	English.	Nicolas	Sarkozy	is	known	to	have	initiated	a	repressive	turn	in	law	enforcement	matters	as	Minister	of	the	Interior	under	Jacques	 Chirac's	 presidency	 (2002-2004	 and	 2005-2007)	 and	 then	 as	 President	 of	 the	 Republic	 (2007-2012).		
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when	discussing	the	card	'Gender'.	This	card	covered	issues	generally	associated	with	the	'New	Left',	including	questions	surrounding	equal	pay,	women's	reproductive	rights	or	 the	rights	of	homosexuals.	Unlike	divisions	over	redistributive	policies,	or	 law	and	order	related	 issues,	 these	questions	have	only	recently	been	at	 the	heart	of	 the	Left-Right	partisan	divide.	The	PS's	decision	to	introduce	same-sex	marriage	in	the	Spring	of	2013,	at	the	time	when	I	did	my	interviews,	spurred	a	lively	debate	in	Parliament	and	deeply	 polarised	 French	 society. 52 	In	 the	 group	 discussions	 I	 led,	 value-based	arguments	were	often	used	by	either	side	to	support	or	question	the	decision.	Despite	this	being	a	relatively	new	topic	of	discussion,	partisans	used	older	Left-Right	registers	to	defend	their	positions.	PS	participants	typically	emphasised	the	necessity	of	equality	between	 heterosexual	 and	 same-sex	 couples	 as	 justifying	 their	 party's	 decision.	 UMP	participants	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 oppose	 it	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 it	 would	 destroy	 the	traditional	 institution	 of	marriage,	 and	 thus	 a	 pillar	 of	 French	 society.	 This	 divide	 is	apparent	in	the	following	statement	by	a	PS	participant:		Justin:	 The	 difference	 in	 terms	 of	 values	 is	 that	 the	 Right	 is	 more	 about...	tradition,	nature,	well	 (a)	 fantisised	(vision	of)	nature.	On	the	 left	 instead	 it	 is	the	idea	of	 justice	that	takes	precedence	over	everything,	and	inevitably	when	there	is	justice,	there	is	equalty,	and...	well,	it	is	unjust	that	one	person	has	the	right	 to	 marry	 and	 another	 does	 not,	 although	 these	 people	 are	 exactly	 the	same	 except	 for	 those	 they	 love.	 And	 so,	 it	 is	 compulsory	 to	 be	 in	 favor	 of	(allowing)	marriage	for	all	when	we	have	this	 ideal	of	 justice	 in	us.	When	you	have	instead	this	ideal	of	tradition,	of	the	established	order,	and	things	like	that,	well	you	see	everything	as	a	shake-up	of	society,	when	in	fact	we	see	this	is	not	at	all	the	case...	But	in	the	end	that	leads	to	a	much	more	stigmatising	discourse.		
Differentiating	the	ideas	and	practices	of	rival	partisans	Until	 now,	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 French	 partisanship	 have	 strong	 ideational	foundations	and	that	the	political	commitments	of	French	participants	are	rooted	in	the	traditional	 registers	 of	 Left	 and	 Right.	 Partisans	 easily	 associate	 these	 established	normative	 commitments	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 policies.	 To	 this	 extent,	 mainstream	partisanship	in	France	appears	to	fulfil	the	executive	criterion,	or	the	ability	to	connect	and	 relate	partisan	 ideas	 and	practices.	But	 as	 the	 evidence	above	 suggests,	 the	Left-Right	dichotomy	also	provides	participants	with	an	easy	short-cut	 to	differentiate	 the	ideas	and	practices	of	their	own	party	from	those	of	their	opponents.	To	some	extent,	the	Left-Right	dichotomy	already	presupposes	an	adversarial	relationship.																																									 																					
52	A	law	authorizing	same-sex	marriage	was	first	suggested	by	the	French	PS	government	on	November	7th,	2012,	debated	in	the	French	Parliament	from	November	2012	to	April	2013,	and	adopted	on	April	23,	2013.	It	is	revealing	that	UMP	participants	generally	refer	to	'gay	marriage',	while	PS	participants	tend	to	refer	to	'same-sex	marriage'.	
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If	one	turns	to	the	coding-based	data,	 this	 intuition	finds	 further	confirmation.	Many	of	the	examples	above	show	partisans	comparing	their	own	ideas	and	to	those	of	their	 opponents	 and	 grounding	 their	 own	 identity	 in	 this	 opposition.	 Adopting	 a	comparative	perspective	can	indeed	be	seen	as	one	indication	of	the	ability	of	partisans	to	 position	 their	 own	 identity	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 identity	 of	 their	 opponents.	 In	 the	process,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 highlight	what	 sets	 party	 platforms	 apart	 and	what	 brings	them	 closer.	 In	 my	 coding,	 I	 considered	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 adopt	 a	comparative	perspective	when	accounting	 for	partisan	 agreements	or	disagreements.	When	 discussing	 a	 particular	 topic	 and	 its	 classification,	 partisans	 could	 draw	 on	elements	of	both	their	own	platform,	and	that	of	their	opponents,	in	order	to	highlight	points	of	convergence	or	divergence	(instances	coded	COMPARISON).	They	could	also	focus	 on	 their	 own	 party's	 position	 (instances	 coded	 SELF-FOCUSED)	 or	 on	 the	positions	 of	 their	 opponents'	 (instances	 coded	 OPPONENT	 FOCUSED)	 without	highlighting	the	alternative	offered	by	the	opposite	party.		
	
Figure	 11:	 Actors	 emphasised	 by	 French	 participants	 in	 the	 course	 of	 justifying	 their	 card	
classification	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	As	shown	in	Figure	11,	French	participants	adopted	a	comparative	perspective	in	 over	half	 of	 their	 attempts	 to	 account	 for	 partisan	 agreements	 and	disagreements.	This	 evidence	 thus	 seems	 to	 confirm	 that	 the	 established	 nature	 of	 the	 Left-Right	dichotomy	 gives	 participants	 a	 frame	within	which	 their	 own	 partisan	 identity	 is	 de	
facto	defined	in	relation	to	a	partisan	other.			
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b.	The	limits	of	cohesiveness	among	PS	partisans	
The	 evidence	 presented	 above	 indicates	 that	 the	 political	 identities	 of	 young	French	 partisans	 are	 indeed	 cohesive.	 Both	 groups	 of	 partisans	 identify	 clear-cut	differences	in	the	ideational	basis	of	political	parties.	They	are	also	able	to	describe	the	types	 of	 practices	 that	 flow	 from	 these	 diverging	 ideas.	 A	 closer	 analysis	 of	 the	interviews,	however,	reveals	differences	in	the	discourse	of	both	groups	of	participants,	and	 more	 specifically,	 the	 greater	 fragility	 of	 left-wing	 partisan	 identities	 in	 France.	While	 PS	 participants	 are	 able	 to	 link	 their	 ideals	 to	 specific	 types	 of	 policies	 in	 the	abstract,	 they	 do	 not	 see	 these	 distinctions	 as	 characterizing	 real-world	 politics.	 PS	participants	often	emphasise	their	party's	tendency	to	enact	policies	that	do	not	follow	what	 'left-wing	 ideals'	 would	 dictate	 and	 their	 party's	 weak	 capacity	 to	 distinguish	itself	 from	 its	main	 opponent.	 In	 other	words,	 while	 their	 personal	 partisan	 identity	meets	 the	 executive	 and	 differentiation	 criteria,	 they	 judge	 and	 criticise	 their	 own	political	 party	 for	 not	 upholding	 these	 standards.	 This	 disjuncture	 -	 between	partisanship	as	they	have	appropriated	it,	and	partisanship	as	they	witness	it	-	creates	a	form	of	disillusionment	which,	at	the	extreme,	leads	them	to	question	the	relevance	of	their	own	beliefs.	In	the	sections	below,	I	first	emphasise	the	perception	by	PS	partisans	of	a	convergence	of	party	policy.	I	then	use	the	coding	evidence	to	show	the	specificity	of	this	discourse	among	PS	participants.		
A	perception	of	policy	convergence		PS	participants	perceive	a	growing	convergence	in	the	practices	of	mainstream	political	 parties	 in	 government.	 This	 is	 also	 why	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 than	 UMP	participants	 to	 see	 agreement	 or	 partial	 agreement	 between	 political	 parties	 on	 the	topics	under	discussion	(see	Figure	12).		
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Figure	12:	Assessments	by	French	participants	of	the	degree	of	partisan	disagreement	on	the	
topics	discussed	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	PS	 participants	 generally	 attribute	 policy	 convergence	 to	 external	 pressures	that	 constrain	 the	 actions	 of	 national	 governments.	 The	 process	 of	 European	integration	and	the	internationalisation	of	local	economies	especially	are	seen	to	limit	the	 policy	 space	within	which	mainstream	parties	 can	 distinguish	 themselves.	 In	 the	following	 example,	 a	 young	 PS	 member	 talks	 about	 the	 reasons	 that	 underlie	mainstream	policy	convergence:		Laure:	 I	 have	 the	 impression	 that	 this	 concerns	 all	 those	 issues	 that	 have	 an	international	 dimension,	 be	 it	 the	 question	 of	 European	 integration,	 or	 the	question	 of	 addressing	 public	 deficits.	 It's	 not	 just	 about	 addressing	 French	deficits,	because	it	is	part	of	a	more	global	economic	policy.	If	we	can't	change	things	at	the	EU	level,	it's	impossible	to	do	anything	differently	on	the	question	of	public	deficits,	so	these	questions	are	linked.	The	question	of	ecology	is	also	linked	(...)	Maybe	that	everything	that	takes	place	a	bit	outside	of	France,	I	think	that	 it	 ends	 up	 being	 consensual.	 There	 is	 this	 feeling	 that	 things	 are	 beyond	our	control,	we	are	overwhelmed	by	events	that	we	cannot	deal	with	ourselves.	The	 French	 State	 is	 not	 that	 powerful.	 And	 we	 get	 sent	 back	 to	 the	 Bourget	speech,	where	 François	Hollande	 said	 that	 his	 first	 ennemy	was	 the	world	 of	Finance53.	Now	we	see	that	it's	not	that...	it	doesn't	work	like	that.		Clotilde:	It's	quite	a	disapointment	too...	According	 to	 PS	 participants,	 these	 constraints	 result	 in	 a	 situation	 where	parties	 end	 up	 enacting	 very	 similar	 policies	 despite	 having	 divergent	 ideational	
																																								 																					
53	This	 speech	 was	 given	 by	 François	 Hollande	 during	 the	 2012	 Presidential	 campaign,	 in	 the	 town	 of	Bourget	on	 January	22,	2012.	Here	he	 said	 "In	 this	battle	 that	has	 just	 started,	 I	will	 tell	 you	who	 is	my	adversary	(...)	This	adversary	is	the	world	of	finance"	(Hollande,	2012).	
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foundations.	When	talking	about	a	given	topic,	young	socialists	would	therefore	often	make	 a	 qualified	 assessment	 (instances	 coded	 MIXED),	 stressing	 differences	 in	 the	ideas	of	political	parties	despite	similarities	in	their	practices.	The	following	statement	by	Benjamin	is	a	good	example	of	this	type	of	argument:			Benjamin:	What	I	think	is	that,	if	you	take	the	official	positions	of	the	PS	and	the	UMP,	 then	 there	 is	 a	 cleavage.	 But	 then	 if	 you	 actually	 consider	 the	 facts,	 the	cleavage	 isn't	 that	 strong.	 From	 what	 I	 see	 the	 UMP	 has	 a	 very	 clear	 policy	when	it	comes	to	the	question	of	employment.	It's	an	intense	form	of	flexibility,	completely	based	on	liberalism	or	neoliberalism.	With	the	PS	there	is	a	greater	ambiguity	 when	 you	 come	 to	 what	 is	 actually	 being	 done...	 (...)	 Hollande	promised	 he	 would	 reduce	 the	 deficit,	 but	 he	 is	 also	 in	 favour	 of	 economic	growth	and	maintaining	public	services.	He	tries	to	help	employment,	but	only	goes	half	way	because	of	the	politics	of	austerity	that	is	also	currently	being	led.	So	I	think	that	ideologically,	there	is	a	real	cleavage,	but	when	you	consider	the	facts...	(...)	The	differences	between	PS	and	UMP	participants	in	this	regard	come	through	if	one	considers	the	different	types	of	'mixed'	assessments	used	in	French	groups.	I	code	participants'	 assessments	 of	 cards	 as	 MIXED	 where	 they	 point	 to	 both	 elements	 of	convergence	and	divergence	in	the	platforms	of	parties	on	a	given	question,	rather	than	declaring	 the	 issue	as	one	of	 straightforward	partisan	agreement	 (instances	 coded	as	CONSENSUAL,	 see	 Figure	 12)	 or	 disagreement	 (instances	 coded	 as	 CONFLICTUAL).	'Mixed'	assessments	 further	 covered	 three	 series	of	 arguments,	detailed	 in	Figure	13.			 	
		
Figure	13:	Arguments	used	by	French	participants	 in	 their	 'Mixed'	assessments	of	partisan	
disagreement	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 13,	 UMP	 participants	 were	 over	 three	 times	 more	 likely	than	PS	participants	to	point	 to	similarities	 in	the	broad	objectives	of	political	parties	(for	 instance	 reducing	 unemployment),	 while	 emphasising	 that	 parties	 employ	different	policy	means	to	reach	these	objectives	(for	instance	state	subsidies	for	the	PS	and	 market	 liberalisation	 measures	 for	 the	 UMP).	 These	 instances	 were	 coded	CONSENSUAL	OBJECTIVES	VS	CONFLICTUAL	PRACTICE.	This	type	of	argument	will	be	
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discussed	at	more	length	in	the	following	chapter.	More	directly	relevant	here,	for	any	given	 topic	 PS	 participants	 were	 over	 twice	 as	 likely	 than	 UMP	 participants	 to	emphasise	a	 convergence	 in	 the	practice	of	political	parties	and	 a	divergence	 in	 their	political	 ideas.	 These	 instances	 were	 coded	 CONFLICTUAL	 IDEAS	 VS	 CONSENSUAL	PRACTICE.		The	disjuncture	that	PS	participants	perceived	between	their	party's	ideas	and	its	policies	 often	 left	 young	 socialists	 conflicted	 as	 to	 which	 criteria	 they	 should	 use	 to	assess	 the	 conflictuality	 of	 the	 issues	 under	 discussion.	 Indeed,	 a	 classification	according	to	the	ideas	of	political	parties	would	lead	them	to	assess	far	more	topics	as	'conflictual',	 while	 considering	 only	 their	 practices	 would	 rather	 encourage	 them	 to	emphasise	 agreements	 between	 political	 parties.	 This	 issue	 sometimes	 created	 lively	debates	within	groups,	as	the	following	dialogue	demonstrates:		Louis:	In	practice,	the	decisions	that	are	taken	and	the	message	carried	by	the	country	 are	 the	 same,	 whether	 we	 like	 it	 or	 not,	 whether	 there	 are	 debates.	Anyone	can	say	whatever	they	want	concerning	Europe,	but	at	the	point	when	decisions	 are	 taken	 at	 the	 European	 Council,	 the	 message	 that	 the	 country	carries,	you	could	take	one	head	of	state	or	another	you	would	have	practically	the	same...	the	same	message	is	being	communicated.		Quentin:	But	then	the	question	is...	 is	there	a	consensus...	 there	is	the	practice,	what	we	see	 from	outside,	but	 the	degree	of...	Or	 is	 there	a	real	consensus	on	the	ideas?	Because	if	that's	the	question...	Louis:	 For	 me	 the	 question	 is,	 if	 we	 take	 the	 facts,	 the	 decisions	 taken,	concretely,	are	there	different	things	that	are	done.		Edgar:	But	 then,	 let's	go	directly	 to	 the	end,	 the	discussion	 is	going	 to	go	 real	quick,	because	 in	 that	 case	we	agree,	 there	 is	a	 consensus	on	every	questions	actually,	because...	(...)	We're	not	going	to	start	a	fiscal	revolution!	No	sorry...	on	sexual	 minorities,	 maybe	 we	 can	 bring	 some	 change	 but...	 on	 Ecology,	 we're	going	to	do	the	same,	on	Justice	and	security,	with	Valls54,	he's	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Home	Affairs?	We	will	do	exactly	the	same!		This	same	issue	often	puzzled	participants	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	discussion,	after	I	distributed	the	cards	and	gave	instructions	as	to	their	classification.	As	indicated	in	Table	1,	there	were	14	instances	were	PS	participants	asked	me	explicitely	about	the	criteria	 they	 should	 adopt	 to	 classify	 the	 cards,	 and	 only	 2	 such	 instances	 in	 UMP	groups.	 For	 instance,	 one	 young	 socialist,	 Sébastien,	 asked	 me	 whether	 the	 group	should	classify	the	cards	"according	to	what	the	PS	actually	believes,	or	(according	to)	the	action	of	 the	(current)	government?"	 In	a	similar	vein,	another	participant,	Samir,	
																																								 																					
54	Manuel	 Valls	 was	 PS	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Home	 Affairs	 between	 2012	 and	 2014,	 and	 is	 known	 for	having	 adopted	 'tough'	 position	 on	 crime	 and	 immigration.	 Since	March	 31	 2014	 he	 has	 become	 Prime	Minister	under	François	Hollande's	presidency.		
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questioned	whether	the	classification	should	be	"UMP	and	PS,	or	Left	and	Right?"	This	question	 is	 particularly	 revealing,	 as	 it	 strongly	 implies	 a	 belief	 that	 real-world	party	competition	does	not	obey	the	logic	dictated	by	the	Left-Right	dichotomy.		
The	limits	of	hanging	on	to	normative	distinctions	While	 the	 political	 commitments	 of	 young	 socialists	 are	 anchored	 in	 the	historical	distinction	between	Left	and	Right,	they	themselves	perceive	this	dichotomy	to	have	 less	and	 less	 real-world	significance.	There	 is	 then	a	disjuncture	between	 the	cohesive	 partisanship	 which	 they	 identify	 with,	 and	 the	 disarticulated	 and	undifferentiated	partisanship	which	they	witness	in	day-to-day	politics.	Many	of	those	I	met	accepted	these	hurdles	and	overcame	their	disapointment	precisely	because	they	are	committed	and	loyal	to	what	they	believe	their	party	has	historically	stood	for.	As	Muirhead	 emphasises,	 partisans	 are	patient	 in	 troubled	 times	because	 they	 carry	 the	memory	of	the	party's	past	successes	and	failures	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	17)55.	They	can	be	patient	because	they	know	the	party	transcends	currents	circumstances	and	leaders.		This	patience	was	apparent	in	much	of	young	socialists'	discourse.	For	instance,	some	were	eager	to	emphasise	that,	while	their	government	indeed	governs	in	a	similar	way	 to	 their	 opponents,	 they	 do	 so	 for	 different	 reasons	 and	 with	 other,	 long-term	objectives.	 In	 the	 following	 discussion,	 PS	 participants	 are	 discussing	 mainstream	parties'	attempts	to	reduce	France's	public	debt	and	deficit:		Louis	 :	Well	 even	 on	 the	means,	 even...	 on	 the	 reasons	why	we	 are	 trying	 to	reduce	our	spending,	(parties)	don't	agree	at	all...	 I	think	that	the	Right	sees	it	as...	 as	 a	way	 to	 cut	 down	 on	 things	 it	 couldn't	 cut	 down	 on	 otherwise...	 like	pensions,	 social	 policies,	 teachers,	 things	 it	 couldn't	 get	 rid	 of	 otherwise.	 The	Left	sees	it	as	a	question	of	sovereignty	and	to	be	capable	of	doing	investment.	I	think	that	on	the	objective	we	agree,	but	on	the	reasons	why	we	need	to	reach	that	objective,	we	completely	disagree.		Edgard:	But	take	the	facts,	the	facts..	I'll	take	out	the	card	'European	Integration'	ten	times	this	evening:	if	we	take	the	facts,	we	are	doing	exactly	the	same	thing,	we	 just	 use	 another	 word...	 we	 say	 rebalancing	 public	 spending,	 productive	rebalancing...	anything	you'd	like...	Quentin:	 But	 wait,	 it's	 not	 just	 policies	 that	 matter,	 it's	 also	 the	 way	 of	presenting	them,	of	defining	their	ends...																																									 																					
55	According	to	Muirhead,	"(p)artisans	are	the	custodians	of	a	shared	memory:	they	identify	certain	events	of	 the	past—public	commitments,	 legislative	enactments—as	achievements,	and	come	together,	and	stay	together,	to	protect	these	achievements.	Policies	and	programs	unfold	over	years,	and	it	is	difficult	to	know	in	 the	 short	 run	 what	 works	 and	 what	 does	 not.	 Leaders	 who	 stumble	 today	 often	 recover	 tomorrow.	Partisans	are	patient	with	 their	own	 leaders	and	 their	own	policies—without	 their	patience,	neither	can	succeed"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	17).		
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Edgard:	Well	yes,	Louis	is	right	if	we	consider	the	objective	of	rebalancing	our	public	spending.	For	us,	 it	 is	 to	allow,	afterwards,	 to	 initiate	a	growth	stratefy	and	to	enable	new	policies...	Many,	 however,	were	more	 conflicted	over	 the	direction	 taken	by	 their	party,	fearing	 a	 deeper,	 irreversible	 transformation	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 which	 the	 PS	 would	alienate	 itself	 from	 its	 own	 foundations.	 Overall,	 PS	 participants	 discussed	 their	 own	party's	 positions	 far	more	 than	 UMP	 participants,	 precisely	 because	 they	were	more	concerned	with	the	general	orientation	of	their	party's	platform.	This	comes	through	in	Figure	 11	 above:	 PS	 participants	 were	 over	 three	 times	 more	 likely	 than	 UMP	participants	 to	 focus	on	 their	own	party	when	accounting	 for	partisan	agreements	or	disagreements	(instances	coded	SELF-FOCUSED),	and	three	times	less	likely	to	focus	on	their	opponents	than	UMP	participants	(coded	OPPONENT-FOCUS).		The	 following	 example,	 where	 socialist	 participants	 discuss	 again	 the	 PS	government's	 reduction	of	 public	 spending,	 illustrates	 this	 critical	 stance	well.	Didier	starts	by	emphasising	that	his	party	has	aligned	its	ideology	with	mainstream	beliefs	by	ceasing	 to	 consider	 public	 spending	 as	 a	 strategic	 instrument	 serving	 a	 political	program.	Samir	and	René	insist,	on	the	contrary,	that	their	leaders	are	not	to	blame	for	these	decisions,	as	these	are	dictated	by	external	circumstances:		Didier:	(...)	There	is	also	at	the	very	heart	of	the	PS,	and	even	in	its	majority,	an	ideological	alignment	with	 the	 idea	 that	public	 spending	must	be	 limited,	 and	more	than	reason	would	dictate...	When	it	comes	to	spending,	there	is	this	idea	that	 we	 shouldn't	 spend	 too	much,	 there	 is	 this	 tendency	 to	 think	 about	 the	economy...	 well	 anyways,	 it	 is	 very	 widespread	 within	 political	 parties,	 and	within	 the	PS,	 to	use	 the	 image	of	 the	breadwinner'56,	who	 is	pragmatic...	The	economy	 is	 not	 at	 all	 thought	 of	 as	 an	 instrument	 that	 can	 serve	 a	 political	program,	 it's	 just	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 something	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 managed	 in	 a	pragmatic	way	(...)	And	we	find	ourselves	today	in	this	type	of	bookkeeping	that	is	garnering	consensus.		Samir:	On	 this	 I	don't	agree,	personally...	 I	 think	Hollande	 is	 in	a	very	difficult	situation	where	 in	 fact	 he	 doesn't	 have	much	 of	 a	 choice.	 In	my	 opinion,	 but	well...	René	 :	Honestly,	 I	 think	 it	doesn't	have	much	 to	do	with	 the	 socialists	getting	converted	to	a	policy	of	hard	austerity,	like	the	one	they	are	currently	leading...	I'm	not	convinced	that	this	is	something	that	is	ideologically	deep.	Look	at	the	United	 States,	 governments	 like	 Oboma's	 that	 are	 not	 necessarily	 more	 left-wing,	we	got	an	unprecedented	stimulus	policy	in	the	history	of	economics,	so	stimulus	 packages	 can	 very	 well	 (be	 adopted)...	 I	 think	 the	 PS	 had	 the	ideological	 capacity,	 at	 the	 level	of	 its	 elites,	 etc,	 to	accept	a	 stimulus	policy.	 I	think	very	simply	that	 they...	They	don't	have	the	means,	 there	 is	an	objective	constraint	(...)																																									 																					
56	In	French,	"bon	père	de	famille".	
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Other	 young	 socialists	 similarly	 voiced	 concern	 over	 the	 structural,	 long-term	nature	of	 the	 changes	at	play.	 In	 the	 following	example,	 Sophie	describes	how	 the	PS	has	failed	to	defend	the	importance	of	State	secularism	(Laïcité)	in	the	last	decade,	and	emphasises	the	disapointment	this	has	been	for	both	her	and	her	parents:	Sophie:	(...)	I	see	people	like	my	parents..	well	they	are	left-wing,	just	like	that,	but	 it's	 a	 really	 important	 topic	 for	 them,	 I	 see	 that	 it's	 really...	What	 I	 see	 is	people	that	are	disappointed,	and	I	am	too,	because..	(...)	Well	I	think	that	when	it	 comes	 to	 religious	minorities,	 the	Left	has	 involved	 itself	 in	muddy	debates	with	the	 far-right,	or	 the	Right,	and	has	never	really	asserted	 its	 ideas.	 I	 think	that	 in	 the	 last	 ten	 years	 it	 never	 knew	how	 to	 deal	with	 this,	 it	 never	 could	decide	on	a	strong	political	axis.	And	on	the	left,	we've	always	defended	this...	It	 was	 also	 not	 uncommon	 for	 UMP	 participants	 to	 recognise	 that	 the	 PS	government	 adopts	 similar	 policies	 to	 the	 ones	 their	 own	 party	 advocates.	 In	 the	following	example,	an	UMP	member	stresses	that	she	finds	it	complicated	to	classify	the	cards	precisely	because	the	PS	government	has	adopted	many	of	the	UMP's	positions:		Anaïs:	 I	 find	 it	 quite	 difficult	 to	 do	 this	 classification	 because...	 we	 had	 the	impression	 that	 the	 Left	 really	 wanted	 to	 differentiate	 itself,	 at	 least	 a	 few	months	ago.	Now	I	 find	that	on	a	 lot	of	questions	the	government	has	tried	to	get	 closer	 to	 the	position	 that	we	ourselves	were	defending.	 So	 I	 find	 it	 quite	complicated	to	do	this	classification	because	a	lot	of	this	is	blurry,	and	a	lot	of	policies	are	ambiguous	(...)	In	 the	 following	 example,	 participants	 from	 another	 UMP	 group	 similarly	emphasise	the	discrepancies	between	the	PS's	campaign	message	on	immigration,	and	the	 decisions	 their	 opponents	 are	 taking	 in	 government.	 Thomas	 is	 talking	 about	Manuel	Valls,	Minister	of	the	Interior	at	the	time	of	the	interview:	Thomas:	Well	he's	never	going	 to	say	 that	he	sent	back...	 that	he	 turned	away	more	Roma	people	than	the	Right	did	Alice:	They	won't	use	the	same	words	for	it..	Thomas:	Even	if	the	numbers	clearly	show	it	so...	he's	not	going	to	pride	himself	of	it.		Alice:	Well	it	went	down	easier	when	he	did	it	than	when	it	was	Sarkozy.		Thomas:	 Exactly,	 when...	Well	 for	me	 that's	 really	 French	 politics,	 we	 have	 a	huge	problem	with...	with	 the	Left,	 in	 the	end	 the	Left	knows	very	well	 that	 it	needs	 part	 of	 its	 electorate	 that	 is	 very	 left-leaning,	 and	 so	 it	 comes	 up	with	things	 that	are	 really	demagogical	during	elections...	And	 then	 it	puts	 in	place	policies...	I	wouldn't	say	that	suit	us,	but	in	the	end...	Alice:	Which	 in	 the	 end	 are	 not	 completely	 different	 from	what	 Sarkozy	 had	planned.			 *	*	*	
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On	 the	basis	of	 this	 section,	 I	 conclude	 that	French	partisans	 in	many	 regards	have	 a	 cohesive	 political	 identity.	 French	 participants	 displayed	 a	 strong	 capacity	 to	connect	 the	 ideational	 and	practice-related	dimensions	of	 their	partisan	 identity,	 and	they	could	identify	how	these	elements	of	their	party	platforms	differ	from	that	of	their	opponents.	 To	 this	 extent,	 they	 fulfil	 the	 executive	 criterion	 and	 the	 criterion	 of	differentiation.	 This	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ideational	 basis	 of	 French	partisanship	 is	 so	well-established.	 Indeed,	 French	 partisans	 also	 fulfil	 the	normative	
condition:	values	and	principles	are	core	to	their	self-definition.	Policies	and	practices	are,	to	this	extent,	secondary:	they	derive	 	from	pre-existing,	divergent	value-systems,	they	 are	 transient	means	 to	 reach	more	 timeless	 political	 objectives.	 The	 primacy	 of	value-systems,	and	 the	dependence	of	policy	on	pre-existing	normative	commitments	comes	through	in	the	following	statement	by	a	young	UMP	participant:	Etienne:	 I	 think	 it	has	 to	do	with	values,	 it	simply	has	to	do	with	values.	Even	when	it	comes	to	questions	of	economics,	it's	either	liberal	values	that	are	going	to	 guide	 policies,	 and	 therefore	 the	 means	 put	 into	 place,	 etc.,	 or	 more	interventionist	 values.	 On	 (our)	 goals	 there	 is	 some	 consensus,	we	want	 less	unemployment,	 we	 want	 things	 to	 go	 better.	 But	 at	 the	 start	 our	 values	 are	
different	and	this	implies	that	the	means	put	into	place	to	reach	these	objectives	
will	be	different	(emphasis	added).		There	are	nevertheless	key	differences	between	PS	and	UMP	participants.	While	for	 UMP	 participants,	 the	 Left-Right	 dichotomy	 still	 very	much	 structures	 day-to-day	politics,	PS	participants	perceive	a	strong	disjuncture	between	their	party's	practice	in	government	and	the	left-wing	ideals	that	form	the	basis	of	their	own	identity.	They	are	also	warry	 that	 this	disjuncture	 is	 accompanied	by	a	 convergence	of	party	platforms,	and	a	growing	inability	of	their	party	to	differentiate	themselves	from	their	opponents.		Does	 this	evidence	suggest	 that	 the	PS	 lacks	programmatic	cohesiveness?	One	could	argue	that	these	perceptions	belong	to	young	grass-root	members	alone	and	that	their	 disapointment	 is	 only	 a	 reflection	 of	 their	 own	 radicality.	 This,	 however,	 is	insufficient	to	fully	explain	their	position.	First,	across	both	countries,	they	are	the	only	group	 of	 partisans	 which	 expressed	 such	 a	 position—despite	 the	 fact	 that	 all	participants	 came	 from	 similar	 age	 groups,	 and	were	 in	 similar	 positions	within	 the	party.	Second,	the	progressive	conversion	of	European,	social-democratic	parties	to	the	principles	 of	 free-market	 economics	 is	 a	widely	 documented	phenomenon.	What	 this	analysis	 teaches	 us	 specifically,	 is	 that	 socialist	 partisans	 do	 perceive	 the	 lack	 of	programmatic	cohesiveness	of	their	own	party	and	that	this	perception	 leads	them	to	feel	 disappointed	 with	 their	 own	 party.	 This	 supports	 the	 general	 theoretical	framework	of	 this	 chapter,	 according	 to	which	parties'	 ability	 to	 engage	 citizens,	 and	
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citizens	 identification	 with	 political	 parties,	 greatly	 depends	 on	 their	 ability	 to	communicate	a	form	of	programmatic	cohesiveness.		
III.	THE	HUNGARIAN	CASE		
I	now	turn	to	 the	discourse	of	Hungarian	partisans.	 I	proceed	differently	as	 in	the	French	case,	 first	 looking	at	 the	cohesiveness	of	Hungarian	partisanship	on	socio-cultural	 issues,	 and	 then	 at	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	 Hungarian	 partisanship	 on	 socio-economic	 issues.	 Indeed,	 while	 in	 French	 groups	 there	were	 no	major	 differences	 in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	on	both	types	of	cleavages,	such	differences	did	exist	in	Hungarian	 groups.	 Indeed,	 Fidesz	 participants	 displayed	 a	 relatively	 strong	 form	 of	cohesiveness	on	socio-cultural	issues	as	compared	to	MSzP	participants.	However,	both	Fidesz	and	MSzP	participants	displayed	 low	 levels	of	cohesiveness	on	socio-economic	issues.		
1.	Socio-cultural	issues	
a.	The	normative	criterion	
The	nationalism/cosmopolitanism	divide	in	Fidesz	participants'	discourse	As	 made	 clear	 in	 the	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter,	 Hungarian	 participants	considered	most	 of	 the	 topics	 under	 discussion	 as	 generating	 partisan	 disagreement.	The	 card	 'Nation	 in	 Politics'	 nevertheless	 stood	 out	 as	 a	 topic	 crystallizing	 political	opposition.	Participants	from	both	sides	of	the	political	spectrum	pointed	to	this	card	as	among	the	most	divisive	(see	Figure	7	above),	and	also	as	one	of	the	topics	generating	the	 clearest	normative	 commitments	 from	partisans.	This	 idea	 is	 expressed	here	 in	 a	young	Együtt	group,	concluding	a	discussion	on	the	reform	of	public	services	and	of	the	health	system	more	specifically.	According	to	Zsófi,	when	compared	to	the	card	Nation	in	 Politics,	 partisan	 differences	 on	 these	 questions	 are	 'marginal',	 and	 do	 not	 rest	 on	principled	considerations:		Zsofi:	 Obviously	 relative	 to	 the	 rest	 this	 is	 marginal.	 And	 we	 have	 here	 the	nation	 in	 politics,	 compared	 to	 (this	 topic)	 the	 differences	 are	marginal.	 The	same	 is	 true	 for	railway	(reforms),	or,	 I	don't	know,	questions	concerning	 the	unions.	Csaba:	Yes,	with	these	topics	you	can't	find	clearcut	principled	differences.		Fidesz	 participants	 were	 however	 noticeably	 more	 concerned	 with	 issues	 of	culture	 and	 identity	 than	 their	 opponents.	 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 14	 below,	 Fidesz	
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participants	discussed	 the	card	Nation	 in	Politics	over	 twice	as	often	 than	 their	MSzP	counterparts.	 Fidesz	 participants	 not	 only	 saw	 this	 topic	 as	 most	 divisive,	 but	 were	explicit	 in	placing	 this	 topic	at	 the	heart	of	 their	own	normative	commitments.	 In	 the	following	 example,	 Eva	 links	 the	 card	Nation	 in	Politics	with	 two	other	socio-cultural	issues:	Religious	and	Ethnic	minorities,	and	EU	politics.	She	places	these	three	topics	at	the	 heart	 of	 her	 own	 engagement.	 Virág	 seconds	 her	 by	 attributing	 this	 feeling	 to	 a	collective	'we',	most	likely	Fidesz	activists	in	general:			Eva:	These	are	the	three	cards	where,	when	I	see	them,	I	can	say:	yes,	I	am	on	this	side,	these	are	the	reasons	why	I	am	here.		Virág:	This	is	why	we	are	here,	because	of	these	three	topics.		
	
Figure	14:	References	to	the	topics	under	discussion	by	Hungarian	participants	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure		 Fidesz	 participants	 were	 eager	 to	 present	 their	 own	 party	 as	 defending	 a	nationalist	idea	of	the	political	community,	against	an	opponent	that	has	less	regard	for	the	 idea	 of	 nation.	 They	 most	 often	 rooted	 this	 opposition	 in	 a	 particular	 historical	narrative.	 References	 to	 20th	 century	 history	 especially	 formed	 a	 core	 pillar	 of	 their	rhetoric	and	were	twice	as	present	in	Fidesz	groups	as	compared	to	MSzP	ones	(Table	4).	More	specifically,	 they	often	pictured	 their	opponents	as	carrying	 the	 legacy	of	an	internationalist	and	secular	communist	regime	that	repressed	national	sentiments	and	religious	commitments.	They	also	see	their	party	as	defending	a	unique	conception	of	the	nation	that	was	censored	before	1989.	This	is	articulated	in	the	following	dialogue	
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between	Fidesz	members:		Olivia:	Well,	I	am	also	biased	when	it	comes	to	this	theme.	I've	always	felt	that	the	Fidesz	 stands	out.	Hungarians	 are	 always...	 the	nation	 always	 comes	 first.	This	is	also	because	I've	felt	this	way	since	my	childhood.	In	general,	this	is	also	the	way	things	are	in	my	heart.		Author:	But	then	on	the	other	side	what	is	there,	if	not	the	nation?	Gábor:	 Basically	 they	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 another	 political	 system	 where	people	didn't	really	talk	about	the	nation	and	religion.	This	was	absolutely	not	a	major	theme.	What	was	insisted	upon	was	not	the	nation,	but	the	people.	Tamás:	The	population57.	Gábor:	The	people,	the	population,	and	they	based	everything	on	this.		Tamás:	I	think	this	is	a	first	a	difference	in	value	systems,	and	a	historical	one	that	pre-dates	 the	change	of	regime	(...)	The	concept	of	nation	and	the	way	of	thinking	about	 the	nation.	When	after	 the	change	of	system,	Antall	 József	said	that	 he	 stands	 for	 15	million	 Hungarians,	 then	 all	 of	 those	 on	 the	 left-liberal	side58	made	 a	 big	 fuss	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 was	 speaking	 about	 15	 million	Hungarians.59	The	 argument	 that	 there	will	 be	 another	 fascist	 system	 started	appearing	in	the	press.	From	this,	one	can	see	that	there	are	different	points	of	view.	So	I	don't	think	it	is	possible	to	say	this	any	other	way,	in	short	that	is	the	point.	On	this	issue	there	is	a	difference	both	historically,	and	in	terms	of	value-systems.			
																																								 																					
57	In	Hungarian,	this	is	the	distinction	between	nemzet	(nation)	and	nép	(people)	-	Tamás	also	stresses	the	term	lakosság	(population).		58	In	Hungarian	balliberális.	This	expression	is	mostly	used	by	the	Hungarian	Right	in	a	pejorative	sense.	In	their	vocabulary,	it	implies	the	existence	of	a	collusion	between	'liberals'	and	'left-wingers'	in	Hungary.		59	József	Antall	was	Prime	Minister	of	Hungary	from	May	1990	to	December	1993.	He	was	member	of	the	MDF,	a	conservative	party	that	ceased	to	gather	any	substantial	share	of	the	vote	from	the	1998	Hungarian	Parliamentary	elections	onwards.	Following	his	designation,	he	declared	 that	he	wanted	 to	be	 the	Prime	Minister	of	15	million	Hungarians	-	a	sentence	that	has	remained	in	the	collective	memory.	This	was	a	way	of	saying	that	the	Hungarian	nation	does	not	only	include	the	residents	of	Hungary,	but	also	the	Hungarian	minorities	 that	have	 lived	 in	neighbouring	countries	since	Hungary's	 loss	of	 territory	 following	the	1920	Trianon	treaty.	As	outlined	in	Chapter	2	of	this	thesis,	the	authoritarian	inter-war	regime	of	Miklós	Horthy	was	determined	to	gain	these	territories	back	and	allied	with	Nazi	Germany	in	the	Second	World	War	for	this	purpose.	After	1898,	Hungary's	conservative	camp	took	up	this	cause,	especially	by	championning	the	rights	 of	 Hungarians	 minorities	 abroad.	 Nowadays	 however,	 only	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 far-right,	paramilitary	groups	call	for	a	revision	of	Hungarian	borders.		
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Table	4:	References	by	French	and	Hungarian	participants	to	their	country's	political	history	More	generally,	Fidesz	participants	see	the	ways	in	which	Hungarians	interpret	and	position	themselves	with	regard	to	the	socialist	period	as	one	of	the	most	divisive	questions	 in	 Hungarian	 politics.	 Fidesz	 participants	 pride	 themselves	 in	 carrying	 the	memory	 of	 the	 victims	 of	 communism.60		 They	 claim	 to	 represent	 those	 who	 were	persecuted	 before	 1989	 and	 see	 their	 opponents	 of	 perpetuating	 the	 legacy	 of	communist	 rule.	These	different	outlooks	are	seen	 to	originate	 in	personal	history,	 in	the	stories	that	are	passed	down	within	family	circles.	This	is	expressed	by	Imre	in	the	following	statement:		Imre:	 There	 were	 800	 000	 members	 of	 the	 communist	 party	 before	 89	 and	there	 were	 about	 800	 000	 people	 who	were	 actively...	 who	 actively	 suffered	some	kind	of	discrimination	in	the	socialist	times.	So	there	are	800	000	on	both	sides,	if	you	multiply	it	by	three,	by	making	a	family,	of	course	families	tend	to	go	 together,	 you	 get	 2.4	million	 people	 on	 either	 side,	 which	 is	 basically	 the	number	of	steady	voters	that	both	parties	have.	So	it's	a	very...	I	think	the	most	important	divisive	line	in	Hungarian	society	is	this	division,	or	feeling	towards	the	last	regime.	Fidesz	 participants	 also	 use	 similar	 narratives	 to	 justify	 their	 own	 political	commitments.	In	the	following	example,	Benkö	traces	his	political	engagement	and	that	of	his	peers	to	the	persecutions	their	families	experienced	during	the	socialist	era:		Benkö:	What	neither	of	you	underlined,	but	which	according	to	me	is	common																																									 																					
60	Importantly,	 there	was	not	one,	but	 two	 types	of	 resistance	 to	 communism.	As	described	by	Kundera,	"one	 based	 on	 a	 belief	 and	 the	 other	 on	 skepticism;	 one	 moralistic	 and	 the	 other	 immoralist;	 one	puritancial	and	the	other	 libertine;	 the	one	reproaching	Communism	for	not	believing	 in	 Jesus,	 the	other	accusing	it	of	turning	into	a	new	Church;	the	one	angry	that	it	permitted	abortion,	the	other	accusing	it	of	making	abortion	difficult"	(Kundera,	2011).	The	resistance	that	Fidesz	refers	to	is	of	the	first	type.	This	was	a	 more	 passive,	 verbal	 form	 of	 anti-communist	 sentiment	 that	 was	 communicated	 within	 religious,	traditionalist	 families	 residing	 outside	 of	 big	 cities.	 In	 Hungary,	 the	 main	 active	 resistance	 against	Communism	 was	 of	 the	 second	 type:	 a	 Budapest-based	 network	 of	 middle-class	 intellectuals	 which	championned	 pro-West	 and	 pro-Democracy	 ideals.	 Fidesz	 participants	 present	 Hungarian	 opposition	 to	Communism	as	a	homogeneous	whole	and	do	not	acknowledge	this	second	type	of	resistance.		
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to	all	of	those	youngsters	who	are	politically	involved	on	the	conservative	side,	even	 before	 these	 events	 of	 2002	 and	 2006,	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 a	 family	 related	motivation.	Our	 families	were	harshly	 persecuted	under	 the	previous	 regime,	during	communism.	Personally	also,	through	the	confiscation	of	properties,	the	dictatorship	harmed	our	families	in	all	possible	ways.	This	is	how	we	grew	up,	even	in	our	youngest	childhood...	from	my	own	parents	I	can't	really	remember,	it's	 only	 afterwards,	 but	 generally	 speaking,	 they	 told	 us	 that	 even	 under	 the	past	 regime	 they	 used	 to	 talk	 at	 home	 against	 communism...	 And	 after	 the	regime	 change,	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 those	 people	 from	 the	 MSzP	 that	 Miklós	already	 talked	 about,	 those	 were	 in	 fact	 the	 servants	 and	 agents	 of	 the	dictatorship.	From	our	earliest	childhood	it	was	impressed	upon	us,	that	these	are	actually	communists,	and	that	we	can	vote	for	anyone,	but	not	for	them.		
Weak	normative	commitments	among	MSzP	participants	If	we	now	turn	to	MSzP	participants,	it	is	clear	that	they	have	a	less	clear	idea	of	the	values	and	principles	that	structure	their	party(s	approach	to	socio-cultural	issues	than	 Fidesz	 participants	 do.	 Like	 most	 other	 Central	 European	 social-democratic	parties,	 the	 MSzP	 built	 its	 identity	 on	 a	 break	 with	 the	 Communist	 past	 (Grzymala-Busse,	2003).	As	a	result,	they	do	not,	and	cannot,	recognise	themselves	in	the	way	in	which	Fidesz	participants	structure	the	political	world.	MSzP	participants	do	not	pride	themselves	to	be	the	descendents	of	the	pre-1989	ruling	class,	or	of	gathering	the	votes	of	those	nostalgic	of	communist	rule.	They	do	not	cast	their	own	party	as	defending	the	achievements	 of	 the	 socialist	 system,	 and	 they	 do	 not	 defend	 an	 alternative	 idea	 of	nationhood	that	would	be	based	on	such	a	narrative.			 This	unwanted	heritage	constitutes	an	unstable	basis	for	defending	political	ideas	in	general	and	 left-wing	 ideas	 in	particular.	The	imbalance	appears	 if	we	consider	the	coding	data	for	both	groups.	Fidesz	participants	are	more	likely	to	talk	about	the	ideas	of	political	parties	than	MSzP	participants	are.	As	shown	in	Figure	15,	Fidesz	members	drew	more	heavily	on	idea-related	arguments	than	their	MSzP	counterparts	(42%	and	33%	of	total	assessments	respectively)	and	less	heavily	on	practice-related	arguments	(58%	and	67%	of	total	assessments	respectively).61	
																																								 																					
61	In	the	previous	section	on	France	I	gave	a	break-down	of	my	coding	for	the	code	'IDEAS'	(see	Figure	9),	offering	an	overview	of	the	cases	where	French	participants	referred	to	abstract	worldviews	and	the	public	philosophies	of	political	parties	 (coded	WORLDVIEWS)	and	 those	where	French	participants	 referred	 to	more	 specific,	 policy	 objectives	 (coded	DIAGNOSTICS/OBJECTIVES).	 I	 do	 not	 offer	 an	 equivalent	 for	 the	Hungarian	 case	 given	 that	 the	 share	 of	 both	 coding	 categories	 in	 Fidesz	 and	MSzP	 transcripts	was	 very	close:	 48.7%	 of	 all	 IDEAS	 codes	 in	 MSzP	 transcripts	 were	 also	 coded	WORLDVIEWS,	 against	 46.4%	 in	Fidesz	transcripts.		
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Figure	 15:	 Dimensions	 of	 partisan	 platforms	 emphasised	 by	 Hungarian	 participants	 to	
justify	their	card	classification	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	On	the	question	of	the	Nation	in	Politics,	Institutional	Reform,	or	EU	Politics,	the	discourse	 of	 MSzP	 participants	 is	 therefore	 far	 less	 structured	 than	 the	 one	 held	 by	Fidesz	 participants.	 In	 contrast	 to	 Fidesz	 participants,	 they	 account	 for	 their	 own	positions	 on	 these	 questions	 in	 a	 far	 less	 assertive,	 cohesive	 and	 specific	 fashion.	Concerning	the	topic	Nation	in	Politics,	for	instance,	MSzP	participants	were	very	vocal	in	 denouncing	 the	 Fidesz's	 excessively	 nationalistic	 focus,	 but	 did	 not	 describe	 the	terms	of	an	alternative	approach	to	the	political	community.	The	following	dialogue	is	representative	in	this	regard:		László:	The	nation	in	politics.	I've	classified	that	at	the	very	fringe	(of	topics	of	disagreement).	(This	is)	at	least	partly	(the	case),	because	of	course	for	us	too,	the	nation	has	an	important	place	in	politics.	I	mean	this	is	why	we	do	politics	in	the	first	place.	But	Fidesz's	view	(on	this)	is	so,	so	radical,	and	given	that	they	try	 to	 bring	 everything	 back	 to	 this	 national	 line,	 I	 classify	 (the	 topic)	 at	 the	fringe.	 Because	 for	 us,	 this	 is	 an	 absolute	 no.	 I	mean	 everything	 is	 "national",	national	cigarets,62	national	I	don't	know	what,	everything	national...	Margit:	(...)	But	today	it's	true,	everything	is	national.	The	very	word	"national"	tends	to	provoke	such	an	incredible	revulsion	from	any	reflective	person...	that	I	see	that	word	and	it	makes	me	sick.	This	word...	how	to	say	it...	it	should	carry	value.	It	doesn't.	
																																								 																					
62	The	Fidesz	majority	legislated	on	the	retail	sale	of	tobacco	in	Hungary	in	December	2011,	and	introduced	a	 state	monopoly	 in	 this	 industry.	Only	government-approved	National	Tobacco	shops	are	authorised	 to	operate	since	July	15,	2013,	those	that	are	granted	concessions	via	a	public	tender	by	the	government.	
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Dávid:	Anymore	László:	They	almost	changed	it	into	a	pejorative	word	Margit:	Yes	These	 MSzP	 participants	 insist	 that	 it	 is	 only	 because	 Fidesz's	 stance	 is	 so	aggressive	 on	 these	 questions	 that	 the	 topic	 breeds	 political	 conflict.	 In	 contrast	 to	Fidesz	activists,	they	do	not	view	partisan	disagreements	on	this	question	as	resulting	from	 the	 confrontation	 of	 two,	 alternative	 conceptions	 of	 the	 political	 community.	 In	fact,	when	they	did	talk	about	their	own	approach	to	the	nation,	 it	was	only	to	assure	that	it	was	also	an	important	topic	for	them.	Lászlo,	cited	above,	was	eager	to	stress	this	idea	 for	 instance.	A	participant	 from	a	different	 group,	Kálmán,	 similarly	 emphasised	"We	on	the	left	 love	our	homeland	just	as	much,	and	for	us	the	nation	and	issues	that	have	 to	do	with	 the	nation	are	 just	as	 important”.	 	This	can	be	 traced	back	 to	a	more	general	 strategy	 adopted	 by	 the	 MSzP,	 that	 has	 tried	 in	 recent	 years	 to	 prove	 its	patriotism	against	the	accusations	issued	by	the	Fidesz.	This	new	strategy	is	decribed	in	the	following	terms	by	Dora:				Dora:	 I	 put	 the	 card	 Nation	 in	 Politics	 in	 the	middle.	 Because	 these	 days	 the	MSzP	agrees	more	and	more	with	Fidesz's	stance	that..	how	should	I	put	this..	not	 to	 be	 nationalist,	 but	 to	 take	more	 into	 account	 these	 national	 questions.	For	example	it	apologised	for...	when	was	it?	In	2008?	Or	2010?	The	vote	that	dealt	with	 the	 dual	 citizenship	 of	 Hungarian	minorities	 abroad.63	In	 that	 case	the	MSzP	was	in	favour	of	the	'no',	and	now	it	says	that	it	is	sorry,	it	should	have	called	 for	 the	 'yes'	 vote.	 And	 now	 they	 also	 support	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	Szeklers,64	the	Szeklers	had	their	march	last	week-end.	So	the	two	positions	are	beginning	to	get	closer	and	closer.	
																																								 																					
63	Dora	 is	 here	 referring	 to	 a	 2004	 referendum	 called	 upon	 by	 a	 civil	 society	 organisation,	 the	 World	Association	 of	 Hungarians,	 on	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 facilitate	 the	 acquisition	 of	 Hungarian	 citizenship	 by	Hungarian-speakers	 living	 outside	 Hungary's	 borders	 for	 several	 generations.	 The	 MSzP,	 then	 in	government,	argued	against	the	motion	on	the	basis	that	this	would	also	grant	social	and	political	rights	to	individuals	that	do	not	effectively	take	part	in	the	country's	day-to-day	political	and	social	life.	The	Fidesz	argued	 in	 favour	on	 the	basis	 that	 these	populations	are	"ethnic"	Hungarians	and	have	been	deprived	of	their	citizenship	only	because	of	adverse	historical	circumstances	-	namely	the	re-drawing	of	the	Austro-Hungarian	 Empire's	 borders	 under	 the	 1920	 Trianon	 treaty.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 referendum	was	 lost	 by	 a	close	 margin.	 In	 May	 2010,	 the	 new	 Fidesz	 government	 changed	 the	 Hungarian	 citizenship	 law	 in	 this	direction.	 Following	 its	 entry	 into	 force	 in	 January	 2011,	 the	MSzP	 changed	 its	 position	 and	 apologised	publicly	to	Hungarians	abroad	for	having	opposed	the	modification	of	the	citizenship	law	in	2004.		64	The	Szeklers	are	a	Hungarian	sub-group	living	in	a	region	of	Central	Romania.	They	make	up	for	about	half	 of	 Romnia's	Hungarian	minority,	with	 about	 600	000	people.	 Since	March	2006,	 they	 hold	 a	 yearly	March	in	favour	of	the	autonomy	of	the	three	Romanian	counties	-	Harguita,	Covasna	and	Mureș	-	in	which	Hungarians	make	for	over	half	of	the	local	population.	While	the	Fidesz	has	long	supported	their	cause,	the	MSzP	has	only	recently	rallied	it.		
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b.	The	executive	criterion	and	partisan	differentiation	
Evidence	for	cohesiveness	among	Fidesz	partisans	On	socio-cultural	 issues,	Fidesz	participants	demonstrate	 their	capacity	to	 link	specific	 political	 practices	 and	 policies	 to	 their	 party's	 normative	 commitents.	 More	specifically,	they	see	the	idea	of	nation	as	a	guideline	of	their	party's	political	decisions	in	government.	The	main	task	of	the	Fidesz,	according	to	them,	is	to	rid	Hungary	of	the	traces	 of	 the	 communist	 past	 and	 to	 ensure	 the	 triumph	 of	 the	 Hungarian	 national	interest	 in	 the	same	process.	 Indeed,	 the	main	 fault	 that	Fidesz	participants	associate	with	 the	socialist	period	 is	 that	 it	was	anti-national.	By	giving	priority	 to	 the	national	interest	 in	 its	policies,	Fidesz	 is	 thus	simultaneously	depicted	as	completing	 the	post-communist	transition.	 In	the	following	example,	Olga,	a	young	Fidesz	member,	sets	as	her	party's	main	political	objective	the	creation	of	a	new	political	culture	in	Hungary:		Olga:	We	still	have	 this	political	culture	 in	Hungary	where	communism	 is	still	very	alive.	And	in	this	regard	the	Fidesz...	it	is	like	it	wants	to	create	a	different	political	 culture.	 We've	 already	 started	 the	 transition	 towards	 this	 other	(culture).	But	this	transition	is	still	difficult.	Because	all	you	see	is	that	there	are	big	 changes,	 and	 in	 general	 people	don't	 really	 like	 changes.	 Even	 though	 the	regime	change	has	been	done	20	years	ago,	we	still	live	in	it.	Because	there	have	been	no	miracles	in	these	20	years.	This	upward	progression	is	difficult.	Getting	out	from	that	world...	Káldor:	I	agree	with	what	you	are	saying.		Olga:	This	does	not	happen	 from	one	day	 to	another.	 It's	a	whole	society	 that	we	would	need	to	replace,	which...	well...	Káldor:	This	process	only	really	started	in	2010..	Later	 in	 the	 discussion,	 Káldor	 ties	 this	 reasoning	more	 explicitely	 to	 Fidesz's	actions	during	 the	2010-2014	 legislature.	He	also	establishes	an	equivalence	between	Fidesz	putting	an	end	 to	 'post-communism'	and	 the	party's	promotion	of	 the	national	interest:		Káldor:	(...)	After	the	regime	change	and	until	2010,	 this	2/3	majority	(for	the	Fidesz),	 this	 did	 not	 exist	 because	 communists	 always	 had	 some	 hand	 in	 the	whole	 thing,	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 power.	 They	 always	 had	 some	 influence.	 They	had	economic	power,	 the	media,	 their	people	 everywhere.	The	national	bank.	Everywhere	 there	 was	 someone.	 In	 2010	 for	 the	 first	 time	 since	 the	 regime	change,	 this	was	not	 the	 case	 anymore.	Now	 that	 there	 is	 a	 2/3	majority,	 the	Fidesz	can	place	whoever	(it	wants)	anywhere,	it	can	change	whatever	it	wants.	There	are	some	things,	small	mistakes,	yes.	But	we	have	never	had	such	a	thing.	Now	that...	how	can	I	say,	 that	there	 is	right-wing...	not	right	wing,	 that	would	not	 be	 the	 appropriate	 term..	 simply,	 how	 can	 I	 say,	 (the	 promotion	 of)	 the	interest	of	Hungary	 (...)	This	never	happened	before	2010.	Because	 there	was	
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always	 a	 left	 wing	 government.	 In	 1998	 there	was	 a	 Fidesz	 government,	 but	even	 then	 (the	 left-wing)	was	 present	 in	 the	 person	 of	 the	 President.65	There	has	 never	 been	 anything	 like	 now.	 And	 because	 of	 that	 now	 everything	 is	changing.	 There	 are	 a	 lot	 of	 	 reforms,	 new	 constitution,	 local	 administrative	system,	 new	 taxes.	Now	a	 lot	 of	 things	 can	 change.	Until	 now	 there	were	not	enough	of	us...	This	 line	 of	 argument	 was	 also	 used	 by	 participants	 to	 account	 for	 partisan	disagreements	in	a	number	of	more	specific	policy	areas.	Hungary's	relations	with	the	EU	was	a	topic	of	choice	in	this	regard.	Participants	often	established	a	parallel	between	the	 socialist	 regime	 attitude	 towards	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 their	 opponents'	 current	position	towards	the	EU.	The	group	was	just	talking	about	Fidesz's	EU	policy:		Mihály:	This	is	the	defence	of	the	national	interest	within	the	EU,	in	contrast	to	the	socialists	position	of	opportunism	and	subservience.		Iván:	Servility,	yes.		Mihály:	What	 they	 learned	with	Moscow	 for	 over	 40	 years,	 they	 applied	 it	 to	Brussels,	 it	 is	 the	same	servility,	begging	for	charity...	This	 is	not	the	nation	 in	politics,	this	is	not	the	defence	of	the	national	interest...	Eva:	But	this	we	don't	need	to	say	to	a	French	person.		Iván:	 We	 have	 this	 saying	 in	 Hungary,	 that	 Brussels	 is	 not	 Moscow.	66	We	invented	it.		This	narrative	thus	serves	to	position	the	Fidesz	as	sole	defender	of	Hungary's	true	interests	at	the	EU	level.	This	is	made	even	more	explicit	in	the	following	example.	Olivia	 speaks	 of	 the	 Fidesz's	 position	 as	 primarily	 motivated	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 further	Hungary's	interests:		Olivia:	Fidesz	gets	attacked	a	lot	because	it	pursues	a	political	trajectory	that	is	very	much	centred	on	the	nation.	So	it	is	very	much	the	Hungarians	that	they...	so	 whatever	 rule	 they	 	 create,	 they	 take	 into	 account	 the	 interests	 of	 the	Hungarians,	and	 the	nation's	 interests.	Until	now	this	wasn't	 really	 typical.	 	 It	was	 there,	 but	 never	 in	 a	 clear-cut	 manner.	 For	 this	 the	 Fidesz	 gets	 a	 lot	 of	attacks	at	the	EU	level.	Because	they	don't	feel	that	this	supports	the	EU's	rules	and	its	expectations.		Tamás:	This	is	what	they	call	a	position	of	autonomy.		Olivia:	Yes.	Because	Viktor,	 I	mean	the	Prime	Minister,	he	defends	us	a	 lot,	he	
																																								 																					
65	From	1990	to	2000,	Hungary's	President	was	Árpád	Göncz.	He	was	a	member	of	the	liberal	party	SzDSz,	the	 coalition	 partner	 of	 the	 MSzP	 between	 1994	 and	 1998.	 Between	 2000	 and	 2005	 Ferenc	 Mádi	 was	President	and	between	2005	and	2010	László	Sólyom	was	President.	Both	were	 independent,	non-party	members.	Note	 that	 the	Presidential	 function	 in	Hungary	was	not	endowed	with	 formal	political	powers	under	the	previous	Constitution,	nor	is	it	now.		66	This	 is	 a	 catch-phrase	 regularly	 used	 by	 Viktor	 Orbán	 in	 his	 speeches.	 For	 instance	 on	 July	 5,	 2013,	following	 the	discussion	of	 the	Tavares	Report	 concerning	Hungarian	breaches	of	democratic	principles,	the	Prime	Minister	declared	on	Hungarian	Public	Radio	that	“Brussels	is	not	Moscow	and	therefore	it	has	no	right	to	meddle	in	the	lives	of	the	member	states.	Hungary	is	a	free	country."	
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doesn't	really	let	us	down.	He's	not	the	type	to	say,	"all	right,	then	we'll	modify	(the	 rule)”.	 But	 then	 again	 he	 wasn't	 just	 confrontational	 with	 the	 EU,	 he	explains	why	things	are	the	way	they	are.	Because	of	this	many	attack	him.	And	what	 I	 think	 is	very	bad,	and	very	apparent,	 is	 that	Hungarian	MEPs	 from	the	opposition	 also	 attack	 the	 country	 when	 Hungary	 is	 being	 discussed	 in	 the	European	Parliament.	It	is	quite	weird,	the	idea	that	you	would	not	protect	your	own	 country	 in	 front	 of	 other	 countries,	 and	 this	 also	has	 a	 very	bad	 echo	 in	Hungary.		Crucially,	this	is	also	the	narrative	that	serves	Fidesz	participants	to	justify	the	controversial	 2011	 Constitution	 brought	 in	 by	 their	 party's	 majority	 (Hungarian	Parliament,	 2011).	 A	 number	 of	 participants	 argued	 that	 the	 one	 previously	 in	 place	was	 a	 'communist'	 constitution	 and	 that	 it	 therefore	 needed	 to	 be	 changed.	 One	participant,	Sándor,	stressed:	"It	was	a	communist	constitution	from	1949.	That	came	through	 (in	 89)	with	 one	 or	 two	minimal	 changes”.	 Káldor,	 from	another	 group,	 also	insisted:	"Yes,	this	was	the	1936	Soviet	Constitution,	we	took	it	over	in	1949...	(...)	and	then	in	1989	they	added	one	sentence	to	the	beginning”.67		
Lack	of	cohesiveness	among	MSzP	partisans	MSzP	 participants	were	 far	 less	 capable	 of	 linking	 their	 party's	 practices	 and	policies	 on	 socio-cultural	 issues	 to	 a	 coherent	 set	 of	 normative	 goals.	 They	 generally	denounce	Fidesz's	rhetoric	and	decisions	as	excessive	and	harmful,	yet	do	not	oppose	it	through	an	alternative	discourse.	Neither	do	they	point	to	fundamental	disagreements	with	 the	 actual	 steps	 that	 the	 Fidesz	 government	 takes,	 or	ways	 in	which	 their	 own	party	could	do	things	differently.		As	shown	in	Figure	16,	MSzP	participants	had	an	even	stronger	tendency	than	Fidesz	 participants	 to	 make	 sweeping	 judgements	 on	 the	 conflictual	 nature	 of	 the	topics	discussed.	Conversely,	they	were	less	likely	to	make	more	nuanced	assessments	
																																								 																					
67	It	is	the	case	that	in	October	1989,	the	Parliament	approved	amendments	to	the	1949	Constitution,	and	did	 not	 adopt	 a	 new	 constitution	 (Hungarian	 Parliament,	 1989).	 These	 amendments,	 however,	 did	 not	involve	'one	or	two	minimal	changes'.	Radical	modifications	were	necessary	to	bring	the	1949	Constitution	to	the	standards	of	a	modern,	democratic	Fundamental	Law	(Dani,	2013;	Szikinger,	2001).	The	process	by	which	 the	 text	 was	 amended	 has	 nevertheless	 suffered	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 political	 legitimacy.	 The	 changes	were	 decided	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 public	 deliberation	 by	 an	 unelected	 body:	 a	 roundtable	 grouping	representatives	of	the	communist	Regime	and	its	opposition.	On	October	18,	1989,	the	modifications	were	approved	not	by	Referendum,	but	by	a	Parliament	that	had	been	elected	during	the	communist	regime.	For	all	of	 these	reasons,	 this	was	supposed	 to	be	a	 transitory	document.	The	preambule	of	 the	 revised	1949	Constitution	itself	stated	“the	Parliament	of	the	Republic	of	Hungary	hereby	establishes	the	following	text	as	 the	Constitution	of	 the	Republic	of	Hungary,	until	the	country’s	new	constitution	is	adopted.”	This	new	constitution,	however,	was	never	adopted.	After	2010,	 the	Fidesz	referred	 to	all	of	 these	points	 to	argue	that	the	text	should	be	abolished,	and	a	new	constitution	be	drafted.				
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of	the	issues	considered,	and	thus	to	emphasise	topics	of	political	agreement,	or	partial	political	agreement,	between	political	parties.68	
	
Figure	16:	Assessments	by	Hungarian	participants	of	the	degree	of	partisan	disagreement	on	
the	topics	discussed	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	Fidesz	participants	were	also	more	 likely	to	compare	 the	platforms	of	political	parties:	to	offer	an	account	of	what	drew	parties	together	and	what	set	them	apart.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 MSzP	 participants	 had	 a	 tendency	 to	 focus	 exclusively	 on	 their	opponents	and	to	remain	vague	about	their	own	party's	platforms.	As	shown	in	Figure	17,	62.1%	of	MSzP	participants'	assessments	were	focused	on	their	opponents,	33.3%	of	 these	were	comparative,	and	only	4.5%	focused	exclusively	on	their	own	party.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 the	 larger	 share	 of	 Fidesz	 participants'	 assessments,	 53.5%,	 were	comparative.	They	dedicated	less	than	a	third	of	their	assessments	to	their	own	party,	and	only	18.4%	of	these	assessments	focused	exclusively	on	their	opponents.	
																																								 																					
68	In	the	previous	section	on	France	I	gave	a	break-down	of	my	coding	for	the	code	'MIXED'	(see	Figure	13),	offering	an	overview	of	the	cases	where	French	participants	referred	to	similarities	between	partisan	ideas	but	 differences	 in	 their	 practices	 (CONSENSUAL	 IDEAS	 vs	 CONFLICTUAL	 PRACTICE)	 or	 differences	between	 partisan	 ideas	 but	 similarities	 in	 their	 practices	 (CONFLICTUAL	 IDEAS	 vs	 CONSENSUAL	PRACTICE).	 I	do	not	offer	an	equivalent	 for	 the	Hungarian	case	given	 that	 the	 total	number	of	 instances	coded	MIXED	 in	 Hungarian	 transcripts	 was	 so	 low,	 and	 that	 the	 differences	 between	 Fidesz	 and	MSzP	patterns	of	speech	in	this	regard	are	not	significant.		
12.9%	 11.0%	
76.1%	
100%	
19.1%	 12.6%	
68.3%	
100%	
0	
50	
100	
150	
200	
250	
300	
CONSENSUAL	 	MIXED	 CONFLICTUAL	 Total	
MSzP-Egyutt	Fidesz-KDNP	
	
136	
	
Figure	17:	Actors	emphasised	by	Hungarian	participants	in	the	course	of	justifying	their	card	
classification	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	The	 following	 dialogue	 illustrates	 well	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 MSzP	 participants'	discourse	on	socio-cultural	issues	especially.	While	Lászlo	points	to	excesses	of	Fidesz's	communication	 on	 EU	 matters,	 he	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 fundamentally	 disagree	 on	 his	opponent's	 EU	 policy.	 He	 also	 does	 not	 explain	 how	 his	 own	 party	 would	 do	 things	differently:	Lászlo:	 (...)	 It's	 a	 fact	 that	 they	 make	 huge	 mistakes,	 especially	 in	 their	communication.	Orbán	as	well	as	the	Fidesz	know	that	we	need	the	EU.	Because	we	 need	 the	money	 and	 all.	 They	 all	 use	 those	 communication	 tricks	 for	 the	Hungarian	public,	such	as	'bad	EU',	'thieves	and	robbers',	'oppressors',	'Brussels	=	Moscow'.	But	then,	when	they	have	to	go	to	Brussels	to	negotiate	about	real	things,	 they	won't	 do	 that.	 They	will	 downplay	 all	 this.	 That's	why	 I've	 put	 it	into	this	category	(of	consensus).	It's	more	in	the	communication	and	the	basic	attitude	that	there	is	a	difference.	But	when	it	comes	to	taking	action,	they	also	do	what	is	expected...	by	us,	and	by	me.		Ábel,	from	an	Együtt	group,	defends	a	very	similar	line	of	argument:		Ábel:	(The	Fidesz)	would	only	accept	the	criticisms	when	the	whole	of	Europe	gathers	 at	 the	Austrian	border	with	 a	huge	gun,	not	before.	 For	me	 that't	 the	most	brutal	thing,	because	if	we	take	this	theme	or	this	card,	(...)	it's	clear	that	basically	Orbán	doesn't	think	that	there	can	be	a	life	for	Hungary	outside	of	the	EU.	So	at	the	end	of	this	part	of	the	discussion,	where	we	were	talking	about	the	themes	in	which	there	are	the	most	marked	differences	between	the	two	camps,	we	 find	 this	 share	 of	 consensus.	 This	 is	 really	 strange.	 It's	 in	 fact	 difficult	 to	identify	differences	(on	this	theme).			MSzP	participants'	discussion	of	Institutional	Reforms	present	a	slight	variation	on	 this	 general	 pattern.	 First,	 their	 opposition	 to	 Fidesz's	 reform	 is	 radical	 and	
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unconditional.	There	 is	no	sense	 that	 their	party	would	agree	 to	some	of	 the	Fidesz's	measures	or	even	some	of	 its	basic	premises.	Second,	they	are	more	aware	of	the	fact	that	 their	 party	 has	 no	 real	 alternative	 to	 offer.	 As	 Dávid,	 a	 young	 MSzP	 member	explicitely	recognises:	"In	this	matter,	we	still	haven't	figured	out	what	we	want.	If	we	win	the	elections,	 then	what	do	we	want.	Sure,	Bajnai	did	mention	that	a	referendum	would	be	needed	to	decide	on	a	new	constitution".	MSzP	groups	are	able	to	give	reasons	for	why	putting	forth	such	an	alternative	is	particularly	difficult.	 Indeed,	Fidesz's	2011	Constitution	locked	in	most	institutional	reforms,	 requiring	 from	 the	opposition	 that	 they	 gain	 a	 two-third	majority	 to	 change	them.	Given	their	own	party's	low	level	of	popularity,	their	discussion	of	this	question	was	tainted	with	fatalism	and	feelings	of	powerlessness.		Adri:	 (...)	 So,	 if	 there	 is	 anything	 that	 they	 do	 not	 like,	 then	 it's	 added	 to	 the	Constitution,	 and	 thereafter	 there	 is	nothing	 that	 can	be	done.	 In	 fact,	we	are	discussing	what	can	happen	if,	let's	say,	it's	not	them	who	are	winning,	what	the	other	 parties	 would	 do.	 In	 the	 end	who	wins	 has	 no	 importance,	 because	 to	have	 a	 modification	 of	 the	 Constitution	 a	 two	 third	 majority	 is	 required,	 for	these	bad	things	to	be...	so	it	may	be	better	(to	have	a	situation)	now	where	the	Fidesz	wins,	and	in	which	the	Fidesz	eventually	pays	for	these	things.	The	only	case	 in	 which	 that	 would	 not	 happen	 is	 if	 somebody	 would	 win	 a	 two	 third	majority	or	succeeds	in	forming	a	coalition	that	would	have	(such	a	majority),	then	they	could	change	these	things.	But	personally	I	don't	see	much	chance	for	that	presently.	So	whatever	happens	in	2014,	it	won't	be	easy,	this	system	is	so	secured	by	now.	Just	with	the	fact	that	everything	is	 in	the	hands	of	the	State,	controlled	by	people	close	to	the	Fidesz.	So	even	if	the	Fidesz	loses	the	elections,	they	 can	 do	 anything,	 even	 just	 stop	 the	 electric	 power	 from	 working	 in	Hungary.	Because	 they	control	everything,	 it's	a	 totally	absurd	situation.	They	can	do	anything	because	in	the	last	3	years	they	have	taken	over	the	control	of	just	everything,	so	what	happens	next	year	is	just	irrelevant.	(...)	Eszter:	And	just	everything!	The	distribution	of	land,69	of	tobacco	shops...70	land	has	 been	 rented	 out	 for	 20-30	 years,	 tobacco	 shops	 for	 20.	 If	 the	 two-third	(majority)	is	not	reached,	and	it	won't	be,	(...)	then	they	are	secure	for	the	next	20-30	years	and	what	can	be	done	about	it?	Réka:	Nothing.	
																																								 																					
69	The	Fidesz	majority	passed	a	land	reform	in	June	2013	which	planned	to	auction	out	approximately	20%	of	Hungarian	state	land	to	owners	of	small	or	medium	sized	farms.	The	government	defended	the	law	by	saying	 that	 it	 would	 encourage	 family-run,	 Hungarian	 agriculture.	 The	 opposition	 argued	 that	 it	 would	offer	Fidesz	a	way	of	distributing	benefits	in	kind	to	their	supporters.			70	The	Fidesz	majority	legislated	on	the	retail	sale	of	tobacco	in	Hungary	in	December	2011,	and	introduced	a	 state	monopoly	 in	 this	 industry.	Only	government-approved	National	Tobacco	shops	are	authorised	 to	operate	since	July	15,	2013,	those	that	are	granted	concessions	via	a	public	tender	by	the	government.	The	opposition	has	accused	the	Fidesz	of	distributing	these	concessions	on	the	basis	of	political	loyalty	rather	than	business	considerations.		
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*	*	*	To	summarize	 the	results	of	 this	 first	section,	Fidesz	participants	have	a	more	cohesive	discourse	on	socio-cultural	 issues	than	MSzP	participants.	The	commitments	of	 Fidesz	 participants	 have	 a	 stronger	 normative	 basis	 in	 a	 form	 of	 nationalism	 and	social-conservatism.	This	also	provides	them	with	guidelines	for	action	in	certain	policy	areas,	 such	 as	 their	 relations	 with	 the	 EU	 and	 institutional	 reforms.	 The	 normative	commitments	 of	 MSzP	 participants	 are,	 in	 turn,	 far	 less	 clearly	 defined.	 This	 also	deprives	 them	 of	 clear	 guidelines	 for	 action:	 they	 can	 express	 their	 disapproval	 of	Fidesz	policies,	but	have	no	clear	alternative	to	suggest	in	their	place.		
2.	On	socio-economic	issues		I	 now	 assess	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 discourse	 of	 Hungarian	 participants	 on	socio-economic	issues	complies	with	the	different	criteria	for	partisan	cohesiveness.		
a.	The	normative	criterion	Socio-economic	issues	were	less	likely	to	generate	coherent	normative	stances	among	Hungarian	partisans	and	this	holds	even	among	Fidesz	participants.	Hungarian	groups	were	prone	 to	 emphasise	 a	 reversal	 of	 the	 traditional	 Left-Right	 value-system	on	 economic	 questions	 (see	 Table	 5).	 This	 will	 come	 as	 no	 surprise	 to	 students	 of	European	party	politics	and	scholars	of	post-communist	politics	especially.	The	thesis	of	 an	 'inversion'	 of	 the	 Left-Right	 economic	 cleavage	 in	 Central	 Europe	 is	 well	established	 in	 the	 literature	 (Evans	&	Whitefield,	 1993,	 1995;	Grzymala-Busse,	 2003;	Kitschelt,	1995;	Kitschelt	et	al.,	1999;	Tavits	&	Letki,	2009).		Fidesz	participants	 for	 instance	often	prided	 themselves	of	 being	more	 statist	and	 socially	 minded	 and	 associated	 their	 opponents	 to	 pro-market	 positions.	 This	comes	through	in	the	following	statement	by	a	young	Fidesz	member:	Kapolcs:	(...)	I	think	the	Left...	has	been	very...	too	eager	to	accept	those	kind	of	liberal	 ideas..	 that	 are	 at	 the	 moment	 not	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 Hungary.	Uncontrolled	privatisation,	which	went	on	after	the	regime	change,	these	kind	of	 ideas...	 uncontrolled	 free	 market	 ideas,	 with	 the	 Western	 multinationals	investing	and	of	course	making	money	and	taking	it	out	of	the	country,	I	think	these	 are	 challenges	 that	 must	 be	 fought	 in	 Hungary.	 (...)	 This	 is	 the	 most	interesting	 thing	 in	 Hungary.	 It	 seems	 that	 in	 Hungary	 Left	 and	 Right	 on	economic	 issues	 have	 reversed.	 Left-wing	 parties	 are	 capitalist	 and	 liberal,	whereas	 right-wing	 parties	 are	 conservative	 and	more	 socially..	 conscious	 or	more	statist	anyways.	
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Table	 5:	 References	 by	 Hungarian	 participants	 to	 the	 inversion	 of	 left-right	 economic	
platforms	MSzP	participants	also	emphasised	the	reversal	of	Left-Right	platforms,	albeit	in	less	explicit	 terms.	 In	the	following	example	for	 instance,	a	young	MSzP	member	talks	about	the	types	of	policies	adopted	by	both	parties:	Zsuzsa:	 In	 reality,	what	happens	 in	Hungary	 is	 that	when	 the	 right-wing	 is	 in	power,	then	there	are	nationalisations,	when	it	 is	the	 left-wing,	then	there	are	privatisations.	So	if	there	is	a	change	of	government	every	four	years,	this	can	generate	 problematic	 situations.	 So	 now	 we	 have	 nationalisations	 in	 various	areas...	At	 closer	 look	 however,	 the	 claims	 of	 Hungarian	 partisans	 on	 socio-economic	issues	do	not	reflect	a	strict	reversal	of	Left	and	Right	value-systems.	More	specifically,	it	 is	not	 the	case	 that	Fidesz	participants	display	commitment	 to	 the	 traditional	 ideas	associated	with	left-wing	economic	platforms.	These	ideas	would	include	an	emphasis	on	the	structural	factors	that	condition	individual	trajectories;	on	the	pivotal	role	of	the	state	in	rectifying	structural	inequalities;	and	more	generally,	on	an	idea	of	the	common	good	 that	 puts	 civil,	 political	 and	 social	 equality	 centre-stage	 (Bobbio,	 1995;	 Lukes,	2003).	Fidesz's	statism	is	rather	based	in	social	conservatism,	nationalism	and	a	form	of	 economic	 populism.	 Its	 interventionism,	 for	 instance,	 favors	 'hard-working'	Hungarians	over	benefit	recipients	and	is	coupled	with	a	strong	emphasis	on	individual	responsibility	 and	 merit.	 In	 the	 following	 example,	 a	 young	 conservative	 activist	associates	his	opponents	to	a	policy	of	benefit	distribution	towards	the	unemployed.	He	then	defends	Fidesz's	alternative,	a	program	that	conditions	benefits	on	accomplishing	public	work:71	Márton:	(The	MSzP)	primarily	takes	interest	in	those	kinds	of	people	who	were																																									 																					
71	The	Fidesz	government	started	its	public	labour	program	on	August	1,	2011.	As	of	then,	public	work	has	become	compulsory	for	the	unemployed.	The	program	has	sparked	controversy	for	several	reasons.	First,	workers	 are	 paid	 less	 than	 the	 minimum	 wage	 and	 do	 not	 generally	 work	 full	 weeks.	 Second,	 public	workers	 can	be	made	 to	move	 to	 live	near	 the	work	 site,	 in	 special	 live-in	 facilities,	 if	 their	 residence	 is	more	 than	 3	 hours	 of	 a	 daily	 commute	 from	 it.	 Finally,	 while	 work	 projects	 can	 only	 be	 set	 up	 by	 the	Hungarian	state	and	municipal	councils,	these	projects	are	de	facto	being	carried-out	by	private	companies	which	therefore	benefit	 from	under-payed	labour.	The	state	can	also	 'loan	out'	public	workers	to	private	companies.		
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inactive	 but	 who,	 as	 Lázár	 mentioned,	 would	 be	 able	 to	 work	 (...)	 (These	people)	will	 be	 exposed	 to	 the	manipulation	 of	 a	 government	which,	 prior	 to	elections,	 will	 raise	 family	 or	 other	 types	 of	 benefits,	 for	 example,	 invalidity	allowances.	 It's	 clear	 that	 for	 families	 with	 low	 incomes,	 even	 a	 one	 time	additional	income	of	10-15	000	Ft	can	mean	a	lot.	At	the	opposite	of	this..	so	for	example	with	 socialist	 governments,	 there	was	an	statist	way	of	 thinking,	 say	the	 A	 version	 of	 statism,	 which	 involved	 the	 state	 giving	 benefits.	 From	 this	point	of	view,	the	strange	thing	in	Hungary	is	that	the	right-wing	party	is	also	state.	But	 it	says	that	 the	State	should	not	distribute	aids,	but	rather	 it	should	distribute	 work.	 Or	 that	 it	 should	 interfere	 with	 the	 market	 through,	 for	example,	 buying	 companies	 that	 were	 previously	 private,	 or	 through	cooperating	with	actors	on	the	market,	companies,	to	increase	the	employment	rate.	 This	 is	 clearly	 not	 a	 classic	 capitalist	 method,	 but	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 the	present	global	crisis,	one	cannot	expect	to	use	methods	that	were	previously	in	use.	So	in	this	there	is	no	agreement	(between	political	parties)	(...)		Another	dimension	of	Fidesz	statism	is	its	pledge	to	actively	support	Hungarian	industry	and	agriculture	-	and	especially	small	and	medium-sized	owners	-	over	foreign	capital	 and	 multinationals.	 This	 aspect	 of	 Fidesz's	 platform	 comes	 through	 in	 the	following	statement.	Lázár,	a	young	KDNP	member,	is	talking	about	differences	between	MSzP	and	Fidesz	governments'	agricultural	policies:	Lázár:	 Perhaps	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 mention	 that	 what	 Márton	 said	concerning	 industrial	policy	also	applies	to	the	question	of	agricultural	policy.	Here	 again	 there	 is	 no	 agreement	 (between	 political	 parties).	 The	 current	government	supports	small	and	medium-sized	land	owners.	As	roughly	half	of	Hungary's	land	is	state-owned,	the	land	is	leased	out	to	individuals	for	them	to	manage	it.	Before	2010,	the	socialists	made	these	very	long,	20-year	contracts,	and	very	large	pieces	of	land,	like	hundreds	of	thousands	of	hectares,	and	they	gave	them	out	to	large	landowners.	Now	that	these	contracts	are	coming	to	an	end,	the	new	government,	the	right-wing	government,	gives	(contracts)	to	small	and	 medium-sized	 land	 owners 72 .	 In	 this	 regard	 too,	 (the	 parties)	 are	completely	different.	The	 left-wing	stands	 for	 the	big	 landowners,	Fidesz	says	that	 those	 who	 live	 in	 the	 countryside,	 and	 possibly	more	 people,	 should	 be	able	to	live	from	the	land.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	MSzP	does	 not	 champion	 economic	 ideas	 traditionally	associated	 with	 the	 Right,	 such	 as	 the	 responsibility	 of	 individuals	 for	 their	 social	trajectory,	or	an	ideal	of	the	common	good	akin	to	meritocracy.	Before	2004	especially,	its	 free-market	policies	were	 rather	 framed	as	a	 condition	 for	 re-integrating	with	 the	West,	a	gateway	towards	joining	the	community	of	liberal	democracies	(Palonen,	2006).	In	the	following	dialogue,	Együtt	participants	agree	that	Fidesz's	stance	is	contradicting	free-market	ideals,	with	its	championning	of	state-subsidised	agriculture	and	industry	especially.	They	nevertheless	have	difficulties	describing	the	MSzP	as	'pro-market':	
																																								 																					
72	On	Fidesz's	land	reform,	see	footnote	71.		
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Csaba:	No,	because	according	to	me	there	is	a	difference	in	values.	The	general	direction	 taken	 by	 the	 current	 government	 is	 to	 have	 strong	 Hungarian	companies,	 with	 strong	 Hungarian	 entrepreneurs,	 and	 behind	 that	 a	 large	strong	national	industry.	And	this	is	not	based	on	free	market	values,	but	on	the	need	for	state	subsidies.	Miklós:	Well	yes.	The	other	thing	is	that	we	are	going	back	to	the	Rákosi	regime.	Because	Orbán	is	gradually	coming	to	the	conclusion	that	(...)	we	should	be	the	country	of	iron	and	steel.73	Zsófi:	 All	 right,	 but	 to	what	 extent	 is	 the	 Socialist	 party	 a	 free-market	 party?	Aside	from	the	rhetoric	(...)	In	truth,	from	what	I	know,	very	few	people,	I	mean	very	 few	politicians,	are	 favourable	 to	 the	market	 in	Hungary.	All	 right	 in	our	party	 there	 are	 a	 few	 of	 them,	 but	 even	we	 have	 inveterate	 communists,	 like	Scheiring	Gábor.		In	 parallel,	 the	 Socialist	 party	 has	 not	 fully	 relinquished	 its	 social	 discourse	either	and	does	pledge	 to	protect	 the	more	vulnerable	portions	of	Hungarian	society.	MSzP's	 ageing	 electorate	 -	 a	 large	 part	 of	 which	 has	 remained	 faithful	 to	 the	organisation	after	its	reform	in	1990	-	also	pushes	the	party	to	retain	a	socially-minded	discourse.	In	the	following	dialogue,	the	description	that	MSzP	participants	give	of	their	party's	response	to	crime	is	in	line	with	traditional	left-wing	ideas:	an	emphasis	on	the	structural	role	of	social	factors,	and	the	necessity	for	the	state	to	address	the	economic	roots	of	criminality:	Kálmán:	But	lets	talk	about	what	the	position	of	the	Left	is...	This	is	just	my	own	opinion,	you	should	add	to	 it	 if	you	 feel	 like	 it.	The	Left	 thinks	that..	of	course	everyone's	 possessions	 should	 be	 secured,	 one's	 weekend	 plots	 of	 land,	because	property	rights	are	sacred	and	inviolable.	Nándor:	But	we	think	in	a	more	social	manner.	Kálmán:	What	we	think...	Levente:	...	is	that	those	in	need	should	be	helped.	Kálmán:	But	however,	it	is	necessary	to	examine	why	somebody	would	go	steal	in	 the	 countryside.	 Does	 he	 steal	 because	 this	 is	 the	 way	 he	 wants	 to	 earn	money	(...)	or	 is	 it	because	his	 four	children	are	famished.	 If	he	steals	because	his	 four	 children	 are	 famished,	 than	 he	 needs	 to	 be	 given	 work.	 Benefits	programs	need	to	be	set	up.	If	despite	all	of	this	he	still	goes	out	and	steals,	then	we	can	bring	in	the	harsher	laws	(...)		In	 some,	 albeit	 rare	 cases,	 MSzP	 participants	 would	 also	 cast	 the	 period	 of	economic	 transition	 as	 a	 parenthesis,	 a	 period	 during	which	 the	 party	 renounced	 its	left-wing	 ideals,	 and	hoped	 that	 their	party	would	 start	defending	 socialist	principles																																									 																					
73	Mátyás	Rákosi	was	the	leader	of	Hungary's	Communist	Party	from	1945	to	1956.	He	was	determined	to	speed-up	Hungarian	industrialisation,	and	especially	to	make	of	Hungary	a	"land	of	iron	and	steel"	(cited	in	Flett,	 2007,	 p.	 35).	 This	was	 a	 particularly	 laborious	 process	 as	Hungary	 had	 neither	 coal	 nor	minerals.	Rakosi's	 expression	 is	 today	 referenced	 in	 Hungary	 to	 summarize	 the	 absurdity	 of	 economic	 planning	under	communism,	or	of	misplaced	state	voluntarism	more	generally.		
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more	openly.	Dávid,	 a	 young	MSzP	member,	 speaks	of	 his	party's	 evolution	 since	 the	early	1990s	in	the	following	terms:	Dávid:	 (...)	 For	 example,	 we	 had	 this	 MSzP	 gathering,	 and	 as	 the	 younger	generations	we	 sang	 partisan	 hymnes74.	 And	 the	 elder	 ones	 just	 looked	 at	 us	like	this	(starring	with	wide	eyes).	Of	course	I	know,	that	during	their	childhood	this	is	what	they	grew	up	with,	and	that	they	were	part	of	all	of	this.	But	in	1989	they	gave	up	on	this	sytem.	Not	only	on	the	system,	but	on	the	whole	concept.	True,	 they	are	starting	 to	say	 that	 the	MSzP	 is	 turning	 left	again.	Because	 this	whole	bourgeois,	fake	Left	was	in	place	these	last	10	years.	Which	of	course,	has	a	lot	to	do	with	Gyurcsány	Ferenc	,	and	which	has	a	lot	to	do	with	the	SzDSz,	the	regular	 coalition	 partner	 (...)	 But	 nevertheless	 we	 need	 to	 differentiate	ourselves	 from	 liberalism,	 and	 from	 the	 bourgeois	 way	 of	 thinking.	 Let's	 be	social	 democrats,	 let's	 be	 left-wing.	We	need	 to	 differentiate	 ourself	 from	 the	Right,	the	Fidesz,	and	from	the	liberals	too.		What	emerges	is	therefore	a	far	more	complex	picture	than	a	simple	reversal	of	the	traditional	Left	and	Right	political	registers.	While	Fidesz	participants	do	emphasise	a	strong	role	 for	 the	state	 in	 the	economy,	 this	 is	nevertheless	coupled	with	stressing	individual	 responsibility	 rather	 than	 social	 factors.	 On	 the	 other	 end,	 the	 pro-market	decisions	 of	 MSzP	 governments	 have	 not	 necessarily	 been	 justified	 in	 the	 name	 of	neoliberal	principles.	 In	parallel,	 the	party	did	not	entirely	cut	 itself	off	 from	socialist	rhetoric.			
b.	The	executive	criterion	and	partisan	differentiation	
Weak	links	between	normative	goals	and	socio-economic	policies	Overall,	Hungarian	participants	also	had	great	difficulties	in	linking	their	party's	normative	 commitments	 with	 specific	 socio-economic	 policies.	 In	 the	 following	statement,	 a	 young	 Fidesz	 participant	 admits	 that	 he	 does	 not	 know	 what	 the	advantages	are	of	the	different	types	of	fiscal	policies	suggested	by	political	parties:	Tamás:	 In	 reality	 we	 only	 hear	 about	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 progressive	imposition	rate	and	a	flat	tax	through	the	media.	In	reality	we	are	not	aware	of	which	advantages	(the	flat	tax)	presents	exactly.	I	think	that	many	people	don't	know.	But	in	these	types	of	matters	it	is	hard	to	give	an	opinion	if	you	are	not	an	expert.	Characteristically,	this	activist	 justifies	his	relative	ignorance	with	the	fact	that	one	needs	to	be	an	'expert'	to	understand	such	specialised	debates.	In	other	words,	this	participant	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 consider	 awareness	 of	 the	 ideas	 that	 justify	 economic																																									 																					
74	In	Hungarian	mozgalmi	dalokat.	Dávid	is	referring	to	songs	that	are	part	of	the	left-wing	tradition,	such	as	 the	 International	 or	 the	 Partisans'	 song.	 These	 take	 on	 a	 particular	 connotation	 in	 the	 post-1989	Hungarian	 context,	 given	 that	 they	were	 an	 integral	part	 of	 the	Communist	Regime,	 and	 sung	especially	during	official	public	mass	gatherings.			
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policies	as	part	of	the	'common	knowledge'	that	members	of	a	party	could	be	expected	to	share.	This	seem	to	be	a	recurrent	pattern:	not	only	did	activists	regularly	admit	that	they	 did	 not	 know	why	 their	 party	 or	 their	 opponents	 put	 forward	 a	 specific	 policy,	they	also	often	apologised	 for	not	being	 'experts'	on	 the	 topics	 I	was	 inviting	 them	to	talk	 about.	 The	 following	 dialogue	 between	 young	 socialists	 took	 place	 at	 the	 very	beginning	of	the	discussion,	after	I	distributed	the	cards	and	gave	them	instructions	as	to	how	to	classify	them.	Participants	seem	overwhelmed	at	the	idea	of	having	to	discuss	each	theme	in	details:		István:	Well,	we	have	here	these	twelve	themes,	I'm	not	the	kind	to	give	short	answers	but	these	are	very	large	themes,	very	large	questions..	I'm	not	sure	that	I	can	answer	your	question	just	like	that.	Pál:	Yes,	I	mean	for	each	of	these	themes	you	would	need	a	different	expert.			In	reverse,	it	was	not	uncommon	for	partisans	to	emphasise	their	own	expertise,	for	instance,	the	fact	they	were	completing,	or	had	completed	a	degree	in	a	specific	area,	in	order	 to	give	 legitimacy	 to	 their	opinions.	 In	 the	 following	example,	 a	young	MSzP	member,	Barnabas,	stresses	that	he	has	written	his	Masters	thesis	on	fiscal	regimes	in	Hungary:		
Barnabas:	 Yes,	 taxation	 is	 a	 crucial	 point,	 it's	 quite	 obvious.	 And	 for	me	 it	 is	linked	to	my	studies,	I've	written	my	Masters	thesis	about	it,	so	this	is	why...		Csilla:	All	right,	no	need	to	show	off	Barnabas:	 So	 this	 is	 why	 I	 don't	 really	 want	 to	 go	 into	 it,	 because	 I	 would	probably	monopolise	the	discussion,	and	the	point	is	not	for	me	to	start	talking	about	this	for	a	whole	hour...	(...)	After	 this,	 Barnabas	 nevertheless	 talks	 at	 great	 length	 about	 his	 degree	while	the	other	participants	remain	silent.	It	seems	that	they	do	not	consider	that	they	know	enough	 about	 the	 topic	 to	 voice	 their	 opinion.	 The	 part	 of	 the	 discussion	 on	 Fiscal	Policy	 thus	 finishes	 with	 the	 end	 of	 Barnabas'	 monologue,	 and	 Lukács,	 another	participant	concludes:	"This	is	very	clear,	I	can't	really	add	anything...	Moreover	you're	the	one	who	wrote	your	thesis	on	this,	so	you	understand	(these	things)”.	This	 weak	 capacity	 of	 Hungarian	 participants	 to	 justify	 parties'	 economic	platforms	 in	 terms	of	 ideas	 also	 expressed	 itself	 in	 other	ways.	 They	 often	described	partisan	policies	or	practices	without	identifying	the	objectives	or	values	that	underlie	them.	 The	 following	 dialogue	 between	 Fidesz	 participants	 illustrates	 this	 quite	 well.	While	Káldor	lists	the	social	policies	defended	by	one	or	the	other	side	of	the	political	spectrum,	and	does	assert	that	the	Fidesz's		proposals	are	'better'	than	the	ones	of	his	opponents,	he	does	not	give	detailed	reasons	for	this	assessment.	When	I	asked	in	what	
	
144	
way	 the	MSzP's	social	policies	are	distinct	 from	the	Fidesz's,	Olga's	 response	remains	vague	and	unspecific:	Káldor:	 Concerning	 (the	 card)	 social	 policy	 there	 is	 the	 issue	 of	 social	 policy	support75.	That	could	be	requested	back	then.	I	believe	the	Fidesz	created	this	policy	 in	 199876.	 One	 could	 request	 benefits	 for	 housing,	 and...	 young	 people	especially	could	ask	 for	help	 to	acquire	housing.	The	MSzP	has	abolished	 it,	 it	probably	gave	different	sorts	of	benefits.	But	now,	thank	God,	the	governement	has	brought	this	measure	back.	Now	you	can	request	this	to	acquire	a	car,	too.	Social	policy	support.	This	is	a	good	thing.	Or,	for	example,	take	the	question	of	benefits.	 The	 left-wing	 government	 gave	 benefits	 to	 the	 Gypsies	 for	 example.	The	current	governement	doesn't	do	 that,	 it	 created	 instead	 the	public	 labour	program77.		Nándor:	Benefit	distributions	have	also	been	maintained.		Káldor:	All	right,	but	for	example	invalidity	retirements	have	been	taken	away.		Nándor:	And	 that	was	 a	 good	 thing,	 because	 a	 lot	 of	 people	 just	 bought	 their	way	to	invalidity	retirements78.		Káldor:	So	this	means	that	now	performance	is	taken	into	account,	you	need	to	work	and	then	you	get	some	salary.	This	is	better	than	benefits,	unemployment	benefits.	These	are	all	questions	of	social	policy.			(...)	Author:	So,	what's	the	difference	here?	What's	the	difference	between	the	Left	and	the	Right?	Olga:	In	my	opinion,	the	difference	is	rather	the	basis,	the	criteria	according	to	which	these	benefits	are	distributed.	According	to	what	criteria	somebody	got	them.	And	what	kind	of	benefits.	And	also	that,	lets	say,	the	"socialists"79	have	a	social	 sensitivity	 in	 different	 domains	 than	 for	 example	 a	 right-wing	government.		 Crucially,	 it	 was	 not	 uncommon	 for	 participants	 to	 recognise	 that	 the	 public	discourse	of	 political	 parties	 is	 also	 characterised	by	 this	 poor	 justification	 for	policy	proposals,	 and	 that	 partisan	 debates	 seldom	 involve	 giving	 reasons	 for	 particular	
																																								 																					
75	Szoc.pol.	 támogatás	 in	Hungarian.	 This	 refers	 to	 a	 one-time	 financial	 contribution	 by	 the	 state	 to	 help	couples	with	 children,	or	 couples	planning	 to	 start	 a	 family,	 to	acquire	 their	 first	home.	This	measure	 is	essentially	designed	to	sustain	birth	rates.		76	This	policy	was	 in	 fact	 already	 in	place	during	 the	Communist	Kádár	 era,	 and	 remained	 in	place	until	2009.	Gordon	Bajnai	then	suspended	it	as	part	of	the	austerity	measures	following	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis.	Fidesz	reestablished	this	measure	during	its	2010-2014	mandate.		77	Fidesz's	public	work	program	is	not	officially	targeted	at	the	Roma	people.	Given	the	significantly	higher	unemployment	rates	among	this	minority	in	Hungary,	Fidesz's	opponents	have	nevertheless	often	accused	the	party	of	catering	to	anti-Roma	sentiment	with	this	measure.		78	Nándor	is	referring	to	the	fact	that	he	believes	people	used	to	obtain	invalidity	retirement	unjustfiably	through	 bribing	 officials.	 It	 is	 a	 known	 fact	 that	 the	 number	 of	 invalidity	 retirements	 has	 been	disproportionately	high	 in	Hungary,	and	that	many	of	these	pensions	were	allocated	to	people	that	were	not,	in	fact,	invalid.		79	Olga	uses	the	diminutive	"szocik"	which	is	a	slightly	denigrating	term	to	designate	her	opponents.		
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political	choices.	In	the	following	example,	the	same	Fidesz	group	as	above	recognises	that	this	lack	of	political	justification	is	a	trait	of	their	political	system	as	a	whole.	In	the	first	statement,	Olga	describes	what	she	would	expect	a	high	quality	political	debate	to	be	like,	and	how	it	is	missing	in	Hungary:		Olga:	 That	 you	would	 be	 able	 to	 give	 an	 answer	 that	 you	 actually	 believe	 in,	without	involving	feelings,	without	(saying	something	like)	"well,	if	they	said	so,	then	I	will	oppose	it”.	Something	that	goes	beyond	giving	arguments	like	"they	were	crap,	and	I'll	do	better”.	But	that	you	say	concretely,	professionally,	what	steps	are	to	be	taken,	in	what	order.	Káldor:	Fidesz	doesn't	do	that	either	Olga:	 So	 it	would	 involve	 that	 they	wouldn't	 answer	 "you	 are	 bad,	 I'm	 better	than	 you”.	 It	 wouldn't	 be	 about	 that.	 It's	 that	 they	 would	 show	 what	 makes	another	(solution)	better.	And	 it's	not	 that	(we	say	that)	 the	MSzP	was	wrong	for	decreasing	that	or	that,	and	therefore	we	will	raise	this	and	this.	It's	more	or	less	that	(parties)	will	do	the	opposite	of	whatever	has	been	done	before.	And	they	 say	 "before	 there	were	 less	 job	 opportunities.	With	 us	 there	 are	more”.	And	that's	what	the	discussions	are	made	of	(...)	
Limited	partisan	differentiation	On	socio-economic	issues,	Hungarian	participants	also	displayed	a	weak	ability	to	point	to	the	characteristics	that	set	their	ideas	and	policies	apart	from	those	of	their	opponents.	In	the	following	example,	a	young	Fidesz	participant	points	to	the	fact	that	Hungarian	political	competition	is	not	structured	around	clearly	defined	and	separated	value-systems.	In	his	own	words,	at	best	they	are	'confused',	at	worst,	'there	aren't	any':		Krisztoff:	 How	 can	 I...	 How	 can	 I	 say	 this,	 so	 in	 Hungary	 there	 is	 some	ideological...	ideological	confusion80.	With	this	I'm	trying	to	say	that	it	is	not	that	we	have	a	conservative	party,	a	liberal	party,	a	social-democratic	party,	a	green	party	 that	are	 in	 competition	with	each	other.	 In	 important	ways,	 the	 lines	of	division	 are	 different,	 this	 turned	 out	 differently...	 I	 think	 there	 aren't	 any	ideologies,	I	think	we	can	forget	about	this.	(...)	This	 'confusion'	 over	 partisan	 differences	 on	 socio-economic	 values	 was	 also	coupled	 with	 uncertainty	 concerning	 differences	 in	 the	 types	 of	 policies	 that	 parties	enact	in	government.	Hungarian	participants	often	emphasised	that	while	the	rhetoric	of	parties	was	strongly	adversarial,	their	actions	in	government	were	far	more	difficult	to	distinguish.	The	same	young	Fidesz	participant	emphasises	this	idea	in	the	following	statement:	Krisztoff:	And	I	think	it's	important	to	make	the	distinction	between	the	level	of	words	and	that	of	deeds,	because	I	know,	that	for	a	foreigner	Hungarian	politics	seem...	because	the	language	is	very	different..	how	can	I	say...	at	a	certain	level																																									 																					
80	English	as	in	original	interview.		
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more	 aggressive.	 This	 can	 suggest	 something	 quite	 different	 than	 what	 the	actions	show.	So	 if	we	consider	 the	 level	of	words,	 there	 is	 some	kind	of	 cold	civil	war.	But,	thank	God,	 in	practice	it's	not	that	serious.	If	one	listens	only	to	the	 political	 discussions,	 then	 one	 can	 get	 a	much	worse,	war-like,	 picture.	 It	may	seem	like	there	is	a	much	deeper	conflict	than	what	there	is	in	reality.		When	 I	 asked	 another	 Fidesz	 group	more	 specifically	 about	whether	 partisan	debates	are	centred	around	policy	alternatives	in	the	field	of	economics,	they	gave	me	a	very	similar	answer:		Káldor:	 No,	 that	 is	 not	 what	 the	 debate	 is	 about.	 The	 debate	 is	 not	 about	something	like,	now	let's	sit	down	and	look	at	the	economy,	and	what	solutions	we	have.	What	 solutions	have	been	applied	 abroad,	 etc.	There	 are	 ideological	debates	on	a	number	of	issues...	But	there	are	no	policy	debates	in	my	opinion.	No?		Nándor:	And	emotional	debates,	yes.		Káldor:	Yes,	emotional	debates.	Unfortunately,	there	is	nothing	like...	Olga:	Insults,	acts	of	revenge,	and	the	like.		This	 'empty'	 form	 of	 animosity	 between	 political	 parties,	 in	 which	 debates	about	economic	policy	have	limited	space,	was	also	noticed	by	participants	on	the	other	side	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum.	 In	 the	 following	 statement,	 a	 young	 Együtt	 member	similarly	emphasises	the	absence	of	'professional	discussions'	in	the	Hungarian	public	space:		 Csaba:	The	most	important	problem	is	the	question	of	morality,	that	the	whole	communication	 is	 aimed	 at	 implying	 that	 the	 other	 is	 a	 criminal,	 and	 the	response	to	any	political	move	(from	the	opposition)	is	a	denunciation	or	a	trial.	So	there	isn't	really	a	political	discourse,	no	professional	discussion	in	any	field,	the	only	goal	is	to	make	the	other	a	criminal.	And	that	has	consequences	on	all	the	 rest,	 because	 it	 strengthens	 the	 stereotype	 that	 politics	 equals	 crime,	 and	that	politicians	are	bad.	That	they	steal	and	lie.		The	weakness	of	policy-based	differentiation	was	also	noticeable	in	accounts	of	partisans	 themselves,	 albeit	 taking	 a	 distinct	 form	 in	MSzP	 and	 Fidesz	 groups.	MSzP	participants	barely	talked	about	their	own	party's	policies	and	did	not	seem	to	clearly	know	how	 their	 platforms	diverged	 from	 the	 Fidesz's.	 They,	 for	 instance,	 spoke	 very	little	 about	 their	 party's	 past	 achievements,	 despite	 the	 MSzP	 having	 been	 in	government	 twelve	 full	 years	 since	 the	 country's	 transition	 to	democracy.	They	were	also	very	 silent	 about	 the	party's	 campaign	proposals,	despite	 the	 fact	 the	 interviews	took	place	six	months	before	the	next	parliamentary	election.	Instead,	MSzP	participant	spent	most	of	the	discussions	criticising	the	Fidesz's	decisions	in	government,	without	emphasising	 the	 alternative	 that	 their	 own	 party	 puts	 forward	 in	 response.	 The	
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following	 dialogue	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 this.	 MSzP	 participants	 are	 discussing	 the	Fidesz's	 labour	policy,81	and	at	no	point	do	they	stress	how	their	own	party	would	do	things	differently	in	government:		Adri:	Well,	 so	public	work	 is	designed	 to	bring	 the	unemployed	back	 into	 the	labour	 market,	 except	 that	 there	 is	 no	 labour	 market	 which	 they	 could	 be	brought	back	to.		Eszter:	Yes,	there	is	nowhere	to	bring	them	back	to.	That	is	why	in	my	opinion,	when	those	poor	devils	are	given	the	possibility	to	go	clean	up	snow	from	the	streets	for	20	000	Ft82,	I	wouldn't	call	that	fix,	secure	work.		Adri:	People	don't	have	any	financial	security.	Réka:	 And	 they	 stress	 this	 explicitely,	 that	 49	 000Ft83	is	 enough	 to	 ensure	financial	security.	They	should	just	try	to	live	with	49	000	Ft.	And	in	most	cases,	people	do	not	live	alone	either.		Eszter:	Of	course,	they	need	to	support	a	family.		Réka:	So	this	is	the	second	most	divisive	topic....		As	 this	 happened	 regularly	 in	MSzP	 groups,	 I	 often	 prompted	 participants	 to	talk	about	their	party's	own	positions	on	the	 issues	under	discussion.	Here	they	were	most	often	puzzled	and	regularly	emphasised	either	that	their	party	had	no	alternative,	or	 that	 they	 did	 not	 know	what	 their	 party's	 alternative	 is.	 The	 following	 discussion	between	 MSzP	 participants,	 for	 instance,	 follows	 a	 long	 monologue	 describing	 the	pitfalls	of	Fidesz's	land	reform:		Eszter:	 (...)	 I	dont	really	know	either	what	we	would	do...	 for	now	it's	enough,	but	I'm	not	even	convinced	that	it	is	up	to	us	to	resolve	these	agricultural	issues.	But	somehow	this	(the	way	Fidesz	is	doing	things)	is	not	right.					While	Fidesz	participants	are	more	comparative	in	their	assessments,	they	were	not	 necessarily	 better	 informed	 on	 the	 specific	 policies	 that	 their	 own	 party	 had	enacted	in	government.	Participants	were	often	unaware	of	key	aspects	of	their	party's	policies.	 Take	 the	 discussion	 between	Káldor,	 Nándor	 and	Olga	 on	 page	 144.	 Káldor,	head	 of	 one	 of	 Fidesz's	 district	 youth	 sections	 in	 Budapest,	 starts	 by	 asserting	 that	"social	policy	support"—a	special	state	contribution	going	towards	young	couples	and	families	looking	to	become	house	owners—was	first	put	in	place	by	the	Fidesz	in	1998.	This	 policy	 was	 in	 fact	 already	 in	 place	 during	 the	 Kadar	 era.84	He	 then	 makes	 a	sweeping	generalisation,	asserting	that	"the	left-wing	government	gave	benefits	to	the																																									 																					
81	On	Fidesz's	public	labour	program,	see	footnote	71.		82	Approximately	£48.	83	Approximately	£119.	84	On	the	question	of	social	policy	support,	see	footnote	75	and	76	
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Gypsies	 for	 example.	 The	 current	 governement	 doesn't	 do	 that”.	 On	 this	 point,	 he	 is	rightfully	corrected	by	another	participant,	who	stresses	that	not	all	benefits	have	been	taken	away	by	Fidesz.	He	also	seems	 to	believe	 that	both	 the	MSzP's	benefits	and	his	own	party's	public	labour	are	designed	specifically	for	the	Hungarian	Roma	population,	which	they	are	not.85	Finally,	 later	 in	the	discussion	he	seems	surprised	when	Nándor	mentions	 the	 educational	 dimension	 of	 the	 Fidesz's	 public	 labour	 program.	 This	 also	suggests	that	he	is	unaware	of	this	aspect	of	the	policy.	
Innaccuracies	 of	 this	 kind	were	 quite	 common	 in	 Fidesz	 groups.	 One	 striking	tendency	came	with	Fidesz	participants	speaking	of	certain	policies	as	their	own,	when	in	 fact	 these	 either	 have	 existed	 since	 the	 socialist	 era,	 or	 were	 in	 fact	 adopted	 by	previous	MSzP	 governments.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 following	 dialogue	 Eva	 associates	 a	policy	tying	land	ownership	to	the	condition	of	being	a	resident	in	Hungary	to	the	first	Fidesz	 government	 (1998-2002).	 She	 is	 corrected	 by	 Sándor,	 who	 specifies	 that	 this	measure	was	in	fact	brought	in	by	an	MSzP	government	in	1994:		Virág:	 And	 the	 last	 thing	 concerns	 land	 acquisitions.	 It's	 not	 as	 simple	 for	foreigners	to	buy	land	Hungary	as	compared	to	before.	 It's	now	subject	to	the	condition	of	how	long	one	has	lived	here.	I	think.	Eva:	But	that	always	was	a	condition.	Virág:	Well,	but	not	in	the	same	way	Sándor:	 Not	 always.	 Before	 the	 land	 reform	 of	 1994,	 mainly	 Austrians	 and	Germans	bought	 land	and	 they	 could	keep	 that	 land	 in	 a	 totally	 legal	 fashion.	After	that,	yes.		Eva:	 Then	 I	 would	 say,	 I	 think...	 this	 was	 decided	 under	 the	 first	 Fidesz	government	Sándor:	 No,	 however	 unbelievable	 it	 seems,	 it	 was	 done	 by	 Horn's	 MSzP	government.	Eva:	 All	 I'm	 saying	 is	 that	 I	 always	 thought	 that	we	 didn't	 figure	 this	 out	 just	now.			
*	*	*	The	 most	 cohesive	 discourse	 among	 Hungarian	 participants	 is	 therefore	Fidesz's	account	of	partisan	differences	on	socio-cultural	issues,	such	as	the	role	of	the	nation	 in	politics,	 the	 relation	of	Hungary	 to	 the	EU,	and	 institutional	 reforms.	Fidesz	participants	 use	 historical	 narratives	 as	 guidelines	 for	 making	 sense	 of	 their	 party's	chosen	course	of	political	action	in	these	areas.	They	are	also	capable	of	differentiating																																									 																					
85	On	Fidesz	public	labour	reform,	see	footnote	71.		
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their	own	platform	from	that	of	their	opponents.	On	the	other	hand,	MSzP	participants	do	 not	 rely	 on	 a	 similarly	 structured	 worldview.	 While	 Fidesz	 participants	 have	appropriated	 a	 narrative	 that	 gives	 coherence	 to	 their	 political	 discourse,	 MSzP	participants	 do	 not,	 and	 cannot,	 participate	 in	 this	 narrative.	 As	 a	 result,	 they	 barely	discuss	 their	 own	 policy	 choices,	 and	 these	 appear	 disconnected	 from	 a	 normative	rationale.	They	also	do	not	systematically	demonstrate	how	their	platform	differs	from	the	Fidesz's.		
On	the	other	hand,	both	groups	of	partisans	display	a	limited	ability	to	account	for	partisan	disagreements	on	socio-economic	questions.	They	cannot	connect	parties'	economic	 and	 social	 policies	 with	 a	 coherent	 set	 of	 political	 ideas.	 Their	 ability	 to	differentiate	 their	 own	 ideas	 and	policies	 from	 those	 of	 their	 opponents	 is	 also	 quite	weak.	 To	 this	 extent,	 the	 Left-Right	 economic	 dischotomy	 is	 shallow,	more	 than	 it	 is	reversed	for	these	participants.	If	partisans	do	'reverse'	the	traditional	registers	of	Left	and	 Right,	 they	 also,	 sporadically,	 adopt	 these	 traditional	 registers.	 If	 none	 of	 this	 is	seen	 as	 a	 contradiction	 with	 what	 a	 given	 party	 is	 supposed	 to	 stand	 for,	 it	 is	 also	because	these	ideas	and	policies	do	not	clearly	define	parties,	single	them	out,	set	them	apart	 from	 other	 parties.	 It	 is	 therefore	 not	 that	 Left	 and	 Right	 simply	 take	 on	 a	different	significance	in	the	Hungarian	context	as	compared	to	a	Western	European	one.	It	is	that	these	roles	are	floating,	vaguely	defined,	not	profoundly	characteristic	of	one	or	the	other	party's	platform.		
IV.	DISCUSSION	OF	RESULTS	
1.	Variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	At	 the	 end	 of	 this	 chapter,	 I	 draw	 some	 conclusions	 on	 variations	 in	programmatic	 cohesiveness	 in	 both	 countries	 under	 study	 and	 thus	 provide	 a	 first	answer	to	the	question:	to	what	extent	does	real-world	partisanship	meet	the	standards	
of	 democratic	 partisanship?	 Overall,	 French	 partisans	 are	 more	 cohesive	 in	 their	discourse	than	Hungarian	partisans.	 Ideas	and	normative	commitments	are	central	 to	the	identity	of	French	partisans.	French	participants	are	capable	of	linking	these	ideas	systematically	 to	 a	 set	 of	 policies;	 and	 they	 know	what	 differentiates	 their	 ideas	 and	practices	from	those	of	their	opponents.		In	 Hungary,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 partisans	 are	 often	 unclear	 as	 to	which	 ideas	ground	their	commitments.	They	have	difficulties	linking	such	ideas	to	a	coherent	set	of	
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policies	 and	 they	 are	 not	 always	 capable	 of	 pointing	 to	 what	 differentiates	 their	platforms	 from	those	of	 their	opponents.	 In	Appendix	6,	 I	 systematically	compare	 the	coding-based	evidence	 for	French	and	Hungarian	partisans,	 and	 this	 comparison	also	confirms	 these	 general	 tendencies.	While	 differences	 between	 French	 and	Hungarian	partisans	 are	 more	 or	 less	 striking,	 depending	 on	 the	 criterion	 considered,	 French	partisans	are	ahead	of	both	Hungarian	parties	on	almost	all	coding	measures	presented	in	this	chapter.		There	are	also	differences	between	parties	in	each	country.	PS	partisans	are	to	some	 extent	 less	 cohesive	 than	 their	UMP	 counterparts.	 Although	 they	have	 a	 strong	notion	of	the	ideas	that	ground	their	own	commitments,	they	are	less	capable	than	UMP	participants	to	point	to	the	policies	and	practices	that	derive	from	these	ideas.	This	also	results	 in	 a	weaker	 capacity	 to	 clearly	 distinguish	 their	 own	platforms	 from	 those	 of	their	opponents.		In	 Hungary,	 although	 both	 groups	 of	 partisans	 lack	 cohesiveness	 on	 socio-economic	 issues,	 Fidesz	 partisans	 displays	 greater	 cohesiveness	 on	 socio-cultural	issues.	They	have	a	clearer	set	of	ideas	and	values	to	refer	to,	can	point	to	the	types	of	policies	 that	put	 these	 ideas	 into	practice,	 and	know	what	 sets	 apart	 these	 ideas	 and	practices	from	those	of	their	opponents.		
2.	Explaining	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	The	second	task	of	this	conclusion	is	to	formulate	potential	explanations	for	the	above-mentioned	 variations,	 and	 thus	 provide	 an	 answer	 to	 my	 second	 research	question:	 how	 can	 we	 explain	 variations	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 uphold	 the	
standards	of	democratic	partisanship?	As	explained	 in	Chapter	2,	 I	 take	as	a	given	that	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	do	not	simply	result	from	differences	in	the	personality	of	partisans,	but	that	these	are	partly	dependent	on	the	specific	constraints	and	 opportunities	 that	 partisans	 have	 for	 political	 discourse	 in	 their	 own	 political	environment.	 In	 this	 regard,	 I	 define	 two	 broad	 categories	 of	 factors	 that	 influence	partisan	 discourse.	 First,	 the	 category	 of	 cultural	 resources,	 broadly	 defined	 as	 the	array	of	signs,	symbols,	 ideas,	memories	 that	 the	history	of	a	given	polity	provides	 to	partisans.	 Second,	 the	 category	 of	 external	 events,	 broadly	 defined	 as	 political,	economic	 or	 social	 phenomena	 that	 parties	 do	 not	 fully	 control,	 yet	 need	 to	 take	 a	position	 on.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 formulate	 possible	 explanations	 for	 the	variations	I	describe	above,	focusing	on	the	more	specific	cultural	resources	or	events	that	different	groups	of	partisans	draw	on	to	make	their	claims.			
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a.	Cultural	resources	
A	history	of	open	competition	and	the	Left-Right	dichotomy	Some	of	the	cultural	resources	that	French	history	provides	to	partisans	appear	as	particularly	conducive	to	the	development	of	a	cohesive	discourse	among	their	ranks.	I	speak	more	specifically	here	about	the	general	categories	of	'Left'	and	'Right'	and	their	role	as	 resources	 in	partisan	discourse	 (White,	2011a).	Born	 in	 revolutionary	France,	their	 significance	 has	 since	 retained	 a	 strong,	 albeit	 changing,	 significance	 in	 the	country's	tumultuous	political	history	(Gauchet,	1996).		These	 categories	 are	 omnipresent	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 the	 young	 French	partisans	I	interviewed,	and	we	can	link	the	ways	in	which	they	use	these	categories	to	the	 cohesiveness	 of	 their	 claims.	 Left	 and	 Right	 first	 provide	 a	 basis	 for	 partisans	fulfilling	the	normative	condition,	as	both	political	traditions	are	firmly	grounded	in	a	corpus	of	established	ideas,	values	and	traditions.	The	resources	of	Left	and	Right	are	also	useful	to	fulfil	the	condition	of	articulation,	as	these	two	ideational	bases	have	been	over	time	associated	with	certain	types	of	policy	solutions	(Bobbio,	1995;	Lukes,	2003).	Finally,	Left	and	Right	do	not	exist	as	autonomous	political	registers:	they	only	exist	as	a	dichotomy,	each	grounding	 their	own	meaning	 in	opposition	 to	 the	other	 (Dyrberg,	2005;	Mouffe,	2000).	To	this	extent,	they	also	explain	why	French	partisans	can	easily	differentiate	their	platforms	from	those	of	their	opponents.		These	 resources	 serve	 as	 opportunities	 for	 a	 cohesive	 political	 discourse	because	 they	are	grounded	 in	a	 long	political	history.	Since	French	parties	have	been	free	 to	 compete	 for	 the	votes	of	 citizens,	 a	period	which	started	with	 the	birth	of	 the	Third	 Republic	 in	 1870,	 Left	 and	 Right	 have	 served	 as	 key	 resources	 for	 partisans'	positioning.	 Over	 time,	 specific	 traditions,	 symbols,	 personalities,	 policies,	 and	 values	were	progressively	attached	to	both	registers.	French	partisans	are	today	the	carriers	of	this	extended	memory	of	free	democratic	competition.		Hungary	 also	 has	 a	 conflictual	 political	 history	 between	 two	 distinct	 political	camps.	On	the	one	hand,	the	current	centre-right	finds	its	political	roots	in	a	Hungarian	tradition	of	nationalism	and	conservatism,	most	clearly	embodied	by	the	authoritarian	regency	of	Miklos	Horthy	between	1920	and	1944	and	gone	underground	following	the	communist	 take-over	 of	 1945.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 current	 centre-left	 finds	 its	political	 roots	 in	 a	 Hungarian	 tradition	 of	 socialism	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 of	 liberal-cosmopolitanism	on	the	other.	While	both	of	these	strands	of	thought	were	repressed	until	 1945,	 socialism	was	 imposed	 as	Hungary's	 official	 ideology	 from	1945	 to	 1989.	
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There	 is,	 then,	 a	 great	 difference	 between	 the	 political	 resources	 that	 French	 and	Hungarian	partisans	dispose	of.	 In	France,	 the	meaning	of	Left	and	Right	was	built	 in	great	part	over	the	last	150	years,	in	a	historical	context	of	open	political	competition.	Both	 camps	had	 to	 learn	 to	 compete	 in	open	elections,	 and	 therefore	 to	be	 in	power,	cede	 power,	 and	 be	 in	 opposition.	 In	 Hungary,	 partisans	 carry	 the	 legacy	 of	 an	authoritarian	history.	Their	memories	are	either	of	their	own	camp	being	repressed,	or	of	 their	own	camp	dominating	others.	 In	 the	absence	of	a	history	of	 free	competition,	neither	political	 tradition	has	 learned	what	 it	means	to	make	partial	claims	about	 the	common	good.	There	 is	 also	no	well-defined	 set	 of	 policies	 that	have	been	habitually	put-forth	by	one	camp	in	response	to	another.		This	 may	 help	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	 Hungarian	 partisans'	discourse	 on	 socio-economic	 issues	 is	 especially	 so	 weak.	 With	 no	 history	 of	 open	debate	 on	 these	 questions,	 the	 policies	 and	 ideas	 generally	 associated	 with	 the	 left-wing	 and	 right-wing	 traditions	 of	 thought	 are	 up	 for	 grabs.	 The	 cultural	 resources	Hungarian	participants	dispose	of	do	not	define	Left	and	Right	as	being	associated	with	a	clear	set	of	ideas	and	practices.	They	do	not	prescribe	well-defined		roles	for	political	parties	 in	a	context	of	open	competition,	precisely	because	neither	the	nationalist	nor	the	socialist	tradition	had	a	chance	to	play	such	roles	in	the	past.	
Political	legacies	in	a	post-authoritarian	context	Different	sets	of	cultural	resources	may	also	help	to	explain	in	part	the	greater	cohesiveness	of	Fidesz	partisans	as	compared	to	MSzP	ones.	To	put	it	simply,	the	MSzP	appears	to	be	more	constrained	by	the	cultural	resources	offered	by	Hungary's	recent	history	 of	 socialism	 than	 the	 Fidesz.	 Given	 that	 the	 socialist	 tradition	 is	 strongly	associated	 with	 Hungary's	 most	 recent	 non-democratic	 regime,	 those	 who	 are	 not	associated	with	this	tradition	today—the	Fidesz—are	also	in	a	better	position	to	form	a	cohesive	political	discourse.		Fidesz	participants	anchor	their	 identity	in	an	established	political	tradition	of	social	conservatism	and	nationalism.	They	are	most	eager	to	refer	to	the	repression	of	this	tradition	under	the	Soviet	regime.	They	speak	of	a	time	when,	 in	the	name	of	the	abstract	and	foreign	principles	of	socialism,	nationalist	feelings	and	religious	sentiment	were	 suppressed.	 This	 not	 only	 comforts	 Fidesz	 participants	 in	 their	 party's	 current	defence	 of	 these	 ideas,	 thus	 allowing	 them	 to	 fulfil	 the	 normative	 condition.	 It	 also	provides	 their	 party	 with	 clear	 guidelines	 for	 action:	 to	 restore	 the	 triumph	 of	 the	national	 interest.	 Fidesz	 participants	 can	 thus	 link	 their	 nationalistic	 ideas	 to	 their	
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party's	policies,	and	thus	fulfil	the	executive	criterion.	Finally,	these	cultural	resources	also	 give	 Fidesz	 participants	 a	 clear	 sense	 of	 how	 their	 party's	 program	differs	 from	that	 of	 their	 opponents.	 	When	 they	 link	 their	 own	 party	 to	 a	 tradition	 of	 resistance	against	the	communist	regime,	they	also	establish	a	continuity	between	this	communist	regime	 and	 their	 current	 opponents.	 As	 a	 result,	 Fidesz	 participants	 see	 their	 own	policies	 as	 grounded	 in	 the	 defence	 of	 the	 national	 interest	 and	 their	 opponents'	position	 as	 embodying	 foreign,	 abstract	 principles	 that	 are	 adverse	 to	 the	Hungarian	nation.		MSzP	participants	are	more	constrained	by	the	cultural	resources	they	have	at	their	 disposal.	With	 the	 profound	 discredit	 of	 Hungary's	 communist	 period	 after	 the	regime	change	of	1989,	a	longer	and	broader	tradition	of	socialist	thought	was	tainted.	The	cultural	resources	that	come	with	this	tradition	are	soiled	in	the	collective	memory.	For	 the	 MSzP,	 committing	 to	 democracy	 and	 market	 liberalism	 in	 the	 1990s	 meant	distancing	 themselves	 from	 the	 socialist	 tradition.	 This	 has	 left	 them,	 however,	 with	few	cultural	resources	at	their	disposal.	With	no	past	to	pride	themselves	on,	socialists	also	have	no	clear	ideas	to	promote,	no	policies	to	link	to	these	ideas,	no	clear	notion	of	what	 sets	 them	 apart	 from	 their	 opponents.	 This	 could	 partly	 explain	 why,	 the	discourse	of	MSzP	partisans	 is	 less	cohesive	 than	 the	discourse	of	Fidesz	participants	on	socio-cultural	issues.			
b.	External	events	
The	weight	of	external	economic	constraints	on	French	partisan	discourse	One	recurrent	topic	of	discussion	in	French	groups	was	the	weight	of	external	economic	 constraints	 on	 the	 policy	 practices	 of	 political	 parties,	 especially	 those	induced	 by	 financial	 globalisation	 and	 European	 integration.	 What	 is	 particularly	interesting	 here	 is	 that	 references	 to	 these	 constraints	 play	 a	 very	 different	 role	 for	UMP	and	PS	participants:	while	these	references	serve	the	cohesiveness	of	UMP	claims,	PS	participants	seem	less	able	 to	 integrate	 these	 factors	 into	a	cohesive	discourse.	To	this	 extent,	 these	 external	 events	 may	 partly	 serve	 to	 explain	 differences	 in	 the	cohesiveness	of	UMP	and	PS	identities.		UMP	 partisans	 frame	 the	 necessity	 for	 governments	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	current	 laws	of	 the	market	 in	a	positive	 light.	They	can	read	the	context	of	 increasing	economic	 interdependence	 among	 European	 nations	 in	 light	 of	 their	 foundational	values	and	suggest	a	line	of	political	practice	on	the	basis	of	this	reading.	According	to	them,	 the	 role	 of	 governments	 is	 to	 adopt	 a	 pragmatic	 approach	 towards	 economic	
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policy-making,	 and	 accompany	 rather	 than	 resist	 the	 global	 trend	 toward	 market	liberalisation	and	state	disengagement	from	the	economy.	In	this	discourse,	they	make	good	 use	 of	 their	 'right-wing'	 cultural	 tool-kit.	 According	 to	 Lukes,	 the	 main	characteristic	 of	 the	 Right	 as	 cultural	 resource	 is	 to	 defend	 the	 social	 necessity	 of	respecting	 timeless	 laws	(Lukes,	2003).	The	 laws	 to	be	defended	change	according	 to	the	 historical	 context	 :	 in	 Revolutionary	 France	 the	 Right	 defended	 the	 King's	 divine	right	 against	 the	partisans	 of	Republican	 rule,	 today	 they	will	 champion	 a	 traditional	conception	of	marriage	against	the	partisans	of	same-sex	unions.	UMP	participants	are	able	 to	 use	 this	 worldview	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 financial	 globalisation	 or	 European	economic	integration.	For	them,	the	role	of	the	state	is	to	respect	the	laws	of	the	market	rather	 than	 attempt	 to	 meddle	 with	 them,	 and	 thus	 encourage	 individuals	 to	 take	responsibility	for	their	own	social	trajectories.	PS	 participants	 referred	 more	 frequently	 and	 more	 directly	 than	 UMP	participants	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 financial	 globalisation	 and	 European	 integration	 on	 the	economic	 policy	 of	 national	 governments.	 They	 however	 seemed	 less	 able	 than	UMP	participants	to	read	these	events	in	light	of	their	political	worldview	and	thus	integrate	these	events	into	a	cohesive	political	discourse.	PS	participants	defended	a	traditional	reading	of	left-wing	ideals,	according	to	which	'timeless	laws'	serve	those	in	power	and	contribute	to	increasing	inequalities.	They	were	not	able,	however,	to	make	sense	of	the	contemporary	economic	context	through	the	lense	of	these	ideas,	and	suggest	ways	in	which	governments	could	respond	to	it.	Instead,	PS	partisans	use	this	economic	context	as	an	explanation	for	the	discrepancies	they	witness	between	their	own	ideas	and	the	PS's	economic	policies.	According	to	most	PS	partisans,	if	their	party	does	not	align	its	practices	with	 left-wing	 ideals	 it	 is	 because	 it	 is	 not	 able	 to.	 Even	when	 they	 did	 not	resign	 to	 this,	 PS	 participants	 could	 not	 suggest	 an	 alternative	 set	 of	 practices	 to	 the	ones	 that	 their	 party	 enact	 in	 government,	 policies	 that	 would	 both	 address	 this	economic	 context	 and	 be	 in	 line	with	 their	 ideals.	While	 this	may	 be	 a	 tall-order	 for	young,	 grass-root	 activists,	 this	 is	 also	 what	 one	 could	 expect	 from	 exceptional	partisanship:	to	provide	a	narrative	on	current	events	that	help	citizens	make	sense	of	them,	and	which	points	to	ways	in	which	a	new	context	can	be	managed	and	addressed	by	the	state.	To	this	extent,	while	UMP	partisans	were	able	to	use	the	current	economic	context	as	an	opportunity	for	cohesive	discourse,	for	PS	partisans	this	was	an	obstacle,	a	constraint	that	they	were	not	able	to	overcome.		
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The	 context	 of	Hungarian	 economic	 transition	and	Fidesz's	 current	 institutional	
reforms	The	 ways	 in	 which	 Hungarian	 partisans	 react	 to	 contemporary	 economic	circumstances	may	also	help	explain	that	 the	discourse	of	Fidesz	participants	 is	more	cohesive	 than	 the	 discourse	 of	 MSzP	 participants.	 As	 shown	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	discourse	of	Fidesz	participants	on	socio-economic	 issues	displays	many	weaknesses.	They	are	able,	however,	to	develop	a	narrative	tying	their	party's	economic	policies	to	their	ideas.	Fidesz	participants	put	a	form	of	nationalism	at	the	heart	of	their	approach	to	 European	 economic	 integration	 and	 to	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	 financial	globalisation.	 In	 this	 light,	 they	 see	 the	 role	 of	 their	 party	 as	 to	 defend	 the	 national	economy	against	these	threats	and	promote	Hungarian	industry.	On	this	basis,	they	can	position	their	opponents	as	those	who	defend	a	cosmopolitan	vision	of	the	world	and	favour	foreign,	multinational	corporations.		MSzP	participants,	on	the	other	hand,	do	not	dispose	of	such	a	narrative.	They	do	not	take	pride	in	their	party's	economic	reforms	during	the	twelve	years	they	were	in	power.	In	fact,	they	barely	talk	about	these	at	all.	It	is	true	that	the	specific	context	of	economic	 transition,	 the	 EU	 accession	 process,	 and	 finally,	 the	 2007	 financial	 crisis	imposed	heavy	constraints	on	successive	MSzP	governments	and	limited	their	ability	to	adopt	 a	 strong	 social	 policy.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 discredit	 that	 the	 socialist	 legacy	 has	experienced	 in	 post-communist	 Hungary,	 this	 may	 make	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 MSzP	participants	 to	 make	 use	 of	 left-wing	 cultural	 resources,	 and	 promote	 a	 credible,	socially-oriented	discourse.		Finally,	MSzP	participants	made	frequent	references	to	the	institutional	reforms	of	Fidesz	as	a	constraining	factor	on	their	party's	ability	to	come	up	with	an	alternative	plan	of	government.	This	factor	therefore	also	deserves	to	be	discussed.	It	 is	true	that	some	of	Fidesz's	institutional	reforms,	the	Media	Law	and	new	Electoral	Law	especially,	do	favour	the	expression	of	pro-Fidesz	views	in	the	mainstream	media	and	increase	the	party's	 chances	 to	 gain	 a	 strong	 majority	 in	 future	 elections	 (European	 Parliament,	2011;	OSCE,	2011;	Political	Capital,	2013).	It	is	also	true	that	if	the	MSzP	were	to	gain	power	 in	 the	 next	 election	 with	 a	 simple	 majority,	 their	 hands	 would	 be	 tied	 on	 a	number	of	topics.	Since	2010,	the	Fidesz	adopted	a	series	of	Cardinal	Acts	that	can	only	be	 amended	 or	 abrogated	 in	 the	 future	 with	 a	 two-third	 majority	 (Hungarian	Parliament,	2011).	These	have	 included	acts	on	 the	protection	of	 families,	on	religion	and	church-state	relations,	on	the	media,	on	the	rights	of	nationalities,	on	the	judiciary,	on	the	constitutional	court,	as	well	as	a	new	election	law	(Bánkuti	et	al.,	2012).		
	
156	
All	 of	 these	 factors	 certainly	 make	 the	 task	 of	 the	 MSzP	 to	 come	 up	 with	 a	cohesive	alternative	of	government	particularly	challenging.	In	some	ways,	however,	it	makes	it	all	the	more	urgent	that	they	do	so.	And	even	though	the	MSzP	faces	a	number	of	constraining	factors,	those	do	not	explain	why	it	is	impossible	for	MSzP	partisans	to	devise	a	strategy	to	address	this	situation.	As	made	clear	in	this	chapter	however,	while	MSzP	participants	are	strongly	critical	of	the	Fidesz	governments'	institutional	reforms,	they	 do	 not	 talk	 about	 how	 their	 own	 party	 could	 counter	 them.	 While	 Fidesz's	institutional	 reforms	 may	 objectively	 complicate	 the	 MSzP's	 task,	 partisans	nevertheless	 retain	 agency	 in	 the	 discourse	 they	 develop.	 To	 this	 extent,	 MSzP	partisans	also	carry	a	share	of	responsibility	for	the	lack	of	cohesiveness	of	their	claims.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 				 		
	
157		CHAPTER	4:	Pluralism	in	partisan	attitudes	towards	opponents		In	 the	 second	 empirical	 chapter,	 I	 examine	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 French	 and	Hungarian	 partisans	meet	 the	 standard	 of	 commitment	 to	 political	 pluralism	 in	 their	attitudes	 towards	 political	 opponents.	 As	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 1,	 one	 challenge	 for	partisans	is	to	contest	partisan	opposition	while	asserting	the	legitimacy	of	opponents	to	 formulate	 dissenting	 claims.	 Respect	 for	 political	 opponents	 thus	 requires	 from	participants	 that	 they	 exercise	 self-restraint	 and	 place	 their	 opponents'	 right	 to	disagree	above	conviction	in	the	superiority	of	their	own	claims.	In	this	sense,	respect	is	not	simply	toleration	that	stems	from	grudgingly	resigning	to	co-existence.	Instead,	it	is	 a	 more	 voluntarily	 "reciprocal	 positive	 regard"	 between	 opponents	 that	 consider	each	 other	 as	 "moral	 and	 political	 equals"	 in	 an	 inclusive	 and	 pluralist	 political	community	(Gutmann	&	Thompson,	1996,	p.	17;	2010,	pp.	1129-1130).	In	 chapter	 1,	 I	 offered	 three	 criteria	 to	 evaluate	 the	 attitudes	 of	 partisans	towards	political	opponents.	I	summarize	these	below	and	indicate	the	type	of	evidence	that	my	interviews	offer	for	each	criterion:			 Criterion	1:	Criticising	opponents	on	practices,	not	intentions:	A	first	sign	of	respect	for	political	opponents	can	be	found	in	the	types	of	criticisms	that	partisans	address	to	their	 opposition.	 Respectful	 opposition	 involves	 criticising	 the	 practices	 of	 opponents	rather	 than	 their	 intentions.	 In	 other	 words,	 partisans	 should	 not	 engage	 in	 'motive	cynicism':	 raising	 doubts	 on	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 reasons	 opponents	 have	 to	 say	 or	 do	something.		(Gutmann	&	Thompson,	2010,	p.	1133).		The	focus	groups	offer	ample	material	for	assessing	partisans'	endorsement	of	this	first	norm.	When	discussing	similarities	and	differences	between	their	own	party's	programs	and	those	of	their	opponents,	partisans	often	had	to	explain	why	they	consider	their	own	ideas	 and	 practices	 as	 superior	 to	 those	 of	 their	 opponents.	 In	 these	 instances,	 I	attributed	specific	codes	to	those	criticisms	targeted	at	the	intentions	of	opponents	and	those	criticisms	targeted	at	the	practices	of	opponents.		
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	 Criterion	2:	Considering	opponents	as	principled:	The	second	criteria	for	partisans	to	 develop	 a	 pluralist	 political	 discourse	 towards	 their	 opposition	 is	 that	 they	acknowledge	the	principled	nature	of	opponents'	positions.	Partisans	should	assume	that,	even	 if	 they	 disagree	with	 their	 rivals'	 stances,	 their	 opponents	 "act	 not	 only	 for	 their	own	political	 gain	 but	 also	 out	 of	 a	 desire	 to	 do	what	 they	 think	 is	 right"	 (Gutmann	&	Thompson,	2010,	p.	1135).	To	say	that	a	politician	has	principles	and	stands	by	them	is	in	itself	a	 recognition	of	political	merit	 to	 the	extent	 that	principled	political	 commitment	carries	intrinsically	positive	connotations.	To	operationalise	 this	particular	criterion,	 I	coded	for	 instances	where	partisans	talked	about	the	values	and	principles	of	their	political	opponents.			 Criterion	 3:	 Viewing	 opponents	 as	 oriented	 towards	 the	 common	 good:	 Finally,	partisans	respect	political	opponents	when	they	consider	these	as	moral	agents	that	are	oriented	 towards	 the	 common	 good.	 This	 amounts	 to	 a	 belief	 that	 adversaries	 are	committed	 to	 addressing	widely	 accepted	 societal	 problems	 (sickness,	 poverty,	 crime),	and	 that	 their	 actions	 are	 guided	 by	 a	 concern	 for	 fundamental	 principles	 such	 as	freedom,	equality	and	the	rule	of	law	(Galston,	2013).		Here	I	coded	for	 instances	 in	which	participants	did	not	respect	this	particular	criteria.	First,	 cases	when	 they	 directly	 questioned	 the	morality	 of	 political	 opponents.	 Second,	cases	 when	 they	 accused	 their	 opponents	 of	 being	 a	 direct	 threat	 to	 fundamental	common	principles,	or	to	the	common	good	more	generally.	I	also	use	examples	from	the	transcripts	where	partisans	explicitly	recognise	the	dedication	of	their	opponents	to	the	common	good.			 *	*	*		 As	 for	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 I	 will	 present	 the	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	evidence	 for	both	cases	 in	 turn,	 starting	with	France	and	 then	moving	 to	Hungary.	 In	the	final	section	I	will	discuss	both	cases	in	a	comparative	fashion	and	provide	tentative	explanations	for	the	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	that	I	uncover.		
I.	THE	FRENCH	CASE	
I	 first	 consider	 the	 arguments	 French	 participants	 use	 to	 criticise	 opponents,	then	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	 see	 their	 opponents	 as	 principled,	 and	 finally	whether	they	perceive	their	opponents	as	oriented	towards	the	common	good.		
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1.	Types	of	criticisms:	intentions	and	practices	As	 is	 apparent	 from	Figure	18,	UMP	participants	were	over	 three	 times	more	likely	 to	 criticise	 their	 opponents	 than	 PS	 activists,	 while	 PS	 activists	 were	 close	 to	three	 times	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 self-critical	 as	 compared	 to	 UMP	 participants.	 These	results	can	be	read	in	line	with	my	earlier	discussion	on	programmatic	cohesiveness	in	France.	As	already	emphasised	in	Chapter	3,	PS	participants	also	regret	that	their	own	party's	practices	are	not	sufficiently	in	line	with	traditional	left-wing	ideals.	This	line	of	argument	goes	far	to	explain	the	more	critical	attitude	of	PS	participants	towards	their	own	party	as	compared	to	their	UMP	counterparts.		
	
Figure	 18:	 Praise	 and	 criticism	 by	 French	 participants	 of	 their	 own	 party	 and	 their	
opponents	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	It	 is	not	 surprising	 that	UMP	participants	are	more	critical	of	 their	opponents	than	 PS	 participants,	 because	 the	 UMP	 was	 the	 opposition	 party	 at	 the	 time	 of	 my	interviews.	 It	 is	also	understandable	 that	PS	participants	have	 less	arguments	against	their	 opponents	 in	 a	 time	 when	 the	 UMP	 has	 little	 policy-making	 power.	 In	 fact,	partisans	of	opposition	parties	in	both	my	French	and	Hungarian	cases	were	far	more	focused	 on	 their	 opponents	 than	 those	 that	 supported	 a	 party	 government.	 PS	 and	Fidesz	 participants	 also	 had	 far	more	 to	 say	 about	 themselves,	 than	 partisans	 of	 the	opposition	parties	(see	Figure	11	for	France	and	Figure	17	for	Hungary	in	Chapter	3).		The	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 are	 critical	 of	 their	 opponents,	 or	 self-critical,	does	not	in	itself	offer	evidence	on	their	level	of	commitment	to	political	pluralism.	As	emphasised	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 it	 is	 the	 task	 of	 partisans	 to	 offer	 citizens	 alternatives	 of	government,	 to	 differentiate	 themselves	 from	 their	 opponents	 and	 therefore	 to	 be	critical	of	them.	Similarly,	partisans	may	be	critical	of	the	government	not	because	they	
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exercise	self-restraint,	but	because	they	believe	their	party's	actions	 in	government	 is	not	 in	 line	with	 these	 convictions	 -	which	 is	 exactly	 the	 case	 for	PS	participants.	 The	information	presented	above	is	nevertheless	a	starting	point	for	examining	the	types	of	criticisms	that	partisans	address	to	their	opponents,	which	in	turn	do	provide	evidence	about	the	pluralist	commitments	of	partisans.		A	 specific	 code	 was	 attributed	 to	 instances	 where	 partisans	 criticised	 the	intentions	 of	 their	 political	 opponents	 (coded	 ILL	 INTENTIONS)	 and	 another	 to	instances	where	 they	 focused	 on	 their	 practices	 (FLAWED	PRACTICES).	 As	 shown	 in	Figure	19,	PS	participants	 focus	equally	on	opponents'	 intentions	and	practices	 (50%	respectively	 of	 all	 instances	 of	 criticisms	 coded),	 while	 UMP	 participants	 tend	 to	criticise	 their	 opponents	 on	 their	 intentions	 far	 less	 than	 they	 do	 on	 their	 practices	(27.2%	and	72.8%	of	total	criticisms	respectively).	It	is	noteworthy,	however,	that	UMP	participants	criticise	the	intentions	of	their	opponents	over	twice	as	often	than	their	PS	counterparts	(37	and	16	instances	coded	respectively).	
	
Figure	19:	Criticisms	by	French	participants	of	their	opponents'	intentions	and	practices	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
a.	Criticisms	of	intentions	
I	 further	 divided	 instances	 in	 which	 participants	 criticised	 their	 opponents'	intentions	 into	 two	 categories.	 First,	 cases	 where	 participants	 criticised	 their	opponents	for	looking	out	for	the	political	interest	of	their	party	-	and	especially	their	re-election	 -	 rather	 than	 the	 public	 interest	 more	 broadly	 (coded	 POLITICAL	INTERESTS).	Second,	I	considered	cases	where	participants	accused	their	opponents	of	acting	out	of	 concern	 for	more	personal	 interests,	 such	as	material	 gain,	 securing	 the	personal	 power	 of	 their	 members	 or	 supporters,	 or	 of	 being	 under	 the	 influence	 of	certain	sectorial	interests	(PERSONAL	INTERESTS).	While	accusations	of	demagoguery,	populism,	 or	 vote-seeking	 behaviours	 more	 generally	 would	 fall	 under	 the	 first	
50.0%	 50.0%	 100%	27.2%	
72.8%	
100%	
0	
50	
100	
150	
ILL-INTENTIONS	FLAWED	PRACTICES	 TOTAL	N
um
be
r	
of
	in
st
an
ce
s	
co
de
d	
PS	UMP	
	
161	
category,	 accusations	 of	 corruption,	 clientelism	 and	 nepotism	 would	 fall	 under	 the	second.		
	
Figure	20:	Types	of	criticisms	by	French	participants	of	their	opponents'	intentions	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	As	 is	 apparent	 from	 Figure	 20,	 the	 majority	 of	 intentions-related	 criticisms	among	French	participants	were	targeted	at	the	political,	rather	than	personal,	motives	of	opponents.	In	these	cases,	French	participants	accused	their	opponents	of	defending	certain	policies	solely	 in	order	to	cater	to	their	electorate,	or	more	generally,	of	being	involved	in	politics	out	of	a	desire	to	be	elected	or	re-elected.	UMP	activists	would	for	instance	regularly	accuse	the	PS	of	adopting	pro-immigration	or	more	multiculturalist	positions	to	maintain	their	popularity	among	French	Muslims.	In	the	following	example,	a	young	UMP	activist	is	making	such	an	argument:		Adrien:	Yes,	I	think	there	is	a	very	electioneering	way	of	dealing	with	this,	and	actually	 it	 works!	 During	 the	 2012	 elections	 I	 think	 something	 like	 93%	 of	Muslims	voted	for	François	Hollande	in	the	second	round86.	This	is	regrettable,	because	 it	 means	 that	 religion	 has	 become	 a	 political	 force,	 and	 secularism	should	 be	 about	 leaving	 religion	 to	 the	 private	 sphere	 (...)	 The	 Left	 says	 for	instance	 that	 it	 is	 all	 in	 favour	 of	 secularism,	 etc.,	 but	 then	 has	 doubts	 about	voting	 the	 law	on	the	Burqa,	 law	that	was	defended	by	 Jean-François	Copé...87	We	can	see	that	the	Left	has	the	objective	of	seducing,	of	continuing	to	seduce	the	Muslim	electorate	in	its	entirety	(...)	The	PS's	social	and	economic	policies	were	also	regularly	cast	as	way	of	gaining	
																																								 																					
86	Adrien	 refers	 here	 to	 an	 opinion	 poll	 conducted	 by	 the	 polling	 institute	 OpinionWay-Fiducial	 for	 the	conservative	 daily	 Le	 Figaro	 on	 May	 6,	 2012,	 the	 day	 of	 the	 second	 round	 of	 the	 French	 Presidential	elections	 (OpinionWay-Fiducial,	 2012).	 This	 statistic,	 however,	 applies	 to	 those	 French	 Muslims	 who	effectively	cast	a	ballot	in	2012,	not	to	all	French	Muslims.	87	Adrien	refers	to	a	law	banning	citizens	from	dissimulating	their	faces	in	the	public	space.	It	was	voted	by	an	 UMP	majority	 on	 11	 Octobre,	 2010	 and	 first	 proposed	 by	 Jean-François	 Copé,	 President	 of	 the	 UMP	group	 in	 the	French	National	Assembly	at	 the	 time.	This	 legislation	has	come	to	be	known	as	 the	 'Burqa	law'.	The	law	was	adopted	with	335	votes	in	favour,	1	against,	and	241	abstentions.	Only	20	PS	MPs	voted	in	favour	of	the	law,	against	all	UMP	MPs.		
37.5%	 62.5%	 100%	20.6%	
79.4%	 100%	
0	
10	
20	
30	
40	
PERSONAL	INTERESTS	 POLITICAL	INTERESTS	 TOTAL	N
um
be
r	
of
	in
st
an
ce
s	
co
de
d	
PS	UMP	
	
162	
votes	rather	than	as	stemming	from	a	particular	set	of	normative	assumptions.	 In	the	following	 example,	 a	 young	 UMP	 activist	 frames	 her	 own	 party	 as	 one	 making	necessary,	yet	unpopular	decisions,	while	the	PS	is	described	as	mostly	concerned	with	being	re-elected:		Marie:	I	absolutely	agree	with	what	has	been	said	on	the	economic	system	and	social	benefits...	When	we	compare	the	UMP	and	the	PS,	the	UMP	wants	to	take	risks,	 even	 if	 that	means	 part	 of	 the	 French	 population	will	 be	 against	 them.	Instead,	 the	PS	only	 acts	 out	 of	 its	 own	 interest,	 to	 get	 re-elected,	 there	 is	 no	vision...	on	the	long	term,	for	France.	It	is	for	their	own	personal	interest,	to	get	re-elected	(...)		Some	activists	went	as	 far	as	 to	attribute	all	of	 their	opponents’	positions	 to	a	vote	 seeking	 strategy,	 a	 line	 of	 argument	 developed	 by	 Edouard	 below.	 As	 in	 the	previous	 example,	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 here	 that	 questioning	 the	 intentions	 of	 opponents	amounts	to	implicitly	denying	their	principled	nature	-	a	point	I	will	come	back	to	later	in	this	chapter:		Edouard:	Here	we	mainly	 see	 that	 on	 societal	 issues...	 because	 societal	 issues	don't	 just	 include	 gay	 marriage...88	there	 is	 also	 the	 example	 of	 public	 drug	consumption	rooms89,	the	right	to	vote	for	foreigners,90	all	of	these	questions...	It’s	a	form	of	demagoguery	because	in	the	end...	they	operate,	we	see	that	the	PS	operates	 community	 by	 community.	 So	 when	 they	 suggest	 public	 drug	consumption	rooms	it's	for	left-wing	'bobos'91,	when	they	suggest	gay	marriage	it	 is	for	the	gay	community,	when	they	suggest	the	right	to	vote	for	foreigners	it's	the	same...	So	in	the	end,	 it’s	only	for	electoral	ends,	they	don't	necessarily	think	about	changes	in	society,	about	the	consequences	it	can	have	for	society...	When	 PS	 participants	 cast	 similar	 arguments,	 it	 was	 in	 most	 cases	 to	 accuse	their	opponents	of	catering	 to	 the	 far-right,	Front	National	electorate.	They	especially	targeted	the	hardening	of	 the	UMP's	position	 in	the	 last	decade	over	 issues	related	to	France's	 immigration	 policy	 and	 its	 treatment	 of	 cultural	 minorities	 more	 generally.	René	and	Didier	are	making	such	a	point	in	the	following	dialogue:	
																																								 																					
88	On	the	PS	law	authorizing	same-sex	marriage,	see	footnote	52.		89	Since	the	Spring	of	2013,	the	PS	government	has	authorised	the	opening	of	a	 limited	number	of	public	drug	consumption	rooms,	places	were	addicts	can	have	access	to	clean	ustensiles	to	inject	drugs,	as	well	as	medical	 help	 and	 information.	 This	 initiative,	 however,	 did	 not	 legalise	 these	 structures	 on	 the	 entire	French	territory	instead.	A	limited	number	of	them	were	opened	on	an	experimental	basis.		90	The	PS	has	been	advocating	that	non-EU	foreigners	be	granted	the	right	to	vote	in	local	elections	since	1981,	but	in	practice	this	right	has	never	been	granted.	This	was	one	of	François	Hollande's	promises	in	the	Spring	of	2012,	but	the	chances	of	this	being	voted	into	law	before	the	end	of	François	Hollande's	mandate	are	rather	slim.		91	'Bobo'	 in	 French	 is	 the	 contraction	 of	 the	 expression	 'Bourgeois-Bohême'.	 It	 designates	 a	 type	 of	individual	 who	 is	 left-leaning,	 artsy,	 and	 part	 of	 the	 middle-class	 or	 upper-middle	 class.	 The	 term	 is	essentially	pejorative,	it	implies	that	the	targeted	individual	adopts	left-leaning	political	positions	as	a	life-style,	rather	than	out	of	genuine	conviction	or	because	of	real-life	experience.			
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René:	The	position	of	 the	Left	 is	compromised	because...	because	the	question	of	secularism	has	essentially	been	raised	around	Islam	these	last	years,	and	this	creates	a	double	problem	on	the	left...	So	we	have	a	problem	of	manipulation	by	the	 Right,	 because	 beneath	 the	 secularism	 of	 Sarkozy	 there	 was	 hostility	 to	Islam	 itself.	 (This	 is	 hostility	 is)	 more	 or	 less	 deep,	 more	 or	 less	 used	 as	 a	political	 instrument.	 They	 played	 on	 the	 fear	 of	 Muslims,	 they	 played	 on	 the	idea	 of	 getting	 back	 a	 share	 of	 the	 Front	 National's	 votes	 on	 these	 cultural	themes,	etc.		Didier:	While	 jumbling	up	Muslims,	 foreigners,	 immigrants...	well,	 there	was	a	whole	package.92		More	serious	accusations	of	opponents	being	motivated	by	the	desire	to	further	personal,	 rather	 than	 political,	 interests	 were	 rare	 in	 French	 groups	 (see	 Figure	 20	above).	In	this	second	category	fall	examples	of	French	participants	accusing	opponents	of	being	under	the	influence	of	private,	financial	interests.	A	young	PS	activist	speaks	of	the	UMP's	employment	policies	in	this	manner	in	the	following	statement:		Lucien:	 (...)	Then	 there	 is	 the	question	of	 fighting	against	unemployment,	 and	employment	policies.	These	are	consensual	(questions)	in	some	sense,	because	we	can	assume	that	both	(parties)...	well,	at	least	publicly,	from	what	is	said	in	the	media,	they	are	all	in	favour	of	a	return	to	full	employment.	But	then	we	can	ask	ourselves	whether	in	the	end,	this	is	not	a	way	to...	a	convoluted	way	for	the	Right	 in	 the	 end	 to	 favour	 certain	 lobbies,	 to	 grant	 them	more	 flexibility,	 for	them	to	adjust	 their	 costs	more	straightforwardly,	 to	allow	 them	to	maximise	their	profits	more	easily	(...)	While	above,	PS	partisans	do	suggest	the	existence	of	an	unhealthy	connection	between	 private	 financial	 interests	 and	 the	 UMP,	 there	 were	 no	 direct	 accusations	among	French	participants	of	opponents	being	motivated	by	a	desire	to	increase	their	personal	wealth	through	their	political	career.	Criticisms	that	came	the	closest	to	these	types	of	accusations	focused	on	specific	instances	of	corruption	affecting	the	opposition	party,	 or	 on	 specific	 material	 favours	 that	 opposition	 politicians	 received	 from	powerful	 economic	 interests.	 Within	 PS	 groups	 for	 instance,	 only	 one	 participant	referred	 to	 the	 'Bettencourt	 scandal'	 that	 affected	 the	 financing	 of	 Nicolas	 Sarkozy's	campaign	 in	 2012.	 As	 for	 UMP	 participants,	 four	 out	 of	 the	 five	 instances	 classified	under	 the	 category	 PERSONAL	 INTERESTS	 are	 related	 to	 accusations	 of	 nepotism,	namely	the	illegitimate	or	unlawful	use	of	state	resource	in	order	to	further	members	or	 sympathisers	 of	 one's	 own	 party.	 Adrien	 for	 instance	 was	 particularly	 concerned	with	what	he	saw	as	the	PS's	nepotistic	use	of	public	funds	in	supporting	left-wing	civil	society	organisations:		Adrien:	(...)	In	parallel,	the	Left	uses	very	powerful	means...	we	talked	about	the																																									 																					
92	See	Chapter	2,	III,	1,	a,	for	an	account	of	the	UMP's	evolution	since	2007	in	this	regard.		
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power	 of	 François	 Hollande,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 recall	 the	 fact	 that	 François	Hollande	created	SOS	racisme	under	Mitterrand,	with	Mr	Harlem	Désir,	and	Mr	Dray...	 So	 SOS	 racisme	 is	 absolutely	not	 an	organisation	of	 nice	 guys	who	are	trying	to	fight	against	racism,	no,	it	was	created	politically,	for	a	political	use,	to	influence	the	media,	public	opinion,	with	public	funds,	and	today	they	only	live	from	public	funds	(...)	Not	to	speak	of	the	trials	of	Harlem	Désir.	Harlem	Désir	is	today	the	President	of	 the	Socialist	Party,	and	an	 investigation	procedure	was	started	against	him	last	week	with	a	number	of	others	from	the	executive	head	of	SOS	Racisme.	93	But	 this	 is	all	 to	say	 that	 the	Left	 lives	 from	public	 funds,	 it	lives	 from	politics.	 In	 its	 great	majority,	 the	 Left	 does	not	 do	politics	 to	 solve	problems.	In	 a	 comparable	 example,	 Nathan	 accuses	 the	 PS	 of	 being	 mostly	 concerned	with	placing	its	own	people	in	key	positions:		Nathan:	 (...)	 What	 I'm	 really	 disappointed	 with	 is	 what	 I	 call	 the	 'PS	 State'.	Today,	 nothing	 is	 based	 on	 competence,	 it	 is	 rather	 based	 on	 favouritism...	François	Hollande	used	to	speak	of	an	irreproachable	Republic94,	but	what	we	have	 is	 rather	 a	 Republic	 of	 Buddies95	(...)	 Today	 the	 socialists	 make	 more	efforts	in	putting	their	friends	in	different	positions,	to	set	up	a	PS	State,	and	to	try	 to	 keep	 France	 until	 2017	 if	 not	 longer,	 than	 to	 fight	 in	 favour	 of	 French	people.		
b.	Criticisms	of	practices	
On	 average,	 the	 majority	 of	 French	 participants'	 criticisms	 of	 opponents	remains	dedicated	to	their	practices,	not	their	intentions	(see	Figure	19	above).	These	types	of	 criticisms	especially	characterize	 the	discourse	of	UMP	participants,	who	are	over	six	times	more	likely	than	PS	participants	to	use	these	types	of	criticism	(99	total	instances	 coded	 against	 16).	 As	 is	 apparent	 from	 Figure	 21	 below,	 UMP	 participants	most	frequently	criticise	the	practices	of	the	PS	either	for	their	inefficiency	or	for	their	irresponsible	character	(coded	INNEFFICIENCY	and	IRRESPONSABILITY	respectively).		
																																								 																					
93	SOS	racisme	-	an	NGO	raising	awareness	on	racial	and	religious	discriminations	in	France	-	was	founded	in	1984,	under	the	PS	Presidency	of	François	Mitterand,	by	personalities	on	the	left-wing	fringe	of	the	PS	such	as	Harlem	Désir	and	 Julien	Dray.	 In	December	1998	Harlem	Désir	was	sentenced	to	a	30	000	 franc	fine	 for	 having	 benefited	 from	 a	 fictitious	 state	 salary	 between	 November	 1986	 and	 October	 1987.	 No	particular	procedure	was	started	against	him	in	early	2013	however.		94	The	catch-phrase	"Je	veux	une	République	irreprochable"	(I	want	an	irreproachable	republic)	was	in	fact	coined	by	UMP	candidate	Nicolas	Sarkozy	in	the	2007	Presidential	elections	(Bonduelle,	2012).		95	In	French,	"République	des	copains”.		
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Figure	21:	Types	of	criticisms	by	French	participants	of	their	opponents'	practices		
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	The	 main	 argument	 of	 UMP	 participants	 is	 that	 the	 PS	 is	 adopting	 counter-productive	measures	 to	 reach	widely	accepted	societal	objectives.	They	criticise	 their	opposition	especially	for	their	idealism.	According	to	UMP	participants,	the	PS's	lack	of	realism	 results	 in	 the	 mismanagement	 of	 crucial	 issues.	 This	 type	 of	 argument	 is	especially	 widespread	 on	 economic	 issues,	 where	 UMP	 participants	 criticise	 their	opponents	 for	 adopting	 practices	 that	 are	 ultimately	 harmful	 to	 France's	 economic	health.	This	 is	 clear	 in	 the	 following	 example.	Here	 a	 young	UMP	activist	 emphasises	that,	while	both	parties	aim	towards	more	social	justice,	the	solutions	suggested	by	the	PS	to	fulfil	this	objective	are	essentially	flawed:			Charles:	 There	 is	 an	 objective,	 which	 is	more	 social	 justice.	 The	 Right	 would	also	like	more	social	justice!	But	it	is	not	by	taking	from	the	rich	and	giving	to	the	poor	that	we	will	succeed.	Nothing	is	created	in	this	way.	The	only	way	for	the	 poor	 to	 have	 a	 better	 living	 standard	 is	 to	 create	wealth,	 that	 is	 the	 only	way.		In	 the	 following	 dialogue,	 another	 group	 of	 UMP	 participants	 discusses	 the	counter-productive	role	of	socialist	taxation	in	this	regard:		Edouard:	 (...)	 The	 fight	 against	 unemployment	 and	 employment	 policies,	 and	(the	 question	 of)	 taxation,	 these	 two	 topics	 are	 linked.	 The	more	 you	 impose	taxation,	 the	 less	you	encourage	investment.	The	less	 investment,	 the	 less	you	have	firms,	the	less	firms	the	less	you	have	employment,	the	less	employment	the	less	taxes	(you	can	collect),	the	less	taxes...	Loïs:	The	less	people	will	consume	too...	Edouard:	Exactly,	the	less	people	consume...	
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This	 type	 of	 argument	 is	 often	 associated	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 PS	 is	 out	 of	touch	 with	 reality:	 they	 are	 accused	 of	 having	 unrealistic	 expectations	 and	 to	misunderstand	 the	 basic	 mechanisms	 of	 both	 micro	 and	 macro-economics.	 In	 the	following	example,	 a	 young	UMP	activist	 is	 explaining	how	business	owners	perceive	the	PS	governments'	measures:		Laura:	 (...)	What	 the	Left	 fails	 to	understand	 is	 that	 it	 is	not	 in	sync	with	how	firms	 function.	 What	 I	 mean	 is	 that	 when	 firms	 read	 the	 report	 issued	 in	September,	on	business	taxes,	they	really	felt	like	politics,	and	the	government,	where	completely	out	of	touch	with	what	they	were	experiencing.	We	are	in	a	crisis	situation,	and	they	increased	taxes,	they	created	new	taxes,	they	modified	previous	 taxes...	 And	 (businesses)	 had	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 rug	was	 being	pulled	from	under	their	feet	(...)	Right-wing	participants	often	associate	this	lack	of	realism	to	the	PS's	tendency	of	being	primarily	guided	by	ideological	considerations.	Instead	of	doing	what	it	should	be	 doing,	 the	 PS	 is	 doing	what	 its	 left-wing	 identity	 commands	 -	 leading	 it	 to	 adopt	fundamentally	 inappropriate	 measures.	 This	 is	 quite	 clear	 in	 the	 following	 dialogue,	where	two	UMP	activists	are	talking	about	the	PS's	attitude	towards	France's	budgetary	deficits:		Eloïse:	 I	 think	 this	 is	 a	 typical	 example	 of	 demagoguery,	 it's	 really	 a	 typical	example	of...	a	topic	where	we	all	know	that	we	need	to	address	the	deficit,	and	we	all	know	what	reforms	are	necessary	for	that	to	happen...	Claire:	Then	the	means	are	not	the	same	on	the	left	and	on	the	right...	Eloïse:	It's	not	even	that,	I	think	at	some	point	they	will	have	to	adopt	the	same	means	 that	 we	 put	 into	 place,	 it's	 simply	 because	 it's	 not...	 Well,	 it's	 not	 the	history	 of	 the	 Left	 to	 adopt	 austerity	 measures	 and	 be	 more	 rigorous.	 It’s	 a	painful	nod,	that	is	why	they	can't	admit	what	really	needs	to	be	done.		But	these	types	of	arguments	were	also	adopted	on	more	societal	 topics.	Here	the	 PS	 was	 similarly	 criticised	 for	 having	 a	 skewed	 vision	 of	 reality	 and	 for	 making	flawed	decisions	 on	 the	basis	 of	 their	 outdated	 ideas.	 In	 the	 following	dialogue,	UMP	activists	are	talking	about	Christiane	Taubira,	the	PS	government	Minister	of	Justice	at	the	time:96	Pierre:	The	question	of	Justice	and	Security.	I	think	we	will	all	agree...	how	can	I	explain	 this,	 how	 can	 I	 explain	 when	 we	 have	 our	 dear	 Minister,	 Christiane	Taubira...	 I'm	 having	 difficulties	 describing	 this	 person,	 she	 seems	 to	 me	 so	bizarre	and	out	of	touch	with	the	reality	on	the	ground.	I	wonder	when	it	is	that	she	last	set	foot	in	a	working-class	neighbourhood...97	
																																								 																					
96	Christiane	Taubira	resigned	from	her	functions	as	Minister	of	Justice	in	January	2016.		97	Pierre	 uses	 here	 the	 expression	 "quartiers	 populaires"	 which	 literally	 means	 "neighbourhood	 of	 the	people”.		
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Charles:	Well	you	know,	she	comes	from	far	away...	(Laughs)	Pierre:	 Yes,	 she	 comes	 from	 very	 far	 away...	 She	 doesn't	 know	 the	 country.	98	When	she	speaks	of	setting	free	prisoners	that	were	sentenced	to	less	than	two	years	 in	prison,	 it	encourages	 the	permanent	repetition	of	offence.99	We	see	 it	clearly	in	this	neighbourhood,	with	small	dealers	that	got	caught	several	times,	who	were	sentenced,	and	then	were	set	free	again	regardless	of	what	they	were	guilty	of.		Finally,	these	criticisms	concerning	the	lack	of	realism	and	inefficiency	of	the	PS	are	 often	 closely	 tied	 to	 an	 accusation	 of	 being	 irresponsible.	 Indeed,	 if	 the	 means	employed	 by	 the	 PS	 are	 essentially	 inefficient	 or	 counter-productive,	 they	 are	 also	fundamentally	 detrimental	 to	 France's	 economy	 and	 society.	 This	 already	 comes	through	 in	 the	 previous	 example,	 where	 the	 PS's	 loss	 of	 touch	 with	 reality	 ends	 up	encouraging	the	development	of	criminality.	This	argument	is	made	even	more	clearly	in	the	following	dialogue:		Thomas:	 (...)	 On	 the	 Left,	 a	 lot	 of	 people,	 and	 even	 elected	 representatives	unfortunately,	 they	sometimes	don't...	They	want	 to	show	themselves	as	open	to	 the	world,	 (open)	 to	 everything,	 so	on	 topics	 like	 for	 example...	we'll	 come	back	 to	 it,	 but	on	 the	 topic	of	 gay	marriage,	 they	are	 in	 favour	 (of	 it)	without	really	seeing	the	consequences	it	can	have.	So	they	want	to	show	that	they	are	open,	show	themselves	as...	Eloïse:	Progressives	Thomas:	Progressives,	so	all	is	well...	And	so	opening	the	borders	is	also	a	good	thing,	we	 tell	 all	 of	 those	who	 leave	 their	 country	 "you	 can	 come	 to	 France",	they	can	come	in	without	having	to	prove	anything...100	and	they	don't	see	the	consequences,	 they	 don't	 realise	 that	 at	 some	 point	we	 can't	 follow,	 at	 some	point,	France	can't...		Crucially,	 this	 type	 of	 argument	 was	 very	 particular	 to	 UMP	 activists.	 While	there	were	 instances	 of	 PS	 participants	 accusing	 their	 opponents	 of	 being	 inefficient,	unrealistic,	 blinded	 by	 ideological	 considerations,	 or	 irresponsible,	 these	 were	extremely	 rare	 (see	 Figure	 21	 above).	 The	 specificity	 of	 UMP	 participants'	 line	 of	argument	 can	 partly	 be	 linked	 to	 their	 position	 on	 the	 right	 side	 of	 the	 political	spectrum.	Traditionally,	 the	Right	has	 stood	 for	a	 form	of	 'status	quo':	 the	 role	of	 the																																									 																					
98	Christiane	Taubira	has	been	French	Minister	of	Justice	since	May	2012.	She	was	born	in	French	Guyana	and	 did	 most	 of	 her	 political	 career	 there	 until	 she	 was	 nominated	 for	 this	 ministerial	 position	 under	François	Hollande's	presidency.		99	Christiane	 Taubira's	 major	 reform,	 promulgated	 on	 August	 15,	 2014,	 encourages	 judges	 to	 privilege	alternative	forms	of	punishment	to	prison	in	the	case	of	petty	crimes	-	for	instance	contributing	to	public	work,	 reporting	 to	 the	 police	 regularly,	 having	 an	 obligation	 to	 be	medically	 assisted,	 etc.	 The	 law	 also	encourages	 judges	 to	 review	 sentences	 when	 two-thirds	 of	 it	 are	 completed,	 and	 to	 commute	 prison	sentences	into	such	alternative	sentences	when	and	where	appropriate.		100	The	PS	is	trying	to	facilitate	immigration	on	French	soil	with	a	new	law	on	the	rights	of	foreigners,	first	examined	 by	 the	 French	 National	 Assembly	 in	 2015	 (Governement	 Français,	 2015).	 The	 text,	 however,	does	not	relax	the	conditions	of	stay	to	the	extent	described	by	Thomas.		
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state	is	to	guarantee	the	triumph	of	a	self-evident	and	pre-existing	order,	be	it	the	law	of	 nature	 or	 the	 law	 of	 the	 market	 (Lukes,	 2003).	 The	 Left,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	traditionally	 championned	 the	 belief	 that	 justice	 can	 only	 be	 produced	 through	challenging	 this	 order,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 being	 to	 'rectify'	 the	 inequalities	 and	injustices	 that	 it	 produces.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 rhetoric	 of	UMP	participants	 is	easily	 understandable.	 By	 intervening	 in	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 market,	 encouraging	immigration	 or	 releasing	 prisoners,	 the	 Left	 is	 interfering	with	 the	 order	 that	 a	 free	market,	 a	 homogeneous	 community	 and	 a	 strong	 legal	 system.	 In	 the	 eyes	 of	 UMP	participants	 these	 moves	 necessarily	 stem	 from	 an	 unrealistic	 diagnosis,	 and	 their	outcome	are	therefore	inefficient	at	best,	irresponsible	at	worst.		This	would	still	 leave	PS	participants	room	to	develop	an	alternative	criticism,	one	that	would	be	focused,	for	instance,	on	the	injustices	that	the	Right	perpetuates	by	aiming	to	preserve	such	an	order.	As	the	evidence	so	far	has	shown,	PS	participants	are	mostly	 focused	 on	 their	 own	 actions	 in	 government,	 not	 on	 their	 opposition.	 It	 is	perhaps	because	they	are	so	critical	of	their	own	party	that	their	opposition	to	the	UMP	is	 less	 effective.	 From	 Chapter	 3,	 we	 know	 that	 PS	 participants	 raise	 doubts	 as	 to	whether	 their	 own	party	 is	 still	 committed	 to	 challenging	 the	 established	order.	 This	may	 also	 put	 PS	 participants	 in	 a	 weaker	 position	 to	 criticise	 their	 opposition	 on	 a	similar	basis.		
2.	The	principled	nature	of	opponents	I	now	consider	the	extent	to	which	French	participants	recognise	the	principled	nature	of	their	opponents'	positions.	Overall,	French	participants	frequently	alluded	to	the	ideas	that	motivate	the	practices	of	their	opposition.	This	is	apparent	in	Figure	22:	in	close	to	half	of	the	instances	were	both	PS	and	UMP	participants	spoke	solely	about	their	opponents,	they	also	alluded	to	the	ideas	that	motivate	their	positions	(45.8%	and	47.3%	of	cases	respectively).	In	fact,	French	participants	tend	to	speak	more	frequently	of	their	opponents'	 ideas	than	of	their	own:	PS	activists	only	evoke	their	own	ideas	in	27.8%	of	the	cases	where	they	speak	about	their	party,	and	UMP	activists	in	44.4%	of	these	cases.			
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Figure	22:	References	by	French	participants	to	the	ideas	of	their	opponents	and	of	their	own	
party	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	A	large	share	of	 these	 instances	reflect	an	 implicit	 form	of	respect	 for	political	opponents.	 By	 recognising	 that	 their	 opponents	 are	 principled,	 participants	 also	recognise	that	there	exists	a	plurality	of	legitimate	values.	They	may	well	disagree	with	their	 opponents'	 positions,	 but	 they	 do	 not	 dismiss	 them	 as	 illegitimate	 for	 this	 sole	reason.	 This	 comes	 through	 in	 the	 following	 dialogue,	 in	 which	 PS	 participants	 are	talking	about	the	ideas	that	structure	Left	and	Right	economic	policies:			Louis:	This	is	what	I	was	saying	in	the	beginning,	that	is...	for	me	this	is	one	of	the	fundamental	cleavages	between	the	Right	and	the	Left.	People	on	the	right	will	tell	you	"this	is	a	great	example	of	individual	success,	and	it	will	give	others	the	desire	 to	succeed	 in	 the	same	way,	 therefore	 it	 is	better	 that	he	keeps	his	money”.	 This	 is	 a	 bit	 the	American	dream,	where	 each	 and	 everyone	one	 can	succeed	and	everything...	And	in	return	you	want	to	say,	yes,	he	gained	a	lot	(of	money),	but	 it	 is	also	because	society	gave	him	a	chance,	 it	 is	because	he	was	lucky,	so	it	is	normal	that	he	contributes,	that	he	helps	others	to	get...	to	enjoy....	Quentin:	Well	and	(that	person)	also	determined	his	own	salary	so	that	helps...	but	yes,	 the	 justification...	There	are	a	 lot	of	questions	 like	 this	one,	when	you	listen	to	the	Right	and	the	Left,	the	arguments	are	not	so	bad,	I	mean	when	you	listen...	I'm	left-wing,	and	listening	to	the	arguments	of	people	on	the	right	I	tell	myself,	 "yes,	 that	 is	 an	 interesting	argument”.	But	 there	 is	 a	basic	 idea,	 at	 the	very	foundation	of	the	conception	they	have	that	is	completely...	We	cannot	say	
it	 is	wrong,	because	that	would	be	to	say	that	what	we	think	 is	completely	true,	but	there	are	still	things...		 This	 last	 sentence	 is	 a	 particularly	 good	 example	 of	 a	 partisan	 exercising	 his	negative	capacity:	while	fundamentally	disagreeing	with	his	opponents,	this	participant	is	aware	that	he	nevertheless	cannot	conclude	that	he	is	 fundamentally	right	and	that	his	 opponents	 are	 fundamentally	 wrong	 as	 a	 result.	 By	 recognising	 the	 principles	 of	opponents,	 he	 is	 also	 recognising	 the	 pluralist	 nature	 of	 the	 political	 realm,	 and	 the	
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illegitimacy	 therefore	 of	 claiming	 that	 his	 own	 party	 holds	 the	 whole	 truth	 on	 what	constitutes	the	common	good.	To	recognise	that	opponents	have	values	is	the	essence	of	recognising	the	ineliminability	of	political	disagreement	in	a	democratic	society.	This	comes	through	in	the	following	statement	by	a	young	PS	member:		Marcel:	 (...)	 If	 you	 followed	 recently	 the	 debates	 on	 same-sex	 marriage101,	 I	often	say	that	this	debate	did	not	get	the	opposition	it	deserved.	It	means	that...	I	mean	that	there	are	people	who	were	deeply	opposed	(to	the	law),	it’s	not	my	position,	but	I	can	understand	where	things	get	stuck.	I'm	not	saying	that	I	am	supportive	 of	 this,	 I'm	 saying	 that	 I	 can	 understand,	 because	 there	 is	 a	 point	where	we	are	touching	upon	intimacy,	upon	people's	deep	convictions.	And	so,	if	you	want,	there	are	two	visions	of	society,	and	if	they	are	opposed,	it	is	called	a	healthy	opposition.	This	means	that	on	certain	topics	we	can	say	that	we	don't	see	things	politically	in	the	same	way,	very	plainly	because	we	don't	see	life	in	the	same	way.		Because	for	me,	the	objective	of	life	is	not	the	same	as	for	a	guy	who	would	 be	 a	member	 of	 the	UMP,	 rather	 on	 the	 right	 of	 the	UMP,	with	 a	much	more	 economical	 vision	 of	 society.	 I'm	 in	 a	management	 school,	 in	my	cohort	 I	 speak	 with	 people	 who	 tell	 me	 that	 human	 relations	 are	 organised	according	 to	 the	 laws	 of	 the	market,	 supply	 and	 demand.	 You	 say	 "hi"	 in	 the	morning,	and	they	sincerely	think	that	it	responds	to	the	logic	of	the	market.	So	here,	with	 these	guys,	 the	gap	 is	deep,	 it’s	 really	 that	we	don't	have	at	 all	 the	same	 vision,	 not	 only	 of	 society,	 but	 of	 life	 in	 general.	 And	 so	 there	 is	 an	opposition,	and	the	fact	that	there	is	no	consensus	on	some	topics,	I	would	say	this	is	not	a	problem	(...)			 Importantly,	recognising	the	principles	of	opponents	is	also	a	form	of	resistance	to	 the	 'motive	 cynicism'	 that	 would	 lead	 partisans	 to	 question	 the	 intentions	 of	opponents.	 In	 other	 words,	 to	 believe	 that	 opponents	 act	 out	 of	 principle	 is	 also	 to	recognise	 that	 they	are	well-intentioned,	 that	 they	 take	part	 in	politics	out	of	 a	belief	that	 they	 are	 doing	what	 is	 right,	 and	 thus	 out	 of	 dedication	 to	 the	 common	 good.	 If	having	 conviction	 is	 a	 fundamentally	 positive	 trait,	 then	 pointing	 towards	 the	conviction	 of	 opponents	 also	 amounts	 to	 ascribing	 a	 positive	 value	 to	 their	 political	actions.	 This	 is	 apparent	 in	 the	 following	 dialogue	 between	 UMP	 activists,	 which	 is	focused	on	the	PS's	project	to	grant	foreigners	the	right	to	vote	in	local	elections.	While	Pascal	argues	 that	his	opponents	are	only	motivated	by	a	desire	 to	expand	 their	own	electorate,	Félix	-	who	still	disapproves	of	this	measure	-	disagrees,	and	emphasises	the	'noble'	principles	that	motivate	the	PS's	proposal:			Pascal:	 I've	 thought	 about	 (why	 they	 intend	 to	 grant	 foreigners	 the	 right	 to	vote),	I	have	a	bit	of	an	answer,	my	impression	is	that	it	is	out	of	pure	electoral	cynicism...	Félix:	No,	it	is	out	of	(a	commitment	to)	universalism,	a	universalism	that	is	in	my	opinion	distorted.																																										 																					
101	On	the	PS	law	authorizing	same-sex	marriage,	see	footnote	52.	
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Pascal:	Universalism	is	a	convenient	justification...102	Félix:	Universalism	has	always	been	a	convenient	justification	(...)	but	there	is	a	difference.	In	this	case	it	is	the	return	of...	and	if	we	can	say	that	the	Left	is	noble	for	something,	 it	 is	because	of	 this,	 it	 is	because	of	 this	 internationalism.	It’s	a	position	that	can	be	defended,	that	I	do	not	share,	but	that	can	be	quite	noble.	It	also	 highlights	 the	 cleavage	 between	 those	 that	 defend	 the	 undividable	character	of	the	nation,	and	the	others	(...)			The	 emphasis	 of	 UMP	 participants	 on	 their	 opponents'	 ideas	 is	 nevertheless	often	part	of	a	critical	argument.	They	regularly	present	the	PS's	ideas	as	both	outdated	and	 leading	 to	 counterproductive	 policies.	 In	 contrast,	 they	 cast	 their	 own	 party	 as	essentially	pragmatic,	devoid	of	 ideology	and	oriented	 towards	problem	solving.	This	comes	 through	 in	 the	 following	 UMP	 dialogue	 on	 the	 PS's	 immigration	 policy.	While	Thomas	still	recognises	the	necessity	to	accept	his	opponents'	perspective	as	genuine,	he	fundamentally	disagrees	with	the	very	idea	of	making	policy	on	the	basis	of	what	he	labels	'utopian'	thinking:		Thomas:	Everything	that	has	to	do	with	immigration,	even	if	you...	 I	think	that	on	 the	 left,	 and	 I	 hear	 a	 lot	 of	 people	 on	 the	 left	 who	 say	 things	 like...	 and	especially	 young	 people,	 (who	 argue	 that)	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 give	 papers	 to	everyone...	It's	very	nice	and	all,	it’s...	but	there	is	no	meaning	behind	it...	I	mean	from	my	perspective,	from	their	point	of	view	there	is	meaning,	it’s...	Freedom	for	all,	it's...	Eloïse:	It's	again	a	lack	of	pragmatism.		Thomas:	Exactly,	we	consider	on	the	right	 that	we	need	to	be	pragmatic,	 they	consider	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 be...	 That	 it	 is	 always	 necessary	 to	 be,	 even	worse:	utopian,	in	my	understanding.	And	on	this	point,	we	can't	change	people,	if	they	want	to	be	utopian,	I	find	it	very	nice	and	all	but...	I	try	to	do	politics	by	being	 pragmatic,	 exactly	 because	 I	 consider	 that	 (satisfying)	 the	 needs	 of	my	country	 requires	 a	 form	 of	 pragmatism,	 or	 else...	 Or	 else	 we	 end	 up	 doing	nonsense.		As	I	stress	later	in	this	chapter,	this	line	of	argument	can	border	on	negating	the	legitimacy	of	opponents	to	act	out	of	conviction,	and	lead	UMP	participants	to	deny	the	necessity	of	alternative	value-systems	more	generally.	This	namely	happens	when	UMP	participants	 associate	 their	 opponents'	 'utopian	 thinking'	 with	 cynical	 political	intentions	rather	than	genuine	conviction.	In	this	scenario,	their	own	party	is	oriented	towards	 the	 common	 good	 because	 they	 are	 doing	 what	 the	 country	 needs.	 The	 PS	instead	harms	the	interests	of	the	country	in	order	to	get	re-elected	while	pretending	to	act	 out	 of	 principle.	 This	 comes	 through	 in	 the	 following	 example,	 where	 Thomas	 is	talking	about	PS	measures	to	subsidize	employment:																																										 																					
102	Pascal	uses	 a	French	expression	 "ça	 a	bon	 teint	 l'universalisme",	which	 literally	means	 "universalism	has	a	good	complexion”.		
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Thomas:	Well	 yes,	 if	 we	 talk	 about	 state	 subsidised	 jobs	 for	 instance,	 on	 the	right	as	on	the	left...	We	are	against	it	because	we	see	that	it	does	not	work,	but	it's	not	a	question	of	 ideology,	 that	 is	what	 I	mean,	 it's	 just	 that...	 they	do	that	out	of	demagoguery,	it	is	just	to	show	that	they	have	found	something	when	(in	fact)	they	have	found	nothing	at	all.	It’s	just	to	try	to	fake	a	direction.	But	it's	not	at	all	ideological,	it's	not.	(...)	
3.	Opponents	and	the	common	good	The	third	criterion	is	tied	to	partisans'	belief	in	the	morality	of	their	opposition.	Partisans	may	disagree	as	to	the	exact	definition	of	the	common	good,	or	the	means	to	reach	 it,	 but	 if	 they	 respect	 their	 opponents,	 they	 should	 also	 believe	 that	 these	 are	motivated	by	a	desire	 to	 further	the	common	good.	At	 the	very	minimum,	this	entails	that	rival	partisans	refrain	from	picturing	their	opponents	as	immoral.	At	best,	it	entails	to	recognise	some	of	their	achievements	as	a	contribution	to	the	common	good.		
a.	Associating	opponents	with	a	threat	to	the	common	good	
Figure	 23	 below	 summarizes	 cases	 where	 French	 participants	 directly	represent	 their	 opponents	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 common	 good.	 The	 code	 MORAL	DEFFICIENCY	was	associated	with	cases	where	partisans	directly	questioned	the	moral	integrity	of	their	opponents.	The	only	such	case	I	 found	in	French	transcripts	was	the	following	 short	 exchange	 between	 two	 PS	 participants,	 talking	 about	 then	 UMP	President	Jean-François	Copé:		Samantha:	Copé	would	sell	his	father	and	mother	if	that	would	allow	him	to	win,	so...	Quentin:	Copé	would	do	anything	in	order	to	win.		Samantha	 and	 Quentin	 are	 directly	 putting	 into	 question	 the	 personal	 moral	integrity	of	 Jean-François	Copé	as	a	person.	This	 is,	however,	a	single	and	exceptional	case.	We	should	therefore	be	careful	to	conclude	that	it	is	revealing	of	a	wider	pattern.	Moreover,	the	participants	are	targeting	a	specific	opponent	and	not	making	a	general	judgement	on	the	members,	supporters,	or	elites	of	the	UMP.		
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Figure	 23:	 Criticisms	 by	 French	 participants	 of	 their	 opponents'	 ability	 to	 further	 the	
common	good	
NB:	Because	the	number	of	instances	coded	here	is	so	low,	I	have	not	indicated	the	percentages	for	
this	figure.		Another,	more	indirect	way	of	challenging	the	general	orientation	of	opponents	towards	the	common	good	is	to	accuse	them	of	knowingly	threatening	some	of	its	main	components:	the	broad	objectives	understood	to	form	part	of	the	general	interest,	the	fundamental	principles	at	the	basis	of	the	political	community,	or	the	functioning	of	the	democratic	 regime	 itself	 (coded	 THREAT	 COMMON	 GOOD).	 This	 would	 include	accusing	 one's	 opponents	 of	 not	 being	 committed	 to	 defending	 the	 country's	fundamental	 interests,	 or	 knowingly	 endangering	 national	 interests.	 Accusations	 of	opponents	 being	 racist,	 intolerant,	 homophobic,	 segregationists,	 totalitarian,	dictatorial,	 etc.,	would	also	 fall	under	 this	 category.	This	 last	 style	of	 rhetoric	 is	often	used	 against	 far-right	 parties	 for	 instance,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 exclude	 them	 from	 the	sphere	of	common	political	morality.		As	indicated	in	Figure	23,	PS	participants	were	more	likely	to	use	these	types	of	arguments	 against	 their	 opponents	 than	 UMP	 participants	 were.	 In	 the	 following	statement	for	example,	a	young	PS	member	establishes	a	schematic	opposition	between	his	own	party	-	that	stands	for	tolerance	and	the	inclusion	of	minorities	-	and	the	UMP	-	that	stands	for	intolerance	and	the	exclusion	of	minorities:		Bertrand:	Concerning	taxation,	 it’s	either	 the	poor	who	pay,	or	 it’s	 the	rich,	 to	caricature.	 For	 religious	 minorities,	 it’s	 either	 we	 are	 all	 equal	 and	 we	 live	together,	or	we	reject	others,	same	for	 immigration.	For	sexual	minorities,	 it’s	the	same,	it’s	either	we	accept	that	others	are	different,	or	we	refuse	it.	So	it’s	all	that	concerns...	this	way	of	approaching	difference.		
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	 Later	 in	 the	 same	discussion,	he	 spells	 this	out	 even	more	 clearly	while	 talking	about	same-sex	marriage.103	In	 the	 first	part	of	his	statement,	he	represents	 the	PS	as	the	 sole	 carrier	 of	 key	 Republican	 values,	 and	 the	 UMP	 as	 standing	 in	 opposition	 to	them:		 Bertrand:	 We	 said	 it	 with	 same-sex	 marriage,	 that	 the	 main	 value	 of	 the	Republic,	 equality,	 stands	 for	 everyone,	 and	we	 think	 that	 the	Right	 does	 not	respect	 the	values	of	 the	Republic.	Liberty,	Equality,	Fraternity.	Here	we	have	concrete	 proof	with	 same-sex	marriage,	 the	 Right	 is	 against	 equality,	 and	we	are	in	favour.	Well,	there	are	different	approaches	with	regard	to	the	Republic,	but	we	will	never	manage	to	make	them	change	their	mind.		Among	UMP	participants,	criticism	against	the	PS	was	in	rare	cases	also	pushed	to	 an	 extreme	 point	 where	 opponents	 were	 accused	 not	 only	 of	 enacting	 measures	detrimental	 to	 the	 common	 good,	 but	 of	 being	 unwilling	 to	 defend	 it.	 This	 comes	through	in	the	following	example:				Adrien:	 (...)	On	 the	Right,	we	 believe	 that	we	have	 the	 right	 to	 have	 a	 French	identity,	 that	we	have	 the	 right	 to	 have	 a	 history,	 a	 culture,	 arts,	 etc.,	 and	we	have	a	huge	problem	with	the	Left	(on	this	question).	It’s	true	that	if	you	look	at	the	American	elections,	be	 it	 the	conservatives,	 I	mean	the	Republicans	or	the	Democrats,	on	the	night	of	the	election	they	all	had	the	American	flag.	In	France,	on	the	night	of	the	Bastille104,	there	were	very	few	French	flags,	there	were	a	lot	of	 foreign	 flags,	but	on	the	right,	 there	were	(...)	 	Exactly	as	Nathan	described,	Nicolas	Sarkozy	said,	"I	am	not	on	the	right	anymore,	I	am	the	President	of	all	French	 people", 105 	because	 France	 goes	 beyond	 us	 all	 as	 individuals.	 It’s	collective,	 the	adventure	 is	a	 collective	one,	 and	 that	 is	what	politics	 is	about.	And	 in	 fact,	 he	 defended	 a	 policy	 of	 opening106	towards	 the	 Left,	 and	 Jean-François	Copé	asked	François	Hollande	to	do	the	same,	but	he	answered:	"no"	(...)	François	Hollande	in	his	discourse,	and	even	Secretaries	of	State	like	Benoît	Hamont	or	others,	they	say	clearly	that	they	are	here...	they	have	been	elected	by	 and	 for	 the	 People	 of	 the	 Left107.	 It’s	 a	 shame	 because	 they	 should	 rather	remind	 themselves	 that	 they	have	been	elected	by	 the	whole	of	France.	And	 I	think	that	this	is	a	sectarianism	that	we	do	not	have	on	the	right.				 It	 is	 clear	 from	 this	 example	 that	 Adrien	 has	 a	 particular	 interpretation	 of	 the	common	good,	one	that	gives	priority	to	the	idea	of	nation,	that	includes	pride	in	one's	history	 and	 cultural	 identity,	 and	 the	 broader	 use	 of	 the	 French	 flag	 on	 election	 day.	While	the	ethical	position	would	consist	in	seeing	this	position	as	a	particular	one,	and	
																																								 																					
103	On	the	PS	law	authorizing	same-sex	marriage,	see	footnote	52.	104	Celebration	of	the	election	of	Hollande,	organised	at	the	Place	de	la	Bastille	on	the	6th	of	May	2012.		105	After	having	won	the	Presidential	election	of	May	2007,	Nicolas	Sarkozy	declared	in	his	victory	speech	"Je	suis	le	Président	de	tous	les	Français.”		106	'Politique	d'ouverture'	in	French.	This	refers	to	the	practice	by	Nicolas	Sarkozy	of	appointing	left-wing	personalities	in	visible	political	positions	at	the	beginning	of	his	2007-2012	mandate.		107	In	French,	the	expression	"Peuple	de	Gauche”.		
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understanding	 that	 opponents'	 may	 not	 share	 it,	 Adrien	 interprets	 the	 PS's	 position	instead	as	a	challenge	to	the	common	good	itself.	This	is	what	leads	him	to	imply,	in	the	end,	that	the	PS	does	not	stand	for	the	community	as	a	whole,	but	for	partial	interests	-	that	of	the	left-wing	electorate.		
b.	A	widespread	belief	in	the	morality	of	opposition	
Overall,	however,	these	examples	are	rather	exceptional	and	may	be	considered	as	 isolated	 instances	 within	 French	 groups.	 Generally	 speaking,	 the	 association	 of	principles	to	the	positions	of	opponents	already	signifies	a	recognition	that	opponents	are	 trying	 to	 do	what	 they	 think	 is	 right.	 Another	 indication	 can	 be	 found	 in	 French	participants	 reluctance	 to	 politicize	 the	 card	 PUBLIC	 MORALITY,	 one	 of	 which	 they	were	 asked	 to	 discuss.	 Indeed,	 participants	 would	 seldom	 use	 this	 card	 in	 order	 to	present	their	own	party	as	virtuous	and	their	opponents	as	fundamentally	flawed.	They	would	often,	on	 the	contrary,	downplay	 the	political	 reach	of	 this	particular	question.	The	 following	 statement,	 in	 which	 a	 PS	 participant	 discusses	 the	 card	 PUBLIC	MORALITY,	illustrates	this	quite	well:		Louis:	Lets	say	that	this	is	not	a	topic	that	causes	debate,	each	will	fight	over...	Each	party	has	its	rotten	apples108	that	are	thrown	back	at	them,	everyone	tries	more	or	less	to	get	rid	of	them...	And	we	see	actually	that	on	questions	like...	the	ban	on	holding	concurrently	several	mandates,	or	on...	transparency	concerning	(public	officials')	wages,	the	cleavage	is	not	between	the	Right	and	the	Left,	it’s	rather	between	those	who	want	to	be	clean...	Well,	those	who	want	to	make	an	effort	 on	 these	 questions	 and	 the	 others	 that	 feel	 like...	 without	 (necessarily)	scheming109,	but	(that	feel	 like)	taking	liberties,	doing	more	or	 less	want	what	they	want	without	being	held	to	account.		Another	 piece	 of	 evidence	 can	 be	 found	 in	 references	 to	 'cross-cutting	cleavages'.	These	are	instances	where,	in	the	course	of	the	general	discussion,	partisans	emphasise	differences	in	positions	that	cut-across	each	party,	rather	than	characterize	the	Left-Right	divide.	Within	French	transcripts,	I	identified	29	such	instances	in	total,	which	 is	 an	 average	 of	 above	 two	 such	 references	 per	 group.	 These	 examples	 are	important	to	the	extent	that	partisans	do	not	divide	the	political	debate	between	their	own	 camp,	which	would	 hold	 the	 truth,	 and	 their	 opposition,	which	would	 be	 in	 the	wrong.	 It	 is	 a	 sign	 that	 they	 recognise	 instead	a	plurality	 of	 legitimate	positions	on	 a	given	question,	and	that	their	own	party	does	not	univocally	and	necessarily	have	the	best	answers	to	a	given	problem.	This	comes	through	in	the	following	example,	where	a																																									 																					
108	In	French,	the	expression	"canard	boiteux”.		109	In	French,	the	argotic	expression	"magouiller”.		
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young	PS	 activist	 admits	not	 only	 that	 there	 are	people	 on	both	 sides	 of	 the	 political	spectrum	arguing	for	Green	politics,	but	that	some	of	the	stronger	Green	advocates	can	be	 found	among	right-wing	ranks.	 Importantly,	he	himself	emphasises	at	other	points	in	the	group	discussion	his	own	commitment	to	environmental	issues:		Patrick:	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 environmental	 issues,	 this	 is	 a	 card	 I	 set	 apart	because	(...)	it's	a	transcurrent	theme,	that	does	not	divide	between	the	Left	and	the	Right,	but	divides	the	Left	and	Right	internally.	There	are	right-wing	people	against	 nuclear	 power	 as	 there	 are	 left-wing	 people.	 There	 are	 right-wing	people	 that	 are	 very	 concerned	 with	 everything	 that	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	renovation	of	buildings,	social	housing	access	(...)	And	on	the	right	and	on	the	centre-right	 there	 are	 some	 (people)	 -	 I'm	 thinking	 namely	 about	 Jean-Louis	Borloo	 -	 that	will	be	much	more	concerned	with	 these	questions	 than	a	 lot	of	people	on	the	left	(...)	Other,	 more	 isolated	 instances	 testify	 of	 French	 participants	 refusal	 of	 using	morality	 as	 a	 political	 argument.	 The	 following	 dialogue	 between	 PS	 participants	 is	perhaps	one	of	the	clearest	examples	of	this,	in	which	René	regrets	what	he	sees	as	the	tendency	of	his	own	camp	to	moralise	its	opposition:		René:	Because	 there	 is	a	bad	tendency	on	the	 left,	and	I	 think	that	on	this	 the	Right...	 if	there	is	one	thing	that	I	hate	on	the	left,	 it	is	that	tendency	of	always	moralizing	politics.	There	are	a	lot	of	people	on	the	left,	and	namely	when	they	are	young,	who	think	that,	basically,	left(-wingers)	are	in	the	camp	of	the	Good,	that	(the	Left)	is	the	Good,	(in	the	camp)	of	progress,	that	they	hold	each	others'	hand	and	march,	etc.	And	if	you	are	on	the	right,	in	the	end,	you're	not	allowed,	or	you	are	very	very	stupid,	or	you	are	an	arse	hole.	So	I	think	you	can	be	right-wing	for	good	reasons.	I'm	not	at	all	a	right-winger,	I	have	no	doubts	about	my	convictions,	but	 I	 think	 that	political	debates	are	very	 complicated,	 that	 these	things	 are	 not	 clear-cut.	 And	 I	 think	 you	 can	 be	 from	 the	 right	 and	 be	 at	 the	same	time	an	intelligent	person,	a	good	person.	I	think	it	does	not	affect	one's	personal	morality.		Didier:	 Oh	 yes	 totally,	 I	 also	 completely	 recognise	 myself	 in	 this.	 Obviously	there	 is	 no...The	 question	 of	 morality	 for	 me...	 it	 should	 not	 be	 taken	 into	account	in	the	political	debate.			Other	 forms	of	evidence	can	be	 found	among	UMP	groups.	For	 instance,	 these	regularly	 emphasised	 that	by	 the	end	of	François	Hollande's	mandate,	 they	would	be	ready	to	recognise	their	opponents'	achievements,	if	shared	societal	objectives,	and	the	common	good	more	generally,	had	been	furthered	by	their	actions.	This	comes	through	in	the	following	example:		Nathan:	 (...)	 I've	 always	 said	 this.	 Sincerely,	 if	 François	 Hollande	 did	 the	necessary	 reforms	 for	progress	 in	 this	 country,	 I	would	be	happy.	 If	 someone	tells	 me:	 François	 Hollande('s	 mandate)	 worked,	 we	 are	 back	 to	 full	employment,	I	would	say	yes,	that	is	great.	If	everything	is	going	well,	the	crisis	is	 over,	 the	president	 is	 great	 and	 everything	 is	 functioning...	 Because	we	 are	first	 and	 foremost	 French.	 All	 of	 this	 is	 to	 say	 that	 even	 if	 we	 are	 separated	
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between	Left	and	Right,	there	is	something...	Nicolas	Sarkozy	said	that	there	is	something	bigger	 than	us,	 and	 that	 is	France.	Whatever	 the	 cleavages,	we	are	first	 and	 foremost	 fighting	 for	 the	 interests	 of	 France.	 And	 if	 (François	Hollande)	made	the	right	decisions	for	France,	we	would	support	him	(...)	A	similar	idea	is	expressed	in	the	following	statement	by	another	UMP	activist:	Martine:	I	think	that...	if	the	Right	and	the	Left	find	common	ground	on	certain	topics	 it	 is	 better,	 because	 what	 is	 the	 objective?	 It	 is	 for	 the	 country	 to	 do	better,	for	France	to	stand	up.	So	be	it	the	Left	or	the	Right	who	puts	it	forwards,	if	it's	a	good	reform,	the	right	way	for	things	to	improve,	then	all	the	better	(...)	So	 if	 in	 five	 years	 the	 mandate	 of	 François	 Hollande	 yields	 positive	 and	beneficial	results	for	France,	it	will	hurt	but	I	will	be	the	first	to	recognise	that,	yes,	 there	 are	 things	 that	worked.	 I	 don't	 think	 so,	 I	 don't	 think	 it	will	 be	 the	case	(...)	but	I	would	recognise	it.		UMP	participants	do	doubt	 that	 the	actions	of	 their	opponents	will	have	these	fruitful	results.	What	matters	here	is	that	in	their	discourse,	even	if	only	for	the	sake	of	rhetoric,	they	recognise	this	possibility	and,	to	this	extent,	both	the	PS's	intention	and	capacity	of	furthering	the	common	good.		
*	*	*		 Many	of	 the	French	participants	 I	 interviewed	displayed	signs	of	a	commitment	to	 value-pluralism	 in	 their	 attitudes	 towards	 political	 opponents.	 They	 refrained,	 in	most	cases,	from	targeting	the	intentions	of	their	opponents	when	they	criticise	them.	Many	participants	recognised	that	the	decisions	of	their	opponents	are	motivated	by	a	set	 of	 principles	 that	 they	 do	 not	 share,	 but	 that	 they	 nevertheless	 consider	 as	legitimate.	 Finally,	 partisans	 seldom	 questioned	 the	 general	 orientation	 of	 their	opponents	towards	the	common	good,	and	they	did	express,	 in	various	forms,	a	belief	in	 the	 morality	 of	 their	 opponents.	 Importantly,	 each	 dimension	 of	 this	 respectful	political	 discourse	 holds	 together.	 Withholding	 from	 'motive-cynicism'	 requires	 to	assume	 the	 principled	 nature	 of	 opponents.	 To	 recognise	 that	 opponents	 act	 out	 of	principle	is	also	to	see	that	they	act	according	to	what	they	think	is	best,	and	therefore	with	concern	towards	the	common	good.			 Notwithstanding	 this	 general	 conclusion,	 there	 are	 key	 differences	 between	 PS	and	UMP	groups.	UMP	participants	are,	overall,	more	critical	of	 their	opponents	 than	their	 PS	 counterparts.	 UMP	 participants	 question	 the	 intentions	 of	 their	 opponents	more	 frequently	 than	 PS	 participants.	 They	 also	 often	 picture	 their	 opponents'	principles	themselves	as	a	form	of	delusion	leading	to	innefficient	policy-making,	or	as	a	convenient	rhetoric	designed	to	gain	votes.	When	they	defend	such	arguments,	UMP	participants	display	a	weak	commitment	to	political	pluralism.		
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II.	THE	HUNGARIAN	CASE	
The	 second	 case	 study	 proceeds	 in	 line	 with	 the	 theoretical	 framework	summarised	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	 chapter.	 I	 first	 consider	 the	 arguments	 that	Hungarian	 participants	 use	 to	 criticise	 opponents,	 then	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	 see	their	 opponents	 as	 principled,	 and	 finally	 whether	 they	 perceive	 their	 opponents	 as	oriented	towards	the	common	good.		
1.	Types	of	criticism:	intentions	and	practices	This	 first	 section	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	 arguments	 Hungarian	 partisans	 use	 to	criticise	 their	political	 opponents.	As	 is	 apparent	 for	Figure	24,	MSzP-Együtt	 activists	are	more	 likely	 to	 criticise	 their	 opponents	 than	Fidesz-KDNP	activists,	while	 Fidesz-KDNP	activists	are	far	more	likely	to	engage	in	self-praise	as	compared	to	their	MSzP-Együtt	 counterparts.	 As	 emphasised	 above,	 opposition	 parties	 in	 both	 France	 and	Hungary	were	far	more	focused	on	their	opponents	than	those	in	governments,	who	in	turn	had	far	more	to	say	about	their	own	party	(see	Figure	11	for	France	and	Figure	17	for	Hungary	 in	Chapter	3).	MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 in	 their	 role	 as	main	opposition	are	therefore	unsurprisingly	critical	of	the	actions	of	the	Fidesz-KDNP	in	government.	It	also	follows	that	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	have	less	to	say	about	their	opponents	in	a	time	 when	 their	 party	 is	 in	 government,	 and	 that	 they	 engage	 instead	 in	 a	 more	thorough	defence	of	their	own	achievements.		
	
Figure	 24:	 Praise	 and	 criticism	 by	 Hungarian	 participants	 of	 their	 own	 party	 and	 their	
opponents	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
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The	extent	 to	which	partisans	are	critical	of	 their	opponents	 -	or	self-critical	 -does	not	 in	 itself	 offer	 evidence	on	 their	 level	of	 commitment	 to	political	pluralism.	 I	thus	 turn	 to	 the	 types	 of	 criticisms	 that	 Hungarian	 partisans	 level	 against	 their	opponents.	 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 25	 below,	 the	 share	 of	 criticism	 that	 Hungarian	participants	dedicate	to	the	intentions	of	their	opponents	is	comparable	to	the	share	of	criticism	 they	dedicate	 to	opponents'	practices	 -	with	MSzP-Együtt	participants	being	nevertheless	slightly	more	focused	on	Fidesz's	 intentions	(54.1%	of	total	criticism)	as	compared	to	their	practices	(45.9%	of	total	criticisms).		
	
Figure	25:	Criticisms	by	Hungarian	participants	of	their	opponents'	intentions	and	practices	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
a.	Criticisms	of	intentions	
If	 we	 consider	 more	 closely	 the	 instances	 where	 partisans	 target	 their	opponents'	intentions,	it	is	noteworthy	that	both	groups	of	partisans	tend	to	focus	more	on	the	personal	motivations	of	their	opponents	than	on	their	political	motivations	(see	Figure	 26	below).	 This	 is	 even	more	 clearly	 the	 case	 for	MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 as	compared	to	Fidesz-KDNP	ones:	71.8%	of	all	MSzP-Együtt	criticism	targeted	at	Fidesz's	intentions	 concerns	 their	 opponents'	 personal	 interests,	 compared	 to	 56.8%	 of	 all	corresponding	Fidesz-KDNP	criticism.		
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Figure	26:	Types	of	criticisms	by	Hungarian	participants	of	their	opponents'	intentions	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	When	Hungarian	 participants	 questioned	 the	 intentions	 of	 their	 opponents,	 it	therefore	most	often	took	the	form	of	framing	their	practices	as	motivated	solely	by	a	desire	for	material	gain,	or	for	the	personal	exercise	of	political	power.	Accusations	of	nepotism,	 clientelism	 and	 corruption	 were	 especially	 rife	 in	 Hungarian	 groups.	Importantly,	 participants	 did	 not	 only	 refer	 to	 specific	 and	 recent	 scandals,	 or	make	loose	 allusions	 to	 isolated	 practices,	 they	 regularly	 attributed	 corruption	 as	 a	constitutive	 trait	of	 their	opposition.	Crucially,	 such	accusations	are	also	omnipresent	in	 the	media	and	 in	politicians'	public	 speeches.	For	 instance,	Fidesz	politicians	often	speak	 of	 their	 opposition	 as	 the	 'mafia	 baloldal'	 (mafia	 left),	 and	 the	MSzP	 regularly	accuse	the	Fidesz	of	building	a	 'mafia	state’.	 In	contrast,	 they	often	position	their	own	party	as	examples	of	virtue.		MSzP-Együtt	 participants,	 for	 instance,	 interpret	 the	 policies	 and	 institutional	reforms	of	their	opponents	as	a	way	of	gaining	more	power	for	themselves	rather	than	as	stemming	from	any	principled	conviction,	or	reflecting	a	certain	interpretation	of	the	common	good.	To	give	some	illustrations,	MSzP-Együtt	participants	 insist	a	 lot	on	the	recent	 land	 reforms,110		 as	 well	 as	 on	 the	 new	 regulations	 on	 Tobacco	 shops,111as	examples	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Fidesz	 redistributes	 assets	 to	 its	 own	 network	 of	politicians	 and	 supporters.	 In	 the	 following	 passage,	 a	 young	MSzP	 activist	 is	 talking	about	Fidesz's	agricultural	policy	and	more	specifically	about	the	criteria	according	to	which	public	land	is	being	redistributed	by	the	current	government:		
																																								 																					
110	On	Fidesz's	land	reform,	see	footnote	69.				111	On	Fidesz's	Tobacco	shop	reform,	see	footnote	70.		
71.8%	
28.2%	
100%	
56.8%	 43.2%	
100%	
0	
20	
40	
60	
80	
PERSONAL	INTERESTS	 POLITICAL	INTERESTS	 TOTAL	
N
um
be
r	
of
	in
st
an
ce
s	
co
de
d	
MSzP-Egyutt	Fidesz-KDNP	
	
181	
Eszter:	It	is	completely	unfair,	similarly	to	the	tobacco	shop	business,	how	it	is	that	only	(those	close	to	the	Fidesz)	get	(parcels	of	land),	only	they	manage	to	compete	 successfully...	 they	decide	on	 the	 terms	of	 competition	 in	 a	way	 that	only	 those	 who	 sympathise	 with	 them,	 those	 who	 are	 with	 them,	 who	 are	family,	relatives,	cousins,	friends,	will	be	able	to	reach	these	conditions	(...)	MSzP	participants	also	tend	to	describe	the	institutional	reforms	introduced	by	Fidesz	as	a	way	for	their	opponents	to	colonize	the	state	by	placing	their	own	men	in	positions	 of	 power.	 In	 the	 following	 example,	 a	 young	 MSzP	 member	 speaks	 about	Fidesz's	decision	to	reduce	the	number	of	seats	in	parliament112	and	local	governments:	Miklós:	 In	 the	 new	 institutional	 system	 the	 only	 important	 thing	 is	 that	 their	people	 fill	 all	 positions.	 If	 for	 a	 given	 institution	 they	 do	 not	 find	 the	 right	person,	 then	 they	rather	abolish	 the	 institution	 itself.	Now	they	have	changed	the...	 we'll	 have	 less	 MP's,	 right?	 Also,	 there	 will	 be	 fewer	 seats	 in	 the	 local	governments.	 They	 don't	 have	 enough	 people	 to	 fill	 all	 these	 institutions,	 so	they	have	simplified	(them),	so	that	they	can	have	a	friend	everywhere.	And	not	to	risk	having	somebody	there	who	wouldn't	be	on	 their	side.	When	we	were	governing,	it	wasn't	such	a	problem	if	we	did	not	have	a	person	from	our	side	to	send	in	an	institution,	we	were	willing	to	accept	somebody	from	the	Fidesz	or	the	 Jobbik	 to	 lead	 the	 institution.	We	 could	work	with	 them.	We	were	 aware	that	they	were	not	on	our	side,	but	we	could	work	with	them.	It	was	also	common	for	MSzP-Együtt	participants	to	focus	on	specific	scandals	involving	their	opposition	in	order	to	make	a	more	general	claim	on	the	corrupt	nature	of	 their	 opponents.	 In	 the	 following	 example,	 an	Együtt	 activist	 contrasts	 the	 general	attitude	of	the	MSzP	in	power	when	faced	with	corruption	scandals,	as	compared	to	the	Fidesz's	practices	in	this	domain:		Tamás:	 And	 yes,	 if	 we	 take	 these	 corruption	 affairs...	 I	mean,	 the	 question	 of	public	morality	 is	not	only,	not	only...	according	to	me	it	has	a	 lot	 to	do	with...	(One’s)	 relation	 to	 power.	 The	 question	 of	 what	 those	 in	 power	 (allow	themselves	to)	do.	So	for	example	it's	true	that	the	socialists	were	also	stealing	when	 they	were	 in	 government.	 But	 if	 it	was	 uncovered	 and	 the	 person	was	really	 indefensible,	 then	 they	would	 exclude	 him	 from	 the	 party,	marginalise	him,	and	they	tried...	 they	were	sorry,	and	tried	to	hide	the	whole	thing...	Now	the	situation	is	that	when	someone	is	implicated	lets	say	in	a	moral	scandal,	like	Papcsák	today...113	Zoltán:	Yes	Tamás:	So	now	this	recording	was	just	made	public,	according	to	which	he	was	given	back	20	%	of	the	price	of	a	contract	for	the	renovation	of	public	buildings.																																									 																					
112	A	new	Elections	Act	was	passed	as	a	cardinal	law	on	December	23,	2011	and	came	into	force	on	January	1,	 2012.	 The	 number	 of	 Hungarian	 members	 of	 parliament	 diminished	 from	 386	 to	 199	 (Venice	Commission	&	OSCE/ODIHR,	2012,	p.	7)	113	Tamás	is	here	referring	to	a	scandal	involving	Papcsák	Ferenc,	Fidesz	mayor	of	Zuglo,	a	local	district	of	Budapest.	A	recording	made	public	in	the	fall	of	2013	revealed	that	the	company	HBF	Építőipari	Kft.	was	granted	a	contract	for	the	renovation	of	public	infrastructure	in	Zuglo	under	the	condition	that	20%	of	the	tender	be	given	back	under	the	table	to	the	Zuglo	municipality.		
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But	he	 (Papcsák)	 is	not	 going	 to	disappear	 from	politics...	Then	you	have	 this	MP,	who...	Or	take	this	(MSzP	MP)	Zuschlag,	consider	not	even	his	stealing	affair,	because	after	that	he	did	come	back,	but	before	then...	he	made	jokes	about	the	Holocaust	and	he	was	dismissed	from	his	responsibilities	in	the	youth	affairs	of	the	socialists.114	And	then	you	have	that	Fidesz	representative	who	is	found	to	have	beaten	his	wife,	and	he	nevertheless	remains	an	MP.115		 	 Fidesz-KDNP	participants	would	also	 frequently	 talk	of	 corruption	as	a	defining	feature	of	their	opposition,	and	present	their	own	party	as	fundamentally	less	corrupt	 than	 the	MSzP.	 A	 young	 Fidesz	member	 expresses	 this	 idea	 in	 the	 following	statement:			Tamás:	In	my	opinion	corruption	scandals	played	a	significant	part	in	the	fall	of	the	 previous	 government...	 It's	 true,	 there	 were	 so	 many	 of	 them.	 So	 many...	Now,	such	things	do	not	happen	anymore.		Or,	further	in	the	same	group:		Olivia:	 (...)	 Look	 for	 example	 at	 the	 speech	 in	 Öszöd,116	it	was	 completely	 the	case,	that	the	whole	government	was	in	it	together,	until	the	end	they...	 fooled	the	population.	And	I	think	that	was	more	generally	true	then,	than	it	is	now.		In	 some	 cases,	 like	 the	 following,	 Fidesz-KDNP	 participants	 would	 also	 more	explicitly	 assert	 that	 their	 opponents	 are	 solely	 concerned	 with	 their	 own,	 material	interests:		Virág:	 That's	 how	 I	 feel	 about	 them.	 That	 for	 them	 nothing	 counts,	 except	 to	have	money.	Really,	their	interest	is	to	get	rich,	if	I	get	rich,	that's	good	for	me.	I'm	not	 interested	 in	what	will	 become	of	 all	 these	 poor	 people	 in	 five	 years.	That	 I've	 sold	 buildings	 under	 their	 real	 value.	 I	 made	 a	 good	 business	 for	myself,	 the	 rest	 is	 none	 of	 my	 concern.	 The	 socialists	 are	 totally	 egoistic,	focusing	only	on	their	own	interests.		 Criticisms	of	 intentions	that	were	focused	more	explicitly	on	the	political	 rather	than	 personal	 interests	 of	 political	 opponents	 also	 took	more	 extreme	 forms	 than	 in	France.	Opponents	were	accused	not	only	of	making	demagogical	promises	in	order	to	win	 over	 or	 keep	 the	 support	 of	 certain	 voters,	 but	 of	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 bribing	citizens	 for	 their	 votes.	 One	 Fidesz	 participant,	Márk,	 told	me	 for	 instance	 "there	 are	
																																								 																					
114	János	Zuschlag	was	a	Hungarian	MSzP	member	of	Parliament	between	2002	and	2004.	In	2004	he	told	jokes	about	Holocaust	victims	at	the	Terror	House	museum's	inauguration	in	Budapest,	and	was	caught	on	film	by	the	television	chanel	Hir.tv.	He	was	forced	to	resign	from	his	parliamentary	position	on	October	18,	2004.			115	Tamás	here	refers	to	Jozsef	Balogh,	a	Fidesz	MP	and	mayor	of	a	small	village	who	was	found	guilty	by	a	court	 in	October	2013	of	beating	his	wife.	Balogh	 lost	neither	his	parliamentary	seat,	nor	his	position	as	mayor,	but	he	was	expelled	from	the	Fidesz.	116	Olivia	 refers	 here	 to	 a	 speech	made	 by	 ex-Prime	Minister	 Ferenc	Gyurcsány	 in	May	 2006	during	 the	MSzP's	 party	 congress.	 The	 sound	 bites	 that	 were	 leaked	 by	 Magyar	 Rádio	 on	 September	 17,	 2006	(especially	"We	lied	morning,	day	and	night",	"	We	have	obviously	lied	throughout	the	past	one	and	a	half-two	
years")	sparked	mass	protests	in	Hungary	and	riots	in	Budapest.	
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clear-cut	 cases	where	 the	Roma	are	 taken	by	buses	 (to	 the	voting	booths),	or	are	 fed	with	potatoes,	or	paid”.		
b.	Criticisms	of	practices	
As	 for	 criticisms	 focused	 on	 the	 practices	 of	 adversaries,	 Fidesz-KDNP	participants	were	most	 likely	to	target	the	 irresponsibility	of	 their	opponents'	actions	(see	 Figure	 27	 below).	 This	 was	 especially	 the	 case	 when	 they	 evoked	 the	 MSzP's	management	 of	 the	 economy	 from	 2002	 to	 2010.	 The	 following	 dialogue	 is	representative	of	this	type	of	criticism:			Iván:	 In	 practice	 there	 is	 no	 consensus.	 And	 I	was	 struck	 by	what	 Virág	 said,	that	the	socialists	took	one	loan	after	another	instead	of	putting	(the	economy)	in	order...	Eva:	Yes,	they	did	the	same	before	1990.	Virág:	It	was	the	same	in	the	Kádár	period.	Iván:	They	acted	according	to	the	idea	that	it	doesn't	matter	what	will	happen	later,	 it	 doesn't	 matter.	 To	 take	 the	 environment	 as	 an	 example,	 (it	 doesn't	matter)	what	will	happen	with	the	Hungary	of	our	grandchildren,	let's	win	the	elections	 today.	Let's	build	 the	Megyer	bridge,	 it	doesn't	matter	 that	 it	will	be	paid	by	a	loan.	Let's	have	the	bridge,	it	doesn't	matter,	the	next	government	will	pay	back	the	loan.	On	the	other	hand	the	Fidesz...	I	think	inflation	has	not	been	this	low	for	40	years?	And	we	have	no	debts	towards	the	IMF	(anymore)117.			
	
Figure	27:	Types	of	criticisms	by	Hungarian	participants	of	their	opponents'	practices	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
																																								 																					
117	On	August	12,	2013	Hungary	repaid	all	of	its	outstanding	debt	(€2.15	billion	euros)	contracted	with	the	International	Monetary	Fund.	This	debt	originated	from	a	2008	emergency	loan	program	contracted	by	an	MSzP	government,	following	the	2007	economic	crisis.		
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As	 for	 the	 criticisms	 that	 MSzP	 participants	 directed	 at	 their	 opponents'	practices,	 they	 were	 mostly	 centred	 on	 the	 incoherence	 and	 inefficiency	 of	 Viktor	Orbán's	 government	 (see	 Figure	 27	 above).	 The	 decisions	 of	 the	 Fidesz	 government	were	thus	often	depicted	as	ill-adapted	to	the	objectives	they	were	intended	to	achieve	and	 as	 producing	 suboptimal	 outcomes.	 In	 the	 following	 dialogue	 between	 Együtt	participants,	Zsofi	highlights	what	she	perceives	as	the	absurdity	of	the	Fidesz's	public	work	program	by	comparing	it	with	employment	policies	under	communism:118	Brúnó:	 (...)	 In	 itself	 the	 public	work	program	 is	 not	 devilish,	 (the	problem	 is)	rather	its	execution.	It	is	the	47	000	Ft	(salary),119	(it	is	the	fact)	that	they	keep	people	in	this	program	and	(that)	they	then	replace	the	school	cleaning	lady	by	a	 public	 worker	 paid	 half	 the	 amount...	 So	 here	 it	 is	 rather	 the	 execution	 on	which	 we	 can	 obviously	 not	 agree,	 but	 then	 the	 principle	 itself,	 that	 is	 not	necessarily	bad.		Zsofi:	Yes,	in	my	opinion	there	are	strong	similarities	here	in	that	the	growth	of	employment	 is	 logically	 a	 central	 theme	 for	 both	 sides.	 But	 the	 Fidesz	 has	addressed	this	differently	than	previous	governments,	in	that	it	created	useless	jobs,	which	are	not	good	(for	the	workers),	from	which	you	can't	even	live,	but	at	 least	(these	people)	are	not	unemployed.	This	 is	a	bit	 like	 in	the	Soviet	era,	with	one	person	screwing	the	light	bulb	in,	and	two	others	holding	the	ladder.	And	in	the	meantime,	all	three	were	"working”.		MSzP-Együtt	participants	also	often	emphasise	that	it	is	because	the	Hungarian	government	is	subject	to	the	whims	and	fancies	of	Viktor	Orbán	himself	that	it	ends	up	making	 incoherent	 and	wasteful	 decisions.	 In	 the	 following	 example,	 Péter	 describes	how	 the	 obsessions	 of	 Viktor	 Orbán	 are	 converted	 into	 absurd	 policies.	 He	 is	 here	talking	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Fidesz	 government	 has	 built	 a	 large	 number	 of	 new	football	stadiums	in	Hungary	since	2010:		Péter:	(...)	It	would	be	possible	to	use	this	money	in	other	ways,	but	concretely	they	 use	 the	 money	 in	 this	 way	 because	 Viktor	 Orbán	 has	 a	 weakness	 for	football.	And	that's	it.	But	it’s	likely	that	he	really	believes	that	football	will	offer	young	people	a	chance	 to	break	 through,	 like	 in	South	America.	Let's	do	good	football,	from	this	we	will	get	money,	and	perhaps	even	the	nation(al	economy)	recovers	 from	 it.	 So	 this	 is	 a	 completely,	 absolutely	 crazy	 thing.	But	 anyways,	this	is	the	disadvantage	of	one-man	leadership.	For	instance	Viktor	Orbán	got	it	in	his	head,	 that	Hungary	could	enrich	 itself	 through	dental	 tourism,	so	he	set	aside	 a	 billion	 forints	 for	 dentists	 to	 advertise	 dental	 tourism	 in	Hungary.	 So	this	is	what	you	get	with	this	leadership	style,	when	you	have	just	one	man...	
																																								 																					
118	On	Fidesz	public	labour	reform,	see	footnote	71.	119	Approximately	£112.		
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István:	(Everything	is	done)	haphazardly.120	
2.	The	principled	nature	of	opponents	
a.	References	to	the	principles	of	opponents	
The	second	criteria	that	I	consider	is	the	extent	to	which	partisans	recognise	the	principled	nature	of	their	opponents'	positions.	Overall,	Hungarian	participants	do	not	systematically	allude	to	the	ideas	that	motivate	the	practices	of	their	opposition.	This	is	apparent	in	Figure	28:	in	only	one	third	of	the	instances	in	which	both	MSzP-Együtt	and	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	spoke	solely	about	 the	position	of	 their	opponents	did	 they	also	 allude	 to	 the	 ideas	 that	 motivate	 this	 position	 (31.1	 and	 30.8%	 of	 cases	respectively).	This	 is	 less,	 for	 instance,	 than	 in	cases	where	 they	 talk	about	 their	own	positions:	here	they	simultaneously	talk	about	the	ideas	that	motivate	their	position	in	41.7%	of	the	cases	for	MSzP-Együtt	participants	and	in	54.4%	of	the	cases	for	Fidesz-KDNP	participants.		
	
Figure	28:	References	by	Hungarian	participants	to	the	ideas	of	their	opponents	and	of	their	
own	party	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	At	this	point,	it	may	be	useful	to	recall	that	a	number	of	the	examples	given	from	French	 transcripts	 contained	 a	 neutral	 description	 of	 opponents'	 values,	 or	 even,	explicit	 expressions	 of	 respect	 and	 tolerance	 towards	 the	 principles	 of	 opponents.	There	 are	 virtually	 no	 such	 examples	 in	 the	 Hungarian	 transcripts.	 In	 other	 words,																																									 																					
120	István	here	used	the	expression	"kézi	vezerlés",	which	literally	means	"manual	driving”.	The	expression	is	 used	 to	 describe	 a	 situation	 where	 decisions	 are	 not	made	 according	 to	 a	 well-established	 plan,	 but	rather	on	an	improvised,	case-by-case	basis.			
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where	Hungarian	 participants	 did	 refer	 to	 their	 oppositions	 "beliefs",	 "principles",	 or	what	their	opponents	"think",	they	do	not	suggest	that	opponents	may	be	legitimate	in	holding	 these	 different	 value-systems.	 It	 is	 in	 fact	 often	 part	 of	 the	 discourse	 of	participants	to	criticise	these	values	in	themselves	as	misguided	or	irresponsible.		Consider	 this	 first	 example	 from	 a	 Fidesz	 group,	 where	 participants	 contrast	their	 own	 approach	 to	 the	 state's	 role	 in	 the	 economy	with	 that	 of	 their	 opponents.	While	they	do	refer	to	how	their	opponents	"feel",	and	to	their	"liberal	principles"	more	generally,	 it	 is	 not	 even	 clear	 whether	 they	 see	 their	 opponents	 as	 adopting	 liberal	economic	policies	out	of	ideological	commitment	or	out	of	a	desire	to	evade	their	own	responsibilities:		Náomi:	The	question	of	public	utilities	is,	in	a	way,	tied	to	the	question	of	public	services.	And	here	we	had	several	nationalisations,	like	now	this	affair	with	the	gas	provider	Eon.	So	public	utilities	are	also	part	of	the	public	service.	So,	then	there	 is	 the	 question	 to	what	 extent	 this	 is	 necessary...	 the	 Left,	 the	 previous	government	privatised	everything,	and	now	the	state	is	buying	back	everything.	The	 latest	 examples	 were	 the	 gas	 provider	 section	 of	 Eon,121	there	 was	 the	water	plant,	and	I	don't	know	which	other.	And	this	is	again	that	the	state...	So,	in	my	opinion,	disagreement	exists	on	how	we	understand...	whether	the	state	is	a	good	manager,	or	a	bad	manager.	The	State,	the	current	government	feels	it	has	 this	 responsibility,	 because	 it	 takes	more	 responsibility	 and	wants	 to	 do	things	in	a	responsible	way.	The	previous	governments	felt	like	this	was	not	of	interest	 to	 them,	 let's	 privatize,	 then	we	don't	 have	 to	bother	with	 it,	 and	we	even	get	money	out	of	it.		Bálint:	 And	 that	 the	 market	 will	 solve	 everything.	 This	 squares	 more	 with	liberal	principles.	They	were	the	party	of	smaller	government	(...)	In	 this	 second	example	 from	an	MSzP	group,	Dávid	 recognises	more	explicitly	his	 opponents'	 particular	 attachment	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 nation.	 He	 nevertheless	 presents	these	ideas	as	excessive,	fanciful	and	harmful,	rather	than	legitimate:		Dávid:	(...)	I	don't	know	where	this	expression	comes	from,	but	I	think	it’s	very	true,	 that	 "one	 shouldn't	 place	 the	 nation	 above	 the	 people”.	 The	 Fidesz	 has	done	 that,	 now	 also	 at	 the	 level	 of	 our	 vocabulary.	 I	 don't	 know	whom	 they	consider	as	part	of	the	nation.	But	it's	likely	that	poor	people	are	not	part	of	it.	They	 have	 a	 picture	 of	 the	 nation,	 people	 sitting,	 posing	 for	 the	 picture	 in	traditional	 Hungarian	 suits	 and	 costumes	with	 pheasant	 hats	 on	 their	 head...	and	 so	 we	 are	 looking	 at	 a	 very	 nice	 picture,	 (where	 people	 are	 taking)	 the	pose...	Or	(they	have	an	 idea	of	 the	nation	as	people)	sitting	 in	the	parliament	and	applauding	 them.	But	 I	don't	know	what	 they	understand	more	generally	as	the	nation.	They	talk	about	Hungarians	in	the	world,	15	million	people.	But	of	 those	 15	 million,	 it	 is	 slowly	 only	 12	 million	 that	 can	 speak	 Hungarian	correctly.																																									 																					
121	In	 February	 2013,	 the	 Hungarian	 government	 reached	 an	 agreement	 with	 German	 energy	 company	E.ON	to	buy	its	four	gas	storage	facilities.		
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b.	Negating	the	principled	nature	of	opponents	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Hungarian	 partisans	 often	 explicitely	 negated	 that	 their	opponents	hold	any	values	whatsoever.	Fidesz-KDNP	activists,	for	instance,	frequently	framed	the	Left	as	lacking	any	sort	of	ideological	commitment.	This	image	of	the	Left	as	non-ideological	 is	 paradoxically	 linked	 to	 the	 association	 that	 the	 Fidesz	 makes	between	the	current	Left	and	the	past	communist	regime.	Indeed,	the	fact	that	so-called	'communists'	were	in	the	1990s	able	to	re-define	themselves	as	democrats	is	for	Fidesz	partisans	the	ultimate	proof	that	their	opponents	have	no	ideals.	This	comes	through	in	the	 following	 dialogue	 between	 two	 Fidesz	 members.	 The	 left-wing	 person	 is	 here	defined	not	as	the	person	who	believes	in	a	given	ideology,	but	as	the	person	capable	of	claiming	he	is	a	communist	-	or	a	social-democrat	-	if	it	serves	his	own	interest:		Káldor:	In	1989,	they	said	that	they	did	not	need	the	reputation	of	the	MSzMP	(Hungarian	Communist	party),	but	 that	 they	did	need	 its	money.	What	was	 in	the	 party's	 cash	 desk	 they	 needed.	 They	 needed	 the	 people.	 "We	 are	 not	communists	 anymore,	 we	 are	 socialists”.	 The	 Hungarian	 Socialist	 Workers'	Party	 abandoned	 the	 "workers"	 part	 of	 its	 denomination.122	Sure,	 now	 they	aren't	like	this,	ideologically...		Nándor:	I'm	sorry	but	the	people	are	the	same.		Káldor:	Well	the	people	are	the	same,	but	you	don’t	actually	think,	that	they	are	communists.		Nándor:	Absolutely	not.	But	the	people	are	the	same,	devoid	of	principles...		who	were	content	with	Kádár,	the	same	way	as	they	would	have	been	content	with	Rákosi...	Káldor:		Power...	but	that	is	also	a	trait	of	Fidesz.	Nándor:	Yes,	but	no...	Among	us	no	one	was	a	 censor.	You	understand	what	 I	mean.	We	 didn't	 have	 party-state	 censors,	 executioners,	 and	 people	 like	 this.	That's	the	difference.	Independently	of	that,	I	can	accept	the	politician	attitude.	But	 this	 is	 just	 unacceptable	 to	 the	 present	 day.	 That	 this	 post-communist..	(that)	 the	 Hungarian	 Communist	 Party	 has	 simply	 changed	 its	 name,	 into	democratic	 at	 present.	 Believe	 me,	 if	 communism	 came	 back,	 they	 would	
immediately	be	the	most	fervent	communists.	This	is	certain.		For	Fidesz	participants,	 the	 'reversal'	 of	Left	 and	Right	 registers	 in	Hungarian	politics	 is	 also	 proof	 of	 their	 opponents'	 lack	 of	 principled	 commitments.	 Drawing	especially	 on	 the	 opposition's	 record	 during	 the	 economic	 transition	 of	 the	 1990s,	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	often	accuse	their	opponents	of	not	upholding	the	 left-wing	
																																								 																					
122	The	 acronym	 of	 the	 ex-Hungarian	 communist	 party,	 MSzMP,	 literally	 stands	 for	 Magyar	 Szocialista	Munkás	 Párt,	 thus	 Hungarian	 Socialist	 Labour	 Party.	 It	 reformed	 to	 MSzP,	 Magyar	 Szocialista	 Párt,	 the	Hungarian	Socialist	party.		
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ideals	that	they	claim	to	stand	for.	In	the	following	example,	a	Fidesz	activist	is	talking	in	these	terms	about	the	MSzP-SzDSz	coalition	between	2002	and	2006:	Zsolt:	 (...)	 And	 that's	why	we	had	 all	 those	 criticisms	 and	 resignations	 during	the	 Medgyessy	 government,	 because	 the	 SzDSz	 had	 at	 that	 time	 all	 those	corruption	 scandals...	 By	 then	 it	was	 crystal	 clear	 that	 (the	 government)	was	not	 leading	the	country	to	where	it	should	have	led	it	according	to	a	 left-wing	ideology,	but	was	rather	delivering	it	to	big	business.	This	 tendency	 was	 also	 noticeable	 in	 the	 unease	 Fidesz-KDNP	 activists	 often	displayed	when	 they	used	 the	 terms	Left	 and	Right.	They	would	often	mime	brackets	with	 their	 hands,	 use	 the	words	 'so-called',	 or	 question	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 these	terms	in	other	ways.	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	were	also	keen	on	emphasing	that	their	party	is	in	fact	the	true	representative	of	the	values	that	the	Left	fails	to	embody.123	This	comes	through	in	the	following	statement:	Benedek:	 (...)	Well,	 it	 is	 very	 often	 a	 topic	 of	 discussion,	who	 can	 call	 oneself	left-wing	 or	 right-wing.	 Now	 these	 well-defined	 roles	 have	 been	 completely	turned	 around	 as...	well,	while	 the	 official	 left-wing,	 or	 the	MSzP	 and	 the	DK,	they	call	themselves	left-wing,	liberals,	these	(roles)	are	now	inverted.	Now	it	is	much	 more	 the	 right-wing	 which	 does	 something	 for	 the	 workers,	 for	 the	agricultural	 sector,	 for	 the	 industrial	 sector,	 and	 I	don't	know	what	else...	 you	just	have	to	look	at	the	decisions	that	have	been	taken	in	the	recent	past.	Bajnai,	Gyurcsány,	these	guys	are	all	about	money.		As	 for	MSzP-Együtt	participants,	 they	also	regularly	emphasised	an	absence	of	values	 or	 principles	 as	 characteristic	 of	 their	 political	 opponents.	One	 socialist	 group	explained	 for	 instance	 that	 they	 struggled	 to	 classify	 the	different	 cards	because	 they	could	not	identify	any	of	the	values	that	motivated	Fidesz's	position:		István:	 I	 don't	 think	 that	 there	 is	 any	 kind	 of	 ideologically-motivated	 politics	infusing	 the	 Fidesz,	 and	 therefore	 they	 have	 nothing	 that	 we	 can	 compare	ourselves	to.	Péter:	 We	 can	 compare	 the	 practice	 and	 the	 communication	 (...)	 The	 Fidesz	accuses	everybody	else	of	 stealing,	 lying,	 cheating,	but	 then	 they	steal,	 lie	and	cheat	even	more.	So	what	then?	They	repeated	this	same	idea	later	in	the	introduction	to	the	discussion,	after	I	advised	 them	 to	 classify	 disagreements	 on	 the	 cards	 according	 to	 whatever	 logic	seemed	most	appropriate	to	them:	Pál:	I'm	quite	unable	to	(classify	these),	because,	as	István	said,	the	Hungarian	Right	has	just	no	principled	political	stance.																																									 																					
123	The	claim	these	participants	make	to	'left-wing'	principles	reflects	a	more	general	discourse	of	Fidesz's	leadership.	For	instance,	the	front	cover	of	one	of	the	main	pro-Fidesz	weekly	magazines	 in	the	winter	of	2013	ran	"Orbán	 is	a	real	social-democrat"	(Stumpf,	2013).	 In	some	ways	the	party	represents	 itself	as	a	total	actor,	one	which	will	take	the	'best'	of	what	both	Left	and	Right	have	to	offer.		
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István:	Then	take	the	practices,	what	they	do.		Pál:	Well	yes,	their	practice,	but	then	one	can	only	criticise	everything	they	do.	Because	(...)	if	we	take	the	previous	eight	years	and	compare	them	for	instance,	here	 there	 are	 huge	 differences.	 But	 only	 in	 the	 practices,	 there	 are	 no	principles.		István	especially	emphasises	something	crucial	in	the	first	of	these	dialogues:	it	is	 the	 unprincipled	 nature	 of	 Fidesz	 that,	 according	 to	 them,	 makes	 comparisons	between	the	parties	impossible.	This	also	betrays	a	feeling	that	their	opponents	are	not	political	equals.	Their	lack	of	values	removes,	to	some	extent,	any	kind	of	legitimacy	to	their	 positions,	 thereby	 making	 any	 discussion	 about	 the	 differences	 or	 similarities	between	parties	irrelevant.		Much	 like	 Fidesz-KDNP	 participants,	 MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 would	 also	picture	 principles	 as	 a	 tool	 that	 their	 opponents	 use	 in	 order	 to	meet	 their	 personal	interests,	a	convenient	electoral	bait	that	serves	more	base	motives.	This	idea	is	made	particularly	 explicit	 in	 the	 following	 example,	 where	 Együtt	 participants	 describe	Fidesz's	ideology	as	a	carefully	crafted	discourse,	designed	to	gain	political	power	and	money.	Zoltán	is	talking	about	Fidesz's	trajectory	since	the	early	2000s:		Zoltán:	 In	my	opinion,	 that	was	 the	direction	 in	which	 the	political	wind	was	blowing.	They	simply...	they	needed	a	toolbox	(to	quench)	their	thirst	for	power.	And	that	required	some	demagogy.	So,	 I	 think	they	became	what	they	are	just	because	 that	was	 the	most	 comfortable	 path.	 They	 saw	 that	we	 have	 a	 post-socialist,	Kádárist,	patriarchal	society,	that	needs	a	strong	leader	figure,	and	for	everything	 to	 be	 free.	 And	 that	 requires	 some	 ideological	 nonsense	 to	 stuff	people's	 heads	 with.	 And	 they	 provide	 this.	 And	 let's	 be	 honest,	 it	 actually	works	quite	well.	I	believe	that	for	the	Fidesz...	for	Viktor	Orbán	and	the	Fidesz,	only	 one	 thing	matters,	 and	 that's	 power	 (...)	 It	 doesn't	matter	what	practical	political	measure	is	at	stake,	what	principle	is	at	stake,	what	alliance	is	at	stake...	if	it	can	be	traded	for	power,	then	they	trade	it.		This	 group	 of	 participants	 would	 also,	 like	 their	 Fidesz-KDNP	 counterparts,	insist	that	their	opposition	did	not	represent	the	principles	that	the	label	they	attribute	to	 themselves	 -	here	 the	 label	 'conservative'	 -	would	normally	entail.	 In	 the	 following	dialogue,	DK	participants	stress	that	the	word	'conservative'	is	an	empty	slogan	in	the	mouth	of	 their	 opponents.	They	are	 talking	 about	 the	 connect	between	 the	 economic	policies	of	the	Fidesz,	and	the	values	that	their	opponents	claim	to	stand	for:		István:	 (...)	 If	we	 start	 looking	 at	whether	 the	 Fidesz	 actually	 functions	 like	 a	conservative	party,	 I	would	answer	 in	 the	negative.	From	this	starting	point,	 I	don't	know	what	their	values	are.	I	have	no	idea.		Péter:	I	don't	know	either.	István:	 I'd	 like	 to	know,	but	 I	 think	 this	 is	 simply	 impossible.	 I'm	sure	 that	on	paper	they	would	give	a	nice,	textbook	definition	of	what	a	conservative	party	
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is,	 that	they	would	say	Fidesz	 is	a	conservative	party.	But	there	 is	no	sense	to	this.		
3.	Opponents	and	the	common	good	The	 third	 criterion	 is	 tied	 to	 partisans'	 belief	 in	 the	 desire	 and	willingness	 of	opponents	 to	 further	 the	 common	 good.	 This	 does	 not	 entail	 agreeing	 on	 the	 exact	definition	of	the	common	good,	or	the	means	to	reach	it,	but	rather	taking	the	morality	of	 political	 opponents	 as	 a	 starting	 point.	 At	 the	 very	 minimum,	 this	 entails	 that	partisans	 refrain	 from	 depicting	 the	 personality	 of	 opponents	 as	 fundamentally	 evil	(coded	MORAL	DEFFICIENCY).	Another,	more	 indirect	way	of	 challenging	 the	general	orientation	of	opponents	towards	the	common	good	is	to	accuse	them	of	intentionally	threatening	it,	for	instance,	by	purposefully	harming	the	general	interest,	opposing	the	principles	 that	 form	 the	basis	 of	 the	political	 community,	 or	 undermining	 the	 regime	itself	 (coded	 THREAT	 COMMON	 GOOD).	 As	 represented	 in	 Figure	 29,	 Fidesz-KDNP	participants	 tend	 to	 use	 the	 first	 argument	 more	 frequently	 than	 their	 MSzP-Együtt	counterparts,	while	MSzP-Együtt	participants	make	a	greater	use	of	the	second	type	of	argument	as	compared	to	Fidesz	participants.																																							 		
	
Figure	 29:	 Criticisms	 by	 Hungarian	 participants	 of	 their	 opponents'	 ability	 to	 further	 the	
common	good	
N.B:	 In	 Figure	 23,	 the	 corresponding	 figure	 for	 the	 French	 data,	 I	 do	 not	 indicate	 percentages	
because	of	the	low	number	of	total	instances	coded.	I	keep	this	consistent	here	to	facilitate	comparison	across	
both	cases.				 If	we	consider	the	discourse	of	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	first,	 their	critic	of	the	morality	 of	 political	 opponents	 often	 starts	 with	 associating	 them	 to	 the	 past	communist	 regime	 (see	Chapter	 3).	 By	 linking	 the	pre-1989	 communist	 elite	 and	 the	current	MSzP,	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	can	establish	a	historical	narrative	to	ground	
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their	 assertions.	 Indeed,	 if	 the	 past	 communist	 elite	 is	 deemed	 fundamentally	wrong	because	of	the	dictatorial	nature	of	the	past	regime	and	if	there	is	a	personal	continuity	across	 the	 regime	 divide,	 then	 Fidesz-KDNP	 participants	 can	 denounce	 the	 very	character	 of	 opponents	 as	 flawed,	 corrupt	 and	 immoral.	 This	 comes	 through	 very	clearly	in	the	following	statement:			Nándor:	(...)	But	we	know,	that	(those	in	the)	MSzP	are	the	same	as	those	who	were	 hanging	 people	 in	 Budapest	 in	 1918,	 in	 1945,124	and	 everywhere	 else.	They	 are	 the	 same	 people.	 There	 is	 this	 Lendvai,125	who	was	 a	 censor	 under	communism.	 She	 represented	 the	 censorship,	 the	 communist	 censorship.	And	now	that	she	is	in	Parliament,	she	is	the	one	who	says	that	under	Orbán,	there	is	no	freedom	of	the	press.			 While	 in	 the	 second	 part	 of	 his	 sentence,	 this	 young	 party	member	 refers	 to	 a	very	 specific	 individual	 (Lendvai),	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 sentence	 describes	 the	kind	of	
people	 that	 are	 today	 in	 the	 MSzP.	 They	 are	 described	 as	 the	 descendants	 of	 the	persecutors	and	traitors	of	1918	and	1945.	The	 fact	 that	some	MSzP	members	where	actually	 in	 positions	 of	 power	 before	 1989	 is	 seen	 as	 supporting	 this	 narrative.	 The	ability	to	persecute	and	to	betray	is	thereby	cast	as	part	of	the	'personality	type'	of	the	left-winger.	In	the	following	example,	this	idea	is	spelt	out	clearly.	Here	a	young	Fidesz	activist	sees	immorality	and	thus	a	disregard	for	the	common	good	as	the	fundamental	trait	 that	 characterizes	 the	 left-wing	 personality,	 and	 distinguishes	 it	 from	 the	 right-
wing	personality:		Zsólt:	 In	 the	 long	 run,	 as	 a	 general	 rule,	 a	 right-wing	 person	 finds	 interest	 in	public	 life,	 his	 disposition	 is	 to	 think	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 common	 good.	 The	difference	with	a	left-wing	person	is	that	the	left-wing	person	is	more	generally	an	 individualist	 who	 has	 no	 respect	 for	 the	 collective,	 and	who	 is	 capable	 of	hating	anybody.	Even	if	they	happen	to	be	in	power,	I	have	the	impression	that...	-	but	perhaps	one	should	ask	them	-	that	if	at	that	moment	he	has	no	concrete	interest	 in	 exerting	 his	 power,	 then	 he	 is	 capable,	 following	 his	 conscious-emotive	state,	to	even	hate	his	own	kind.	(By	this	I	mean)	how	can	I	put	this...	his	preferred...	 the	political	 elite.	As	 a	 result	he	has	no	ideological	engagement	that	would	link	him	to	his	party,	or	to	a	certain	side	of	the	political	spectrum.			In	the	following	example,	a	young	KDNP	activist	also	differentiates	between	the	Left	and	the	Right	according	to	their	concern	for	furthering	the	country's	interest.	The	proof	of	the	MSzP's	lack	of	commitment	is	here	again	rooted	in	their	identification	with																																									 																					
124	Attila	is	most	likely	speaking	here	about	the	communist	revolution	of	1919,	which	led	to	the	short-lived	Hungarian	Soviet	Republic	of	March-August	1919,	and	the	'liberation'	of	Hungary	by	Russian	Soviet	troups	in	the	winter	of	1944-45.	125	Ildikó	Lendvai	worked	for	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Hungarian	Communist	party	handling	cultural	matters	 from	 1984	 onwards.	 In	 this	 capacity,	 her	 functions	 did	 involve	 limiting	 the	 possibility	 for	publication	of	works	considered	a	threat	to	party.	She	then	became	an	MSzP	politician	and	served	as	party	leader	between	April	2009	and	July	2010.	
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the	communist	past:	Lázár:	 (...)	 For	me,	 the	 basic	 difference	 is	 that	 today,	 in	Hungary...	 the	way	 in	which	a	 citizen	of	 average	 age	differentiates	between	 the	Right	 and	 the	Left...	and	that's	something	 that	we	see	 from	the	polls...	 (The	citizen	establishes	 this	difference)	 not	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 opinion	 one	 side	 or	 the	 other	 have	concerning	 this	 or	 that	 question	 and	 what	 the	 differences	 are	 between	 their	two	 opinions.	 But	 rather	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 the	 Left,	being	as	corrupt	as	it	is,	is	really	engaged	to	do	something	for	the	country,	and	that	 they	 believe	 this	more	 to	 be	 the	 case	 for	 the	Right.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 young	people,	 for	 our	 political	 generation,	 it	 is	 not	 believable	 that	 they	 (the	 MSzP)	really	want	to	work	in	the	interest	of	the	country,	given	the	MSzP	is	the	heir	of	the	past	communist	regime	and	were	the	parasites	of	this	country	for	40	years.	If	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	believe	the	above,	then	one	may	wonder	how	they	explain	 that	 anyone	 in	 Hungary	 would	 actually	 vote	 for	 their	 opponents.	 Beyond	nostalgia	 for	 communism,	 which	 is	 one	 argument	 Fidesz-KDNP	 participants	 give	 to	explain	the	past	electoral	successes	of	the	Left,	some	of	them	emphasise	that	the	MSzP's	voter	 basis	 also	 share	 this	 disregard	 for	 the	 common	 good.	While	 Fidesz	 voters	 are	presented	 as	 hard-working	 people	 concerned	 for	 the	 good	 of	 their	 country,	 MSzP	voters	are	non-productive	individualists,	who	fail	to	contribute	to	society.	According	to	one	participant,	Naómi,	a	right-wing	citizen	will	say	"I	want	to	do	things	for	this	country	to	prosper	 and	 I	pay	my	 taxes	 and	work	 correctly”,	while	 a	 left-wing	 citizen	 reasons,	according	 to	her,	 in	 the	 following	way:	 "I	 just	want	 to	make	 the	most	of	 the	situation	and	I	avoid	(my	responsibilities)	or,	even	worse,	 live	on	social	benefits”.	According	to	her,	these	different	electorates	also	orient	the	discourse	of	each	party:		Naómi:	 (...)	 If	we	consider	what	 the	messages	are,	what	 the	electoral	bases	of	the	 different	 parties	 are,	 to	 whom	 the	 messages	 of	 the	 parties	 are	 directed,	what	 kind	 of	 laws	 they	 vote	 for	 once	 in	 power...	 Then	 it's	 quite	 obvious	 on	whom	the	parties	are	relying,	whom	the	parties	represent.	Like,	 it's	clear	 that	today	the	Fidesz	helps	 families.	They	don't	distribute	benefits	 just	 if	you	have	children,	as	something	(that	is)	due	(to	you).	Rather,	if	those	who	work	and	give	something	 to	 the	 country	 count	 on	having	 a	 child,	 then	 they	 get	 a	 tax	 rebate.	They	may	not	even	have	to	pay	tax,	 if	 they	raise	a	certain	number	of	children.	And	it's	quite	clear	that	the	socialists	rather	speak	to	those	who...	how	to	say	it	politely?	Those	who	do	not	really	wish	to	do	something	to	help	the	country	and	society	develop.	While	this	is	not	explicit	in	Naómi's	statement,	the	idea	according	to	which	the	Left	 is	 unconcerned	 with	 the	 common	 good	 often	 overlaps	 with	 Fidesz-KDNP	participants'	perception	of	 their	disregard	 for	 the	 idea	of	nation.	To	be	more	specific,	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	establish	equivalence	between	concern	for	the	common	good	and	 the	 defence	 of	 national	 interests.	 This	 idea	 takes	 root,	 again,	 in	 a	 certain	interpretation	of	history.	 Indeed,	Fidesz	participants	represent	the	communist	regime	
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as	a	time	when	Hungary's	'national	spirit'	was	crushed	and	forced	to	go	underground.	Communism,	 being	 the	 epitome	 of	 'evil',	 the	 idea	 of	 political	 community	 that	 they	opposed	is	seen	in	turn	as	embodying	the	repressed	common	good.	Fidesz	participants	see	their	current	opposition	as	carrying	this	disregard	for	the	nation	and	thus	as	having	no	desire	to	further	the	common	good.	This	narrative	is	clear	in	the	following	example,	in	which	Tamás	is	first	talking	about	life	under	communism:	Tamás:	 The	 context	 then	 excluded	 the	 notion	 of	 nation.	 This	 question	 didn't	exist	 under	 socialism.	 Those	 who	 haven't	 lived	 through	 that	 period,	 and	 I	haven't,	but	I	have	read	and	learned	about	it,	cannot	imagine	how	different	the	thinking	was	at	 that	 time.	 In	France,	both	 sides	 fight	 for	 the	nation.	 I've	been	told	that,	and	I	studied	it	too.	But	in	Hungary,	this	is	quite	different.	The	roots	are	 really	 different.	 This	whole	 thing	 has	 very	 different	 foundations.	 Because	the	idea	of	the	nation	is	really	an	emotional	one.	The	 more	 general	 idea	 according	 to	 which	 opponents	 do	 not	 'fight	 for	 the	nation'	 is	 recurrent	 in	 Fidesz-KDNP	 transcripts.	 As	 already	 emphasised	 in	 Chapter	 3,	'EU	politics'	was	a	topic	of	choice	for	the	expression	of	these	views.	The	attachment	of	the	MSzP	to	Europe	is	 like	the	communist	regime's	dedication	to	the	USSR:	 it	 is	proof	that	 they	 are	 ready	 to	 subjugate	 their	 own	 country	 to	 foreign	 interests,	 out	 of	 sole	concern	 for	 the	 power	 they	 derive	 from	 being	 vassals.	 This	 comes	 through	 in	 the	following	dialogue:		Iván:	 The	 defence	 of	 national	 interests	 is	 not	 something	 they	 aim	 for.	 On	 the	contrary,	take	Viktor	Orbán	with	the	media	law...126	Sándor:	They	just	represent	foreign	interests.	Iván:	The	representation	of	foreign	interests,	yes.	We	have	already	talked	about	this,	Moscow,	now	 foreign	multinational	 firms	and	other	 foreign	 interests	 are	what	they	defend.	But	take	Viktor	Orbán,	in	relation	with	the	media	law...	Oh	(I	shouldn't	be	talking	about)	the	Fidesz.	So	let's	take	a	socialist	Prime	minister,	I	should	be	 just	 talking	about	 the	socialists.	A	socialist	prime	minister	wouldn't	have	travelled	to	Strasbourg	by	himself,	for	the	first	ever	time	in	the	history	of	the	EU,	to	explain	the	Hungarian	point	of	view	concerning,	let's	say,	a	media	law.	A	 socialist	 prime	minister	wouldn't	 have	 done	 that.	 That	way	 I'm	 not	 talking	about	the	Fidesz.	What	else	do	socialists	do,	I	have	to	think	about	it...	Eva:	The	socialists...	Virág:	They	are	not	interested	in	the	nation,	only	in	their	own	interests...	Pluralist	 partisans	 could	 realise	 that	 the	 emphasis	 they	 place	 on	 the	 idea	 of	nation	 is	 a	 partial	 interpretation	 of	 the	 common	 good,	 and	 therefore	 still	 admit	 that																																									 																					
126	On	March	 10,	 2011	 the	 European	 Parliament	 issued	 a	 resolution	 expressing	 concern	 over	Hungary's	new	Media	Law	of	July	22,	2010	(European	Parliament,	2011).	On	January	19,	2011,	Viktor	Orbán	was	in	Strasbourg	to	defend	the	Media	Law	in	person	in	front	of	the	European	assembly.				
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their	 opponents	 defend	 another	 vision	 of	 the	 political	 community.	 Fidesz-KDNP	participants	 cannot	 do	 this	 precisely	 because	 they	 perceive	 nationalism	 as	 the	 only	legitimate	 path	 to	 the	 common	 good,	 and	 their	 party	 as	 its	 only	 legitimate	representative.	 Counter-examples	 to	 this	 general	 tendency	 are	 very	 exceptional.	 The	following	 example,	 for	 instance,	 is	 an	 anomaly	 in	 Fidesz	 transcripts,	 as	 a	 Fidesz	supporter	 calls	 his	 opponents	 'compatriots'	 and	 recognise	 their	 attachment	 to	 the	nation:		Gergő:	Actually	 I	 can	understand	 that,	 even	not	 so	 long	ago,	 there	were	MSzP	gatherings	 were	 they	 sung	 the	 International	 and	 not	 the	 Hungarian	 national	anthem.	The	problem	here	is	that	it	doesn't	help	to	breach	the	(partisan)	divide.	I'm	sure	 that	our	 left-wing	compatriots	have	 the	same	national	 feelings	as	us,	it's	just	they	don't	want	to	emphasise	it	in	the	way	we	do.		I	 will	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 discourse	 of	 MSzP-Együtt	 participants.	 The	 latter	 also	provide	 cases	 where	 the	 Fidesz	 is	 presented	 as	 intrinsically	 immoral.	 For	 instance,	Zoltán	 a	 young	 Együtt	 participant,	 asserted,	 "we	 just	 don't	 agree	with	 them,	 because	they	are	barbarians”.	As	shown	 in	Figure	29,	 such	cases	are	however	 less	 frequent	 in	MSzP-Együtt	 transcripts	 as	 compared	 to	 Fidesz-KDNP	 ones.	 While	 MSzP-Együtt	participants	did	question	their	opponents'	orientation	towards	the	common	good,	this	rested	more	on	a	critic	of	the	actions	of	Fidesz	in	power,	rather	than	on	a	critic	of	what	being	part	of	the	Fidesz	elite	necessarily	means.	In	the	following	example,	MSzP-Együtt	participants	make	more	measured	assessments	on	how	specific	steps	 taken	by	Viktor	Orbán	 at	 the	 EU	 level	may	 be	 'dangerous'	 for	Hungary.	 They	 do	 not	 stress,	 however,	that	 this	 is	 because	 the	 Fidesz	 is	 geared	 against	 the	 country's	 interests.	 They	 rather	present	these	steps	as	the	political	miscalculations	of	an	"insane"	prime	minister:		Dávid:	For	me	this	is	also	the...	or	at	least	one	of	the	most	conflictual	topics,	(the	question	 of)	 relations	 with	 the	 EU.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Orbán	 is	 one	 of	 the	European	People's	Party's	vice-presidents,	he	still	tries	to	give	the	appearance	of	huge	fights	(...)	He	tries	to	push	things	to	their	limit.	To	the	point	where	there	are	still	no	sanctions	towards	Hungary,	but	almost.	In	this	he	unfortunately	gets	help	 from	 the	 European	 People's	 Party,	 although	 there	 are	 also	 people	 there	who	 don't	 favour	 this	 at	 all.	 But	we	 do	 know	what	 it	 is	 like	when	 right-wing	people	 agree	 with	 each	 other.	 This	 is	 the	 way	 it	 is,	 they	 pull	 it	 in	 many	directions...		Margit:	It's	very	dangerous	(...)	because...	what	happens	if	once...	how	can	I	say	this,	 (if	 he)	pushes	 things	 too	 far.	 If	 once	he	doesn't	 know	where	 the	 limit	 is,	where	 he	 needs	 to	 stop.	 And	 then	 the	 rock-hard	 sanctions	 will	 come.	 So	 it’s	dangerous.	In	fact	the	man	is	completely	insane,	he	is	very	dangerous.	MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 would	 also	 emphasise	 more	 often	 that	 their	opponents	 endanger	 fundamental	 democratic	 principles	 -	 that	 form	 part	 of	 the	'common	good'	broadly	defined	-	and	this	especially	through	their	institutional	reforms.	
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In	the	following	statement,	a	young	MSzP	activist	is	talking	about	the	way	in	which	the	Fidesz	used	the	two-third	majority	they	obtained	in	2010,	depicting	his	own	party	as	a	model	of	democratic	virtue	and	his	opponents	as	fundamentally	authoritarian:		Levente:	So	they	abused	their	position	of	strength.	As	Laci	said,	when	between	1994	and	1998	the	MSzP	had...	or	rather	the	MSzP-SzDSz	coalition	had	a	two-third	majority,	 they	 did	 not	 use	 this	 opportunity	 to	 govern	 the	 country	 in	 an	authoritarian	 fashion.127	They	 could	 have	 done	 it,	 but	 principles	 were	 more	important	back	then.	It	was	more	important	for	the	MSzP	to	prove	that	it	is	not	a	surviving	inheritor	of	the	party	state,	but	a	modern,	Western	European-type	social-democratic	party.	And	not	a	nostalgic	left-over	from	the	Kádár	era.	That	was	the	 important	thing	back	then.	Whereas	for	the	Fidesz	what	matters	 is	 to	demonstrate	 that	 there	 is	 only	 them,	 to	 capture	 power	 for	 themselves	 solely,	and	this	they	don't	even	hide.	Fidesz's	 constitutional	 reforms	 do	 reveal,	 for	 MSzP-Együtt	 participants,	 a	deeper	 form	of	 amorality,	 and	more	 specifically,	 a	 lack	 of	 commitment	 to	 democracy	stemming	 from	 self-interest.	 In	 some	way,	MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 are	 reproaching	their	 opponents	 for	 being	 'unethical',	 for	 failing	 to	 exercise	 their	 'negative	 capacity'.	This	comes	through	in	the	following	dialogue	concerning	the	constitutional	re-drafting	process	 of	 2011.	 Here	 Együtt	 participants	 speak	 of	 the	 Fidesz	 as	 lacking	 the	 'moral	urge'	and	'political	culture'	to	take	their	opponents'	opinion	into	consideration:		Zsofi:	 And	 the	 Fidesz	 doesn't	 feel	 the	 need	 to	 ask	 for	 the	 opinion	 of	 others,	because	 they	 have	 the	 majority	 to	 make	 the	 laws.	 It	 wouldn't	 be	 politically	comfortable	to	negotiate	with	anybody,	and	because	they	are	sufficiently	strong	themselves,	they	don't	need	it.	And	they	don't	 feel	the	moral	urge,	 let's	say,	to	exchange	with	 the	 representatives	of	 the	other	3	million	voters,	because	 they	feel	just	fine	on	their	own,	which	is	logical	anyways...	Ábel:	And	 there	 is	 a	difference	between	 the	Left	 and	 the	Right,	 because	 there	was	a	 time	 in	1994	when	 the	Left	had	a	 two	 third	majority,	 but	 they	had	 the	courtesy	to	require	a	3/4	majority,	or	rather	a	4/5	majority,	 for	 the	 laws	that	today	 require	 a	 2/3	majority.128	But	 this	 political	 culture	 doesn't	 exist	 on	 the	right.	And	they	haven't	made	the	same	gesture	towards	the	Left.	It	is	worth	stressing	that	in	most	of	these	examples	specific	practices	are	taken	as	 examples	 of	 Fidesz's	 assaults	 on	 the	 common	 good	 -	 with	 these	 criticisms	MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 do	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 that	 their	 opponents	 are	 in	 essence	incapable	of	doing	otherwise.	There	 are,	 in	 fact,	 examples	 in	MSzP-Együtt	 transcripts	that	testify	of	a	clear	separation	between	their	assessments	of	these	practices,	and	their																																									 																					
127	A	 year	 after	 having	 obtained	 a	 two-third	 majority	 in	 1994,	 the	 MSzP-SZdSz	 coalition	 raised	 the	threshold	 for	a	new	constitutional	drafting	 from	a	 two-third	parliamentary	majority	 to	a	 four-fifths	one;	the	requirement	for	constitutional	amendments,	however,	remained	a	two-third	majority.	One	of	the	first	constitutional	 amendments	 of	 Fidesz	was	 to	 lower	 the	 threshold	 for	 constitutional	 re-drafing	 back	 to	 a	two-third	majority.	128	On	the	period	when	the	MSzP	has	a	two-third	majority,	see	footnote	127.	
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assessments	 of	 Fidesz	 as	 a	 political	 actor.	 The	 following	 dialogue	 is	 particularly	revealing	 in	 this	regard.	Here	Együtt	participants	point	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	did	agree	with	many	of	the	policies	set	forward	by	the	previous	Fidesz	government	(1998-2002).	In	saying	this,	they	also	admit	that	in	principle	the	Fidesz	is	capable	of	contributing	to	the	common	good:		Pálko:	If	you'd	asked	me	three	years	ago...	I	also	hated	Fidesz	then,	but	I	would	have	said	that	on	EU-related	questions	we	completely	agree.	 	And	now	it’s	not	the	case,	so...	I	don't	know.	And	I	haven't	changed,	it's	the	(Fidesz)	government...	Béla:	And	 there	are	some	more	questions	 like	 this.	Under	 the	previous	Fidesz	government	 there	were	 also	 some	 problems	with	 these	 questions,	with	 their	social	policies	also,	but	they	were	not	extremists	at	that	time.	Obviously	I'm	not	saying	that...	I	mean	they	were	always	a	classical	right-wing	party,	in	favour	of	a	small	state,	a	 low	share	of	redistribution,	but	(it	was)	nothing	like	now.	There	wasn't	 this	 extreme...	 (...)	 I	 could	 agree	 with	 100%	 of	 the	 previous	 Orbán	government's	education	policy.	 I	 could	agree	not	with	100%	but	with	90%	of	the	 ideas	of	 the	Pokorni	package.129	So	 for	me,	 if	 they	had	continued	to	 follow	this	line,	then	I	wouldn't	really	have	a	big	problem	with	their	education	policy.	All	right,	I'm	pushing	the	argument,	but	it's	sure	that	I	wouldn't	have	this	big	of	a	 problem	 (with	 it)	 and	 disagreements	 would	 be	 limited	 to	 specific,	 local	questions.	So	the	whole	big	conception	of...	I	mean	they	made	a	full	U-turn,	not	only	when	it	comes	to	the	EU,	but	in	many	other	domains	as	well	(...)	Some	 examples	 from	 MSzP-Együtt	 transcripts	 also	 included	 an	 indirect	recognition	of	the	existence	of	a	suprapartisan	political	community,	one	that	does	not	include	only	their	own	kind	but	also	their	opponents.	This	was	especially	the	case	when	they	attempted	to	defend	themselves	against	accusations	from	the	Fidesz	that	the	Left	fails	 to	defend	national	 interests.	Against	 this	 stance,	 they	often	positioned	 their	own	party	as	more	inclusive.	The	following	statement	is	a	good	example:		László:	 (...)	The	point	 is,	 on	 the	 left	we	have	 the	 same	 love	 for	our	homeland,	and	 the	 nation,	 questions	 related	 to	 the	 nation,	 are	 as	 important	 for	 us.	However	 we	 don't	 say	 that	 those	 who	 are	 not	 with	 us	 do	 not	 belong	 to	 the	nation.	 This	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 sides.	We	 accept	 everyone	 as	Hungarian,	while	in	practice	they	negate	our	identity	as	Hungarians.130			
*	*	*		 Many	 of	 the	 Hungarian	 activists	 I	 interviewed	 displayed	 a	 weak	 form	 of	commitment	to	pluralism	in	their	attitudes	towards	political	opponents.	They	engaged	in	 motive-cynicism,	 frequently	 accusing	 their	 opponents	 of	 being	 motivated	 by	 the																																									 																					
129	Zoltán	Pokorni	was	Minister	of	Education	under	Fidesz's	1998-2002	government.	During	this	time,	he	established	a	student-loan	system	and	abolished	tuition	fees.		130	In	Hungarian,	Lászlo	uses	the	word	"magyarság"	which	would	literally	translate	"Hungarianness”.		
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desire	for	material	gain	or	personal	power.	They	rarely	recognised	their	opponents	as	principled,	and	when	they	did,	they	did	not	ascribe	a	positive	value	to	these	convictions.	They	 in	 fact	 frequently	 denied	 that	 their	 opponents	 obey	 any	 kind	 of	 value-system,	depicting	 them	 as	 fundamentally	 devoid	 of	 principle.	 Finally,	 they	 often	 directly	accused	 their	opponents	of	being	a	 threat	 to	 the	common	good	and	 implied	 that	 they	are	 outside	 the	 sphere	 of	 common	 political	 morality.	 Each	 dimension	 of	 this	disrespectful	political	discourse	holds	together.	Engaging	in	'motive-cynicism'	requires	to	 assume	 the	 unprincipled	 nature	 of	 opponents.	 Denying	 that	 opponents	 act	 out	 of	principle	is	also	to	see	them	as	lacking	concern	for	the	common	good.			 Notwithstanding	these	general	results,	there	are	key	differences	between	MSzP	and	 Fidesz	 participants.	While	MSzP	 participants	 do	 not	 fare	 better	 on	 every	 coding	category	used	here,	we	can	nevertheless	assert	that,	in	their	discourse,	they	were	more	committed	to	pluralism	than	their	Fidesz	counterparts.	Indeed,	the	criticisms	that	both	groups	addressed	 their	opponents	had	a	 fundamentally	different	starting	point.	MSzP	participants	 took	 the	 undemocratic	 practices	 of	 their	 opponents	 as	 proof	 that	 their	opponents	are	ill-intentioned,	unprincipled,	and	uncommitted	to	the	common	good.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 Fidesz	 participants	 took	 as	 their	 primary	 focus	 the	 identity	 of	opponents	 as	 heirs	 of	 the	 communist	 regime,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 they	established	their	opponents'	ill	intentions,	lack	of	principles	and	weak	dedication	to	the	common	good.	In	short,	MSzP	participants	were	less	 likely	than	Fidesz	participants	to	question	the	intrinsic	morality	of	their	opponents.		
III.	DISCUSSION	OF	RESULTS	
1.	Variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	At	 the	 outset	 of	 this	 chapter,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 draw	 some	 conclusions	 on	variations	 in	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 partisans'	 commitment	 to	 pluralism	 and	 thus	provide	 a	 second	 series	 of	 	 answers	 to	 the	 question:	 to	what	 extent	 does	 real-world	
partisanship	 meet	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	 partisanship?	 Differences	 between	French	and	Hungarian	attitudes	towards	political	opponents	are	striking	throughout	all	three	criteria	considered,	with	French	partisans	consistently	displaying	greater	respect	for	 political	 opponents	 as	 compared	 to	 their	 Hungarian	 counterparts.	 While	 French	participants	 refrain	 from	 targeting	 their	 opponents'	 motives,	 Hungarian	 participants	repeatedly	engage	 in	motive	cynicism.	While	many	French	participants	recognise	and	declare	 as	 legitimate	 the	 principles	 of	 their	 opponents,	 Hungarian	 participants	
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regularly	deny	that	opponents	have	any	principles	at	all.	While	in	France	partisans	very	seldom	 imply	 that	 their	 opponents	 infringe	 upon	 the	 common	 good	 and	 show	many	signs	of	belief	in	the	morality	of	the	opposition,	Hungarian	activists	in	many	instances	actively	deny	that	their	opponents	are	oriented	towards	the	common	good.	In	Appendix	6,	 I	 systematically	 compare	 the	 coding-based	 evidence	 for	 French	 and	 Hungarian	partisans,	 and	 this	 comparison	 further	 confirms	 these	 general	 tendencies.	 Indeed,	French	partisans	are	ahead	of	the	activists	of	both	Hungarian	parties	on	all	 indicators	considered.		There	are	also	noteworthy	differences	between	groups	of	partisans	within	each	country.	 UMP	 participants	 are	 more	 critical	 of	 their	 opponents	 than	 their	 PS	counterparts.	 They	 question	 the	 intentions	 of	 their	 opponents	 more	 frequently,	 and	often	 see	 their	 opponents'	 principles	 themselves	 as	 a	 form	 of	 delusion,	 or	 as	 a	convenient	 rhetoric	 destined	 to	 gain	 votes.	 Overall,	 the	 discourse	 of	 PS	 participants	about	their	opponents	was	more	pluralistic.		MSzP	participants	are	in	a	limited	way	more	pluralist	than	Fidesz	participants.	In	 their	 criticisms	 of	 opponents,	 MSzP	 participants	 most	 often	 focus	 on	 what	 they	perceive	 as	 the	 undemocratic	 practices	 of	 Fidesz	 and	 take	 these	 as	 proof	 that	 their	opponents	 are	 ill	 intentioned,	 unprincipled,	 and	 uncommitted	 to	 the	 common	 good.	Fidesz	participants	are	more	likely	to	take	as	their	primary	focus	the	deep	character	of	their	opponents	and	to	put	in	question	their	intrinsic	morality.		
2.	Explaining	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	The	second	task	of	this	conclusion	is	to	formulate	potential	explanations	for	the	above-mentioned	 variations	 and	 thus	 provide	 an	 answer	 to	 my	 second	 research	question:	 how	 can	 we	 explain	 variations	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 uphold	 the	
standards	of	democratic	partisanship?	As	explained	 in	Chapter	2,	 I	 take	as	a	given	that	whether	 or	 not	 partisans	 uphold	 democratic	 standards	 does	 not	 simply	 result	 from	variations	 in	personal	 idiosyncracies,	but	 that	 these	patterns	are	partly	dependent	on	the	specific	constraints	and	opportunities	that	partisans	have	for	political	discourse	in	their	 own	 political	 environment.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 formulate	 possible	explanations	for	the	variations	I	describe	above,	focusing	on	the	more	specific	cultural	resources	or	events	that	different	groups	of	partisans	draw	on	to	make	their	claims.			
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a.	Cultural	resources	
A	history	of	open	political	competition	One	inference	that	we	can	draw	from	the	evidence	presented	in	this	chapter	is	that	 the	history	of	political	 opposition	within	each	 country,	 and	 the	 types	of	partisan	identities	 that	 result	 from	 them,	 influence	 partisans'	 present	 degree	 of	 respect	 for	political	oponents.		In	France,	the	historical	opposition	between	Left	and	Right	may	be	interpreted	as	 an	 opportunity	 for	 respectful	 partisan	 discourse.	 As	 seen	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 French	participants	 have	 a	 shared	 framework	 within	 which	 to	 understand	 the	 terms	 of	partisan	 disagreement.	 Both	 PS	 and	UMP	 groups	 understand	 the	 defining	 features	 of	the	 left-wing	and	right-wing	 traditions	 in	a	similar	way.	Many	of	 their	descriptions	of	political	 debates	 are	 fairly	neutral:	 they	 are	described	 in	 similar	 terms	by	one	or	 the	other	 group.	 The	 established	 nature	 of	 these	 political	 identities	 also	 presupposes	 a	certain	form	of	respect.	Each	group	of	partisans	can	more	easily	see	their	opponents	in	light	 of	 a	 certain	 political	 tradition,	 and	 this	 tradition	 itself	 is	 attached	 to	 a	 series	 of	values	 and	 principles	 recognised	 by	 all.	 While	 partisans	 may	 sometimes	 doubt	 the	intentions	of	their	opponents	or	question	their	ability	to	reach	the	common	good,	these	attitudes	are	tempered	by	a	form	of	respect	for	the	wider	tradition	within	which	their	opponents	ground	themselves.	As	Dyrberg	insists,	this	is	why	the	Left-Right	dichotomy	may	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 democratic	 ideology:	 Left	 and	 Right	 are	 necessary	counterpoints	 for	 each	 other	 and	 are	 thus	 in	 a	 fundamentally	 democratic	 relation	 of	equality	(Dyrberg,	2005).		For	Hungarian	partisans,	the	past	history	of	political	competition	rather	seems	to	 act	 as	 a	 constraint	 on	pluralist	 attitudes.	 First,	 the	 frame	 that	Hungarian	partisans	inherit	 from	 their	 political	 history	 is	 one	 in	which	 one	 camp	has	 always	 ruled	 at	 the	detriment	 of	 the	 other.	 Competition	was	 not	 open	 and	 equal	 between	 the	Hungarian	conservative	and	socialist	traditions	before	1989.	This	also	means	that	Fidesz	and	MSzP	partisans	 have	 a	 fundamentally	 different	 reading	 of	 what	 the	 terms	 of	 Hungarian	political	competition	are.	Contrarily	to	French	partisans,	they	have	no	shared	frame	of	understanding.	 Fidesz	partisans	 see	party	 competition	 as	opposing	 the	 foreign	 to	 the	national,	 the	communist	to	the	anti-communist.	MSzP	partisans	see	party	competition	as	 opposing	 the	 democratic	 to	 the	 authoritarian,	modernity	 to	 backwardness.	With	 a	limited	experience	of	being	political	equals,	partisans	also	do	not	treat	their	opponents	as	 political	 equals.	 They	 	 instead	 reproduce	 the	 'us	 vs.	 them'	 narrative	 of	 pre-
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democratic	times.	Opponents	are	still	enemies	that	constitute	a	threat	to	the	common	good	and	should	therefore	be	suppressed.	But	 the	 particular	 political	 history	 of	 both	 countries	 may	 also	 influence	 the	capacity	 of	 partisans	 to	 be	 respectful	 indirectly,	 via	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	partisan	claims.	One	could	argue	that	parties	with	a	cohesive	political	identity	are	more	likely	 to	 develop	 a	 constructive	 criticism	 of	 opponents;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 partisans	that	are	unsure	about	what	 they	themselves	stand	 for	are	more	 likely	 to	 lash	out	and	use	disloyal	arguments	to	contradict	opponents.		In	 Chapter	 3,	 I	 offered	 as	 one	 potential	 explanation	 for	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	French	partisan	identities	the	importance	of	Left	and	Right	as	cultural	resources.	With	such	cohesive	identities,	partisans	have	real	assets	to	use	against	their	opponents:	a	set	of	values	on	which	to	judge	their	opponents'	actions	and	a	set	of	policies	to	suggest	as	an	alternative	to	 their	opponents'	practices.	They	have	a	clear	 idea	of	what	sets	 them	apart	 from	 their	 opponents,	 and	 they	 therefore	 know	 how	 to	 criticise	 them	 in	 a	constructive	 manner.	 To	 this	 extent,	 they	 may	 also	 not	 need	 to	 question	 their	opponents'	 intentions	 or	 their	 orientation	 towards	 the	 common	 good	 in	 order	 to	compete	 and	 show	 their	 political	 worth.	 If	 opponents	 are	 cohesive,	 and	 therefore	principled	in	their	stances,	then	they	are	also	more	worthy	of	political	respect.		Much	 the	 opposite	 can	 be	 said	 about	 the	 Hungarian	 context.	 Partisanship	 in	Hungary,	and	especially	on	the	centre-left	side	of	the	political	spectrum,	fundamentally	lacks	 cohesiveness.	 This	 again	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 fact	 partisan	 identities	 have,	 for	most	part,	 not	 been	 built	 in	 a	 time	 of	 open	 political	 competition.	 If	 partisans	 indulge	 in	disrespectful	behavior	 it	may	also	be	because	 they	do	not	have	 the	means	 to	criticise	their	 opponents	 in	 a	 constructive	manner:	 no	 clear	 set	 of	 values	 on	which	 to	 ground	their	opposition	and	no	clear	set	of	alternative	policies	to	suggest	as	an	alternative	to	their	opponents'	doings.	In	the	absence	of	a	clear	differentiation	on	values	and	policies,	and	 therefore	 of	 structured	 arguments	 to	 justify	 one's	 political	 worth,	 it	 is	 also	tempting	to	focus	on	corruption	scandals	or	the	personality	of	opponents.	Conversely,	if	opponents	are	unable	to	ground	their	own	commitment	in	a	well-defined	and	coherent	set	of	values,	they	also	fall	more	easily	prey	to	the	accusation	of	being	unprincipled.		
Political	legacies	in	a	post-authoritarian	context	It	 may	 be	 because	 Fidesz	 participants	 give	 in	 to	 historical	 narratives	 more	forecefully	 than	 their	 opponents	 that	 they	 are	 less	 respectful	 than	 their	 MSzP	counterparts.	 This	 is	 also	 because	 they	 more	 explicitely	 ground	 their	 self-
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understanding	 in	 the	 memories	 of	 the	 victims	 of	 communism.	 To	 this	 extent,	 their	particular	 position	 vis-à-vis	 history	 provides	 greater	 opportunities	 for	 disrespectful	discourse:	they	act	with	the	resentment	of	the	dominated	victim,	while	MSzP	partisans	carry	 the	guilt	of	past	perpetrators.	 In	 this	configuration,	 the	opponents	of	Fidesz	are	not	 worthy	 of	 respect	 precisely	 because	 they	 are	 viewed	 as	 the	 inheritors	 of	 an	oppressive	 tradition.	 The	 terms	 of	 the	 partisan	 opposition	 are	 therefore	 themselves	contested,	 as	 this	 narrative	 cannot	 be	 shared	 by	 the	 MSzP:	 they	 do	 not	 recognise	themselves	 in	 this	 oppressive	 tradition,	 or	 pride	 themselves	 in	 carrying	 its	memory.	The	 Fidesz's	 framing	 of	 the	 Left	 is	 therefore	 also	 perceived	 as	 a	 form	 of	 injustice,	 a	disloyal	attack	against	the	MSzP.	This	situation	may,	in	turn,	not	be	conducive	to	MSzP	partisans	respecting	their	opponents.		
b.	External	events	
Frequency	of	corruption	scandals	Different	 levels	 of	 corruption	 in	 both	 countries	 may	 also	 partly	 explain	differences	in	levels	of	respect	for	political	opponents.	Indeed,	corruption	scandals	are	a	 type	of	external	event	 likely	 to	generate	disrespectful	behavior,	as	 they	constitute	a	legitimate	 reason	 to	 doubt	 the	 intentions	 of	 one's	 adversaries.	 Hungarian	 partisans	denounce	 the	corrupt	practices	of	 their	opponents	more	 frequently	 than	 their	French	counterparts,	 and	 these	 denunciations	 are	 central	 to	 the	 'motive-cynicism'	 that	 they	commonly	 display.	 This	 variation	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 differences	 in	 the	 levels	 of	corruption	 in	 each	 country.	 In	 this	 sense,	 corruption	 scandals,	 and	 a	 high	 level	 of	corruption	more	generally,	may	act	as	a	constraint	on	respectful	partisan	behavior.		Corrupt	practices	are,	 in	general,	a	far	greater	problem	in	Central	Europe	than	they	 are	 in	 Western	 Europe.	 Weak	 legal	 capacity	 deriving	 from	 incomplete	 state	building	 is	 a	 common	 characteristic	 of	 the	 post-communist	 region	 (Falkner,	 Treib,	 &	Holzleithner,	2008;	J.	n.	Kornai	&	Rose-Ackerman,	2004;	Linz	&	Stepan,	1996,	p.	436).	The	 weakness	 of	 Central	 European	 state	 capacity	 has	 facilitated	 an	 extreme	 form	 of	state	colonisation	by	political	parties,	an	even	stronger	form	of	party	cartelisation	than	in	 Western	 Europe,	 and	 more	 widespread	 corrupt	 practices	 among	 public	 officials	(Innes,	 2014;	 Kopecký,	 2006,	 2007;	 Kopecký	&	 Spirova,	 2011).	While	 corruption	 has	also	 been	 on	 the	 rise	 in	 Western	 Europe	 over	 the	 last	 three	 decades,	 a	 parallel	deterioration	in	Central	Europe	means	that	the	East-West	divide	remains	stark	in	these	matters	 (Innes,	 2015;	MacDonald	&	Tariq	Majeed,	 2011).	These	differences	 also	hold	for	France	and	Hungary	more	specifically.	On	Transparency	International's	Corruption	
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Perception	 Index	 which	 ranges	 from	 0	 as	 highly	 corrupt	 to	 100	 as	 least	 corrupt,	Hungary	meets	a	score	of	54,	and	France	a	score	of	69,	with	an	average	EU	score	of	66	(Transparency	 International,	 2014).	 This	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	Governance	Indicator	“control	of	corruption”,	with	Hungary	reaching	the	61	percentile	mark	in	2014,	against	88	percentile	in	France	in	the	same	year	(World	Bank,	2014).		Corruption	 scandals	 may	 therefore	 constitute	 types	 of	 events	 that	 provide	Hungarian	partisans	with	arguments	against	their	opposition	and	those	arguments	are	less	available	to	French	partisans.	In	this	sense,	corruptions	scandals	may	be	seen	as	a	type	 of	 event	 that	 constrains	 the	 respectful	 behavior	 of	 political	 opponents.	 With	 a	greater	number	of	scandals	involving	their	opposition	and	corruption	being	higher	on	the	 list	 of	 preoccupation	 of	 Central	 European	 citizens	 (Rose-Ackerman,	 2001),	Hungarian	partisans	are	likely	to	be	more	easily	tempted	to	make	use	of	these	cases	to	criticise	their	opponents.		There	 is	 nevertheless	 evidence	 in	 both	 cases	 to	 suggest	 that	 partisans	 retain	agency	in	the	way	they	choose	to	use	-	or	not	to	use	-	cases	of	corruption	involving	their	opponents.	 For	 instance,	 despite	 the	 widespread	 nature	 of	 corruption	 in	 Hungary,	partisans	 could	 nevertheless	 have	more	 accurately	 described	 corruption	 as	 a	 plague	affecting	all	parties,	and	which	all	parties	need	to	fight	in	their	own	ranks.	Not	only	do	they	instead	solely	focus	on	scandals	involving	their	opponents,	but	they	also	use	these	scandals	to	question	more	generally	the	moral	integrity	of	their	opponents.	The	reverse	can	be	said	for	the	French	case.	While	corruption	is	certainly	less	developed	in	France	than	 it	 is	 in	 Hungary,	 a	 number	 of	 high-ranking	 politicians	where	 involved	 in	major	scandals	 in	 the	spring	of	2013,	at	 the	 time	of	my	 interviews.131	These	cases	made	 the	first	pages	of	many	French	newspapers	and	drawing	on	these	would	have	been	an	easy	way	 for	my	participants	 to	 frame	 their	 opponents	 as	 corrupt	 and	 their	 own	party	 as	virtuous.	However,	with	 only	minor	 exceptions,	 French	participants	 did	not	 raise	 the	issue.	This	 suggests	 that	corruption	 is	 indeed	better	conceived	as	a	resource	 for	anti-
																																								 																					
131	Nicolas	Sarkozy,	former	president	of	the	French	Republic	from	2007	to	2012,	and	still	one	of	the	UMP's	leading	personalities	in	2013,	was	involved	in	three	major	scandals.	The	first	is	the	Bettencourt	Affair,	 in	which	Nicolas	 Sarkozy	 is	 suspected	 to	 have	 obtained	 illegal	 financing	 from	 Liliane	 Bettencourt,	 head	 of	L'Oréal,	for	his	2007	campaign.	Sarkozy	himself	was	put	under	investigation	on	March	21,	2013.	Another	investigation	opened	early	2013	following	revelations	of	the	online	journal	Mediapart,	according	to	which	Sarkozy's	 2007	 campaign	 would	 have	 also	 been	 illegally	 financed	 by	 the	 Libyan	 regime	 of	 Mouammar	Kadhafi.	 Finally,	 another	 case	was	 opened	 in	October	 2012,	 investigating	 the	 conditions	 of	 a	 1.5	million	euros	 contract	 between	 the	polling	 agency	Publifact	 and	 the	President's	 office	 between	2007	 and	2012.	Another	large	affair	involved	Jérome	Cahuzac,	PS	Minister	of	Budget,	in	the	winter	and	spring	of	2013.	He	was	 accused	 of	 owning	 an	 undeclared	 bank	 account	 in	 Switzerland	 by	 the	 online	 investigative	 journal	
Mediapart.	Jérome	Cahuzac	had	to	resign	from	government	on	March	19,	2013	and	was	indicted	two	weeks	later	for	fiscal	fraud.	
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pluralist	 speech,	 rather	 than	 a	 reality	 that	 partisans	 can	 only	 account	 for	 in	 anti-pluralist	 terms.	 If	 a	 corrupt	 environment	 	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 disrespectful	discourse,	 partisans	 nevertheless	 retain	 the	 agency	 to	 choose	whether	 or	 not	 to	 use	corruptions	scandals	as	a	weapon	against	their	political	opponents.		
Socio-economic	constraints	and	imbalances	in	cohesiveness	The	 fact	 that	overall	 right-wing	partisans	are	 slightly	 less	 respectful	 than	 left-wing	partisans	can	also	be	explained	by	their	different	positions	with	regard	to	socio-economic	 constraints.	 As	 explained	 in	 the	 conclusion	 to	 Chapter	 3,	 there	 is	 an	imbalance	 in	 cohesiveness	 between	 right-wing	 and	 left-wing	 parties,	 and	 this	imbalance	can	be	partly	attributed	to	the	greater	weight	of	socio-economic	constraints	on	 left-wing	 platforms	 as	 compared	 to	 right-wing	 ones.	 Arguably,	 this	 imbalance	creates	a	greater	incentive	towards	disrespect	among	right-wing	partisans	than	among	left-wing	partisans.		In	 France,	 the	 imbalance	 in	 cohesiveness	 seemed	 linked	 particularly	with	 the	lesser	 ability	 of	 the	 PS	 to	 adapt	 to	 an	 increasingly	 constrained	 context	 for	 economic	policy.	 This	 particular	 context	 puts	 them	 in	 a	 vulnerable	 position	 and	 the	 UMP	 in	 a	relative	 position	 of	 strength.	 Indeed,	 the	 globalised	 economy	offers	UMP	participants	evidence	 to	 argue	 that	 traditionally	 left-wing	 positions	 on	 social	 equality,	 public	services	 and	 state	 interventionism	 are	 unrealistic	 and	 delusional.	 As	 seen	 in	 this	chapter,	 it	 is	 then	 easy	 for	 UMP	 partisans	 to	 conclude	 that	 if	 the	 PS	 still	 holds	 these	position,	it	is	for	base	motives,	rather	than	out	of	concern	for	the	common	good.	Much	the	opposite	can	be	said	for	PS	participants.	As	is	apparent	in	this	Chapter,	they	are	too	preoccupied	with	 themselves,	 too	 concerned	 about	 their	 own	 party's	 incapacities,	 to	unsure	about	 the	stance	they	can	 legitimately	defend	 in	 the	current	circumstances,	 to	effectively	criticise	their	opponents.	If	PS	participants	are,	de	facto,	more	respectful,	it	is	thus	also	because	they	simply	do	not	engage	to	the	same	degree	in	deconstructing	their	opponents'	stances.		This	also	holds,	to	a	certain	extent,	in	Hungary.	One	of	the	main	explanations	for	the	lack	of	cohesiveness	of	MSzP	claims	is	that	since	their	birth	in	1989,	they	have	more	or	 less	renounced	to	defend	a	social-democratic	platform	on	economic	 issues,	despite	arguing	 that	 they	 are	 social-democrats.	 As	 shown	 in	 this	 chapter,	 this	 particular	 fact	makes	them	easy	targets	for	the	criticism	of	Fidesz	partisans.	Fidesz	partisans	regularly	refer	 to	 the	MSzP's	 'betrayal'	 of	 socialist	 ideals	 as	 proof	 of	 their	 ill	 intentions,	 and	of	their	lack	of	principled	commitment	to	a	certain	idea	of	the	common	good.		
	
204		CHAPTER	5:	Pluralism	in	partisan	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement		In	 the	 last	 empirical	 chapter,	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 French	 and	Hungarian	uphold	the	standard	of	commitment	to	pluralism	in	their	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement.	These	attitudes	provide	an	adequate	ground	for	assessing	pluralist	partisanship.	Indeed,	if	partisans	were	to	only	follow	their	particular	convictions	 without	 exercising	 self-restraint,	 they	 would	 wish	 for	 a	 consensus	 to	 be	established	in	favour	of	their	own	views	and	thus	for	political	disagreement	to	come	to	an	 end.	 Commitment	 to	 political	 pluralism	 should	 act	 as	 a	 break	 on	 these	 drives.	Beyond	 respect	 for	 political	 opponents,	 ethical	 partisans	 will	 also	 have	 a	 certain	appreciation	 of	 the	 value	 of	 partisan	 disagreements	 in	 a	 democratic	 political	community.		In	 chapter	 1,	 I	 offered	 two	 criteria	 to	 evaluate	 the	 attitudes	 of	 real-world	partisans	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement.	I	summarize	these	below	and	indicate	the	type	of	evidence	that	my	interviews	offer	for	each	criterion:		
Criterion	 1:	 The	 importance	 of	 shared	 principles:	 First,	 pluralist	 partisans	recognise	 and	 appreciate	 the	 principles	 that	 ground	 the	 political	 communitiy	 and	 are	shared	across	partisan	lines.	The	political	community	starts	with	the	idea	of	the	common	good:	 'what	 we	 are'	 is	 what	 we	 share	 with	 others	 that	 transcends	 particular	 group	interests	 and	 our	 defence	 of	 particularistic	 convictions.	 Following	 Galston,	 we	 can	identify	 three	 separate	 components	 of	 the	 'common	 good'	 in	 democratic	 societies	(Galston,	 2013).	 First,	 'matters	 of	 common	 concern',	 issues	 that	 should	 be	 considered	collectively	 because	 they	 result	 from	 social	 linkage.	 Second,	 a	 series	 of	 fundamental	principles	 that	define	 the	common	good	at	large	 -	generally	 listed	 in	 the	Preamble	of	a	democracy's	 constitution.	 Finally,	 democratic	 institutions	 themselves	may	 also	be	 seen	as	a	common	good.	Partisans	should	uphold	a	pluralistic	idea	of	the	political	community	in	which	such	a	broad	understanding	of	the	common	good	is	shared	across	partisan	lines.	
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This	 also	 entails	 that	 they	 refrain	 from	 contesting	 these	 common	 foundations	 or	 from	claiming	their	mastery.		The	focus	groups	provide	direct	evidence	for	this	criterion.	At	the	end	of	each	interview,	I	asked	participants	specifically	whether	they	would	rather	have	more	agreement	or	more	disagreement	on	the	twelve	topics	they	were	asked	to	discuss.	This	allowed	me	to	code	for	 instances	 where	 partisans	 value	 political	 agreement	 and	 to	 analyse	 the	 type	 of	arguments	that	participants	make	in	support	of	these	normative	claims.		
Criterion	 2:	 The	 ineliminability	 of	 disagreement:	 A	 second,	 fundamental	characteristic	of	pluralist	partisanship	 is	 the	capacity	 to	value	political	 contestation	 for	its	 own	 sake.	 Pluralist	 partisans	 believe	 that	 disagreement	 over	 the	 meaning	 and	
implications	 of	 the	principles	 that	 form	 the	 common	good	 is	not	only	 ineliminable	 in	 a	liberal	 democracy,	 but	 core	 to	 its	 perpetuation.	 To	 this	 extent,	 pluralist	 partisans	 are	aware	 of	 the	 moral	 indeterminacy	 attached	 to	 foundational	 principles	 and	 do	 not	attempt	to	foreclose	it.	In	other	words,	they	accept	the	partial	nature	of	their	claims	and	the	fact	that	these	will	necessarily	and	permanently	spur	contestation.			The	 focus	groups	provide	direct	evidence	 for	 this	criterion.	As	 indicated	above,	 I	asked	participants	 specifically	 towards	 the	 end	of	 each	 interview	whether	 they	would	 rather	have	more	agreement	or	more	disagreement	on	 the	 topics	 they	were	asked	 to	discuss.	This	allowed	me	to	code	for	instances	where	partisans	value	political	disagreement	and	to	analyse	 the	 type	of	arguments	 that	participants	make	 in	support	of	 these	normative	claims.	Another	 source	 of	 evidence	 are	 responses	 to	 the	 last	 question	 in	 each	 interview	concerning	 participants'	 personal	 experiences	 of	 interpartisan	 dialogue.	 I	 coded	especially	for	both	positive	and	negative	accounts	of	these	experiences.	While	these	only	partly	reflect	the	opinion	of	participants	on	the	value	of	disagreement,	partisans	do	often	cast	an	opinion	on	the	benefits	of	confronting	one's	own	views	to	those	of	others.	Valuing	or	 depreciating	 the	 experience	 of	 interpartisan	 dialogue	 may	 to	 this	 extent	 offer	 an	additional	measure	of	this	criterion.		 *	*	*		 As	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 I	 will	 present	 the	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	evidence	 for	 both	 France	 and	 Hungary	 in	 turn.	 In	 the	 final	 section,	 I	 discuss	 both	country-cases	 in	 a	 comparative	 fashion	 and	 provide	 tentative	 explanations	 for	 the	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	that	I	uncover.	
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I.	THE	FRENCH	CASE	
I	 start	 by	 examining	 the	 attitudes	 of	 French	 partisans	 towards	 political	agreement	and	the	extent	to	which	they	see	themselves	as	belonging	to	a	suprapartisan	political	community	built	on	shared	values.	I	then	focus	on	French	partisans'	attitudes	towards	 political	 disagreement	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 value	 partisan	contestation	for	its	own	sake.			
1.	The	importance	of	shared	principles	There	 is	much	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 claim	 that	 French	 partisans	feel	part	of	a	common,	suprapartisan	political	 community	built	on	shared	values.	The	evidence	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 4	 already	 goes	 in	 this	 direction.	 To	 see	 opponents	 as	moral	and	political	equals	 is	 to	see	them	as	part	of	 the	political	community.	Partisans	that	respect	their	political	opponents	see	that	what	they	share	with	opponents,	a	desire	to	serve	the	common	good,	supersedes	their	particular	convictions	on	what	serving	the	common	exactly	means.	Much	of	the	previous	chapter	thus	already	shows	that	French	participants	feel	that	they	belong	to	an	inclusive	and	pluralist	political	community.		This	realisation	nevertheless	takes	different	forms	for	UMP	and	PS	participants.	As	 emphasised	 in	 chapter	 3,	 UMP	 participants	 often	 emphasise	 a	 commonality	 of	objectives	between	political	parties.	This	is	clear	in	the	types	of	arguments	they	use	to	justify	political	disagreement	over	the	different	issues	they	were	asked	to	discuss.	More	frequently	than	PS	participants	they	insist	on	the	common	goals	of	political	parties	and	their	 dissimilar	 means	 to	 reach	 these	 goals	 (coded	 CONSENSUAL	 OBJECTIVES	 vs.	CONFLICTUAL	 PRACTICE,	 see	 Figure	 13	 in	 Chapter	 3).	 This	 emphasis	 on	 shared	political	 objectives	 also	 carries	 the	 recognition	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 symbolic	 political	space	within	which	all	parties	operate.	This	 comes	 through	 in	 the	 following	example,	where	 an	UMP	participant	 talks	 about	 issues	 that	 both	parties	 consider	 as	 'essential'	and	this	because	they	'affect	the	citizen	directly':		Simon:	These	topics	are	consensual	in	that	on	both	sides	we	agree	that	political	life	needs	 rules,	 that	we	 cannot	do	politics	 the	way	we	did	30	years	 ago,	 and	that	 there	 are	 demands	 of	morality	 today,	 citizens	 relate	 to	 politics	 in	 a	way	that	has	changed.	I	think	that	both	Left	and	Right	have	understood	this,	in	any	case,	but	of	course	the	answers	that	we	bring	can	sometimes	be	different.	But	on	 the	 necessity	 of	moralizing	 public	 life,	 I	 think	 that	 on	 this	 point,	 Alexis	 is	right,	 there	 is	 a	 consensus.	 On	 the	 necessity	 to	 do	 something	 to	 really	 bring	employment	 to	 young	 people,	 to	 fight	 against	 unemployment,	 it’s	 obvious.	While	 clearly	 what	 the	 Right	 and	 the	 Left	 suggest	 is	 different,	 there	 is	 the	realisation	that	these	issues	are	essential	because	they	affect	the	citizen	directly.			
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The	 last	 section	 of	 each	 interview	 offers	 additional	 evidence	 for	 this	 point.	Indeed,	 each	 group	 interview	 concluded	 with	 a	 discussion	 on	 the	 general	 value	 of	political	 agreement	 and	disagreement.	 I	more	 specifically	 asked	participants	whether	they	would	rather	have	more	agreement	or	more	disagreement	on	the	topics	they	were	asked	 to	 discuss.	 By	 answering	 this	 question,	 participants	 also	 offered	 a	 series	 of	justifications	 for	 why	 they	 attach	 worth	 to	 political	 agreement.	 A	 large	 number	 of	responses	emphasise	 the	necessity	of	having	a	shared	definition	of	 the	common	good	with	opponents	and	attribute	a	positive	quality	 to	belonging	 to	a	political	community	built	on	shared	values.	Towards	the	end	of	each	discussion,	participants	from	the	UMP	often	 emphasised	 the	 positive	 value	 of	 a	 suprapartisan	 agreement	 on	 the	 'common	good'	broadly	defined	and	 the	existence	of	 a	 shared	desire	 among	political	parties	 to	further	this	'common	good'.	Simon,	for	instance,	makes	an	argument	about	the	general	value	of	political	agreement	that	is	coherent	with	his	above-cited	position:			Simon:	 I	 don’t	 think	 politics	 are	 like	 a	 civil	 war,	 on	 this	 point...	 I	 mean,	 it’s	possible	to	say	things...	 it	 is	possible	to	disagree	on	a	number	of	solutions,	 it’s	possible	to	spell	these	out	clearly,	but	it’s	not	a	civil	war,	I	mean...	we	are	here	to	work	things	out,	in	all	logic	we	all	have,	on	the	left	and	on	the	right...	I	mean,	at	the	 end	 of	 the	 day	 our	 preoccupation	 is	 to	 better	 the	 everyday	 lives	 of	 our	fellow	citizens,	to	be	very	honest...		Léa:	But	disagreements	are	necessary,	in	any	case,	that's	what	creates	debate...	Simon:	We	have	different	responses	on	some	issues,	but	we	should...	Léa:	There	will	be	a	point	when	we	will	need	to	agree...	Simon:	We	are	working	towards	the	same	objective,	which	is	to...	I	was	going	to	say	'change	life	for	the	better',	to	take	up	a	slogan	that	is	not	necessarily	a	right-wing	 slogan,	 but	 well...	 (Laughs),	 in	 any	 case,	 to	 better	 the	 existence	 of	 our	fellow	citizens,	and	this	is	the	aspiration	we	all	have.		On	the	other	hand,	PS	participants	were	more	likely	to	emphasise	the	existence	of	 a	 suprapartisan	 agreement	 on	 fundamental	 principles	 and	 institutions.	 In	 the	following	example,	a	young	activist	discusses	the	card	PUBLIC	MORALITY.	 In	contrast	to	the	previous	statement	by	Simon,	he	does	not	emphasise	a	commonality	in	objectives,	but	a	shared	respect	for	key	values	and	of	the	institutional	framework:	Edgard:	The	consensus	here	has	to	do	with...	a	way	of	seeing	the	separation	of	powers	that	is	valid	for	everyone,	the	same	way	as	(on	both	sides)	introducing	morality	in	public	life	is	done	on	the	basis	of...	not	necessarily	on	questions	like	the	holding	of	multiple	public	functions,	but	on	a	number	of	values,	a	number	of	engagements	 too,	 of	 respect	 for	 one's	 engagements	 and	 this	 starts	 with...	 At	bottom	 there	 is	 this	 idea	 that	 elected	 representative	 should	 have	 a	 form	 of	respect	for	certain	things,	for	their	own	work	with	regard	to	citizens.	And	that	there	 should	 be	 a	 respect	 for	 pre-existing	 institutions.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 is	
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when	 the	 Right	 tried	 to	 call	 on	 the	 CESE,	 the	 Economic,	 Social	 and	Environmental	 Comity,	 as	 a	 public	 institution,	 for	 advice	 on	 gay	marriage...132	Well	there	is	a	certain	idea	of	respect,	we	don't	agree	on	everyone,	but	this	idea	of	respect	(...)	PS	participants	adopt	a	similar	kind	of	argument	when	they	value	consensus	in	the	 last	 part	 of	 the	 discussion.	 The	 following	 dialogue	 is	 particularly	 striking	 at	 a	number	of	levels.	Two	PS	activists	contrast	a	period	of	France's	history	in	which	these	suprapartisan	agreements	did	not	exist	to	the	more	appeased	current	state	of	political	debate.	 They	 emphasise	 especially	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 consensus	 on	 the	 Republic	(République	in	French)	-	the	"public	matter"	-	a	concept	which,	in	itself,	summarizes	the	notion	of	the	common	good:		René:	This	being	said,	I	don't	regret	that	a	consensus	has	emerged	on...	I	think	the	 society	 of	 the	 1970s,	 the	 society	 of	 the	 1960s	 and	1970s	was	 excessively	conflictual..	I	wouldn't	trade...	Didier:	But	that's	necessary,	that	is	what	the	Republic	is,	it’s	a	consensus.	That	is	what	the	Res	Publica	is.	A	consensus	that	exists	today	is	the	Republic.	I	mean	that	the	Right	and	the	Left	are	Republican...	René:	In	this	sense...	Yes,	you	see,	I	don't	regret	the	1900s...	(...)	we	don't	regret	the	Dreyfus	affair,	we	don't	regret	the	1930s,	to	get	closer	(to	the	present	day).	A	 real	 gathering	 of	 French	 society	 has	 occurred	 around	 the	 Republic,	 and	around	 some	 fundamental	 values.	 These	 can	 be	 instrumentalised,	 but	nevertheless	 I	 think	 that	 (the	 principle	 of)	 secularism133	remains	 something...	This	is	also	actually	why	it	can	be	used	as	a	political	instrument,	we	use	it	as	a	political	instrument	precisely	because	we	know	that	at	the	end	of	the	day	it	has	a	positive	value	for	everyone.		Didier:	Let's	say	there	is	a	consensus	on	the	organisation...	at	least	on	the	rules	of	public	debate.	Generally	speaking,	these	include	the	Republic,	democracy,	etc	(...)	As	 René	 points	 out	 in	 this	 example,	 it	 is	 because	 all	 parties	 value	 certain	fundamental	 principles,	 that	 an	 appeased	 contestation	 is	 possible	 around	 their	interpretation.	 To	 see	 the	 positive	 function	 of	 a	 suprapartisan	 consensus	 on	 the	common	good	is	therefore	not	contradictory	with	valuing	political	disagreement	for	its	own	sake.	I	now	move	to	this	specific	question.		
																																								 																					
132	A	 petition	 was	 signed	 by	 approximately	 700	 000	 French	 citizens	 and	 addressed	 to	 CESE	 for	 it	 to	examine	 the	 bill	 and	 its	 societal	 consequences	 in	 February	 2013.	 The	 CESE	 considered	 the	 request	 as	invalid,	given	that	the	law	had	not	yet	been	voted	on	at	the	time.		133	In	French,	"laïcité".	
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2.	The	ineliminability	of	disagreement	
a.	The	value	of	political	disagreement	
In	 the	 last	 part	 of	 each	 group	 discussion,	 French	 participants	 frequently	expressed	the	conviction	that	political	disagreement	is	a	necessary	and	positive	feature	of	a	democratic	society.		
	
Figure	30:	Value	associated	by	French	participants	to	political	disagreement	and	agreement	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	As	shown	in	Figure	30,	UMP	participants	were	less	likely	to	emphasise	the	value	of	agreement	as	compared	to	PS	participants.	This	is	unsurprising	in	light	of	the	general	orientation	of	UMP	activists	towards	pragmatism,	solution-seeking	and	their	emphasis	on	 a	 commonality	 of	 objectives	 among	 political	 parties.	 Transcripts	 of	 UMP	 groups	nevertheless	 provide	 examples	 of	 participants	 recognising	 the	 ineliminability	 of	political	 disagreement.	 In	 the	 following	 example,	 Thomas	 emphasises	 that	 partisan	differentiation	is	necessary	for	citizens	to	make	a	choice	among	political	alternatives:		Thomas:	 Well,	 I	 absolutely	 agree,	 I	 think	 that...	 So	 we	 shouldn't	 try	 to	 make	everyone	believe	that	the	Left	and	the	Right	have	the	same	ideas	and..	very	far	from	it,	but...	That	being	said,	I	think	it	is	because	people	are	mature	that	we	can	find	back	to	each	other	on	issues	of	national	interest...	After	that,	if...	I	mean,	on	topics	where	there	is	no	ideological	philosophy,	it	would	be	a	waste	not	to	find	a	 consensus.	 On	 topics	 that	 cause	 cleavage	 because	 we	 have	 a	 different	philosophy,	it's	absolutely	normal	and	each	power	in	place	will	enact	their	own	policies.	 I	 think	that	after	that	the	French	can...	 judge	each	policy	according	to	the	facts.	If	the	Right	has	been	so	long	in	power	it	is	maybe	because	we	noticed	that...	it	worked	better.		This	example	is	interesting	because	the	young	UMP	activist	can	retain	a	certain	vision	 of	 legitimacy	 based	 on	 problem-solving	 and	 policy	 output	while	 admitting	 the	
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democratic	necessity	of	leaving	it	up	to	citizens	to	decide	which	ideas	and	policies	are	most	 appropriate	 to	 reach	 socially	 desirable	 objectives.	 Other	 examples	 from	 UMP	groups	 demonstrate	 a	 more	 straightforward	 endorsement	 of	 the	 ineliminability	 of	disagreement.	This	is	the	case	in	the	following	dialogue,	where	UMP	participants	more	explicitly	emphasise	that	democracy	entails	the	confrontation	of	alternative	programs	of	government:		Nelson:	Actually,	compromise	cannot	be	found.	I	think	that	there	are	issues	on	which	we	will	not	be	able	to	find	a	compromise.		Agnès:	 And	 fortunately	 so.	 Because	 it's...	 it's	 the	 foundation	 of	 democracy,	 I	mean,	if	we	agreed	on	everything,	it	would	be...	I	mean,	I	don't	know.	It	leads	to	totalitarianism.		Jeanne:	Well,	others	speak	of	unity...	Nelson:	Well	I	don't	know,	because	we	speak	of	conflict...	I	would	say	we	need	more	alternatives.	 See,	because	 conflict	 is	 a	bit...	war-like,	 it’s	maybe	 just	 that	when	 it	 comes	 to	 discourse	 we	 should	 actually	 have	 the	 possibility	 of	comparing	different	discourses	on	every	topics.	See,	 it’s	more	like	that,	(at	the	moment)	we	don't	see	the	different	options	that	we	have.	We	have	declarations	of	good	 intention,	but	we	don't	see	where	 the	different	paths	are	 leading	 to,	 I	think	that	is	what	is	missing.	This	being	said,	whether	it	should	take	the	shape	of	a	general	 fight,	why	not,	 that’s	possible...	 (...)	But	 I	 think	there	 is	a	need	 for	more	choice,	more	choice	because	our	ideological	spectrum	is	too	narrow.		Importantly,	 the	 above-mentioned	 example	 is	 also	 from	 a	 local	 group	 of	UMP	activists,	who	self-avowedly	 locate	 themselves	on	 the	right-wing	 fringe	of	 their	party.	As	becomes	clear	 later	 in	 the	 transcript,	Nelson	also	calls	 for	widening	 the	spectre	of	ideological	 choice	 because	 he	 is	 critical	 of	 his	 own	 party	 for	 being	 too	 'mainstream'.	This	 type	 of	 reasoning	 was	 very	 frequent	 in	 the	 case	 of	 PS	 groups,	 who	 far	 more	frequently	than	UMP	activists	wish	for	their	own	party	to	be	more	assertive	than	they	perceive	it	to	be	(see	Chapter	3).	If,	as	shown	in	Figure	30,	they	are	more	likely	to	see	disagreement	 in	 a	 positive	 light	 than	 their	 UMP	 counterparts,	 it	 is	 therefore	 also	because	they	regret	a	consensus	which,	in	their	view,	is	established	at	the	detriment	of	left-wing	ideals.	This	comes	through	in	the	following	dialogue:		René:	(...)	What	I	have	an	issue	with,	because	now	we	were	essentially	talking	about	 issues	 of	 EU	politics	 and	public	 debt,	what	 I	 have	 an	 issue	with	 is	 that	consensus	has	been	formed	around	right-wing	theories.	The	liberal	Right	...	not	neo-liberal,	 no	 need	 to	 exaggerate,	 but	 around	 liberal,	 right-wing	 theories.	Which	means,	basically...	 reducing	public	 spending...	 giving-up	on	an	assertive	monetary	policy,	to	pressure	the	Central	Bank,	renouncing	a	European	budget,	giving-up	on	a	common	economic	policy.	That	is	what	disappoints	me.	And	we	could	also	speak	about	protectionism	later	on.	What	I	have	an	issue	with...	yes,	this	 is	what	I	have	an	issue	with,	beyond	the	very	notion	of	consensus,	what	I	have	an	issue	with,	is	that	it	is	us	who	have	capitulated	in	this	consensus.			
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Didier:	And	who	have	not	defended	our	positions,	or	at	 least	 the	positions	we	consider	needing	to	be	defended	by	the	PS	(...)		 	On	 this	 basis,	 PS	 participants	 often	 make	 a	 defence	 of	 political	disagreement	because	they	would	wish	for	their	own	party	to	disagree	with	the	UMP	in	a	more	open	and	clear-cut	way.	In	the	following	statement,	a	young	PS	activist	is	talking	about	the	topics	on	which	he	would	welcome	more	disagreement:		Patrick:	All	of	 them!	All	of	 them,	to	be	plain.	Because	the	Left	should	be	much	more	feisty	on	(the	question	of)	public	morality,	the	Left	should	be	much	more	feisty	in	its	discourse	and	in	its	actions	when	it	comes	to	immigration,	on	(the	question	 of)	 secularism,	 on	 (the	 question	 of)	 protectionism	 (...)	 On	 European	integration	 we	 need	 to	 go	 much	 further,	 and	 do	 things	 very	 differently,	 on	environmental	 issues	 we	 need	 to	 be	 much	 more	 aggressive.	 On	 every	 card	today	there	is	not	enough	(of	a)	cleavage	(...)	In	my	opinion,	if	we	were	to	reach	a	consensus	on	Europe	after	a	real	debate,	a	real	political	battle,	all	right	(...)	If	we	wage	 a	 battle	 and	we	 lose	 it,	 then	we	 lose	 it,	 that's	 democracy,	 that's	 the	debate.	 But	 if	 we	 shut	 up,	 if	 we	 just	 give	 a	 little	 speech	 to	 say:	 we	 will	renegotiate	 the	 treaty,	 and	 we	 renegotiate	 it	 without	 really	 trying	 to	renegotiate	it,	in	this	case	the	Left	really	needs	a	change	of	orientation.		As	Patrick's	statement	suggests,	PS	participants	 first	deplore	 their	party's	 lack	of	 assertiveness	 because	 this	 amounts	 to	 a	 betrayal	 of	 left-wing	 ideals.	 They	 also,	however,	regret	 this	situation	because	they	see	democracy	as	a	confrontation	of	clear	alternatives	and	consider	that	their	party	is	failing	to	participate	in	this	confrontation.	There	 are,	 therefore,	many	points	 in	 the	 interviews	were	 PS	 participants	 also	 valued	disagreement	 for	 its	 own	 sake.	 In	 the	 following	 dialogue,	 Didier	 and	 René	 equate	democracy	with	a	continuous	struggle	 in	which	each	party	tries	 to	convince	others	of	the	validity	of	their	views,	yet	each	party	is	aware	that	their	views	cannot	and	should	not	fully	triumph:		Didier:	 That's	 it	 actually,	 I	 don't	 really	 see	 the	 point	 of	 consensus...	 For	 me	politics	is	a	struggle,	it's	(about)	creating	cleavages.	That	being	said,	as	we	are	in	a	democratic	society	I	have	no	enemies,	 I	don't	have...	 I	mean,	 if	 the	person	I'm	 faced	with	disagrees	with	me,	 I	will	 talk	with	 them,	 I	will	 try	 to	 convince	them,	 but	 I	won't	 reach	 a	 consensus	 (...)	 I'm	 not	 engaged	 in	 politics	 to	 find	 a	consensus	actually.		René:	It	may	seem	a	bit	paradoxical	because	we	each	promote...	At	first	glance,	one	could	think	that	people	get	engaged	 in	politics	 to	see	their	 ideas	triumph.	So	the	more	they	triumph,	the	more	we	should	be	glad.		Didier:	 But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 day	 when	 they	 triumph	 completely	 and	everyone	agrees,	it's	the	end	of	democracy	because	that	would	mean...	We	can't	always	think	100%	in	the	same	way	(...)	
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b.	Experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue	
The	 accounts	 participants	 make	 of	 their	 everyday	 life	 experiences	 of	interpartisan	 dialogue	 constitute	 another,	 albeit	 indirect,	 source	 of	 evidence	 on	 their	attitudes	 towards	 political	 disagreement.	 I	 concluded	 each	 interview	 by	 asking	participants	about	their	real-life	encounters	with	political	opponents.	When	analysing	the	 interviews,	 I	 coded	 specifically	 for	 both	 positive	 and	 negative	 experiences	 of	interpartisan	dialogue.	While	these	only	partly	reflect	the	opinion	of	participants	on	the	value	of	disagreement,	partisans	do	often	cast	an	opinion	on	the	benefits	of	confronting	their	own	views	to	those	of	others.	To	this	extent,	whether	they	value	or	depreciate	the	experience	of	interpartisan	dialogue	offers	an	additional	measure	of	their	appreciation	of	political	disagreement	more	generally.		It	is	first	worth	worth	noticing	that	a	large	share	of	the	accounts	partisans	give	of	 encounters	 with	 political	 opponents	 refer	 to	 political	 discussions	 with	 friends.	Several	participants	on	the	right	in	fact	declared	that	most	of	their	friends	were	on	the	left,	or	that	their	closest	friends	were	on	the	left.	Below	are	several	examples:		Alexis:	I'll	tell	you	a	secret...	70%	of	my	friends	are	 left-wing,	actively	engaged	on	 the	 left,	 not	 simply	 people	 who	 see	 themselves	 as	 close	 to	 the	 Left.	 And	among	these	70%,	there	are	about	30%	who	have	key	positions	in	the	current	government,	so	people	who	are	advising	ministers,	collaborating	with	members	of	parliament,	senators,	activists	with	national	level	responsibilities,	so...	at	the	MJS,	so	I	know	them,	very	well.	We	co-exist,	we've	done	the	same	universities,	we've	 done	 the	 same	 high	 schools,	we've	 done	 the	 same	 schools,	 so	 they	 are	truly	friends	(...)	Or	Simon,	in	the	same	group:		Simon:	Well	 me	 I...	 surprisingly,	 I	 have	 more	 or	 less	 the	 same	 number	 of...	 I	mean,	perhaps	it’s	not	the	same	friends,	but	the	large	majority	of	my	friends	are	engaged,	very	active,	on	the	left.	
	
Figure	 31:	 References	 by	 French	 participants	 to	 their	 positive	 or	 negative	 personal	
experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
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As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 31,	 the	 majority	 of	 experiences	 that	 French	 partisans	accounted	for	where	positive:	65.5%	of	instances	coded	in	PS	transcripts	and	69.9%	of	UMP	 transcripts.	 Some	 participants	 would	 present	 political	 disagreement	 with	opponents	as	a	playful	and	pleasant	rhetorical	exercise,	 in	which	one	can	both	try	out	and	 exaggerate	 one's	 arguments.	 In	 the	 following	 example,	 two	 young	 PS	 activists	describe	discussions	with	some	of	their	right-wing	friends	as	a	source	of	enjoyment:		René:	They	aren't	adversaries,	the	aim	is	not	necessarily	to	convince	the	other,	I	mean	that	if	we	are	all	honest	with	each	other,	there	is	a	playful	side	to	debating	with	 right-wing	 people	who	 are	 really	 friends,	we	 play	 a	 little...	we	 tease,	we	provoke	 each	 other...	 we	 test	 our	 arguments	 a	 bit,	 we	 defend	 things	 that	 we	don't	necessarily	believe	in...	I	don't	want	to	say	this,	but	it’s	kind	of	true...	Didier:	No,	but	it’s	true,	it’s	for	the	pleasure	of	the	game...		René:	It’s	for	the	pleasure	of	the	debate,	we	radicalise	a	bit	our	positions...	Others	described	discussions	with	political	 opponents	 as	 a	necessary	 exercise	for	 someone	 engaged	 in	 politics.	 In	 these	 cases,	 they	would	 especially	 insist	 on	 how	such	 encounters	 allow	 them	 to	 refine	 their	 views	 and	 arguments	 and	 thus	 to	 learn	about	how	to	convince	those	that	still	need	convincing.	The	following	statement	from	a	young	PS	activist	is	a	good	example:		Edgard:	(...)		I	like	to	be	confronted	on	these	things,	it	forces	you	to	refine	your	arguments	as	much	as	possible.	To	be	not	 just	 capable	of	 saying...	 "we	should	fight	 against	 unemployment	 because	 unemployment	 is	 bad"	 and...	 Nowadays,	I'm	 working	 for	 Élisabeth	 Guigou,134	and	 these	 are	 (the	 type	 of)	 things	 one	could	 say	during	a	 campaign	period.	 So	when	 I	 go	 to	Seine-Saint-Denis135	and	say,	 'what	 we	 want	 is	 fight	 against	 unemployment,	 because	 unemployment	means	 no	 jobs'.	 Well	 great,	 you	 will	 have	 a	 huge	 support	 of	 the	 whole	population	who	will	applaud	you,	etc.,	 it’s	 really	easy.	But	 try	 to	say	 the	same	thing	in	the	7th	district136,	to	guys	who	tell	you,	'well,	I'm	not	unemployed!'	The	experiences	of	UMP	participants	also	combine	these	types	of	arguments.	In	the	 following	 example,	 Martine	 emphasises	 not	 only	 that	 she	 enjoys	 talking	 with	opponents,	but	that	the	challenge	it	represents	also	makes	it	particularly	interesting:		Martine:	Well	yes,	I'm	on	the	right(-fringe)	of	the	(centre-)right,	so	it	does	cause	opposition	 on	 some	 questions,	 but	 it	 doesn't	 preclude	 us	 from	 having	 drinks	together,	 from	 having	 discussions.	 And	 it’s	 quite	 fun	 as	 I	 can	 see	 that	 even	among	themselves	(the	left-wing	people	I	know)	don't	all	agree,	some	of	them	come	 closer	 to	my	 opinions,	 others	 not	 at	 all.	 But	 there	 is	 respect	 there,	 we																																									 																					
134	PS	 Member	 of	 Parliament	 for	 Seine-Saint-Denis	 and	 head	 of	 the	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Commission	 in	 the	French	Parliament.			135	Seine-Saint-Denis	is	one	of	France's	poorest	departments,	with	one	of	the	highest	unemployment	rates.	This	has	traditionally	been	a	left-wing	bastion.			136	The	7th	district	is	one	the	wealthiest	neighborhoods	in	Paris,	also	called	Saint-Germain-des-Près.		
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never	insult	each	other,	they	never	say	"well	you're	just	a	jerk,	you	are	a	right-wing	fascist",	I	never	heard	things	like	these	from	them.	On	the	contrary,	I	find	it	even	more	 interesting	because	well,	we	know	that	we	disagree,	but	 there	 is	an	open-mindedness	which	means	 that...	we	 try,	we	allow	 the	other	 to	 speak,	we	try	to	understand	his	point	of	view	(...)	Loïs,	 another	UMP	 participant	who	 is	 also	 part	 of	 a	 local	 city	 council,	 is	 even	more	 explicit	 in	 making	 this	 same	 argument,	 emphasising	 that	 he	 finds	 it	 more	interesting	to	debate	with	opponents	than	to	talk	with	fellow	partisans	from	the	Right:		Loïs:	 (...)	 People	 are	 really	 open-minded,	 the	 socialists	 in	my	 town.	We	 drink	coffee	together,	we	talk	a	bit	about	(our)	 ideology,	or	a	bit	about	the	future	of	Clichy137,	what	should	be	done,	etc.	So	on	this	front	there	is	no	problem.	Quite	the	contrary,	it's	more	enriching	than	to	talk	with	the	UMP	section	of	my	town,	where	we	all	agree	on	the	same	topics,	so	in	the	end	we	conclude	10	topics	in	the	 space	 of	 5	 minutes.	 With	 people	 from	 the	 PS...	 It’s	 really	 fascinating,	because...	 we	 don't	 try	 to	 convince	 each	 other	 at	 all	 costs...	 (With	 statements	like)	"He's	in	the	wrong,	etc.”,	so	really	there	is	mutual	respect.	Then	of	course	there	are	people	with	whom	you	can't	talk,	for	instance,	on	the	far-left,	it's	true	that...	not	necessarily	physically,	but	at	least	verbally	they	are	quite	violent.	It's	true	that	with	them	there	is	little	dialogue.	With	people	from	the	FN	not	really	either,	so...	but	with	people	from	the	Left,	that	yes,	yes,	of	course.		As	transpires	from	the	last	example	cited,	participants'	negative	encounters	are	often	 not	with	 partisans	 of	 the	main	 opposition	 party,	 but	with	 supporters	 of	 fringe	political	parties.	In	the	following	statement,	Alexandre,	on	the	right	fringe	of	the	UMP,	gives	quite	a	striking	account	of	the	contrast	between	these	two	groups	of	opponents:		Alexandre:	At	the	Tolbiac	University138,	[student	union]	elections	always	end	in	a	fight,	and...	There	are	two	lefts,	 there	is...	one	of	my	best	friends	is	at	the	PS,	she	 is	a	social-democrat.	We	talk	 for	hours	on	certain	topics,	we	quarrel	a	bit,	but	 it	all	goes	 fine.	Same	with	other	 friends	that	are	at	 the	PS,	we	talk,	 it	goes	well,	I	mean,	we	disagree	but...	Edouard:	 Even	with	 some	 people	 from	 the	 Front	 de	Gauche139	it’s	 possible	 to	have	a	discussion...	Alexandre:	Some	of	them	yes,	but	with	the	radical	Left,	it’s	really	not	worth	it.	I	can	see	it	at	Tolbiac.	They	see	me,	they	threaten	me,	there	will	always	be	one	to	try	 to	punch	me	and	 that	starts	a	 fight.	 I	don't	mind	at	all,	 I'm	the	 feisty	 type,	and	 so	 if	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 scrap,	 I'll	 do	 it.	 But	 it’s	 because	 they	 have	 that	objective...		 When	 accounting	 for	 'negative'	 experiences	 of	 interpartisan	 dialogue,	participants	 also	 tend	 to	 blame	 the	 radicalism	 of	 their	 opponents	 -	 rather	 than																																									 																					
137	Clichy	is	a	town	located	in	the	Parisian	periphery.		138	Tolbiac	is	of	the	campuses	of	the	Sorbonne,	known	to	be	very	left-leaning.					139	The	 Front	 de	 Gauche	 is	 an	 electoral	 coalition	 created	 for	 the	 2009	 European	 elections	 between	 the	French	Communist	Party	and	other	political	parties	on	the	far	left.	This	coalition	obtained	11.1%	of	votes	in	the	2012	presidential	elections	and	19	seats	in	the	2012	Parliamentary	elections.		
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dismissing	 the	actual	 experience	of	 encountering	divergent	views	altogether.	Echoing	the	 experience	of	 other	 speakers	 in	different	 groups,	Bertrand	 from	 the	PS	describes	how	he	fell	out	with	a	right-wing	friend	of	his:		Bertrand:	(These	encounters)	don't	go	so	well!	(Laughs)	I	have	a	friend	who	is	right-wing,	 and	 during	 the	 2012	 electoral	 campaign	 we	 had	 quite	 a	 quarrel	because	 of	 topics...	 it’s	 true	 that	 when	 they	 defend	 arguments	 that	 we	 really	disagree	with,	it’s	hard	to	reach	an	agreement.	I	mean	now	recently	with	same-sex	marriage,	when	we	hear	 that	homosexuality	and	being	zoophilous	are	 the	same	 thing,	 well,	 we	 have	 problems	 debating	 with	 them.	 I	 mean,	 there	 is	 a	complete	 split,	we	 have	 no	 desire	 to	 share	what	we	 think	with	 them.	But	 it’s	true	 that	 on	 less	 contentious	 topics	 debate	 is	 possible,	 even	 if	 it’s	 hard,	afterwards,	to	reach	an	agreement.		 From	these	accounts	of	interpartisan	dialogue	we	can	conclude	that	in	most	cases	participants	see	encounters	with	members	of	their	main	opposition	as	experiences	they	can	 benefit	 from,	 either	 politically	 or	 personally.	 Beyond	 a	 mere	 acceptance	 of	 the	inevitability	of	political	disagreement,	the	latter	is	seen	to	have	a	value	in	itself	and	to	produce	a	fundamentally	positive	outcome.		
The	limits	of	valuing	disagreement	While	the	above-mentioned	evidence	suggests	a	strong	commitment	of	French	participants	 to	 political	 pluralism,	 there	 are	 nevertheless	 limits	 to	 the	 self-restraint	they	 displayed	 in	 this	 particular	 area.	 There	 were	 cases	 where	 their	 particular	convictions,	and	their	belief	 in	the	validity	of	 their	own	views,	 trumped	their	belief	 in	the	necessity	of	partisan	contestation.		This	 came	 through	 in	 some	 of	 the	 arguments	 that	 UMP	 participants	 gave	 in	favour	of	political	agreement.	As	shown	in	Figure	30	above,	they	were	less	likely	than	PS	participants	to	value	disagreement	and	more	likely	to	value	agreement.	As	already	stressed	 at	 different	 points	 of	 this	 thesis,	 the	 baseline	 assumption	 of	 many	 UMP	participants	is	that	parties	want	to	solve	similar	problems.	They	therefore	criticise	their	opponents	 for	 the	means	 that	 they	 choose	 to	 reach	 these	 common	objectives.	 Such	 a	line	 of	 argument,	 however,	 easily	 turns	 into	 what	 Muirhead	 has	 termed	 the	 "naive	holism"	of	political	centrism	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	145):	a	belief	in	the	fact	that	there	is	one	 obvious	 path	 to	 the	 common	 good	 and	 that	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 do	 away	 with	ideological	considerations	to	grasp	the	right	means	to	realise	it.	The	types	of	arguments	they	 give	 for	 valuing	 consensus	 is	 thus	 a	 double-edged	 sword.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	entails	 recognising	a	 common	good,	on	 the	other	hand	 it	obscures	 the	 fact	 that	 there	may	be	alternative	ways	of	defining	it	than	their	own.	This	ambivalence	comes	through	in	the	following	example:	
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Antoine:	I	find	(consensus)	positive,	it	means	that	we	have	the	same	ideas,	the	same	objectives,	for	the	same	country,	and	that	is	good,	that's	good.		Marie:	We	don't	always	have	to	be	in	opposition	to	each	other...	Antoine:	 And	 today	 sincerely,	what	 I	would	 like	would	 be	 to	 put	 these	 cards	(showing	the	cards	he	classified	as	'conflictual'),	now	that	François	Hollande	is	in	power	for	five	years,	for	the	future	of	France,	I	would	wish	for	these	cards	to	be	on	the	other	side	(showing	the	'consensual'	part	of	his	classification),	but	I	can't.	Because	today,	after	all,	 there	 is	a	difference	between	the	Left	and	the	Right,	 I	would	 like	 for	 us	 to	 have	 the	 same	objectives	during	 these	 five	 years,	 for	 the	country	to	be	better	governed,	but	I	cannot...	Charles:	I	think	that	 is	the	aim,	 in	the	end,	to	find	solutions,	so	the	consensual	topics	should	be	more	numerous,	that's	what	we	all	wish	for,	clearly...	After	all	we	all	wish	for	François	Hollande	to	succeed,	we	don't	believe	in	it,	but	we	hope	for	it...		From	 here	 UMP	 participants	 sometimes	 concluded	 that	 those	 who	 disagree,	those	who	contest	rather	than	strive	towards	consensus,	are	not	truly	trying	to	further	the	common	good.	In	the	following	statement,	Thomas	expresses	this	idea	clearly:		Thomas:	To	tell	the	truth,	those	that	look	for	disagreement	in	all	circumstances	are	 just	 trying	 to	 grab	 attention...	 So	 yes,	we	 have	 to	 tell	 the	 truth.	 If	we	 are	really	here	to	build	something	strong	in	France	and	to	get	our	country	to	grow,	there	 is	 nothing	 better	 than	 consensus,	 so	we	 shouldn't	 be...	we	 shouldn't	 be	naive.	 I	 mean	 if	 someone	 is	 always	 looking	 for	 conflict,	 it	 means	 there	 is	 a	reason	 behind	 it...	 I	mean	 that	 at	 base	 there	 is	 often	 a	willingness	 to	 further	personal	interests,	interests	that	are	personal.		Finally,	UMP	participants	often	present	their	own	camp	as	lucid	and	pragmatic,	while	 they	 perceive	 their	 opponents	 are	 blinded	 by	 their	 ideology.	 In	 the	 following	example,	 Simon	 suggests	 that	 the	 PS	 should	 lift	 its	 socialist	 veil	 and	 accept	 that	'responsibility	 and	 rigour'	 are	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 UMP.	 This	 idea	 is	 expressed	 in	 the	following	dialogue,	in	which	UMP	participants	talk	about	their	own	weak	appreciation	of	political	disagreement:	Jean-Louis:	We	would	like	less	of	it	but...	on	our	side	I	mean...	in	favour	of	what	we	believe	in...		Simon:	Yes	I	mean,	once	again,	I	believe	in	the	virtues	of	consensus,	but	on	all	of	these	 topics,	 we	 really	 need	 our	 left-wing	 friends	 to	 go	 through	 a	 cultural	revolution,	at	 least	 in	their	behaviours.	On	the	question	of	 immigration,	etc.,	 it	will	be	necessary	that	they	be	hit	by	reality	at	some	point,	that	they	look	at	the	world	as	it	is	and	not	as	they	would	want	it	to	be...	as	they	always	wanted	it	to	be	and	as	it	never	was,	 in	the	end.	Because	it	 is	clear	that	their	solutions	have	failed.	So	we	can	hope	for	a	consensus,	but	on	these	issues	I	believe...	I	mean...	if	
we	take	into	account	the	fact	that	responsibility	and	rigour	are	on	our	side,	it	will	
be	 for	our	 left-wing	friends	to	come	in	our	direction,	 and	 I	 don’t	 think	 that	will	happen	 soon	on	 these	 issues.	They	would	need	 to	 abandon	part	 of	 their	 very	ideological	vision	on	these	issues,	because	in	my	opinion	it	has	remained	very	deeply	rooted	in	them,	and	for	a	long	time!	(...)	
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While	 PS	 participants	 did	 occasionally	 advocate	 a	 consensus	 on	 their	 own	positions,	they	were	more	measured	in	their	statements	than	their	UMP	counterparts.	In	 the	 following	dialogue	 for	 instance,	 Jean	argues	 for	greater	 consensus	on	a	 limited	number	 of	 societal	 topics,	 while	 emphasising	 that	 this	 does	 not	 preclude	 the	 more	general	persistence	of	disagreements	between	parties:		Jean:	 And	 what	 I	 wanted	 to	 say	 is...	 oh	 yes,	 concerning	 (the	 question	 of)	consensus,	 I	 would	 actually	 like	 more	 consensus	 on	 those	 topics	 where	 the	Right	 adopts	 an	 opportunistic	 discourse.	 And	 I	 think	 it	 would	 be	 more	responsible	on	their	part,	even	if	we	have	differences,	to	at	least	have	less	of	a	simplistic	discourse,	and	perhaps	to	think	things	through	more...	Author:	So	what	topics	are	you	talking	about?	Jean:	So	we	were	talking	about...	Léonard:	Immigration,	religious	minorities...	Jean:	Immigration,	security,	sexual	and	religious	minorities,	all	of	these.	So	(the	Right)	has	the	tendency	to	stigmatise	(minorities	on	these	topics),	and	here	it's	true	that	we	could	wish	for	greater	consensus...	Justin:	Well	but	they	target	us	for	running	after	the	Front	de	Gauche140	and	all,	so...(...)	 it's	 true	 that	 if	 nobody	 acted	out	 of	 political	 opportunism,	 and	 if	 each	stayed	 on	 their	 own	 line,	 then	 there	 could	 be	 more	 points	 of	 consensus	because...	 between	a	 socially	oriented	Right	and	 today's	PS,	well	 there	are	 far	less	 differences	 and	 a	 far	 greater	 possible	 consensus	 than	with	 today's	Right,	Sarkozyst	and	hard...	While	 Justin	 does	 suggest	 that	 he	 would	 wish	 the	 Right	 to	 be	 more	 'social-oriented',	he	also	frames	this	as	a	way	for	the	Right	to	stay	true	to	itself	(to	stay	'on	its	own	line'	 in	Justin's	words),	rather	than	as	a	capitulation	to	the	views	of	the	PS.	More	generally,	 these	 partisans	 seem	 to	 regret	 not	 some	much	 the	 persistence	 of	 political	disagreement	 than	 what	 they	 perceive	 to	 be	 the	 recent	 radicalisation	 of	 their	opposition.	 This	 approach	 also	 comes	 through	 in	 the	 following	 dialogue.	 Here	participants	 stress	 that,	 while	 they	 do	 sometimes	 wish	 for	 a	 political	 agreement	 on	their	 own	 positions—Quentin	 emphasises	 especially	 the	 question	 of	 gay	 marriage—such	agreements	would	not	signify	the	end	of	political	disagreement	more	generally:		Quentin:	 This	 is	 typical	 of	 contemporary	 political	 thinking,	 people	 think	 that	from	the	point	where	 there	would	be	some	kind	of	a	consensus...	 (...)	Because	this	is	how	people	conceive	of	political	thinking,	that	from	the	point	where	we	reach	something,	some	kind	of	general	idea	where	people	agree,	that	means	in	essence	that	we	stopped	thinking.	 It’s	 like	the	question	of	gay	marriage,	when	you	 say	 that...	 The	 thing	 of	 the	 Right	 that	 concerned...	 (The	 Right	 said	 we	needed)	 to	 stop	 the	 one-thought	 system.	 Of	 course	 a	 one-thought	 system	 is	dumb,	but	if	there	is	some	kind	of	consensus	towards	the	good,	that	will	never																																									 																					
140On	the	Front	de	Gauche,	see	footnote	139.		
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prevent	us	from	putting	this	question	back	into	perspective,	and	to...	(...)	To	say	that	 because	 there	 is	 a	 consensus	 that	 implies	 the	 death	 of	 thinking,	 I	 don't	agree.		Louis:	Me	neither.	From	the	point	where	you	have	a	consensus,	you	can	mark	the	point	on	which	you	reach	consensus,	and	then	go	beyond.		Edgard:	Because	there	are	always	people	that	will	be	born	after	us,	we	will	die	in	 80	 years,	 there	 will	 always	 be	 people	 that	 will	 think	 (through	 these	questions)	again.			 *	*	*		 French	 partisans	 do	 reveal	 their	 commitment	 to	 political	 pluralism	 in	 their	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement.	First,	they	recognise	and	value	the	existence	of	shared	objectives	and	principles	across	partisan	line	and	do	not	claim	the	mastery	of	these	foundations.	In	this,	they	also	show	allegiance	to	a	suprapartisan	and	 pluralistic	 idea	 of	 the	 political	 community,	 one	 in	 which	 what	 partisans	 across	political	 lines	have	 in	common	trumps	what	sets	 them	apart.	French	participants	also	demonstrate	an	attachment	to	political	contestation	for	its	own	sake.	Not	only	do	they	express	 their	 belief	 that	 political	 disagreement	 is	 an	 ineliminable	 feature	 of	 French	democracy	 as	 a	 whole,	 but	 they	 also	 see	 the	 value	 of	 interpartisan	 dialogue	 in	 their	personal	 life.	 They	 know	 that	 they	 gain	 from	 confronting	 their	 own	 convictions	 to	contradictory	views.			 There	 is	 a	 caveat	 to	 this	 generally	 positive	 conclusion:	 the	 tendency	 of	 UMP	participants	 to	 succumb	 to	 a	 form	of	 naive	 holism.	When	 they	 recognise	 that	 parties	have	 a	 shared	 commitment	 to	 the	 common	 good,	 they	 tend	 to	 emphasise	 the	 broad	political	objectives	that	parties	have	in	common	rather	than	the	principles	that	parties	share.	 With	 their	 pragmatic	 emphasis	 on	 problem-solving,	 UMP	 participants	 are	 too	quick	 to	assert	 that	 there	exists	a	unique	set	of	solutions	 to	reach	these	shared	goals.	They	 criticise	 their	 opponents	 for	 choosing	 the	 'wrong'	 means	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 the	common	 good	 and	 describe	 their	 own	 party	 as	 the	 only	 one	 capable	 of	 making	 the	'right'	choices.	In	turn,	PS	participants	reproach	their	own	party	for	succumbing	to	this	vision	 of	 the	 political	 world,	 in	 which	 there	 is	 only	 one	 set	 of	 appropriate	means	 to	reach	 a	 'commonsensical'	 common	 good.	 What	 becomes	 obscured	 with	 such	 a	worldview	 is	 the	 necessity	 of	 disagreement	 in	 a	 democratic	 society	 and	 the	 intrinsic	legitimacy	of	contradictory	claims.		
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II.	THE	HUNGARIAN	CASE	
In	 the	 second	 case	 study,	 I	 proceed	 in	 line	 with	 the	 theoretical	 framework	summarised	 in	 the	 introduction.	 I	 start	 by	 examining	 the	 attitudes	 of	 Hungarian	partisans	towards	political	agreement	and	the	extent	to	which	they	see	themselves	as	belonging	 to	 a	 suprapartisan	 political	 community	 built	 on	 shared	 values.	 The	 second	section	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	 attitudes	 of	 Hungarian	 partisans	 towards	 political	disagreement	and	whether	they	value	partisan	contestation	for	its	own	sake.			
1.	The	importance	of	shared	principles	
a.	Longing	for	a	community	of	values	
Much	 of	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 discussed	 so	 far	 indicates	 that	 Hungarian	partisans	 do	 not	 feel	 part	 of	 a	 common,	 suprapartisan	 political	 community	 built	 on	shared	 values.	 The	 previous	 chapter	 has	 already	 suggested	 this	 idea.	 Most	 often	Hungarian	 participants	 do	 not	 consider	 their	 opponents	 as	 principled	 and	 oriented	towards	 the	 common	 good.	 	 Partisans'	 weak	 respect	 for	 their	 political	 opponents	indicates	 that	 they	 view	what	 separates	 them	 from	 their	 adversaries	 as	 superseding	what	they	should	be	sharing:	a	desire	to	better	the	common	good.		As	 emphasised	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 Hungarian	 participants	 had	 great	 difficulties	identifying	 any	 ground	 of	 agreement	 with	 political	 opponents	 on	 the	 different	 cards	they	were	asked	to	discuss	(see	Figures	5	and	7,	and	Table	3).	 It	 is	not	only	that	they	could	rarely	point	to	cards	on	which	they	found	parties	to	agree.	They	would	also	only	rarely	 emphasise,	 contrary	 to	 what	 French	 participants	 did,	 that	 parties	 may	 seek	similar	objectives	 in	these	different	domains	(security,	prosperity,	etc.),	while	holding	divergent	 value-systems	 and	 suggesting	 different	 policies.	 As	was	 also	made	 clear	 in	Chapter	3,	for	Hungarian	participants	disagreement	with	opponents	is	more	of	a	matter	of	 principle,	 than	 grounded	 in	 thorough	 justification.	 MSzP	 participants	 explain	 this	widely	shared	tendency	in	the	following	dialogue:		Barnabás:	Apart	from	environmental	policy,	there	is	no	real	consensual	theme.	Lukács:	And	I	say	there	won't	be	any,	because	we	are	opposed	in	everything	to	the	ruling	party	Csilla:	Basically	(everything).	Barnabás:	 Hungarian	 public	 life	 is	 so	 divided,	 the	 cleavages	 are	 so	 great,	oppositions	 on	 the	 different	 themes	 are	 so	 great,	 disagreements	 on	 these	different	 themes,	 that	 it's	 really	difficult	 to	 find	any	 consensual	 theme	among	
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these	 (cards)	 (...)	 Because	 in	 public	 life,	 the	 dominant	 style	 is	 really	 that	 if	 a	person	is	against	the	government,	he	is	declared	a	traitor	to	the	nation.	And	at	the	 same	 time,	 to	 be	 honest,	 even	 if	 the	 government	 sometimes	makes	 some	good	 suggestions,	 it	 cannot	 be	 accepted,	 because	 the	 voters	 of	 the	 opposition	would	 see	 that	 as	 a	 proof	 of	 weakness.	 So	 today	 there	 is	 just	 no	 chance	 for	consensus	in	Hungarian	politics	(...)	The	 last	 section	 of	 the	 interviews,	 in	which	 participants	 are	 asked	 to	 ascribe	value	 to	 either	 political	 agreement	 and	 disagreement	 in	 their	 society,	 confirms	 this	general	 point,	 but	 with	 a	 fundamental	 nuance.	 Indeed,	 while	 Hungarian	 participants	recognise	that	they	lack	common	principles	with	their	opponents,	they	also	regret	this	state	of	affair.	They	long	for	the	united	political	community	that	they	do	not	have	and	wish	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 broader	 forms	 of	 agreements	within	 society.	 This	 feeling	 is	expressed	plainly	 in	 the	 following	dialogue,	where	 two	Fidesz	participants	 regret	 the	absence	of	what	they	call	a	'national	minimum'	in	Hungary:	Tamás:	In	my	opinion,	the	main	problem	with	Hungarian	politics	is	that	there	is	no	 'national	 minimum'.	 Those	 things	 on	 which	 both	 sides	 would	 agree.	 In	practice	this	does	not	exist.		Author:	A	'national	minimum'?	Olivia:	That	is	there	is	no	such...	Tamás:	A	level...	Gábor:	There	is	no	point	in	common	Olivia:		No	(such)	themes,	on	which	a	common...	Tamás:	 (Something)	 that	 is	 shared.	 On	 which	 (parties)	 aren't	 torn	 apart.	Something	 on	which	 they	 could	 come	 together,	 a	 shared	 view.	Unfortunately,	that	 doesn't	 exist.	 I	 think	 that	 on	 this,	 Hungarian	 politics	 stands	 out	 (as	compared	to)	Europe	(as	a	whole).	Participants	often	emphasise	that	such	minimal	forms	of	agreements	would	be	necessary	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 society	 together	 and	 for	 parties	 to	 be	 able	 to	 govern	effectively.	In	the	last	section	of	the	previously	quoted	Fidesz	group,	participants	gave	me	the	following	reasons	for	why	they	desire	a	more	consensual	society:		Tamás:	It	would	be	better	if	there	was	more	consensus	Olivia:	It	obviously	would	be	better.	Tamás:	 Of	 course	 it	 would	 be	 better.	 The	most	 important	 thing	 would	 be	 to	have	 a	 national	 minimum.	 If	 we	 had	 that...	 in	 reality	 a	 very	 divided	 country	cannot	make	progress.	 In	 fact,	 it	 leads	 to	 a	 lot	 of	 backsliding.	And	 the	 society	also	 falls	 apart.	 In	 reality,	 it’s	 much	 harder	 this	 way.	 It's	 harder	 to	 solve	economic	 problems	 than	 if	 we	 were	 united.	 Of	 course	 society	 will	 never	 be	100%	 united,	 because	 we	 are	 human.	 But	 it	 would	 still	 be	 necessary	 to	somehow	find	a	common	way	of	thinking.	MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 adopted	 very	 similar	 positions.	 In	 the	 following	
	
221	
statement	 for	 instance,	Dávid	 takes	Germany	as	 the	example	of	 a	 'developed	political	culture',	in	which	there	is	sufficient	agreement	between	the	main	political	parties	that	they	can	effectively	govern	together:	Dávid:	(...)	Like	the	 fact	 that	 in	Germany	they	will	now	have	a	grand	coalition,	that	is	possible	because	they	have	a	very	developed	political	culture.	And	in	fact,	such	big,	huge	differences	do	not	exist	between	what	the	CDU	and	the	SPD	say.	There	 they	 have	 that	 sort	 of	 consensus	 that	 you've	 talked	 about.	 Those	agreements	 that	 last	 for	 several	 governments,	 that	 nobody	will	 tamper	with,	because	it	works	this	way.	Well,	we	have	none	of	these.	None.	Past	governments	have	been	unable	to	agree	on	an	educational	policy	that	would	be	approved	by	all	 the	 parliamentary	 and	 extra-parliamentary	 parties,	 and	 that	 would	 be	carried	 forward	by	 the	next	government.	 If	we	begin	anew	every	 fourth	year,	then	nothing	can	ever	be	completed	(...)	In	 rare	 instances,	 participants	 also	 recognised	 their	 party's	 own	 share	 in	perpetuating	 this	 status	 quo.	 In	 the	 following	 example,	 a	 young	 Fidesz	 participant	regrets	her	own	party's	inability	to	make	a	step	in	the	MSzP's	directions,	and	deplores	the	'sensible	reforms'	made	impossible	by	this	attitude.	More	specifically,	she	is	talking	about	 a	 referendum	organised	 in	2009	by	her	 opponents	 on	 a	 reform	of	 the	national	health	system:		Naómi:	 And	 it	 is	 sometimes	 obvious	 that	 there	 aren't	 sensible	 discussions	anymore,	only	ones	that	sound	like	'if	you	go	in	this	direction,	then	I	go	in	that	direction'.	Even	if	a	good	idea	is	put	forward,	an	idea	that	should	be	supported,	if	 (your	 opponent)	 comes	 up	with	 it,	 then	 it's	 a	 'no'.	 And	 (opportunities	 for)	sensible	reforms	are	 lost	 this	way.	Like,	we	had	this	referendum	concerning	a	health	 reform	 in	 2009,	 and	 at	 that	 time	 they	 didn't	 debate	 at	 all	whether	we	need	 to	pay	 for	a	medical	consultation	or	whether	we	should	have	a	daily	 fee	for	hospital	care.	Nobody	was	really	interested.	It	was	all	about	whether	or	not	one	supports	Gyurcsány.141	Zsolt:	Yes,	exactly.	Naómi:	 This	 was	 the	 most	 terrible	 thing,	 that	 the	 discussion	 went	 in	 this	direction,	while	in	terms	of	policies	it	absolutely	made	sense.	It's	possible,	even	likely,	 that	 I	would	 have	 voted	 in	 favour	 of	 it.	 But	 because	 this	 turned	 into	 a	political	 question	 it	 became	 impossible.	 The	 right-wing	 declared	 that	 it	 could	not	support	it,	even	though	voters	did	not	agree	with	this	(position),	because	it	became	a	core	political	question.	And	it	is	often	the	case	that	(the	discussion	of)	really	 important	 and	 reasonable	 things	 goes	 in	 that	 direction.	 And	 then	 (the	discussion)	is	not	really	about	what	it	should	be	about.		
b.	Negotiating	the	basis	of	political	agreement	
Hungarian	participants	from	both	sides	of	the	political	spectrum	concur	that	their	
																																								 																					
141	Ferenc	Gyurcsány	was	MSzP	Prime	Minister	at	the	time	this	health	reform	was	debated.		
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respective	 parties	 should	 have	 more	 agreement.	 They	 similarly	 emphasise	 that	 an	agreement	on	some	core	values	would	pacify	Hungary's	political	debate,	allow	parties	to	work	more	effectively	together,	and	better	the	quality	of	governance	more	generally.	There	 is	 no	 agreement,	 however,	 on	 the	 principles	 that	 partisans	 believe	 should	 be	shared	 in	 the	 political	 community.	 If	 partisans	 had	 similar	 ideas	 about	 which	 values	should	form	the	basis	of	the	political	community,	they	would	not	regret	the	absence	of	this	 common	basis	 in	 the	 first	place.	Moreover,	whenever	participants	do	 refer	 to	 the	more	specific	principles	and	values	that	they	believe	parties	should	ideally	share,	they	also	point	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	not	 them,	but	 their	opponents	 that	 fail	 to	uphold	 these	basic	 principles.	 This	 is	 arguably	 the	 key	 problem	 of	 Hungarian	 politics:	 there	 is	 no	agreement	on	the	principles	that	form	the	common	and	these	principles	themselves	are	therefore	an	object	of	political	contestation.		It	is	noteworthy	that	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	would	rarely	get	explicit	about	the	principles	 that	 they	 consider	 should	 form	 the	 common	 good.	 In	 the	 rare	 instances	 in	which	they	did	make	such	explicit	references,	it	was	with	reference	to	the	idea	of	nation.	In	 other	 words,	 for	 their	 opposition	 to	 become	 legitimate	 in	 their	 eyes,	 these	 would	need	to	have	the	same	conception	of	the	nation,	and	of	its	role	in	politics,	than	the	one	the	 Fidesz	 upholds.	 This	 comes	 through	 in	 the	 following	 dialogue,	 in	 which	 Fidesz	activists	 are	 talking	 about	 those	 principles	 that	 should	 not	 be	 the	 object	 of	 partisan	contestation.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 it	 is	 their	 own	 ideas	 that	 they	 consider	 should	 be	more	widely	shared:	Zsolt:	 There	 are	 some	 fundamental	 principles	 that	 shouldn't	 be	 used	 in	 the	political	arena	for	one's	own	gain...		Márk:	Consensual....	Zsolt:	 ...	 that	 shouldn't	 be	 a	 topic	 of	 political	 debate,	 because	 we	 know	 that	casting	them	as	topics	of	debate	causes	damage	(to	these	principles),	that	(our	opponents)	are	trying	to	diminish	their	value.	For	instance,	the	referendum	on	dual	 citizenship,142	this	 is	not	 a	 contentious	question,	 because	 it	 is	not	 even	a	question	 (...)	Making	 the	 question	 "who	we	 are"	 into	 a	 political	 one,	 it	 is	 like	highjacking	one	part	of	the	country.	Even	if	the	person	doing	it	is	in	our	ranks,	that's	tough.		Zsolt	 is	 referring	 to	 a	 2004	 referendum	 called	 upon	 by	 a	 civil	 society	organisation,	 the	World	Association	of	Hungarians,	on	whether	or	not	 to	 facilitate	 the	acquisition	 of	 Hungarian	 citizenship	 by	 Hungarian-speakers	 living	 outside	 Hungary's	borders	 for	 several	 generations.	 The	 MSzP,	 then	 in	 government,	 argued	 against	 the	
																																								 																					
142	On	the	referendum	on	dual	citizenship,	see	footnote	63.		
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motion	on	the	basis	that	this	would	also	grant	social	and	political	rights	to	individuals	that	 do	 not	 effectively	 take	 part	 in	 the	 country's	 day-to-day	 political	 life.	 The	 Fidesz	argued	in	favour,	on	the	basis	that	these	populations	are	"ethnic"	Hungarians,	and	have	been	deprived	of	their	citizenship	only	because	of	adverse	historical	circumstances,	the	redrawing	of	 the	Austro-Hungarian	Empire's	 borders	under	 the	1920	Trianon	 treaty.	Zsolt	 is	 therefore	 indirectly	 arguing,	 that	 the	 only	 legitimate	 way	 of	 answering	 the	question	"who	we	are"	is	through	this	ethno-historical	lens.	Contesting	this	definition	of	the	 political	 community	 is,	 according	 to	 him,	 profoundly	 damaging	 to	 the	 political	community	itself.		MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 also	 adopted	 the	 position	 according	 to	 which	 it	 is	their	opponents	 that	 contest	principles	 that	 should,	 in	 fact,	be	common,	and	 that	 it	 is	therefore	up	 to	 their	opponents	 to	 join	 them	in	upholding	 these	values.	However,	 the	principles	 that	 MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 place	 in	 this	 category	 form	 part	 of	 a	 more	generally	 accepted	 definition	 of	 the	 common	 good	 in	 liberal	 democratic	 societies:	 a	respect	 for	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 the	 separation	of	 powers,	 and	 fundamental	 constitutional	principles	 more	 generally.	 In	 the	 following	 statement	 for	 instance,	 a	 young	 MSzP	participant	argues	that	this	common	basis	was	lost	in	the	last	decade,	and	it	is	clear	that	in	his	mind	it	is	the	Fidesz	that	carries	the	responsibility	for	it:		Levente:	It	would	be	good,	if	fundamental	values,	those	basic	values	that	were	still	 alive	 in	 Hungarian	 political	 life	 before	 2006-2008,	 those	 that	 concern	democracy,	 Europe,	 (state)	 independence...	 those	 values	 characteristic	 of	European	 civilisation,	 that	 everybody	 accepted	 before	 2010	 or	 2006...	 if	 we	could	 have	 these	 values	 in	 common	 again,	 if	 we	 would	 not	 have	 to	 discuss	whether	we	should	opt	for	a	one-party	system,	or	whether	we	should	remain	a	multi-party	system...	I	think	it	is	a	terrible,	huge	tragedy	that	Hungary	has	fell	so	low	(...)		That	 MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 blame	 their	 opponents	 for	 this	 state	 of	 affairs	comes	through	even	more	plainly	in	the	following	example.	Here	an	Együtt	participant	claims	that	the	Fidesz	is	not	clearly	committed	to	Hungary	being	a	modern	state:		Béla:	 (...)	 In	 a	 normal	 country,	 (political)	 debates	 concerns	 the	 means	 (of	political	 action),	 I	mean...	 there	 are	 value-based	 debates,	 but	 there	 are	 three-four	things	on	which	people	agree,	at	least	on	the	level	of	values.	But	we	don't	have	any	agreements	on	values.	It	isn't	even	decided	whether	we	want	to	go	to	the	 Right...	 the	 differences	 are	 so	 serious,	 that	 even	 at	 the	 level	 of	 general	principles	we	don't	know...	whether	we	want	to	go	back	to	the	past	and	set	up	a	kind	 of	 semi-feudal	 system,	 or	 whether	 we	 want	 to	 develop	 a	 21th	 century	modern	 state,	 because...	 it's	 not	 even	 clear	 at	 the	 level	 of	 Fidesz's	communication	 that	 they	 want	 to	 have	 a	 modern	 state	 apparatus.	 So	 at	 this	basic	 level	there	is	no	agreement,	there	is	no	societal...	The	biggest	problem	is	that	society	is	not	consulted,	in	fact	there	are	is	no	debate,	everything	is	being	imposed	and	decided	through	force.		
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In	 categorising	 their	 opponents	 as	 fundamentally	 undemocratic,	 MSzP	participants	 do	 put	 them	 outside	 of	 the	 sphere	 of	 common	 political	morality.	 By	 the	same	 token,	 they	 also	 contribute	 to	 foreclosing	 political	 debate.	 That	 being	 said,	 the	principles	 that	 they	 implicitely	promote	 in	 this	 critic	of	 their	opponents,	 for	 instance,	the	 importance	 of	 a	 multi-party	 system	 or	 the	 necessity	 of	 consulting	 civil	 society, would	not	in	themselves	limit	partisan	contestation	if	they	were	adopted	by	all	parties.	In	other	words,	MSzP	partisans	do	not	argue	in	favour	of	a	specific	interpretation	of	key	principles,	 but	 in	 favour	 of	 an	 accepted	 constitutional	 framework	 within	 which	 all	sensibilities	can	express	themselves.		The	stance	of	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	is,	on	the	other	hand,	more	problematic	from	the	perspective	of	political	pluralism.	They	are	arguing	for	more	particular	ideas	about	 the	 political	 community	 to	 be	 generalised.	 In	 arguing	 for	 the	 triumph,	 across	partisan	identities,	of	an	ethno-cultural	idea	of	the	nation,	they	also	fail	to	recognise	the	partial	nature	of	 their	own	partisan	beliefs.	To	 this	 extent,	 the	 type	of	principles	 that	they	argue	 should	be	 shared,	 forecloses,	 rather	 than	opens,	 the	potential	 for	partisan	debate.	In	what	follows	I	examine	this	last	question	in	more	detail,	presenting	evidence	on	Hungarian	participants'	attitudes	towards	political	disagreement.		
2.	The	ineliminability	of	disagreement	
	 a.	The	destructive	nature	of	political	disagreement	
Given	the	above,	it	will	come	as	no	surprise	that	Hungarian	participants	tend	to	view	partisan	disagreement	in	a	primarily	negative	light,	and	only	rarely	recognise	the	benefits	 that	 partisan	 contestation	 may	 bring.	 As	 indicated	 in	 Figure	 32	 below,	Hungarian	participants	tend	to	recognise	far	more	frequently	the	value	of	agreement	or	the	negative	consequences	of	disagreement	(both	types	of	arguments	coded	VALUE	OF	AGREEMENT),	 than	 they	 emphasise	 the	 value	 of	 disagreement	 or	 the	 negative	consequences	of	agreement	(both	types	of	arguments	coded	VALUE	OF	AGREEMENT).			
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Figure	 32:	 Value	 associated	 by	 Hungarian	 participants	 to	 political	 disagreement	 and	
agreement		
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	Beyond	the	negative	consequences	of	partisan	polarisation	on	good	governance,	an	argument	outlined	above,	activists	would	also	frequently	point	to	the	adverse	effects	of	 partisan	 disagreements	 on	 interpersonal	 relations	 and	 societal	 cohesion	 more	generally.	 Hungarian	 participants	 describe	 a	 political	 context	 in	which	 individuals	 of	opposite	 political	 convictions	 cannot	 talk	 about	 public	 affairs,	 where	 partisanship	destroys	 family	 and	 friendship	 circles,	 and	 where	 the	 mass	 of	 citizens	 becomes	disinterested	in	politics	as	a	result.	These	ideas	come	through	in	the	following	dialogue	between	MSzP	activists:		Lászlo:	According	to	me	the	greatest	problem	in	this	whole	thing,	is	that	public	life,	like	everything	else,	has	been	made	into	some	kind	of	a	constant	war	(...)	All	this	has	come	to	a	point	where	families	fall	apart,	where	circles	of	friends	break	down.	And	a	Fidesz	and	an	MSzP	supporter	simply	can't	sit	down	-	I'm	talking	about	party	members	-	at	the	same	table,	and	talk	normally.		Margit:	For	 it	 to	come	 to	 this,	you	don't	even	need	 to	be	a	party	member.	 It’s	enough	to	be	a	sympathiser.		Lászlo:	It's	true,	sympathisers	too.	Of	course	among	sympathisers	there	are	also	more	normal	people	and	we	also	have	more	dogmatic	elements	(in	our	ranks).	But	people	have	been	turned	against	each	other.	There	is	such	a	deep	divide	in	society	between	partisans	of	 the	different	parties.	And	then	we	have	the	third	largest	 category,	 which	 is	 completely	 alienated	 from	 it	 all.	 And	 there	 is	absolutely	 no	 way	 that	 they	 will...	 so	 it	 will	 be	 very	 difficult	 to	 get	 them	interested	again	in	public	affairs,	in	politics	(...)	In	 the	 following	 example,	 a	 Fidesz	 participant	 similarly	 emphasises	 how	 the	pervasive	and	intense	nature	of	partisan	divisions	turns	lay	citizens	away	from	politics:		Kálmán:	(...)	From	the	people's	point	of	view,	from	the	point	of	view	of	95%	of	them,	people	abhor	this.	It's	like,	when	tensions	go	on	constantly	in	a	family,	at	some	point	it	leads	to	fragmentation,	name	calling,	to	breaking	up.	That's	what	
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we	have	today	in	Hungary.	It's	so	evident	who	is	on	one	side,	and	who	is	on	the	other.		This	 last	 sentence	 points	 to	 a	 more	 general	 point	 made	 by	 Hungarian	participants:	 if	 politics	 are	 so	 conflictual,	 it	 is	 because	 the	 'partisan	 lens'	 is	overwhelming	in	public	life.	Partisanship	defines	individuals	not	only	because	it	implies	a	certain	view	of	the	political	world,	but	because	citizens	look	at	each	other	as	primarily	defined	by	these	political	preferences.	These	preferences	thus	tend	to	take	precedence	over	 affective	 ties	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 interpersonal	 relationships.	 These	 connections	 are	explained	in	the	following	dialogue	between	Fidesz	participants:		Olivia:	Politics	contaminates	society.	What	(politicians)	do,	does	not	stay	within	the	walls	of	parliament.	(...)	Tamás:	Discussions	in	friendship	circles,	in	the	family.	It's	there,	in	the	practice	of	our	everyday	life.	Olivia:	It's	very	much	there.	So	the	fact	that...	People	have	internalised	this	to	a	point	that	you	judge	people	immediately	when	you	learn	that	a	person	is...	you	immediately	identify	the	person	with	that	party.	For	example,	if	he	says	"I	don't	like	 Viktor	 (Orbán)",	 you	 immediately	 say,	 aha,	 all	 right,	 I	 see.	 And	 it's	 really	built	 into	 people,	 they	 look	 at	 one	 another	 like	 that,	 like	 (through	 a)	 red	 and	orange	(lens).143	And	that's	really	not	good.	Because	it	becomes	difficult	to	build	human	connections,	you	just	can't	forget	it.	Because	it’s	so	decisive	in	one's	own	life....	at	least	where	we	live,	in	our	own	lives,	that	you	just	can't	really	let	go	of	it	when	 you	meet	 somebody	 (...)	 If	 somebody	 says	 he	 is	 voting	 for	 the	MSzP,	then	 you	 know	 that	 you	 won't	 agree	 on	 much.	 Even	 though	 he's	 possibly	 a	really	 good	person.	 But	 you	 feel	 like,	 how	 is	 it	 that	 this	 person	 can	 stand	 for	these	 things	 that	are	completely	opposite	 to	 the	ones	 that	 I	 stand	 for?	 I	 think	that	for	us	it	is	something	that	is	very	emotional.		
b.	Signs	of	appreciation	of	disagreement	
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 above,	 instances	 where	 participants	 explicitely	 praised	Hungary's	 polarised	 political	 debate	 were	 seldom.	 The	 following	 statement	 from	 a	KDNP	participant	is	one	of	those	examples:		Márton:	The	issue	of	public	morality	is	an	interesting	one.	There	will	obviously	never	be	an	agreement	on	this	as	long	as	the	country	is	as	politically	divided	as	it	 is.	 Until	 then,	 each	 side	 will	 claim	 that	 the	 bad	 state	 of	 public	 morality	 is	resulting	from	what	the	other	side	does.	 I	 think	that	there	 is	no	problem	with	this,	because	I	would	actually	find	it	quite	boring	to	live	in	a	country	in	which	you	can't	tell	apart	the	Right	and	centre-left	parties.	In	fact	I	definitely	enjoy	the	fact	that	they	are	divided,	that	it's	possible	to	debate,	that	there	are	differences.	So	I	know	what	the	exact	differences	are	between	one	and	the	other,	what	are																																									 																					
143	Red	is	the	colour	associated	with	the	MSzP,	while	orange	is	the	colour	associated	with	Fidesz.		
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the	values	promoted	by	each	party.	I	believe	this	is	something	important	(...)	The	fact	that	such	examples	are	rare,	and	that	in	general	Hungarian	participants	cannot	see	the	benefits	of	the	current	state	of	partisan	contestation,	may	in	fact	be	seen	as	an	encouraging	sign	for	the	future	of	Hungarian	politics.	That	they	are	critical	of	this	situation	is	a	first,	albeit	insufficient	step,	towards	breaking	this	cycle	of	antagonism.	It	is	 the	 form	 that	 disagreement	 takes	 in	 Hungary	 which	 participants	 regret,	 and	 this	regret	does	not	signify	their	outright	rejection	of	partisan	contestation	for	its	own	sake.	This	was	in	fact	recognised	explicitly	by	a	number	of	Hungarian	participants,	and	MSzP	participants	 especially.	 In	 these	 instances,	 they	 emphasised	 more	 specifically	 that,	while	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 partisan	 contestation	 expresses	 itself	 in	 Hungary	 is	problematic,	 political	 disagreement	 remains,	 a	 necessary	 feature	 of	 democratic	 life.	This	is	expressed	in	the	following	dialogue	between	several	MSzP	activists:	Dora:	I	think	having	a	lot	of	disagreements	would	not	be	a	problem,	if	(parties)	could	 build	 on	 one	 another('s	 achievements).	 Because	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	agree	 completely,	 democracy	 depends	 on	 these	 different	 opinions.	 If	 in	 all	matters	there	were	a	lack	of	divergent	opinions,	then	there	would	be	only	one	party	and	no	opposition.			Réka:	(We	would	need)	something	more	constructive.		Eszter:	 I	 can't	 remember	which	 philosopher	 stated	 this,	 but	when...	 there	 are	two	opposed	views,	and	these	clash	with	each	other,	then	a	third,	higher,	more	sensible	 opinion	 will	 come	 out	 of	 it.	 And	 this	 opinion	 will	 generate	 its	 own	opposition,	and	these	(opinions)	will	also	intensify	and	clash	with	one	another,	and	from	this	there	will	also	emerge	a	better	result.	We	are	not	there	right	now,	we	 have	 these	 clashes	 and	 then	 everybody	 goes	 away.	 Everyone	 is	 nicely	destroying	each	other.	The	problem	is	not	with	the	confrontation,	but	the	 fact	that	 all	 we	 get	 is	 a	 dialogue	 of	 the	 deaf,	 rather	 than	 a	 third,	 better	 thing	emerging	from	it.		In	 the	 following	 statement,	 a	 young	 Fidesz	 participant	 makes	 a	 comparable,	albeit	 less	 elaborate	 point,	 emphasising	 that	 it	 is	 the	 scale	 and	 reach	 of	 partisan	disagreement	that	is	problematic	in	Hungary,	not	its	mere	existence:	Bálint:	Look,	take	the	American	party	system,	they	have	two	strong	parties,	but	I	 think	 it's	 not	 as	 polarised	 (as	 the	Hungarian	 party	 system).	 The	 problem	 is	that	this	polarisation	affects	not	only	politics,	but	society	as	a	whole.	And	that's	really	bad.		 In	the	following	dialogue,	MSzP	participants	similarly	stress	that	the	problem	of	Hungarian	 politics	 is	 that	 it	 rests	 on	 'rigid	 opposition'	 and	 not	 on	 the	 exchange	 of	rational	arguments:		Miklós	and	Dávid:	Well,	we	could	not	be	doing	worse	than	this...	László:	Well,	we	could	not	be	doing	worse	than	this.	I	would	like	decisions	to	be	made	 between	 the	 two	 blocks	 using	 rational	 arguments...	 that	 in	 this	 whole	
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story	rational	arguments	would	dominate,	not	this	rigid	opposition.			 Another,	 more	 outright	 sign	 of	 participants'	 appreciation	 of	 partisan	disagreement	 are	 their	 own,	 positive	 experiences	 of	 interpartisan	 dialogue.	 As	shown	 in	 Figure	 33,	 there	 is	 a	 relatively	 fair	 balance	 between	 negative	 and	positive	 experiences	 in	 the	 accounts	 of	 participants.	 Undeniably	 many	participants	 had	 negative	 experiences	 to	 account	 for,	 and	 they	 were	 more	generally	aware	of	the	negative	impact	of	Hungary's	extreme	form	of	polarisation	on	 their	 own	 personal	 relations	 (see	 examples	 above,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 following	section).	 But	 that	 a	 number	 of	 participants	 could	 nevertheless	 appreciate	 the	value	of	discussions	with	 some	of	 their	political	 opponents	 is,	 in	 this	particular	context,	a	positive	sign.		
	
Figure	 33:	 References	 by	 Hungarian	 participants	 to	 their	 positive	 or	 negative	 personal	
experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure		 Importantly,	 many	 of	 these	 examples	 establish	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	participants'	 own	 generation	 and	 their	 elders	 in	 their	 capacity	 to	 exchange	 with	political	 opponents.	 They	 emphasised	 that	 it	 is	 easier	 for	 younger	 members	 of	Hungarian	 society	 to	 exchange	 with	 other	 youngsters	 of	 different	 political	 opinions	than	it	is	for	elder	Hungarians.	This	argument	comes	through	in	the	following	dialogue	between	Fidesz	activists,	who	are	talking	about	constructive	exchanges	that	they	have	had	with	political	opponents:		István:	 It's	 quite	 interesting.	 I	 can	 easily	 say	 that	 this	would	 have	 been	 quite	unimaginable	 10	 years	 ago,	 at	most	 (this	would	 have	 been	 imaginable)	 for	 a	public	debate.	But	the	situation	has	changed	to	such	an	extent	in	our	generation,	that	we	organise	a	 series	of	 events,	 the	Tranzit	meetings,	where	we	 regularly	invite	speakers	from	the	Left,	older	ones,	younger	ones.	And	for	example	we	can	
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have	a	beer	with	(someone	 like)	Gábor	Vágó	 from	the	LMP.144	We	don't	agree	on	 a	 lot	 of	 things,	 but	 that	 tension	 and	 visceral	 passion	 doesn't	 exist	 in	 our	generation.	 I	 could	 quite	 easily	 imagine	 sitting	 down	 for	 half	 an	 hour	with	 a	young	 left-wing	 person	 to	 talk,	 even	 if	we	 do	 not	 agree	 on	many	 things.	 This	would	have	been	unthinkable	10	years	ago	(...)	Péter:	 (...)	 I	 was	 often	 in	 situations	 where	 we	 found	 ourselves	 sitting	 at	 the	same	table	with	young	left	wing	and	liberal	political	activists.	These	were	in	any	case	 interesting	 conversations,	 we	 disagreed	 on	 many	 things,	 but	 in	 our	generation	 we	 don't	 have	 this	 idea	 that	 the	 other	 aims	 at	 destroying	 the	opposite	side.	This	is	just	not	the	case	anymore,	rather	we	are	able	to	sit	at	the	same	table	and	talk	and	debate	with	each	other.				 On	the	basis	of	these	positive	experiences,	some	participants	also	outlined	their	hope	 that	 generational	 change	 would	 solve	 the	 problems	 associated	 with	 partisan	polarisation	in	Hungary	and	give	way	to	more	appeased	forms	of	political	debate.	Márk,	a	young	Fidesz	activist,	expresses	this	idea	in	the	following	example:	Márk:	 (...)	 (This	polarisation)	will	disappear	one	way	or	another	anyways,	 it's	simply	 a	 question	 of	 generational	 renewal.	 The	 present	 political	 elite	 has	demonstrated	 it's	 inability	 to	 find...	 to	 communicate	 with	 the	 other	 side	 and	reach	agreements.	They	are	just	unable	(to	do	it).	This	is	partly	because	of	this	communist/anti-communist,	 Left/Right	 divide.	 But	 these	 cleavages,	 that	 exist	today	 (...)	 they	 aren't	 so	 divisive	 in	 younger	 circles.	 They	 aren't	 closely	 as	divisive	as	they	are	among	our	fathers'	circles.	 It's	not	even	comparable.	 I	can	discuss	 politics	 very	 well,	 or	 anything	 else,	 with	 a	 left-wing	 friend	 of	 mine	whose	 parents	 are	 left-wing,	 too.	 Actually,	 we	 can	 be	 very	 well	 together,	 we	agree	on	so	many	things	that	I	could	even	imagine	forming	a	government	with	him	 (...)	 (In	 Hungary)	 we	 have	 this	 (partisan)	 divide.	 It	 is	 because	 of	 our	historical	 heritage	 that	 we	 have	 such	 a	 divide,	 but	 only	 in	 our	 fathers'	(generation).	It's	not	something	that	really	exists	in	the	younger	generation.	It's	insignificant.	 This	 divide	 doesn't	 exist.	 And	 with	 time	 this	 will	 dominate.	 At	least	I	hope.		 An	MSzP	activist	expresses	a	comparable	idea	in	the	following	statement:		Attila:	When	this	right-wing	generation,	that	is	doing	this	top-down	governance,	will	be	on	the	way	out,	I	am	hopeful	that	there	won't	always	be	these	intrigues	between	 Left	 and	 Right,	 we	 hate	 this	 situation	 so	 much...	 I	 have	 right-wing	friends,	David	has	 too,	everyone	does.	We	are	open-minded,	 in	 this	age	group	there	aren't	such	serious	conflicts.	It	is	above	that	there	is	this	"we	hate	the	Left,	we	hate	the	communists"	movement.		
c.	Blaming	opponents	for	the	pathologies	of	partisanship	
	 We	might	 nevertheless	 question	whether	Hungarian	 partisans	 are	 sufficiently	self-reflective	 to	 counter	 the	 negative	 cycle	 that	 they	 are	 critical	 of.	 The	 evidence																																									 																					
144	The	LMP	(Lehet	Más	a	Politika,	which	means	'politics	can	be	different')	is	a	fringe	Green	party	founded	in	2009.	It	scored	between	2.5%	and	7.5%	of	the	vote	in	national	and	European	elections	since	then.		
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presented	 in	 previous	 chapters	 makes	 clear,	 that	 these	 young	 partisans	 are	contributing	 to	 the	 bleak	 quality	 of	 Hungarian	 political	 debate	 through	 their	 own	discursive	practices.	If	they	are	in	any	ways	representative	of	the	upcoming	generation	of	 politicians	 in	 Hungary,	 then	 their	 hope	 that	 political	 change	 will	 come	 through	generational	renewal	will	most	likely	be	disappointed.			 There	 are	 other	 signs	 that	 Hungarian	 participants	 are	 not	 in	 a	 position	 to	reverse	 the	 tendencies	 that	 they	 themselves	 deplore.	 This	 would	 first	 require	 that	participants	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 role	 that	 their	 own	 party,	 and	 ideally,	 they	 themselves,	play	in	fuelling	the	fire.	As	Naomi's	statements	on	page	221	show,	there	are	cases	when	participants	 regretted	 the	stubbornness	of	 their	own	party.	 Instances	of	 self-criticism	are,	however,	very	rare	in	Hungarian	groups	(see	Figure	24	in	Chapter	4).	And	even	in	these	rare	instances,	participants	are	far	less	severe	with	their	own	party	than	they	are	with	 their	 opponents.	 Consider	 the	 following	 dialogue	 between	 MSzP	 participants.	After	having	criticised	his	opponents	for	using	injurious	vocabulary	in	Parliament,	he	is	far	more	lenient	towards	similar	practices	in	his	own	camp:		Dávid:	I	listened	to	some	speeches	from	the	first	Hungarian	Parliaments	in	the	1990s.	Compared	to	what	we	have	today,	these	were	really	pleasant	to	my	ears.	So	I	listened	to	them...	Margit:	You	were	not	even	born	then.	Dávid:	 I	 didn't	 listen	 to	 them	 at	 the	 time...	 So	 there	 were	 things	 like	 "may	 I	remind	 the	honourable	MP	that	what	he	says	does	not	correspond	to	reality”.	And	even	 that	sounded	really	rude.	While	now...	 I	was	 in	 the	Parliament,	 they	shout	at	each	other	to	a	point	that	the	TV	viewer	can't	even	hear	anything.	They	insult	women,	disparage	them.	The	fact	 that	there	are	Nazis	 in	the	Parliament	makes	 things	 even	 worse.	 And	 unfortunately	 we	 ourselves	 sometimes	contribute	 to	 lowering	 the	 level.	Like	 this	Tibor	Szanyi.	 I	 like	him	a	 lot,	he's	a	swell	guy.	And	he	is	right	when	he	says	'fuck'	in	Parliament.145	But...	Margit:	Well,	no,	that's	not	really	good-mannered	Dávid:	But	he	shouldn't	do	that	in	Parliament.	Exactly...		 More	 generally	 speaking,	 both	 groups	 of	 partisans	 tend	 to	 blame	 their	opponents	for	Hungary's	particular	situation.	Each	are	waiting	for	the	other	to	change,	rather	 than	 talking	 about	 what	 they	 could	 be	 doing	 themselves.	 There	 are	 in	 fact	striking	parallels	in	the	discourse	of	both	groups	of	participants.	Both	tend	to	blame	the	initial	 degradation	 of	 public	 discourse	 in	 the	 early	 2000s	 on	 their	 opponents.	 In	 the	following	 statement,	 a	 young	 MSzP	 participant	 is	 talking	 about	 changes	 in	 Fidesz's	
																																								 																					
145 	Tibor	 Szanyi	 was	 an	 MSzP	 Member	 of	 Parliament	 between	 2010	 and	 2014	 known	 for	 having	particularly	strong	language.		
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strategy	during	the	2002	campaign:		Lászlo:	From	2002	onwards,	Orbán	defined	himself	as	an	enemy	of	 the	MSzP.	From	 that	 point	 on	 I	 don't	 really	 see	 how	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 to	 find	 a	consensus.	There	may	be	some	trivial	affairs	in	which	we	can	agree	(...)	But	on	the	major	questions	that	feature	on	these	cards,	these	twelve	cards,	(the	Fidesz)	said	 openly	 that	 everything	we	 did	was	wrong.	 It's	 not	 that	 I	want	 to	 accuse	them	of	having	 'started	 it',	 like	kids	do.	But	 from	 that	moment	onwards,	 they	really	went	in	the	opposite	direction	on	everything.	And	then	they	had	no	other	choice,	but	to	actually	put	(these	discourses)	into	practice.	Or	they	undid	what	we	had	done.	And	for	us,	 that's	bad.	Because,	well,	obviously!	From	that	point	on	it	becomes	an	impossible	situation.		 The	 words	 of	 Iván,	 a	 young	 Fidesz	 activist,	 closely	 mirror	 the	 above-cited	statements	by	Lászlo.		He	directs	very	similar	accusations	towards	his	opponents:		Iván:	Another	 important	difference	 is...	Well	you	know,	we	said	 that	we	stand	for	 something,	 while	 they	 just	 watch	 the	 other	 side,	 and	 they	 go	 against	 it,	criticise	it.	At	the	time	of	the	2002	elections,	the	Fidesz	was	not	fully	aware	of	the	importance	of	negative	campaigning.	But	the	socialists	did	not	do	anything	else	but	attack	the	previous	four	successful	years	on	every	possible	front.	While	the	 Fidesz,	 and	 even	 Viktor	 Orbán	 himself,	 felt	 that...	 it's	 not	 necessary	 to	conduct	 a	 negative	 campaign,	 it's	 sufficient	 to	 emphasise	 the	 results.	 To	 talk	about	the	results	(...)	Participants	 from	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	would	 similarly	 accuse	their	opponents	of	ascribing	 labels	 to	 them	that	delegitimise	any	of	 their	actions,	and	against	which	no	defence	 is	 possible.	Here	 a	 young	MSzP	participant	 is	 talking	 about	how	her	opponents	call	her	party	'communist':		Csilla:	 (The)	problem	 is	 that	 they	are	unable	 to	get	over	 the	past.	To	 this	day	they	 call	 the	 socialist	 party	 'communist'.	 It	 doesn't	 matter	 if	 (the	 MSzP)	 has	young	people	 (in	 its	 ranks),	 it	 doesn't	matter	 that	we	don't	 really	know	what	communism	was,	and	that	we	haven't	experienced	it.	We	just	cannot	get	rid	of	this	 label,	 because	 here	 are	 people	 that	 actually	 lived	 through	 (communism),	and	they	tell	us	that	we	are	like	that.		In	the	following	statement,	a	young	Fidesz	activist	addresses	similar	criticisms	to	his	opponents,	stressing	that	no	debate	is	possible	once	the	MSzP	starts	using	words	such	as	"fascist"	and	"Nazi"	to	characterize	the	government's	actions:		Krisztoff:	An	unnecessary	 form	of	hysteria	 is	being	 introduced	 in	public	 life.	 I	don't	 know,	 there	 is	 this	 demonizing...	 Obviously	 it	 is	 possible,	 and	 even	necessary,	 to	 accept	 serious	 criticism	 again	 our	 party.	 But	 there	 are	 people	crying	out	that	we	have	here	a	fascist,	Nazi	dictatorship,	that	the	persecution	of	gypsies	is	raging,	that	we	are	bringing	people	away,	and	that	is	a	lie,	I	mean...	If	someone	here	says	that	there	is	a	dictatorship,	then	it	 is	 impossible	to	debate,	then	everything...	any	possible	debate	is	closed	down	with	these	(accusations).	(...)	
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	 Finally,	 in	most	 of	 their	 	 accounts	 of	negative	 real-life	 encounters	with	 political	adversaries,	participants	picture	 themselves	as	 the	ones	 trying	 to	establish	a	dialogue	and	their	opponents	as	those	making	it	fail.	In	the	following	statement,	a	young	Együtt	activist	 describes	 the	 difficulties	 he	 encountered	 when	 he	 tried	 talking	 to	 Fidesz	supporters:		Miklos:	 I	 have	 to	 admit	 that,	 while	 I	 have	 Fidesz	 acquaintances,	 it's	 simply	impossible	 to	 exchange	 with	 them.	 I	 consider	 myself	 a	 left-wing,	 intellectual	person,	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	 in	my	habit	 to	 try	and	 start	 some	discussion	 (with	them)	and	try	to	give	some	arguments.	So	I	say,	"all	right,	why	don't	you	try	and	think	 this	 thing	 over”.	 But	 at	 the	 very	moment	when	 I	 say	 something,	 I	 see	 a	grey	veil	covering	his	eyes,	he	changes	into	Viktor	Orbán	and	he	shouts	at	me,	letting	me	know	that	I'm	just	a	stupid	jerk	to	vote	for	the	Left,	a	retard,	and	how	can	I	not	see	that	they	have	sold	the	country	out...	And	(in	response)	to	this,	 I	just	don't	know	what	to	say,	I'm	just	sitting	there,	and	wondering:	What	is	this?	How	can	this	be?		 This	 account	 closely	 mirrors	 the	 experience	 of	 Zsolt,	 a	 young	 Fidesz	 activist,	who	 similarly	 emphasises	 the	 closed-mindedness	 he	 confronts	 when	 talking	 to	opponents:		Zsolt:	 There	 is	 no	 content,	 only	 emotion.	 And	 to	 emotion	 one	 can	 answer	emotionally	 -	 but	 then	 there	 is	 no	 communication	 or	 dialogue	 with	 the	 Left,	only	disputes.	Or	one	 tries	 to	 give	 reasoned	arguments,	 but	 then	 it	 turns	out,	that	 this	 is	 not	 even	 really	 what	 the	 discussion	 is	 about.	 They	 aren't	 even	criticising	what	you	are	 saying.	 It	 goes	 in	 the	 register	of	passion,	 and	 there	 is	conflict.	 And	 it	 just	 turns	 out	 that	 you	 don't	 even	 understand	 one	 another,	because	(your	interlocutor)	just	says	'I	hate,	I	hate,	I	hate',	and	I	answer	'What's	the	 problem?	 What’s	 the	 problem?	 What’s	 the	 problem?'	 This	 is	 how	 I	experience	these	instances	of	conflict.		
d.	Questioning	the	necessity	of	opposition	
Finally,	a	number	of	examples	suggest	 that	Fidesz-KDNP	participants	question	whether	the	existence	of	the	Left	is	necessary	in	Hungarian	politics.	Fidesz	participants,	for	instance,	sometimes	pictured	the	MSzP	as	a	remnant	of	the	past,	one	that	would	not	necessarily	 remain	 a	 key	 political	 actor	 in	 the	 future.	 In	 these	 statements,	 they	 also	convey	the	idea	that	Hungarian	politics	would	do	better,	if	this	were	to	happen.	In	the	following	statement,	for	instance,	a	young	Fidesz	participant	describes	how	the	MSzP	is	dependent	on	an	ageing	electorate	that	is	nostalgic	of	communist	rule.	According	to	her,	Hungarian	politics	will	be	'difficult'	until	'society	is	not	renewed':	Olga:	We	still	have	a	lot	of	old	people.	I	was	at	an	MSzP	convention,	and	90%	of	them	were	old	women	(...)	Until	society	is	not	renewed...	or	until	young	people	become	a	majority	and	not	the	elderly	who	worked	under	communism,	and	had	their	best	time	back	then...	Because	they	had	jobs,	salaries,	they	could	go	to	the	
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Balaton146	twice	each	summer	to	some	union	holiday	home,	 this	was	for	them	joyful,	beautiful.	While	now,	I	don't	know,	they	have	small	retirements,	jobless	children,	and	they	will	therefore	not	vote	for	anybody	else	(than	the	MSzP)	(...)	I	mean,	 until	 society	 is	 not	 renewed	 and	 until	 the	 young	 people	 who	 haven't	grown	up	under	communism	are	in	minority,	it	will	be	difficult.	Another	 Fidesz	 participant	 was	 more	 explicit,	 and	 predicted	 that	 the	 MSzP	would	disapear	with	generational	renewal:		Nándor:	The	Left	will	disappear	and	it's	place	will	be	taken	by	the	radical	and	moderate	Right	 (...)	 To	make	 it	 short,	 the	 Fidesz	will	 fall	 apart	 and	 become	 a	right-liberal	party,	and	its	more	radical	(elements)	will	 form	a	new	party	with	the	 least	 radical	 element	 of	 the	 Jobbik,	 and	 they	 will	 be	 the	 next...	 And	 so...	Because	whatever	the	MSzP	is	trying,	its	voter	base	is	shrinking	over	time.	And	in	 the	meantime	 there	 are	more	 and	more	 right-wing	 voters,	 because	 young	people	are	right-wing.	Old	people	support	the	MSzP,	and	Bajnai	will	not	be	able	to	draw	anyone	from	the	MSzP.147	(...)	Neither	Olga	nor	Nándor	imagine	the	possibility	that	the	MSzP	disapears	but	is	replaced	by	another	left-wing	party.	Their	vision	of	the	future	is	one	in	which	the	Right	stands	alone.	And	neither	of	them	view	this	scenario	as	problematic.	 In	the	statement	below,	Zsolt,	another	Fidesz	activist,	makes	this	point	more	explicitly.	He	suggests	that	the	 only	 reason	why	 the	 Left	 still	 exists	 in	 Hungary	 is	 that	 part	 of	 the	 population	 is	irresponsible	and	'non-productive'.	He	also	implies	that	the	country	would	be	far	better	off	without	these	people,	and	thus	without	their	opponents	being	able	to	obtain	power.	In	his	first	sentence,	Zsolt	is	talking	about	Fidesz	voters:		Zsolt:	Because	when	you	have	responsibilities,	it	is	also	more	difficult	for	you	to	be	 a	 mere	 profiteer.	 The	 person	 who	 produces	 things	 necessarily	 has	responsibilities.	And	that's	the	root	of	the	problem,	we	don't	have	50%...	There	are	3,8	million	people	in	Hungary	who	work,	who	give	some	revenue	on	a	daily	basis.	 And	 the	 population	 that	 can	 vote	 is	 of	 8	 million.	 That's	 the	 problem.	That's	why	the	Left	exists	in	Hungary,	that's	why	it	can	obtain	power	at	all	(...)	MSzP-Együtt	participants	did	not	predict	 the	disapearance	of	 their	opponents,	or	 imply	 that	 their	 country	 would	 do	 better	 without	 the	 Fidesz.	 They	 did,	 however,	hope	 for	Fidesz	 to	 change	 in	 the	 future	 and	 saw	 this	 change	as	necessary	 for	 a	more	balanced	 form	of	political	debate	 to	emerge	 in	Hungary.	 In	 the	 following	dialogue	 for	instance,	MSzP	 participants	wish	 for	 Fidesz	 to	 change	 into	 a	 'European	 conservative	party',	but	do	not	predict	that	the	Right	as	such	will	disappear:		Levente:	 (...)	 That	would	 be	 good,	 I	mean...	 if	 from	 the	 ruins	 of	 the	MSzMP,	 a																																									 																					
146	The	 Balaton	 is	 a	 large	 lake	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 Hungary,	 where	 many	 Hungarians	 still	 go	 spend	 their	summer	holidays.		147	Gordon	Bajnai	 served	as	MSzP	Prime	Minister	 in	2009	and	2010.	 In	2012	he	 founded	his	own	party,	Együtt	2014.		
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party-state,	we	could	built	a	European,	West-European	social-democratic	party,	then	sooner	or	later	the	Fidesz	could	also	change	into	a	European	conservative	party	Attila:	These	people	will	get	older	and	older.	The	Fidesz	won't	be	 like	 this	 for	the	next	200	years,	Viktor	Orbán	won't	live	for	200	years...	Levente:	The	point	is...	the	problem	is...	Attila:	That	we	have	to	wait	until	then.		Another	MSzP	activist	develops	a	similar	idea	at	greater	length	in	the	following	statement.	Here	Kálmán	emphasises	 that	he	has	no	problem	with	having	a	right-wing	opposition	and	that	his	country	needs	a	strong	conservative	party.	He	simply	wishes	for	the	Fidesz	to	grant	more	legitimacy	to	the	Left	in	return:		Kálmán:	 I	 wish	 we	 could	 get	 to	 a	 point	 where,	 when	 the	 right-wing	 wins	 in	Hungary,	I	wouldn't	have	to	feel	bad	in	this	country	for	being	left-wing.	I	don't	have	 a	 problem	with	 the	Prime	Minister	 coming	 from	 the	 Fidesz,	 rather	 than	the	MSzP.	But	simply	they	should	not	question	my	national	pride,	 they	should	not	question	my	right	 to	exist.	Because	 these	people	wanted	 to	 include	 in	 the	Basic	Law	that	those	who	are	member	of	the	MSzP	are	criminals	and	should	be	ashamed.	 In	 the	 Hungarian	 Basic	 Law,	 they	 wanted	 to	 include	 that	 being	 a	member	of	one	of	the	largest	parties	of	Hungary	is	criminal.148	I	should	not	have	to	feel	bad,	in	my	own	country,	because	the	government	is	on	the	other	side.	I	wish	for	an	election	day	where	it	does	not	matter	who	wins	the	election.	I	don't	mind	 it,	 I	believe	we	need	a	right-wing,	 I	would	even	say	 that	 there	are	many	conservative	values	which	I	believe	we	need.	But	it’s	not	right	that	people	have	to	 live	 under	 this	 aggressive	 domination,	 in	 fear.	 And	 (it's	 not	 right)	 to	 have	today	such	a	bad	public	atmosphere	imposed	on	this	country.			 *	*	*		 In	the	two	previous	chapters	on	partisan	cohesiveness	and	respect	for	political	opponents,	 the	conclusions	 for	the	Hungarian	case	were	relatively	straightforward.	 In	both	 cases,	 the	 discourse	 of	 Hungarian	 partisans	 failed	 to	meet	 the	 standards	 it	was	held	 up	 against.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 results	 for	 this	 third	 empirical	 chapter	 are	 mixed.	Hungarian	 partisans	 do	 not	 meet	 the	 criteria	 established	 in	 the	 exact	 way	 that	 the	theoretical	 framework	 would	 predict.	 Hungarian	 participants	 do	 not	 recognise	 that	partisans	 of	 all	 tendencies	 share	 some	 basic	 principles	 and	 that	 they	 are	 part	 of	 a	
																																								 																					
148	Article	U	of	the	new	Fundamental	Law	stipulates	that	"(t)he	Hungarian	Socialist	Workers’	Party	and	its	legal	 predecessors	 and	 the	 other	 political	 organisations	 established	 to	 serve	 them	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	communist	 ideology	 were	 criminal	 organisations,	 and	 their	 leaders	 shall	 have	 responsibility	 without	statute	of	 limitations	 (...)	 (p)olitical	 organisations	having	 gained	 legal	 recognition	during	 the	democratic	transition	as	legal	successors	of	the	Hungarian	Socialist	Workers’	Party	continue	to	share	the	responsibility	of	 their	 predecessors	 as	 beneficiaries	 of	 their	 unlawfully	 accumulated	 assets"	 (Hungarian	 Parliament,	2011).	While	 this	 does	 not	 directly	 restrict	 the	 rights	 of	 the	MSzP	 to	 compete	 for	 electoral	 support,	 the	wording	of	this	article	is	sufficiently	vague	that	it	could	serve	as	a	legal	basis	to	do	so	in	the	future.	
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suprapartisan	political	community.	They	have	great	difficulties	identifying	the	positive	implications	 of	 political	 disagreement	 in	 their	 society	 and	 in	 their	 personal	 relations.	Notwithstanding	 this,	 they	 display	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 lucidity	 on	 the	 pathologies	 of	partisanship	 in	 their	 own	 country.	 They	 long	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 those	 common	foundations	 that	 parties	 in	 their	 country	 lack,	 and	wish	 for	 their	 society	 to	 evolve	 in	such	a	way	that	political	disagreement	could	be	valued	for	its	own	sake.		 Hungarian	 partisans	 are	 nevertheless	 key	 contributors	 to	 the	 tendencies	 that	they	deplore,	and	they	most	often	lack	the	reflexivity	to	see	the	responsibility	of	their	own	camp	in	this	state	of	affair.	This	critical	awareness	is	what	Hungarian	partisans	are	missing	 to	 make	 a	 positive	 contribution	 to	 Hungarian	 democracy.	 In	 this	 light,	 it	 is	ironic	 that	 they	 depict	 generational	 renewal	 as	 a	 miraculous	 cure	 to	 their	 country's	problems.	Change	through	generational	renewal	would	require	that	they	themselves,	as	representatives	 of	 a	 new	 generation	 of	 politicians,	 see	 the	 share	 of	 their	 party	 in	perpetuating	these	problems.			 There	 are	 also	 key	 differences	 between	 the	 discourse	 of	 MSzP	 and	 Fidesz	activists	on	this	measure.	MSzP	activists	wish	 for	a	greater	consensus	across	partisan	lines	on	what	is	generally	understood	to	be	the	'common	good'	in	democratic	societies:	key	constitutional	principles	and	a	democratic	institutional	framework.	Fidesz	activists	also	have	an	idea	of	what	these	common	foundations	should	be,	but	it	is	ethno-cultural	and	 grounded	 in	 a	 distinct	 political	 narrative.	 There	 is,	 therefore,	 a	 key	 difference	between	these	two	possible	foundations	for	the	Hungarian	political	community.	The	set	of	principles	put	forward	by	MSzP-Együtt	activists	can	in	theory	be	interpreted	in	many	different	ways.	Their	adoption	by	all	parties	would	not	preclude	partisan	contestation.	The	 common	 principles	 that	 Fidesz	 activists	 set	 forward,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 do	 no	accommodate	alternative	interpretations.	Their	partial	view	of	the	political	community	certainly	 has	 a	 legitimate	 place	 among	 other	 partial	 claims.	 But	 its	 adoption	 by	 all	parties	would	necessarily	 foreclose	political	debate.	 It	 therefore	comes	as	no	surprise	that	some	Fidesz	participants	are	able	to	imagine	-	or	even	to	wish	-	for	an	alternative	reality	 in	which	 their	opponents	do	not	exist.	The	nation	as	 they	conceive	 it	 could,	 in	theory,	accomodate	itself	of	the	disapearance	of	the	Left.	Even	if	MSzP	participants	wish	for	their	opponents	to	change,	they	at	least	do	not	expect	them	to	disappear.	They	can	wish	 for	 Fidesz	 to	 endorse	 broad	 democratic	 principles	 without	 hoping	 for	 partisan	contestation	to	come	to	an	end.		
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III.	DISCUSSION	OF	RESULTS	
1.	Variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	With	 this	 last	 empirical	 chapter,	 we	 reach	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 matter	 in	 what	separates	the	ethics	of	French	and	Hungarian	partisanship.	Recognising	the	existence	of	foundational	 agreements	 and	 valuing	 political	 disagreement	 for	 its	 own	 sake	 are	 the	two	ideas	at	the	very	core	of	a	pluralist	conception	of	the	political	universe.	I	will	first	summarize	the	variations	in	partisan	commitment	to	pluralism	in	both	countries	under	study	 and	 provide	 another	 answer	 to	 the	 question:	 to	 what	 extent	 does	 real-world	
partisanship	meet	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	 partisanship?	 Overall,	 French	 partisans	have	 a	 far	 more	 pluralist	 approach	 to	 political	 agreement	 and	 disagreement	 than	Hungarian	participants.	The	comparison	of	the	French	and	Hungarian	coding	evidence	in	Appendix	6	also	confirms	this	general	tendency.			In	France	the	existence	of	an	accepted,	common	political	space	sets	boundaries	to	partisan	contestation.	Political	disagreement	can	be	valued	for	its	own	sake	because	it	does	not	threaten	the	basic	principles	that	hold	the	political	community	together.	 If	partisans	are	sometimes	tempted	to	argue	for	a	greater	consensus	on	their	own	views,	they	 never	 suggest	 that	 politics	 could	 do	 without	 their	 opponents.	 They	 never	 even	imagine	a	hypothetical	situation	in	which	they	would	be	the	only	political	actor.		In	Hungary,	there	is	no	agreement	on	the	basic	principles	that	partisans	should	share	in	order	for	a	democratic	political	community	to	exist.	If	the	very	foundations	of	the	 political	 community	 are	 the	 object	 of	 partisan	 contestation,	 then	 the	 peaceful	confrontation	 of	 partisan	 claims	 about	 the	 common	 good	 becomes	 impossible.	 The	Hungarian	situation	finds	an	echo	in	the	words	of	Muirhead,	according	to	which	when	"rival	partisans	 inhabit	 'different	worlds'	(...w)hen	the	common	terrain	of	 factuality	 is	obliterated,	 (then)	 it	 becomes	 impossible	 to	 share	 a	 political	 community"	 (Muirhead,	2014,	 p.	 125).	 In	 such	 a	 context,	 partisan	 disagreement	 is	 effectively	 destructive	 and	hard	to	value	for	its	own	sake.	Hungarian	partisans	show	awareness	of	the	destructive	nature	 of	 this	 situation,	 but	 are	 unable	 to	 perceive	 their	 own	 party's	 role	 in	 it.	 The	temptation	is	strong	for	partisans	to	make	a	claim	on	the	'mastery	of	the	foundations',	and	 thus	 to	 wish	 for	 the	 disappearance	 of	 an	 opposition	 held	 responsible	 for	 the	turmoil	that	plagues	politics.		There	are	also	differences	between	parties	in	each	country.	PS	participants	are	overall	more	pluralist	in	their	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement	than	 their	UMP	 counterparts.	UMP	participants	 tend	 to	 limit	 the	 'common	good'	 to	 a	
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broad	 set	 of	 political	 objectives	 parties	 have	 in	 common.	 They	 sometimes	 end	 up	claiming	that	their	own	party	is	uniquely	capable	of	promoting	the	right	set	of	solutions	to	 reach	 these	 shared	 goals.	 In	 this	 world-view,	 political	 disagreement	 becomes	 an	unnecessary	feature	of	public	life,	one	that	could	recede	if	their	opponents	would	adopt	a	more	pragmatic	approach	to	public	policy.	PS	participants,	on	the	other	hand,	do	not	succumb	to	this	form	of	technocratic	holism.	They	ground	the	common	good	in	a	set	of	shared	 values	 and	 more	 explicitely	 picture	 disagreement	 as	 an	 ineliminable	 and	valuable	trait	of	their	democratic	polity.		In	 Hungary,	 the	 attitudes	 of	 MSzP	 partisans	 are	 slightly	 more	 pluralist	 than	those	of	their	Fidesz	counterparts.	MSzP-Együtt	activists	wish	for	a	greater	consensus	across	 partisan	 lines	 on	 key	 constitutional	 principles	 and	 a	 democratic	 institutional	framework.	This	vision	accomodates	partisan	contestation,	 as	 these	principles	 can	be	interpreted	in	many	different	ways.	As	a	result,	while	MSzP	participants	wish	for	their	opponents	to	endorse	these	principles,	they	do	not	expect	their	opposition	to	disappear	entirely.	Fidesz	activists	wish	to	ground	the	polity's	common	foundations	in	an	ethno-cultural	 vision	 of	 the	 nation.	 This	 vision	 does	 not	 accommodate	 alternative	interpretations,	 and	 its	 adoption	 by	 all	 parties	 would	 necessarily	 foreclose	 political	debate.	As	 a	 result,	 Fidesz	participants	 are	 able	 to	 imagine—or	 even	 to	wish—for	 an	alternative	 reality	 in	 which	 their	 opponents	 do	 not	 exist	 and	 in	 which	 they	 face	 no	opposition.			
2.	Explaining	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	The	second	task	of	this	conclusion	is	to	formulate	potential	explanations	for	the	above-mentioned	variations,	and	thus	provide	a	 third	series	of	answers	to	my	second	research	question:	how	can	we	explain	variations	in	the	extent	to	which	partisans	uphold	
democratic	standards?	As	explained	in	Chapter	2,	I	take	as	a	given	that	whether	or	not	partisans	uphold	democratic	standards	does	not	simply	result	from	variations	in	their	intrinsic	political	morality.	Instead,	these	patterns	are	partly	dependent	on	the	specific	constraints	 and	opportunities	 that	 partisans	have	 for	political	 discourse	 in	 their	 own	political	 environment.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 formulate	possible	 explanations	 for	the	 variations	 I	 describe	 above,	 focusing	 on	 the	 more	 specific	 cultural	 resources	 or	events	that	different	groups	of	partisans	draw	on	to	make	their	claims.			
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a.	Cultural	resources	
The	time	to	build	common	principles	Differences	in	the	cultural	resources	that	both	national	histories	provide	appear	once	 again	 as	 the	main	 explanatory	 factor	 for	 the	 cross-country	 variations	 described	above.	The	 common	 foundations	of	 a	democratic	political	 community	 are	 established	over	time,	following	periods	of	contestation	over	their	content	and	nature.	When	such	agreements	 are	 not	 in	 place,	 democratic	 setbacks	 are	 likely	 to	 occur.	 One	 camp	will	then	see	the	other	as	being	outside	of	the	space	of	common	political	morality,	declare	that	 it	 can	 guarantee	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 political	 community	 on	 its	 own,	 and	 seek	 to	eliminate	 disagreement.	 Times	 of	 revolution,	 civil	 war	 and	 dictatorship	 are	 likely	 to	arise	 before	 partisans	 have	 sufficient	 confidence	 in	what	 they	 have	 in	 common	with	others	to	welcome	political	disagreement.		In	 France,	 these	 upheavals	 have	 happened	 repeatedly.	 The	 70	 years	 that	separate	 us	 from	 the	 Vichy	 regime	 represents	 the	 longest	 period	 in	 the	 tumultuous	history	of	French	democracy	that	has	not	been	marked	by	a	regime	change.	Today,	the	stability	 of	 French	 democracy	 is	 still	 conditional	 on	 parties	 sharing	 foundational	principles	 that	 have	 been	 repeatedly	 challenged,	 violated,	 contested	 in	 the	 past.	 It	 is	also	 through	 this	 history	 of	 strife	 that	 the	 value	 of	 these	 shared	 principles	 was	established,	their	acceptance	by	all	government	parties	progressively	entrenched,	and	thus	the	possibility	of	peaceful	disagreement	opened.	As	one	of	my	PS	participants	put	it,	French	partisans	do	not	regret	the	Dreyfus	affair,	or	the	1930s.	They	know	the	price	of	 disagreeing	 on	 foundations,	 and	 thus	 what	 they	 gain	 in	 sharing	 a	 once	 contested	space	with	their	opponents.		The	last	regime	change	in	Hungary	happened	a	mere	quarter	of	a	century	ago.	The	 country	 has	 since	 then	 experienced	 the	 longest	 period	 in	 its	 history	 with	 free	elections,	and	its	first	peaceful	alternations	in	power	of	elected	majorities.	In	the	20th	century,	 Hungary	 had	 three	 different	 regimes	 in	 which	 the	 ruling	 elite	 unilaterally	proclaimed	 to	 hold	 the	 truth	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 country's	 'common	 good'.	 The	 fact	that	the	foundations	of	the	political	community	are	today	still	contested	is	therefore	not	surprising:	Hungarian	partisans	have	had	very	little	time	to	suggest,	contest,	negotiate	these	foundations,	and	discover	their	value.		
Political	legacies	in	a	post-authoritarian	context	The	 particular	 nature	 of	 Hungary's	 recent	 authoritarian	 past	 can	 also	 help	explain	 imbalances	 in	 pluralist	 attitudes	 between	 Fidesz	 and	 MSzP	 partisans.	
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Hungarian	partisans	are	marked	by	the	memory	of	the	Hungarian	Communist	regime,	times	during	which	only	one	 idea	about	the	common	good	-	 the	socialist	 ideal	 -	could	publicly	 express	 itself.	 Present-day	 socialists	 are	 therefore	 considered	 illegitimate	 in	upholding	this	ideal,	or	any	other	for	that	matter.	Partly	because	of	their	desire	to	break	with	 this	 past,	 they	 make	 themselves	 the	 champions	 of	 democratic	 principles	 and	institutions.	Due	to	their	historical	origins,	and	to	their	more	general	lack	of	a	cohesive	message,	they	have	however	no	authority	in	advocating	them.		On	the	other	hand,	Fidesz	partisans	ground	their	convictions	in	the	memory	of	past	 injustices.	 They	 are	 fighting	 a	 hegemony	 that	 disappeared	 25	 years	 ago,	 in	 a	contemporary	context	where	the	socialist	ideal	has	no	practical	relevance.	Against	this	ghost,	 they	 are	 declaring	 the	 supreme	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 nationalist	 conception	 of	 the	common	good,	 one	 that	had	no	 right	of	 expression	before	1989.	As	 a	 result,	 they	are	repeating	 in	 present-day	 Hungary	 the	 past	 historical	 mistakes	 they	 themselves	denounce.	 	What	 follows	 from	 this	dynamic	 is	 that	 the	 country	 is	 experiencing	 a	 set-back	 in	 its	 first	 attempt	 to	 establish	 a	 common	 political	 space,	 one	 in	 which	 shared	principles	are	sufficiently	strong	so	that	dissent	can	be	valued	for	its	own	sake.	Once	we	consider	 this	 set-back	 in	 Hungary's	 larger	 historical	 context	 however,	 it	 ceases	 to	appear	as	an	accidental	ripple	in	an	otherwise	linear	process	of	democratisation.		
b.	External	events	
As	 explained	 in	 the	 conclusion	 to	 Chapter	 4,	 socio-economic	 constraints	 and	their	 effect	 on	 partisan	 cohesiveness	 can	 help	 explain	 the	 different	 levels	 of	commitment	to	pluralism	between	PS	and	UMP	partisans.		If	 we	 consider	 the	 discourse	 of	 UMP	 participants	 about	 the	 community's	common	foundations,	 they	do	carry	the	 legacy	of	French	Republicanism.	They	picture	the	common	good	as	something	that	all	parties	strive	 towards	and	regularly	 insist	on	the	 broad	 objectives	 for	 the	 political	 community	 that	 government	 parties	 share.	 But	UMP	participants	also	use	the	resources	that	a	new,	globalised	economic	context	offers	them.	 The	 growing	 weight	 of	 external	 constraints	 offers	 the	 UMP	 an	 opportunity	 to	reinforce	 a	 more	 traditional,	 right-wing	 discourse	 about	 the	 necessity	 for	 politics	 to	accept	 "the	world	 as	 it	 is",	 and	 follow	 its	 logic.	 This	 takes	 the	 form	of	 a	 technocratic	discourse,	 of	 using	 the	 logic	 of	 expertise	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 politics.	 As	 explained	 in	 the	conclusion	of	Chapter	3,	 this	 lends	a	particular	 cohesiveness	 to	 the	discourse	of	UMP	partisans.		
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Such	 a	 stance,	 however,	 is	 also	 conducive	 to	 a	 form	 of	 'naive	 holism'	 among	UMP	partisans	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	145).	They	thus	tend	to	emphasise	that	there	exists	a	 set	 of	most	 appropriate	means	 to	 reach	 established	 and	undisputed	 societal	 goods.	And	that	their	own	party,	doing	away	with	'ideology',	is	in	a	better	position	to	find	the	proper	means	to	solve	common	problems.	While	UMP	partisans	do	not	go	so	far	as	to	deny	the	need	for	political	disagreement,	they	nevertheless	tend	to	overlook	one	of	the	crucial	pillars	of	political	pluralism:	 that	while	we	can	all	 agree	on	 the	need	 to	 strive	towards	the	common	good	broadly	defined,	the	exact	content	of	the	common	good,	and	therefore	 the	 proper	 means	 to	 reach	 it,	 will	 always	 be	 a	 matter	 of	 contestation.	 As	expressed	by	Muirhead:		"The	 persistence	 of	 partisanship,	 especially	 of	 the	 sort	 that	 addresses	the	basic	commitments	that	define	a	political	community,	is	a	reminder	that	nonpartisan	expertise	 is	 insufficient	because	our	agreement	about	ends	 is	 both	 incomplete	 and	 fragile.	 Politics	 is	 resistant	 to	 rational	agreement	about	what	 is	good	and	right	because	practical	reason	does	not	issue	in	general	agreement	about	moral	and	political	things.	Reason	either	 fails	 to	 culminate	 in	 certain	 conclusion	 or	 it	 fails	 to	 persuade.	Where	our	reason	fails	us	or	whether	we	fail	reason	is	beside	the	point:	however	much	we	may	want	 agreement,	we	 cannot	 agree"	 (Muirhead,	2014,	p.	78)	While	 PS	 participants	 do	 not	 adopt	 this	 logic,	 they	 denounce	 the	 tendency	 of	their	own	party	to	do	so	increasingly.	What	PS	participants	regret	is	that	their	party	is	more	and	more	often	joining	the	UMP	in	a	univocal	understanding	of	the	common	good	and	 in	 the	belief	 that	only	a	given	set	of	means—those	 traditionally	promoted	by	 the	UMP—can	bring	about	the	common	good.	While	PS	partisans	do	defend	the	necessity	of	political	disagreement	in	democratic	societies,	they	believe	it	to	be	increasingly	absent	in	 their	 own	 party	 system.	 If	 this	 perception	 by	 PS	 participants	 is	 correct,	 it	 would	indicate	a	worrisome	dynamic	in	French	democratic	politics.					
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Conclusion	
In	this	thesis	I	have	provided	an	answer	to	the	question	to	what	extent	does	real-
world	partisanship	uphold	the	standards	of	democratic	partisanship?	 I	 expected	French	partisans	 to	 conform	 better	 to	 the	 standards	 than	 their	 Hungarian	 counterparts.	 It	remained	 a	 question	 open	 to	 empirical	 investigation	 whether	 this	 was	 confirmed	 in	reality,	and,	if	yes,	how	wide	the	gap	between	both	groups	of	domestic	partisans	would	be.	The	differences	I	uncover	are	very	clear-cut.	French	partisans	indeed	fare	better	on	both	the	standard	of	cohesiveness	and	the	standard	of	commitment	to	pluralism	than	Hungarian	participants.	They	rank	higher	than	Hungarian	participants	on	all	of	the	sub-criteria	for	each	standard	that	I	established	in	my	theoretical	framework.	It	is	also	clear	that	 there	 is	 a	 substantial,	 qualitative	 gap	 between	 the	 discourses	 of	 both	 groups	 of	partisans.	 The	 most	 democratic	 of	 French	 partisans	 reach	 the	 most	 stringent	 ideals	established	by	normative	political	 theory.	Those	French	partisans	 that	 fare	 the	worst	still	 appear	more	 in	 line	with	 the	 standards	 than	 the	 average	Hungarian	 participant.	Conversely,	the	most	cohesive	and	pluralist	Hungarian	participants	still	seem	far	from	the	average	French	participant.	As	for	Hungarian	partisans	at	their	worst,	they	display	some	of	the	destructive	and	divisive	potential	that	partisanship	holds.			The	analysis	has	also	uncovered	distinct	patterns	of	 speech	between	different	groups	of	partisans	within	each	country.	Overall,	UMP	partisans	are	more	cohesive	than	their	 PS	 counterparts,	 and	 Fidesz	 participants	 uphold	 the	 standard	 of	 cohesiveness	better	than	MSzP	partisans.	This	relation,	however,	 is	reversed	when	we	consider	the	question	 of	 pluralism.	 UMP	 partisans	 are	 less	 openly	 pluralist	 than	 their	 PS	counterparts,	and	Fidesz	participants	do	not	uphold	the	principle	of	pluralism	as	well	as	MSzP	partisans.		In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 also	 provided	 answers	 to	 the	 question	 how	 can	 we	 explain	
variations	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 uphold	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	
partisanship?	 All	 three	 empirical	 chapters	 offer	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 cultural	resources	 provided	by	 a	 history	 of	 open	party	 competition	 create	 an	 opportunity	 for	democratic	 forms	 of	 partisan	 discourse	 in	 France.	 The	 absence	 of	 such	 resources	 in	Hungary	is	in	turn	a	strong	constraint	on	the	capacity	of	Hungarian	partisans	to	uphold	
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the	 standards	 of	 democratic	 partisanship.	 Higher	 levels	 of	 corruption	 in	 Hungary	 as	compared	to	France,	may	act	as	a	further	constraint	on	Hungarian	participants'	respect	for	political	opponents.	Finally,	greater	external	constraints	have	weighed	on	economic	policy-making	 in	Hungary	 as	 compared	 to	France,	 and	 this	may	also	help	 explain	 the	fact	that	democratic	forms	of	partisanship	are	more	developed	in	France	as	compared	to	Hungary.		As	 for	 differences	 between	 the	 levels	 of	 cohesiveness	 and	 commitment	 to	pluralism	of	PS	and	UMP	participants	in	France,	and	MSzP	and	Fidesz	in	Hungary,	one	explanatory	factor	seems	to	be	a	greater	vulnerability	of	left-wing	programs	to	external	constraints	on	economic	policy-making.		This	helps	to	understand	why	PS	partisans	are	less	cohesive	 in	their	 identities	than	UMP	partisans,	and	MSzP	partisans	 less	cohesive	than	their	Fidesz	counterparts.		In	 Hungary,	 cultural	 resources	 also	 appear	 to	 constrain	 more	 heavily	 the	cohesiveness	 of	MSzP	partisans,	 given	 their	 party's	 communist	 past	 and	 the	negative	connotations	associated	with	it,	 than	the	cohesiveness	of	Fidesz	participants,	who	can	pride	 themselves	 of	 a	 tradition	 of	 resistance	 towards	 communism.	 This	 particular	situation	 also	 encourages	 the	 disrespectful	 and	 anti-pluralist	 behaviour	 of	 Fidesz	participants.	 Finally,	 while	 Fidesz	 participants	 have	 integrated	 their	 party's	institutional	 reforms	 into	 a	 more	 general,	 cohesive	 rhetoric,	 these	 reforms	 seem	 to	have	an	adverse	effect	on	the	capacity	of	the	MSzP	to	develop	a	cohesive	program.			
I.	DISCUSSION	OF	RESULTS	
1.	The	dynamics	of	cohesiveness	and	pluralism	If	 we	 take	 a	 step	 back	 and	 consider	 the	 variations	 in	 patterns	 of	 political	discourse	 that	 my	 study	 uncovers,	 an	 interesting	 pattern	 emerges.	 As	 shown	 in	 the	visual	 representation	 of	 my	 results	 below	 (Figure	 34),	 the	 parties	 that	 are	 most	cohesive	 in	 both	 country	 cases,	 the	 UMP	 and	 the	 Fidesz,	 are	 also	 the	 least	 pluralist.	Conversely,	the	parties	that	are	most	pluralist	 in	both	countries,	the	PS	and	the	MSzP,	are	also	the	least	cohesive.	This	would	seem	to	suggest,	at	first	glance,	that	there	exists	a	 trade-off	 between	 both	 qualities	 of	 democratic	 partisanship.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	however,	partisans	in	France	are	both	more	cohesive	and	more	pluralist	in	France	than	they	are	in	Hungary.	Notwithstanding	the	impact	of	cultural	factors	and	external	events	discussed	 above,	 one	would	 also	 infer	 from	 this	 that	 high	 levels	 of	 cohesiveness	 and	
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pluralism	are	mutually	supportive,	while	low	levels	of	cohesiveness	and	pluralism	also	serve	to	reinforce	each	other.		
	
Figure	34:	Variations	 in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	across	 the	 four	groups	of	partisans	
under	study	
N.B:	This	figure	is	primarily	for	illustrative	purposes.	The	position	of	parties	does	not	correspond	to	
quantitative	measures.		While	 I	 cannot	make	 firm	conclusions	concerning	either	of	 these	dynamics	on	the	 basis	 of	 two	 country	 case	 studies,	 I	make	 a	 tentative	 argument	 for	 each	 of	 these	potential	 dynamics	 in	 the	 paragraphs	 below.	 As	 I	 discuss	 later	 in	 this	 conclusion,	subsequent	studies	should	further	confirm	and	explore	the	existing	dynamics	between	partisan	cohesiveness	and	commitment	to	pluralism.			
a.	The	case	for	a	trade-off	
Differences	 in	 levels	 of	 cohesiveness	 and	 pluralism	within	 each	 country	 lend	some	 credit	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 trade-off	 between	 both	 standards	 of	democratic	partisanship.	Indeed,	within	each	party	system	the	most	cohesive	partisans	are	also	the	least	pluralist	ones,	while	the	most	pluralist	parties	are	the	least	cohesive	ones.		 The	 idea	 according	 to	 which	 partisan	 conviction	 and	 political	 pluralism	 are	fundamentally	 in	tension	with	each	other	is	common	in	normative	political	theory.	As	emphasised	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	 thesis,	 deliberative	 approaches	 to	 democracy	have	 long	 excluded	 partisanship	 from	 their	 considerations,	 precisely	 because	 it	 was	
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considered	 a	 form	 of	 loyalty	 that	 undermines	 the	 respectful,	 constructive	 and	 open-minded	attitude	required	to	enter	the	deliberative	process.		While	 theorists	 of	 partisanship	 have	 argued	 that	 partisans	 can	 adopt	 the	pluralist	attitudes	best	fit	to	sustain	liberal	democracy,	they	also	emphasise	a	trade-off	between	partisan	 conviction	and	democratic	 ethics.	Muirhead	depicts	 an	antagonistic	relationship	between	cohesiveness	and	pluralism,	where	belief	 in	 the	superiority	of	a	set	 of	 partisan	 claims	 always	puts	 one	 at	 risk	 of	 desiring	 their	 complete	 triumph.	He	stresses,	 for	 instance,	 that	 partisan	 loyalty	 brings	with	 it	 "permanent	moral	 danger",	because	"in	 transcending	self-interested	strategic	reason,	 loyalty	 threatens	 to	become	immune	to	reason	and	judgment.	It	can	become	a	form	of	unthinking	stubbornness	that	brings	 with	 it	 a	 kind	 of	 closure—closure	 to	 fact,	 to	 principle,	 and	 to	 consequences"	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	116).		If	 we	 consider	 the	 case	 of	 UMP	 and	 Fidesz	 partisanship,	 they	would	 seem	 to	support	 this	 idea.	 Both	 UMP	 and	 Fidesz	 partisans	 are	 particularly	 assured	 of	 the	validity	 of	 their	 own	 convictions	 and	 this	 assurance	 easily	 converts	 into	 self-righteousness.	When	they	 lack	 the	negative	capacity	 to	respect	political	opponents	or	see	the	necessity	of	political	disagreement,	 it	 is	also	because	they	are	so	convinced	of	the	superiority	of	their	own	claims.		Conversely,	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 value	pluralist	 outlook	may	be	 too	much	 to	 ask	from	those	who	hold	principled	convictions.	This	is	much	the	position	defended	by	John	Stuart	 Mill	 at	 his	 time,	 according	 to	 which	 the	 "salutary	 effects"	 of	 political	disagreement	 will	 be	 visible	 to	 the	 "disinterested	 bystander",	 not	 the	 "impassioned	partisan"		(Mill,	1991	[1859],	p.	58).	By	undermining	the	partisan's	belief	that	he	is	in	the	 right,	 by	 excessively	 tampering	 his	 assertiveness,	 his	 commitment	 to	 political	pluralism	may	in	fact	deprive	the	partisan	of	the	necessary	tools	to	convince	others	of	the	 validity	 of	 his	 claims.	 Like	 Mill's	 one-eyed	 man,	 partisans	 cannot	 be	 completely	lucid.	 They	 need	 to	 be	 blind	 in	 some	 respect	 in	 order	 to	 further	 their	 claims	 in	 a	cohesive	manner.			My	 analysis	 of	 PS	 partisanship	 especially	may	 be	 seen	 to	 lend	 some	 credit	 to	these	 arguments.	 In	 this	 specific	 case,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 trade-off	 between	 lower	levels	 of	 cohesiveness	 and	higher	 levels	 of	 pluralism.	The	weaker	 cohesiveness	 of	 PS	partisans	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 they	are	 strongly	preoccupied	by	 the	 faith	of	 their	own	party	and	very	critical	of	their	elites'	actions.	The	forms	that	their	commitment	to	pluralism	 take	 also	 reflect	 these	 particular	 troubles	 with	 their	 party's	 identity.	 For	instance,	PS	partisans	are	 far	 less	 critical	 of	 their	opponents	 than	are	UMP	partisans.	
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This	 is	 also	 because	 they	 spend	 far	 less	 time	 than	UMP	partisans	 talking	 about	 their	opponents'	 platforms	 and	 far	 more	 time	 pondering	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 their	 own	identity.	This	explains	why	PS	partisans	strongly	value	disagreement.	It	is	because	they	fear	 the	dilution	of	 their	 own	 identity	 in	 the	 convergence	of	 left-wing	 and	 right-wing	partisan	identities.		
b.	The	case	for	complementarity	
The	 above-mentioned	 points,	 however,	 do	 not	 account	 for	 the	 fact	 that	partisans	 in	 France	 are	 both	 more	 cohesive	 and	 more	 pluralist	 than	 partisans	 in	Hungary.	 Not	 disregarding	 the	 impact	 of	 cultural	 factors	 and	 external	 events	 in	explaining	 these	outcomes,	 there	 is	also	evidence	 to	suggest	 that	strong	cohesiveness	and	 pluralism	may	mutually	 reinforce	 each	 other	 in	 the	 case	 of	 France.	 At	 the	 same	time,	the	weak	cohesiveness	and	commitment	to	pluralism	of	Hungarian	partisans	may	also	 reinforce	 each	 other.	 The	 claim	 that	 cohesiveness	 and	 pluralism	 are	complementary	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 counter-intuitive	 from	the	perspective	of	democratic	theory	and	thus	worthy	of	discussion.				In	 France,	 strong	 forms	 of	 cohesiveness	 seem	 to	 serve,	 in	 some	 ways,	 the	respectful	 attitudes	 of	 partisans	 in	 their	 criticism	 of	 political	 opponents.	 To	 a	 large	extent,	 it	 appears	 that	 French	 partisans	 do	 not	 attack	 their	 opponents	 on	 their	intentions	or	accuse	them	of	being	morally	deficient	because	they	do	not	need	to	do	so	in	order	to	oppose	them.	They	know	what	they	stand	for,	have	firm	ideas	on	their	own	values	 and	 policies,	 and	 are	 fully	 aware	 of	 how	 they	 differ	 from	 those	 of	 their	opponents.	 They	 put	 forward	 a	 constructive,	 justified	 indictment	 of	 their	 opponents	without	resorting	to	disrespectful	arguments.	The	fact	that	opponents	campaign	on	the	basis	of	a	well-defined	set	of	values	may	also	make	it	easier	for	partisans	to	recognise	their	 opponents	 as	principled.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 cohesiveness	of	 opponents'	 claims	may	 generate	 respect	 in	 itself	 and	 more	 generally	 encourage	 the	 commitment	 of	partisans	to	political	pluralism.		Conversely,	 partisans'	 commitment	 to	 pluralism	 may	 also	 serve	 their	cohesiveness.	The	 fact	 that	French	partisans	agree	on	 fundamental	principles	and	are	convinced	 that	 their	 opponents	 are	 committed	 to	 the	 common	 good	 could	 facilitate	their	 formulation	 of	 cohesive	 claims.	 French	 partisans	 do	 not	 disagree	 on	 the	foundations	 of	 the	 political	 community.	 This	 is	 also	why	 partisans	 can	 compete	 over	rival	 interpretations	 of	 foundational	 values	 and	 on	 the	 means	 that	 are	 necessary	 to	realise	 them	 in	 practice.	 To	 this	 extent,	 this	 common	 framework	 not	 only	 limits	 the	
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scope	of	partisan	claims,	it	also	allows	for	their	cohesive	expression.	It	is	also	because	opponents	 are	 part	 of	 this	 common	 political	 space	 and	 worthy	 of	 respect,	 that	 they	should	 be	 opposed	 with	 strong	 and	 justified	 arguments.	 Worthy	 opponents	 cannot	simply	be	dismissed,	 they	deserve	 to	be	opposed	with	a	 convincing	 set	of	 values	and	policies.			The	 Hungarian	 case	 also	 suggests	 that	 these	 dynamics	 can	 operate	 the	 other	way	 round.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 offers	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 claim	 that	 low	 levels	 of	cohesiveness	 and	 low	 levels	 of	 commitment	 to	 pluralism	 can	 be	 complementary	 and	even	 reinforcing.	 First	 of	 all,	 Hungarian	 partisans	 have	 an	 incentive	 towards	disrespectful	 speech	 precisely	 because	 they	 have	 very	 little	 else	 to	 oppose	 their	adversaries.	With	 confused	notions	over	 the	values	and	policies	 that	 they	 themselves	stand	for,	 it	 is	also	easier	to	accuse	one	opponents	of	being	immoral	and	to	engage	in	negative	campaigning.	Second,	the	lack	of	cohesiveness	of	opponents	in	Hungary	may	in	itself	spur	lower	forms	of	respect	for	them.	When	Fidesz	participants,	for	instance,	call	their	opponents	unprincipled	and	lacking	fixed	commitments	to	a	series	of	values,	they	are,	to	a	large	extent,	simply	describing	reality.		Finally,	 the	fact	that	partisans	 in	Hungary	have	no	respect	for	their	opponents	and	disagree	on	core	principles	may	also	impede	their	development	of	cohesive	claims.	In	the	Hungarian	context,	the	very	foundations	of	the	political	community	are	contested.	If	rival	partisans	argue	that	they	are	the	only	legitimate	representatives	of	the	political	community,	then	they	do	not	need	to	justify	this	claim	on	the	basis	of	limited	values	or	policies.	 It	 is	 sufficient	 that	 they	 assert	 their	 moral	 superiority.	 By	 the	 same	 token,	when	opponents	are	considered	as	fundamentally	immoral,	then	partisans	do	not	need	to	 oppose	 them	with	 a	 coherent	 account	 of	 the	 common	good,	 or	 a	 set	 of	 alternative	policies.		
2.	Partisan	discourse	and	democratic	change	in	France	and	Hungary	
a.	The	creative	power	of	partisan	discourse	
The	idea	that	what	partisans	say	or	do	matters	to	the	vitality	and	endurance	of	democracy	 formed	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 this	 thesis.	 Their	 privileged	 position	 in	 the	political	system	lends	them	more	influence	than	lay	citizens.	Partisans	certainly	inherit	certain	 structures	 and	exert	 their	power	under	 the	 influence	of	 these	 structures.	The	past	weighs	 on	 the	 democratic	 present.	 Culture	 provides	 partisans	with	 resources	 to	formulate	their	discourse,	but	it	also	constrains	activists	in	their	efforts.	However,	the	
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agency	of	partisans	lies	precisely	in	their	power	to	use	and	interpret	the	past.	Partisans	draw	on	available	cultural	resources,	yet	need	to	choose	which	ones	to	focus	on.	They	also	need	to	adapt	these	cultural	resources	to	present	circumstances,	when	confronted	with	unexpected	events.		It	 is	 in	 this	 space	 left	 for	 creative	 interpretation	 that	 partisans	 can	 become	agents	of	democratic	change—be	it	positive	or	negative.	If	structural	constraints	were	overbearing	and	there	was	no	room	left	for	the	agency	of	partisans,	then	partisanship	in	 its	discursive	expression	would	simply	serve	to	consolidate	pre-existing	structures.	But	 partisans	 can	 hold	 back	 from	 the	 obvious,	 and	 devise	 strategies	 for	 democratic	speech	against	 the	odds.	They	can	also	choose,	of	course,	 to	 indulge	 in	 the	worst	 that	their	 past	 and	 present	 has	 to	 offer.	 It	 is	 their	 choice.	 But	 those	 choices	 are	consequential	for	the	future	of	democracy.		The	 effect	 that	 partisanship	 will	 have	 on	 democratic	 structures	 is	 likely	 to	depend	on	how	established	democracy	is	in	the	first	place.	Established	democracies	are	not	 protected	 against	 erosion,	 but	 it	 will	 likely	 take	 some	 time	 before	 undemocratic	forms	of	partisanship	reach	democracy's	bone.	 In	newly	born	democracies	 the	stakes	are	 certainly	 higher.	 The	 birth	 of	 a	 democratic	 culture	 will	 always	 be	 slow	 and	cumbersome	 and	 require	 from	partisans	 that	 they	 give	 their	 very	 best.	 	 The	 nascent	democratic	system	is	also	 far	more	vulnerable	 to	radical	 forms	of	erosion	 if	partisans	succumb	 to	 adopting	 the	 undemocratic	 patterns	 of	 speech	 their	 authoritarian	 past	might	provide.		
b.	 France:	 The	 ongoing	 vulnerability	 of	 established	 democracies	 to	 the	
weaknesses	of	democratic	partisanship		
The	French	case	demonstrates	that	a	history	of	open	partisan	competition	does	provide	 a	 buffer	 to	 democratic	 erosion.	 The	 cultural	 resources	 that	 French	 partisans	dispose	of	 are	 favourable	 to	democratic	 forms	of	partisan	discourse.	These	 resources	create,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 a	 self-sustaining	 dynamic	 for	 democracy.	 By	 conforming	 to	habitual	 interpretations	 and	 uses	 of	 these	 resources,	 partisans	 maintain	 relatively	cohesive	 and	 pluralist	 identities.	 As	 this	 analysis	 shows,	 however,	 there	 are	 limits	 to	this	self-sustaining	dynamic.	Left-wing	and	right-wing	identities	were	consolidated	in	a	time	when	nations	were	more	insulated	from	each	other	than	they	are	today,	and	the	actions	 of	 national	 governments	 were	 far	 less	 constrained.	 The	 increasing	interdependence	 of	 national	 economies,	 the	 globalisation	 of	 finance,	 and	 Europe's	progressive	economic	integration	since	the	post-war	era	create	a	very	different	context	
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for	partisan	discourse.	Partisans	today	cannot	use	the	Left-Right	dichotomy	in	the	ways	their	predecessors	did.	They	need	to	adapt	the	resources	from	the	past	to	present-day	situations.		The	 vagrancies	 that	 result	 from	 this	 necessary	 transition	 are	 visible	 in	 the	discourse	of	French	partisans.	Their	occasional	lack	of	cohesiveness	or	pluralism	reflect	their	efforts	and	difficulties	to	adapt	past	resources	to	contemporary	circumstances.	PS	partisans	are	convinced	of	the	value	of	the	traditional	Left-Right	dichotomy	and	know	that	the	real-world	poses	a	challenge	to	it.	Today's	economic	context	raises	particularly	acute	 difficulties	 for	 those	 parties	 that	 have	 their	 roots	 in	 social-democratic	 ideals.	These	parties	have	traditionally	denounced	the	established	order,	considered	'timeless	laws'	 as	 serving	 those	 in	 positions	 of	 power,	 and	 exerted	 state	 power	 in	 attempts	 to	limit	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 inequalities.	 PS	 partisans	 are	 committed	 to	 these	 ideas,	 yet	aware	of	their	limited	present-day	applicability.	They	view	the	actions	of	their	elites	in	government	as	a	 form	of	capitulation,	a	 selling	out	of	 their	 identity.	But	 they	have	no	real	 proposal	 of	 their	 own	 as	 to	 how	 their	 left-wing	 identity	 should	 adapt.	 Their	discourse	is	only	really	cohesive	when	they	disregard	this	disjuncture	and	focus	on	an	ideal	dichotomy	that	has	less	and	less	relevance	in	real-world	politics.		UMP	partisans	are	in	a	different	situation.	The	particular	'tool-kit'	that	they	rely	on	 is	more	 easily	 adaptable	 to	 present-day	 circumstances	 than	 the	 resources	 that	 PS	partisans	dispose	of.	The	globalised	economy	confirms	the	right-wing	stance	that	states	should	respect	timeless	laws—here,	the	law	of	the	market—and	that	individuals	should	take	 responsibility	 for	 their	 own	 social	 trajectories.	 These	 contemporary	 changes	 do	not	 put	 any	particular	 strains	 on	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	 centre-right	 partisan	discourse,	quite	the	contrary.	In	adapting	to	this	new	situation,	UMP	partisans	have	nevertheless	compromised	 on	 their	 commitment	 to	 pluralism.	 It	 is	 not	 necessarily	 surprising	 that	UMP	partisans	conclude	from	this	situation	that	their	opponents'	traditional	positions	on	social	equality,	public	 services	and	state	 interventionism	are	unrealistic.	However,	they	also	imply	that	if	the	PS	still	holds	these	positions,	it	is	out	of	personal	interest	and	disrespect	for	the	common	good.	UMP	partisans	also	seamlessly	slip	into	'naive	holism',	convinced	 that	 there	 is	 one	 set	 of	 appropriate	 means	 to	 reach	 a	 widely	 accepted	societal	good	(Muirhead,	2014,	p.	145).	As	they	consider	their	party	alone	to	be	capable	of	implementing	these	means,	the	need	for	political	disagreement	becomes	obscured.		These	 two	 weaknesses	 of	 French	 partisans'	 discourse	 are,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	mutually	dependent	and	 in	a	dynamic	 relationship.	 Socialist	hesitations	 in	 the	 face	of	contemporary	circumstances	comfort	the	UMP	in	its	sense	of	superiority.	On	the	other	
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hand,	 the	 UMP's	 technocratic	 discourse—according	 to	 which	 there	 is	 only	 one	 valid	way	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 world	 as	 it	 is—further	 paralyses	 the	 PS	 in	 formulating	 an	alternative	discourse.		If	 we	 take	 a	 step	 back	 and	 briefly	 consider	 some	 of	 the	 weaknesses	 of	contemporary	 French	 democracy,	 they	 can	 tentatively	 be	 associated	 with	 these	limitations	 of	 partisan	 discourse.	 	 As	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 partisan	 cohesiveness	 is	particularly	 important	 to	 maintain	 citizens'	 belief	 in	 "the	 worth	 of	 engaging	 with	collective	 political	 agency	 so	 as	 to	 exercise	 the	 fundamental	 democratic	 principle	 of	popular	 self-rule"	 (White	 &	 Ypi,	 2010,	 p.	 809).	 The	 weak	 cohesiveness	 of	 PS	partisanship	 and,	 more	 generally,	 the	 convergence	 of	 mainstream	 parties	 towards	technocratic	 types	 of	 appeals	 has	de	 facto	 restrained	 the	 scope	 of	 party	 competition.	These	developments	may	be	 fuelling	French	 citizens'	 disengagement	 from	 traditional	forms	 of	 political	 representation.	 In	 France,	 as	 elsewhere	 in	 Western	 Europe,	 this	disengagement	 has	 manifested	 itself	 over	 the	 past	 three	 decades	 by	 rising	 levels	 of	abstention,	 lowering	 rates	 of	 party	 membership,	 and	 growing	 distrust	 towards	traditional	parties	 (for	a	 comparative	overview,	 see	Biezen	van	et	 al.,	 2012;	Dalton	&	Wattenberg,	 2000;	 Mair,	 2006;	 on	 PS	 and	 UMP	 memberships,	 see	 pp.	 81-82	 of	 this	thesis).	 Together	 with	 the	 lower	 commitment	 of	 UMP	 partisans	 to	 the	 principles	 of	political	 pluralism,	 the	 deficiencies	 of	 contemporary	 partisanship	 may	 also	 be	encouraging	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 French	 far-right	 (on	 this	 last	 phenomenon,	 see	 Berezin,	2009;	 Delwit,	 2012;	 Dézé,	 2012).	 As	 others	 have	 already	 argued,	 when	 mainstream	partisans	 do	 not	 offer	 real	 alternatives	 while	 endorsing	 anti-pluralist	 attitudes,	 they	also	 legitimise	 the	 views	 of	 populist	 parties	 that	 offer	 a	 more	 credible	 promise	 of	political	 change	 (on	 this	 point,	 see	 Arzheimer,	 2009;	 Arzheimer	 &	 Carter,	 2006;	Bornschier,	2012;	Kitschelt,	2007;	Thränhardt,	1995).	
c.	 Hungary:	 The	 critical	 importance	 of	 partisanship	 in	 newly	 established	
democracies	
In	 the	 Hungarian	 case,	 a	 limited	 history	 of	 open	 party	 competition	 seriously	constrains	 the	 possibility	 for	 democratic	 forms	 of	 partisan	 discourse.	 Hungarian	partisans	 start	 with	many	 handicaps	 as	 compared	 to	 their	 French	 counterparts.	 The	traditions	 of	 conservatism	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 socialism	 on	 the	 other,	 have	mostly	developed	 in	 times	 of	 dictatorial	 rule	 where	 one	 tradition	 would	 repress	 the	 other.	There	is	therefore	no	well-defined	set	of	values	and	policies	that	have	been	habitually	put	 forth	 by	 one	 camp	 in	 response	 to	 the	 other	 and	 which	 contemporary	 partisans	
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could	 draw	 on	 today.	 With	 little	 experience	 of	 being	 political	 equals,	 partisans	 also	more	easily	reproduce	the	'us	vs.	them'	narrative	of	pre-democratic	times.	Finally,	there	has	 been	 far	 less	 time	 than	 in	 the	 case	 of	 France	 to	 openly	 suggest,	 contest,	 and	negotiate	the	foundations	of	the	political	community	and	discover	their	value.	The	fact	that	these	foundations	are	still	contested	today	breeds	political	polarisation,	and	makes	political	disagreement	very	difficult	to	value	for	its	own	sake.		The	ways	 in	which	 partisans	 are	 responding	 to	 contemporary	 circumstances,	however,	has	not	contributed	to	gear	Hungarian	political	culture	towards	taking	more	democratic	 forms.	 In	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	 the	 MSzP	 was	 eager	 to	 prove	 its	commitment	to	democracy	and	capitalism.	But	by	the	same	token,	the	party	distanced	itself	 from	 the	 socialist	 ideals	 that	 could	 have	 grounded	 its	 political	 platforms	more.	While	the	institutional	reforms	of	Fidesz	are	today	a	real	challenge	for	the	MSzP	to	face,	the	MSzP	partisans	I	 interviewed	do	not	even	have	ideas	on	the	steps	that	their	party	could	 take	 in	 response	 to	 these	 reforms.	While	MSzP	 partisans	 blame	 the	 Fidesz	 for	these	 institutional	 reforms,	 they	 have	 no	 clear	 set	 of	 values	 on	 the	 basis	 of	which	 to	criticise	 them,	 or	 policy	 alternatives	 to	 suggest	 in	 response.	 To	 have	 something	 to	oppose	 to	 their	 main	 competitors,	 MSzP	 partisans	 attack	 Fidesz's	 ill	 intentions	 and	corrupt	practices.	While	corruption	is	a	widespread	problem	in	Hungarian	politics	that	deserves	 to	be	 addressed,	MSzP	partisans	do	not	 recognise	 that	 their	 own	party	 also	contributes	to	perpetuate	this	problem.		As	 for	 Fidesz	 partisans,	 their	 choices	 also	 accentuate	 rather	 than	 soften	 the	unfavourable	 impact	of	Hungary's	political	history	on	contemporary	democracy.	They	frame	 themselves	 as	 the	 inheritors	 of	 a	 Hungarian	 tradition	 of	 nationalism	 and	conservatism	 repressed	 in	 communist	 times,	 and	 picture	 their	 opponents	 as	perpetuating	the	legacy	of	communist	rule.	While	this	rhetoric	does	form	the	basis	of	a	relatively	 cohesive	 discourse,	 it	 also	 entails	 very	 weak	 commitment	 to	 political	pluralism.	By	carrying	the	memories	of	the	victims	of	communism,	Fidesz	also	carries	the	 resentment	 that	 comes	 with	 victimhood.	 They	 critic	 the	 intrinsically	 immoral	character	 of	 their	 opponents	 and	 systematically	 suspect	 them	 of	 ill	 intentions.	 The	MSzP	 is	 not	worthy	 of	 respect,	 or	 of	 competing	 openly	with	 them,	 precisely	 because	they	are	viewed	as	 the	 inheritors	of	an	oppressive	 tradition.	Fidesz	partisans	de	facto	deny	 their	 opponents	 the	 legitimacy	 to	 formulate	 an	 alternative	 conception	 of	 the	common	good.		These	 weaknesses	 of	 Hungarian	 partisans'	 discourse	 are,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	mutually	 dependent	 and	 in	 a	 dynamic	 relationship.	 The	 weak	 cohesiveness	 of	 MSzP	
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partisans	 and	 their	 renunciation	 of	 socialist	 ideals	 confirms	 Fidesz	 partisans	 in	claiming	that	their	opponents	lack	any	real	principled	commitments.	The	holistic	stance	of	Fidesz	and	their	aggressive	 institutional	reforms	also	make	 it	more	difficult	 for	 the	MSzP	to	develop	a	coherent	discourse,	and	not	to	simply	focus	on	the	attacks	that	they	are	the	object	of.	The	position	and	actions	of	Fidesz	also	lends	credit	to	the	discourse	of	MSzP	 partisans,	 according	 to	which	 their	 opponents	 are	 uncommitted	 to	 democratic	ideals	and	therefore	unworthy	of	respect.		On	 a	more	 positive	 note,	 the	 period	 that	 separates	 us	 from	1989	 has	 at	 least	opened	Hungary's	political	debate	and	allowed	for	a	free	confrontation	of	 ideas	about	the	common	good.	 It	has	also	revealed	the	problems	associated	with	parties	 lacking	a	shared	 basis.	 The	 young	 Hungarian	 partisans	 I	 interviewed	 are	 learning	 from	 the	contemporary	political	context.	They	know	that	they	need	more	common	ground	with	their	 opponents,	 and	 they	 know	 that	 the	 form	 taken	 by	 political	 disagreement	 in	contemporary	 Hungary	 has	 negative	 consequences.	 They	 regret	 the	 present-day	situation,	and	 they	hope	 for	 change.	 In	making	a	 lucid	diagnosis	of	 the	pathologies	of	contemporary	partisanship,	they	make	a	first	step	towards	their	resolution.	In	the	long	run,	 these	 are	 the	 sorts	 of	 realisations	 that	 could	 allow	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	more	pluralist	political	community	in	Hungary.	For	now,	and	because	young	partisans	fail	to	grasp	 the	 responsibility	 of	 their	 own	 party	 in	 this	 state	 of	 affair,	 their	 discourse	contributes	 to	 reproduce	 those	 very	 traits	 of	 Hungarian	 politics	 that	 they	 consider	problematic.		At	 present,	 the	 existing	 balance	 between	 both	 mainstreams	 parties	 is	threatening	Hungarian	democracy.	The	MSzP	is	the	only	party	that	shows	allegiance	to	a	minimally	democratic	 framework,	 but	 they	have	no	 authority	 to	 convince	others	of	the	worth	of	this	framework.	Their	poor	economic	performance	and	mismanagement	of	government	between	2002	and	2010	has	durably	affected	the	party's	credibility	and	its	capacity	to	engage	citizens.	They	plunged	from	42.05%	of	the	vote	to	19.03%	over	this	period	 and	 have	 failed	 to	 recover	 their	 voter	 basis	 since	 2010.	 They	 have	 also	 been	losing	their	membership	basis	at	a	rapid	rate	over	the	last	ten	years.		
Much	 the	 opposite	 can	 be	 said	 about	 the	 Fidesz.	 In	 opposition	 between	 2002	and	 2010,	 they	 convinced	 a	 large	 number	 of	 citizens	 to	 become	 party	 members,	multiplied	their	local	branches,	organised	several	protests	of	over	100	000	participants,	gathered	 a	 high	 number	 of	 signatures	 for	 large-scale	 petitions,	 and	 developed	 their	links	with	conservative	civil	society	organisations	(Enyedi,	2015;	Enyedi	&	Linek,	2008;	Saltman,	2014,	pp.	105-106).	In	2010,	this	rise	in	support	found	its	electoral	outlet,	the	
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Fidesz	 obtaining	 52.7%	 of	 the	 vote	 and	 a	 two-third	 majority	 in	 Parliament,	 supra-majority	 that	 it	 also	 succeeded	 in	 renewing	 in	 2014	 (Hungarian	 National	 Election	Office,	 2010).	 The	 Fidesz's	 discourse	 has	 radicalised	 during	 this	 time.	 The	 party	 has	increasingly	adopted	aggressive	and	populist	forms	of	negative	campaigning	since	the	early	 2000s	 (Bozóki,	 2008;	 Bozóki	&	Kriza,	 2008;	Mesežnikov,	 Gyárfášová,	 &	 Smilov,	2008;	Palonen,	 2006,	 2009).	 In	2014,	 Fidesz	Prime	Minister	Viktór	Orbán	officialised	his	party's	stance	in	a	famous	speech,	defending	the	need	"to	abandon	liberal	methods	and	 principles	 of	 organizing	 a	 society"	 and	 to	 build	 an	 "illiberal	 state"	 in	 Hungary	(Orbán,	2014).		
This	combination	of	a	weak	liberal	party	and	a	strong	illiberal	party	has	proved	profoundly	 corrosive	 for	 Hungarian	 democracy.	 Fidesz's	 institutional	 reforms	 since	2010	 have	 deeply	 eroded	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	 Hungary's	 democracy,	 threatening	 the	independence	of	the	judiciary,	the	freedom	of	the	press	and	the	impartiality	of	electoral	monitoring	 bodies	 (see	 Council	 of	 Europe,	 2013;	 European	 Parliament,	 2013;	Norwegian	 Helsinki	 Committee,	 2013;	 United	 States	 Commission	 on	 Security	 and	Cooperation	in	Europe,	2013).	Since	the	time	of	my	interview,	Fidesz	has	extended	the	reach	 of	 its	 illiberal	 measures,	 leading	 Freedom	 House	 to	 rate	 the	 country	 down	 in	2013	and	again	in	2014	(Freedom	House,	2015b).	The	Hungarian	case	thus	provides	a	poignant	example	of	how	weaknesses	in	the	democratic	character	of	partisan	discourse	is	 intimately	 linked	 to	 the	 undemocratic	 partisan	 practices	 of	 parties	 in	 government.	Indeed,	 the	events	of	 these	 last	 few	years	 can	be	 read	as	 a	progressive	 translation	of	Fidesz's	discourse	into	governmental	practice.	The	Hungarian	case	thus	demonstrates	the	power	of	partisanship	over	democracy	and	the	particular	importance	of	democratic	forms	of	partisanship	for	the	successful	democratisation	of	post-authoritarian	societies.			The	 Hungarian	 case	 may	 also	 serve	 as	 a	 "cautionary	 tale"	 for	 European	partisanship	 in	 general	 (Komárek,	 2014).	 Both	 France	 and	 Hungary	 have	 in	 their	political	mainstream	a	cohesive	Right	slipping	into	non-pluralism,	and	a	weakening	Left	that	lacks	the	cohesiveness	to	stand	its	ground.	While	these	partisan	traits	are	far	more	accentuated	 in	 Hungary	 than	 they	 are	 in	 France,	 the	 overall	 balance	 remains	comparable.	 The	 restriction	 of	 governments'	 leeway	 for	 economic	 policy	 in	 both	countries	 might	 provide	 a	 partial	 explanation	 for	 these	 comparable	 developments.	What	 separates	France	most	 clearly	 from	 the	Hungarian	experience,	and	explains	 the	difference	 in	degree	between	both	cases,	 are	a	hundred	and	 fifty	years	of	democratic	history.	 To	 some	 extent,	 France's	 democratic	 history	 provides	 a	 form	 of	 'buffer'	 to	democratic	erosion	that	Hungary	lacks.		
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As	 highlighted	 above,	 however,	 a	 democratic	 history	 will	 not	 by	 itself	 make	democratic	partisanship	eternal	and	protect	established	democracies	from	the	negative	impact	 of	 partisan	 pathologies.	 The	 Left-Right	 dichotomy	 is	 losing	 its	 relevance	 in	contemporary	 Europe,	 precisely	 because	 parties	 are	 failing	 to	 adapt	 its	 meaning	 to	contemporary	 circumstances.	 In	 this	 process,	 Western	 European	 parties	 are	progressively	cutting	themselves	off	from	political	roots	that	have	been	built	over	more	than	 a	 century	 of	 open	 party	 competition.	 In	 many	 ways,	 Western	 European	 party	systems	are	increasingly	looking	like	Central	European	ones.	As	Hanley	stresses,		"it	 is	 time	 to	 turn	around	 the	 telescope	and	reflect	upon	what	CEE	can	 tell	us	about	 the	 rapid	 erosion	 of	 historically	 based	 party	 configurations	 in	Western	Europe	 (...)	Western	Europe	may	be	 increasingly	 converging	 towards	 the	CEE	model	 of	 fragmented,	 fluid	 electorates,	 ideologically	 rootless	 parties	 and	pragmatic	 managerial	 politicians	 whose	 hold	 on	 power	 is	 disturbed	 only	 by	periodic	populist	upsurges	at	the	polls"	(Hanley,	2012,	p.	795).		If	 democratic	 forms	 of	 partisanship	 in	 Western	 Europe	 are	 dependent	 on	historically	 inherited	 identities,	 then	cohesiveness	and	pluralism	may	well	erode	with	the	fading	of	these	traditional	identities.	The	Hungarian	case	may	act	as	a	reminder	of	what	democracy	in	Western	Europe	still	gains	from	its	history	and	of	what	it	has	to	lose	by	losing	touch	with	its	roots.	It	also	highlights	the	urgency	for	partisans	in	established	democracies	 to	 adapt	 and	 thus	 keep	 alive	 those	 political	 traditions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	which	democratic	forms	of	partisanship	were	constructed	over	time.		
II.	IMPLICATIONS	FOR	PARTISANS	AND	EXTERNAL	POLITICAL	ACTORS		
1.	Implications	for	partisans	The	results	of	 this	 thesis	have	 implications	 for	partisans	that	are	 interested	 in	furthering	 democracy	 in	 their	 own	 country.	 If	 democratic	 forms	 of	 partisanship	 are	central	to	the	vitality	and	even	endurance	of	contemporary	democracies,	then	partisans	that	 are	 also	 democrats	 should	 strive	 to	 uphold	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	partisanship.	Along	with	the	body	of	theoretical	literature	that	has	sought	to	establish	such	 standards,	 this	 thesis	offers	 some	guidelines	 for	 real-world	partisans.	The	 ideal-case	scenario	of	democratic	theory—a	partisan	that	 is	both	cohesive	and	pluralist—is	not	a	far-fetched,	removed	ideal.	Many	of	the	partisans	interviewed	in	France	displayed	the	capacity	to	uphold	both	standards,	thereby	also	demonstrating	the	accessibility	of	this	 ideal	 for	 real-world	partisanship.	These	exemplary	partisans	show	 that	partisans	do	not	necessarily	need	to	compromise	their	cohesiveness,	and	thus	their	capacity	for	
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mobilisation,	in	order	to	act	with	respect	towards	political	opponents	and	to	defend	the	value	of	political	disagreement.	 In	fact,	 there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	partisans	can	lose	 a	 share	 of	 cohesiveness	 by	 engaging	 in	 empty	 forms	 of	 negative	 campaigning.	Beyond	their	positive	impact	on	the	functioning	of	representative	democracy,	partisans	could	 also	 be	 furthering	 their	 own	 cause	 by	 upholding	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	partisanship.		I	 have	 stressed	 at	 several	 points	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 whether	 or	 not	 partisans	uphold	democratic	partisanship	is	not	only	dependent	on	their	good	will.	Certain	sets	of	cultural	resources	and	external	events	may	make	their	task	easier	or	more	difficult	and	thus	contribute	to	explain	some	of	the	variations	in	patterns	of	partisan	discourse.	This	being	said,	and	as	already	highlighted	above,	partisans	are	not	fully	determined	by	the	structures	 within	 which	 they	 operate.	 They	 have	 agency	 in	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	decide	 to	 interpret	 the	 past	 and	 their	 current	 environment,	 and	 their	 interpretations	will	matter	to	the	contribution	they	make	to	democracy.	If	partisans	are	aware	of	their	own	power,	and	aware	of	 the	constraints	within	which	 they	exercise	 it,	 they	can	also	work	to	minimise	the	effects	of	these	constraints	on	their	own	discourse.		Take	 the	 question	 of	 corruption,	 for	 instance,	 and	 its	 constraining	 effect	 on	partisans'	 respect	 for	 opponents.	 The	 fact	 that	 a	 given	 society	 is	 corrupt	 does	 not	diminish	the	moral	obligation	of	partisans	to	uphold	the	standard	of	political	pluralism.	They	can	talk	about	scandals	affecting	particular	political	opponents,	while	respecting	the	presumption	of	innocence,	and	without	using	these	instances	as	political	weapons	against	 their	opposition	as	 a	whole.	They	 can	denounce	 the	plague	of	 corruption,	 yet	see	 the	 necessity	 for	 their	 own	 party	 to	 address	 this	 problem	 in	 their	 own	 ranks.	Corruption	 certainly	 makes	 disrespect	 for	 opponents	 a	 tempting	 strategy.	 In	 these	conditions,	 overt	 commitment	 to	 pluralism	 demands	 strict	 rigor	 from	 partisans,	perhaps	greater	self-restraint	than	would	be	necessary	in	less	corrupt	societies.		Much	the	same	goes	 for	 the	other	constraints	on	democratic	partisanship	 that	this	 thesis	has	uncovered.	Partisans	 can	be	aware	of	 the	dangers	 that	 a	 restriction	of	their	 economic	 leverage	 represents	 for	 partisan	 cohesiveness	 and	 not	 succumb	 to	 a	rhetoric	according	to	which	there	is	only	one	sets	of	valid	means	to	reach	the	common	good	in	such	circumstances.	 In	post-authoritarian	societies,	partisans	can	be	aware	of	the	danger	of	perpetuating	an	'us	vs.	them'	narrative	and	search	their	own	history	for	values,	 ideas,	and	policies	they	can	draw	on	without	compromising	their	commitment	to	 political	 pluralism.	 Faced	with	 radical	 institutional	 reforms	 from	 their	 opponents,	partisans	 can	 invest	 all	 of	 their	 energy	 in	 devising	 a	 coherent	 alternative	 to	 counter	
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these	 reforms	 efficiently.	 Witnessing	 the	 destructive	 effects	 of	 extreme	 polarisation,	partisans	can	recognise	and	question	their	party's	own	share	in	this	state	of	affairs.		At	 a	 certain	 point,	 democratic	 partisanship	 does,	 therefore,	 also	 demand	 the	good	will,	effort,	and	awareness	of	partisans	themselves.	This	is	the	share	that	partisans	can	 do.	 In	 adverse	 circumstances,	 they	 can	 resist	 the	 tempting	 option	 of	 negative	campaigning	 and	 see	moral	 faults	 in	 their	 own	 self	 and	 not	 only	 in	 their	 adversary.	Rather	 than	 lashing	 out	 against	 opponents,	 they	 can	 focus	 on	 putting	 together	 a	coherent	program	of	government.	Partisans	can	at	least	take	the	task	of	overcoming	the	constraints	they	are	faced	with	seriously	and	do	the	best	that	they	can	with	the	specific	context	within	which	they	operate.			
2.	Implications	for	external	political	actors	-	The	case	of	the	EU	This	 thesis	 also	 has	 implications	 for	 political	 actors	 external	 to	 the	 domestic	politics	 of	 states	 and	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 encouraging	 their	 democratic	 vitality	 and	endurance.	The	European	Union	is	a	particularly	 interesting	case	 in	this	regard,	given	especially	the	influence	it	has	on	both	candidate	countries	and	current	member	states	(Grabbe,	 2006;	 Ladrech,	 2009).	 Moreover,	 the	 EU	 was	 founded	 with	 the	 idea	 of	promoting	peace	and	democracy	on	the	continent,	and	its	treaties	still	frame	these	aims	as	 its	primary	raison	d'être.149	Under	 the	Copenhagen	criteria	established	 in	1993,	 the	opening	 of	 accession	 negotiations	 with	 a	 candidate	 country	 is	 conditioned	 on	 the	'stability	 of	 institutions	 guaranteeing	 democracy,	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 human	 rights	 and	respect	 for	and	protection	of	minorities'	 (European	Commission,	2012).	 	As	 I	show	in	the	 following	 paragraphs,	my	 findings	 highlights	 the	 tensions	 that	 exist	 between	 this	general	objective	and	 the	realisation	of	other	principles	 that	have	been	central	 to	 the	EU's	practices.		As	highlighted	above,	 the	 findings	of	 this	 study	 suggest	 that	 available	 cultural	resources	 in	a	given	country	have	an	 impact	on	 the	discourse	of	party	members,	 and	thus	 indirectly	 on	 the	 vitality	 and	 endurance	 of	 a	 given	 democracy.	 But	 the	 EU's	approach	to	democracy	in	current	and	future	member	states	sits	uneasily	with	the	idea	of	 taking	 into	 account	 cultural	 factors	 in	 its	 enlargement	 or	 internal	 policies.	 The	European	Union	 has	 indeed	 always	 fostered	 a	 universalist,	 rather	 than	 contextualist,	approach	 to	 democracy	 and	 mostly	 considered	 democracy	 in	 current	 and	 future	
																																								 																					
149	See	Article	2	and	3	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	(Official	Journal	of	the	European	Union,	2008).		
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member	states	from	an	institutional	point	of	view.	The	political	criteria	of	Copenhagen	typically	include	traditional,	institutionalist	standards	for	democracy.		However,	 temporary	 institutional	 compliance	 is	 compatible	 with	 partisan	dynamics	 that	are	highly	 corrosive	 to	 these	 same	 institutions	 in	 the	 short	 to	medium	run.	In	Hungary,	for	instance,	political	discourse	started	radicalizing	in	the	early	2000s,	before	 the	 EU	 accession	 process	 of	 2002.	 This	 increasingly	 undemocratic	 partisan	discourse	has	gone	hand	in	hand	with	a	degradation	of	partisan	practice	and	an	erosion	of	the	procedural	basis	of	Hungary's	democracy	in	2010.	Today,	the	country	would	not	reach	 the	 institutional	 standards	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 it	 was	 accepted	 as	 an	 EU	member.	 Other	 post-communist	 countries	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 may	 be	 taking	 a	similar	path.	The	Law	and	Justice	party	 in	Poland,	 for	 instance,	has	conducted	several	institutional	 reforms	 since	 the	 Fall	 of	 2015	 that	 have	 also	 eroded	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	Polish	democracy.		To	this	extent,	the	Hungarian	story	highlights	the	paradox	within	which	the	EU	is	 caught	 in	 its	 approach	 to	 enlargement.	 If	 the	 EU	 maintains	 a	 universalistic	 and	institutionalist	 outlook	 on	 democracy,	 it	 runs	 the	 risk	 of	 accepting	 more	 fragile	democracies	among	its	members.	It	could,	on	the	other	hand,	add	other	standards	to	its	procedural	 survey	 of	 domestic	 institutions.	 The	 EU	 could	 pay	 more	 attention	 to	 the	expression	of	democratic	norms	in	partisan	discourse	and	practices	and	give	more	time	to	 processes	 of	 democratisation	 before	 accepting	 a	 post-authoritarian	 country	 as	 a	member.	 This	 approach	may	be	 a	 good	 complement	 to	 current	 procedures	 to	 ensure	the	internally	democratic	character	of	the	European	political	space.		I	have	also	argued	that	economic	constraints	on	the	actions	of	political	parties	are	likely	to	have	a	negative	effect	on	the	democratic	character	of	partisanship.	These	constraints	threaten	partisan	cohesiveness	on	the	left	side	of	the	political	spectrum	by	reducing	the	possibilities	for	state	intervention	in	the	economy.	These	constraints	also	put	 right-wing	 parties	 in	 a	 position	 to	 declare	 their	 absolute	 superiority,	 and	 thus	creates	an	incentive	towards	non-pluralist	discourse.	Given	the	difficulties	it	creates	for	partisans	to	express	alternative	positions	on	economic	questions,	these	constraints	also	encourage	the	development	of	negative	forms	of	campaigning	on	socio-cultural	issues.		On	this	question	the	practices	of	the	EU	may	also	come	in	contradiction	with	its	objective	 of	 preserving	 democracy	 on	 the	 continent.	 In	 the	 1950s,	 the	 European	Communities	 were	 built	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 economic	 interdependence	 between	member	states	would	contribute	to	preserve	peace	and	democracy	on	the	continent.	In	parallel,	 however,	 economic	 integration	 has	 limited	 the	 leverage	 of	 national	
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governments	 in	 their	 economic	 policy.	 Over	 the	 last	 three	 decades	 especially,	 the	budgetary,	 fiscal	 and	 monetary	 constraints	 that	 weigh	 on	 member	 states	 have	 been	tightened.	In	light	of	the	findings	of	this	thesis,	these	economic	constraints	are	likely	to	have	had	a		negative	impact	on	the	democratic	character	of	European	partisanship.		This	 supports	 the	 conclusion	 of	 a	 number	 of	 scholars,	 who	 have	 already	emphasised	 that	 EU	 decision-making	 contributes	 to	 create	 widening	 democratic	deficits	 among	 candidate	 countries	 and	 member	 states	 (Mair,	 2005).	 A	 number	 of	authors	have,	for	instance,	analysed	the	ways	in	which	the	tough	economic	benchmarks	for	 EU	 accession	 have	 encouraged	 parties	 in	 post-communist	 Europe	 to	 distinguish	themselves	 through	 their	 style	 and	 rhetoric	 rather	 than	 through	 their	 policies	(Grzymalala-Busse	 &	 Innes,	 2003;	 Innes,	 2002;	 Mair,	 2003b;	 Vachudova,	 2008).	 The	ways	 in	 which	 economic	 integration	 is	 currently	 conducted	 may	 thus	 be	 running	counter	the	EU's	larger	objective	to	deepen	democracy	on	the	continent.		Finally,	 this	 thesis	 has	 shown	 that	 high	 levels	 of	 corruption	 are	 likely	 to	encourage	 low	 levels	 of	 partisan	 commitment	 to	 political	 pluralism,	 which	 in	 turn	fragilise	democracy.	There	is	also	evidence	that	radical	institutional	reforms	contribute	to	a	degradation	of	partisan	discourse	by	polarising	the	party	system.		Given	the	EU's	democratic	moto	and	its	preference	for	procedural	definitions	of	democracy,	one	could	expect	the	organisation	would	constrain	its	members	to	uphold	the	institutional	requirements	of	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law.	This,	however,	comes	in	 tension	 with	 another	 central	 pillar	 of	 the	 European	 Union:	 the	 constitutional	sovereignty	 of	 its	 member	 states.	 While	 the	 EU	 does	 put	 an	 emphasis	 on	 these	requirements	 during	 accession	 negotiations	 (see	 above),	 it	 has	 few	 instruments	 to	ensure	 that	 governments	 continue	 to	 respect	 these	 criteria	 once	 they	 have	 become	members.	 Indeed,	 constitutional	 matters	 and	 institutional	 design	 remain	 within	 the	
exclusive	 competence	 of	 member	 states.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 European	 Commission	cannot	 directly	 instigate	 an	 infringement	 procedure	 against	 a	 member	 state	 for	weakening	democratic	institutions	or	undermining	human	rights,	nor	can	the	Court	of	Justice	of	 the	European	Union	 (CJEU)	referred	 to	directly	on	 these	matters.150	The	EU	does	 dispose	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘nuclear	 option’	 of	 Article	 7	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	 European																																									 																					
150	Only	controversial	measures	in	these	fields	that	are	also	related	to	domains	of	EU	competence	can	fall	under	an	infringement	procedure.	For	instance,	states	can	be	prosecuted	if	specific	corrupt	practices	also	infringe	on	the	principles	of	market	competition.	As	a	more	concrete	example,	the	CJEU	has	examined	the	new	 retirement	 age	 for	 judges,	 prosecutors	 and	 public	 notaries	 in	 Hungary	 on	 the	 legal	 basis	 that	 it	contradicts	 EU	 rules	 on	 equal	 treatment	 in	 employment	 (Directive	 2000/78/EC).	 It	 could	 not	 have,	 for	instance,	directly	addressed	this	measure	on	the	basis	that	it	challenges	the	independence	of	the	Hungarian	judiciary.		
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Union	 (TEU),	 which	 allows	 the	 Council	 to	 unanimously	 suspend	 a	 member	 states'	voting	right	in	case	of	a	serious	and	persistent	breach	of	democratic	principles.	In	the	absence	 of	 a	 series	 of	 specific	 criteria	 to	 determine	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 'clear	 and	 serious	breach'	 of	 democratic	 principles,	 and	 the	 strong	 lack	 of	 incentives	 for	 the	 Council	 to	impose	such	drastic	sanctions	on	one	of	its	members,	this	article	has	however	remained	of	little	practice	use	until	now.151		As	a	direct	result	of	this	situation,	the	EU	has	as	of	yet	done	 very	 little	 to	 address	 Hungary's	 ongoing	 process	 of	 democratic	 backsliding	(Herman	&	Saltman,	2014).		To	 conclude	 this	 section,	 a	wider	debate	would	be	necessary	on	 the	 extent	 to	which	the	EU's	objective	of	 furthering	democracy	on	the	continent	 is	compatible	with	some	of	the	other	principles	that	structure	the	EU's	practices.	This	would	be	necessary	if	 European	 Union	 institutions	 are	 to	 play	 a	 positive	 role	 in	 encouraging	 parties	 to	uphold	 democratic	 standards	 in	 their	 discourse	 and	 practices	 and	 thereby	 to	 foster	democratic	consolidation.			
III.	AVENUES	FOR	FUTURE	RESEARCH	
If	the	democratic	character	of	partisanship	is	indeed	central	to	the	vitality	and	even	 endurance	 of	 contemporary	 democracies,	 then	 it	 should	 also	 become	 a	 more	widespread	object	of	academic	study.	As	highlighted	in	the	Introduction	to	this	thesis,	this	would	 involve	 that	empirical	party	studies	 take	greater	 interest	 in	 the	normative	implications	 of	 partisan	 practice	 and	 discourse	 and	 engage	 in	 a	 closer	 dialogue	with	contemporary	 democratic	 theory.	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 suggest	 some	 more	specific	avenues	for	further	research.				
																																								 																					
151	The	only	 existing	 guidelines	 are	 set	 out	 in	 a	2003	Communication	of	 the	EC	 (COM	2003).	The	 recent	evolution	 of	 Hungary	 has	 nevertheless	 initiated	 a	 debate	 at	 the	 EU	 level	 on	 the	 inefficiency	 of	 existing	instruments	to	address	these	types	of	problems	and	the	need	for	new	ones.	In	March	2014,	the	European	Commission	 has	 for	 instance	 set	 forth	 a	 new	 EU	 Framework	 to	 strengthen	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 (European	Commission,	 2014).	 The	 European	 Commission	 intends	 this	 framework	 as	 a	 'pre-article	 7	 procedure',	which	 would	 allow	 European	 institutions	 to	 warn	 member	 states	 before	 imposing	 official	 sanctions.	According	 to	 expert	 commentators,	 this	new	 framework	 is	 a	 timid	 step	 that	will	 only	 very	 insufficiently	address	the	problem	at	hand	(Kochenov	&	Pech,	2015).		On	January	13,	2016,	this	procedure	was	started	for	the	first	time	by	the	European	Commission	to	address	suspicions	of	rule	of	law	shortcomings	in	Poland,	under	the	Polish	Law	and	Justice	party	in	government	since	October	2015	(European	Commission,	2016).	
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1.	New	partisan	subjects	and	methodological	tools	to	evaluate	democratic	
partisanship	First	 of	 all,	 assessing	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisan	 discourse	 complies	 with	democratic	 standards	 should	 be	 more	 systematically	 integrated	 in	 scholarly	assessments	of	the	vitality	and	endurance	of	representative	democracies.	The	study	of	partisan	 discourse	 should	 become	 a	 more	 systematic	 endeavour	 in	 evaluating	processes	of	democratisation	in	newly	established	democratic	regimes.	In	the	study	of	post-communist	 democratic	 transitions	 especially,	 the	 excessive	 focus	 on	 procedural	and	institutional	indicators	has	led	scholars	to	overestimate	democratic	progress	in	the	region	 (Dawson	&	Hanley,	2016;	Herman,	2015).	They	have	paid	 far	 less	attention	 to	the	 deeper,	 cultural	 changes	 in	 political	 discourse	 that	 are	 key	 to	 the	 long-term	endurance	of	young	democracies.		A	first	step	would	be	to	diversify	the	categories	of	partisans	studied.	There	were,	as	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 many	 good	 reasons	 to	 focus	 here	 on	 intermediary	 party	members.	 We	 would	 nevertheless	 obtain	 a	 more	 complete	 view	 on	 the	 democratic	character	 of	 partisanship	 by	 comparing	 the	 discourse	 of	 activists	 with	 that	 of	 party	elites	 and	 lay	 party	 supporters.	 This	 would	 allow	 scholars	 to	 evaluate	 variations	 in	patterns	 of	 discourse	 between	 these	 different	 groups	 of	 partisans	 and	 whether	 the	extent	 to	 which	 activists	 uphold	 the	 standards	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 is	 indeed	representative	 of	 the	 discourse	 of	 partisans	 as	 a	 whole.	 This	 would	 also	 offer	 us	 an	indication	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 elite	 discourse	 affects	 the	party's	 lower	 ranks.	 Conversely,	 it	 could	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 party	activists	and	lay	supporters	pick-up	on	the	queues	of	party	elites.		One	could	replicate	 the	methodology	used	 for	 this	study	 in	order	 to	 interview	both	 lay	 supporters	 and	 elites.	 But	 other	 methodological	 tools	 could	 be	 devised,	 for	instance,	 evaluating	 the	 public	 discourse	 of	 party	 leaders	 according	 to	 democratic	standards,	or	designing	a	survey-study	adapted	to	evaluating	the	extent	to	which	party	supporters	uphold	democratic	standards	.		
2.	Exploring	the	relationship	between	partisanship	and	democratic	change	More	 research	 is	 warranted	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 partisanship	 on	 democratic	processes.	 We	 would	 need	 to	 determine	 in	 more	 detail	 the	 mechanisms	 by	 which	partisans'	 exercise	 of	 political	 power	 affects	 democracy	 at	 large.	 In	 this	 regard,	 one	important	area	of	study	concerns	the	impact	of	partisan	discourse	on	public	opinion.	If	
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partisans	have	a	 responsibility	 in	 furthering	both	 the	political	engagement	of	 citizens	and	 their	 commitment	 to	 pluralist	 norms,	 then	we	need	 to	 study	 in	more	detail	 how	their	 discourse	 and	 actions	 either	 encourage	 or	 discourage	 these	 trends.	 The	 role	 of	party	 discourse	 in	 furthering	 or	 inhibiting	 citizen	 engagement	 is	 already	 a	 topic	 of	academic	 interest	 (Ansolabehere	&	 Iyengar,	1995;	Ansolabehere	et	al.,	1994;	Evans	&	Tilley,	2012;	Romer,	Jamieson,	&	Cappella,	2000).	The	evidence	so	far	uncovered	should	receive	 greater	 attention	 and	 be	 complemented	 by	 further	 studies.	 Further,	 it	would	also	 be	 necessary	 to	 explore	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 discourse	 of	mainstream	 parties	shapes	 public	 opinion	 and	 how	 it	 can	 serve	 to	 encourage	 or	 discourage	 the	consolidation	 of	 pluralist	 values	 within	 society	 at	 large	 (for	 existing	 studies,	 see	 for	instance	 Chong	 &	 Druckman,	 2007;	 Druckman,	 2004;	 Enyedi,	 2005;	 Sniderman	 &	Theriault,	2004).		Another	potential	area	of	research	concerns	the	relationship	between	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	and	patterns	of	partisan	practice.	While	this	thesis	has	focused	on	the	 discourse	 of	 partisans,	 the	 most	 direct	 ways	 in	 which	 partisans	 can	 erode	democracy	 is	 through	using	the	decisional	power	conferred	to	 them	via	elections.	We	may	want	to	conduct	longitudinal	studies	to	observe	whether,	at	the	macro-level,	non-democratic	 institutional	 reforms	 are	 always	 preceded	 by	 non-pluralist	 forms	 of	political	discourse.	We	could	also	explore	the	ways	in	which	political	discourse	comes	to	'translate'	into	political	practice.	For	instance,	it	would	be	interesting	to	compare	and	contrast	 the	 discourse	 of	 European	 parties	 that	 have	 undermined	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	democracy	in	their	country	before	and	after	they	come	to	power.	On	the	basis	of	such	studies,	the	democratic	merits	of	partisan	discourse	could	become	a	more	widespread	indicator	to	assess	the	consolidation	of	newly	established	democracies.		
3.	Studying	the	factors	that	influence	patterns	of	partisan	discourse	Finally,	more	academic	 interest	 could	be	devoted	 to	 the	 factors	 that	 influence	the	democratic	character	of	partisan	discourse.	As	detailed	in	the	conclusions	to	each	of	my	empirical	 chapters,	 this	 study	has	allowed	 to	 formulate	 tentative	explanations	 for	the	 variations	 in	 patterns	 of	 discourse	 that	 I	 uncover.	 More	 research	 would	nevertheless	 be	 needed	 in	 order	 to	 substantiate	 these	 explanations,	 specify	 the	respective	weight	of	these	factors	on	democratic	partisanship,	and	clarify	the	possible	interactions	between	the	different	factors	that	I	discuss.		Consider,	 for	 instance,	 the	 relation	 between	 a	 political	 history	 of	 open	 party	competition	and	democratic	forms	of	partisan	discourse.	To	generalise	the	claims	that	I	
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make	 on	 this	 particular	 point,	 we	 would	 need	 to	 examine	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 linear	relationship	between	the	'age'	of	a	democracy	and	the	extent	to	which	partisans	uphold	the	 standards	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 in	 their	 discourse.	 Uncovering	 such	regularities	would	ideally	require	large-n,	comparative	studies.	This	would	also	require	obtaining	data	on	democratic	partisanship	with	methods	that	are	less	time-consuming	and	work	 intensive	 that	 the	 ones	 used	 here.	 This	 exercise	 could	 also	 be	 repeated	 to	assess	the	correlation	of	democratic	or	undemocratic	forms	of	partisan	discourse	with	levels	of	corruption,	socio-economic	constraints,	the	institutional	reforms	of	opponents,	etc.		 To	 specify	 the	 respective	weight	 of	 the	 different	 factors	 I	 identified	 here	 and	clarify	 the	 possible	 interactions	 between	 different	 factors,	 one	 could	 also	 conduct	 a	number	 of	 additional	 small-n	 studies	 of	 the	 type	 conducted	 here.	 It	 would	 be	particularly	 interesting	 to	 focus	on	 'hard	cases',	ones	where	 the	 factors	at	play	 in	 the	French	or	Hungarian	case	would	appear	to	have	a	different	effect	on	partisan	discourse.	Studying	 such	 cases	 would	 allow	 future	 scholarship	 to	 understand	 the	 idiosyncratic	aspects	of	my	own	findings,	and	revise	or	nuance	the	conclusions	of	this	thesis.		Here	I	will	only	consider	one	such	case:	the	United	States.	This	choice	would	be	a	 fascinating	 addition	 to	 the	 two	 countries	 chosen	 here.	 All	 the	 available	 evidence	points	towards	a	radicalisation	of	American	political	discourse	in	the	last	two	decades,	with	 negative	 campaigning	 and	 personal	 attacks	 having	 become	 commonplace	(Ansolabehere	 &	 Iyengar,	 1995;	 Gutmann	 &	 Thompson,	 2012;	 J.	 J.	 Mansbridge	 &	 Jo	Martin,	 2013;	 Nivola	 &	 Brady,	 2006;	 Sinclair,	 2006).	We	 could	 therefore	 expect	 that	American	partisans	would	fare	worse	than	French	ones	on	the	standard	of	commitment	to	pluralism.	Yet	the	US	is,	like	France,	one	of	the	oldest	democracies	in	the	world,	with	a	 long	 history	 of	 open	 party	 competition.	 This	 case	 would	 thus	 be	 particularly	interesting,	at	it	would	allow	scholarship	to	shed	further	light	on	the	conditions	under	which	 a	 history	 of	 democratic	 competition	 allows	 for	 the	 expression	 of	 democratic	forms	of	partisan	discourse.		We	 could	 also	 enquire	 into	 additional	 factors	 that	may	 come	 into	 play	 in	 the	American	 case.	 Some	 authors	 have	 argued,	 for	 instance,	 that	 the	 growing	 role	 of	 the	private	 sector	 in	 campaign	 financing	 and,	 more	 generally,	 the	 increasing	interconnection	of	the	American	political	sphere	and	business	circles	contribute	to	the	radicalisation	of	American	partisan	discourse	(Crouch,	2004).	 If	a	similar	study	to	the	one	 conducted	 here	 would	 confirm	 this,	 we	 could	 say	 that	 the	 political	 economy	 of	America's	party	system	plays	a	comparable	role	to	high	levels	of	corruption	in	Hungary.	
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While	in	Hungary	high	levels	of	corruption	inhibit	the	development	of	a	pluralist	form	of	 discourse,	 the	 growing	 role	 of	 the	 business	 sector	 would	 be	 contributing	 to	 a	degradation	of	pluralist	norms	 in	 the	United	States.	This	would	 then	be	a	case	where	external	events	are	sufficiently	fundamental	that	they	progressively	trump	the	positive	role	 of	 political	 history	 on	 partisanship,	 thus	 leading	 to	 a	 modification	 of	 political	culture	itself.		In	 this	 context,	 it	 would	 also	 be	 interesting	 to	 see	 how	 American	 partisans	compare	 with	 French	 ones	 on	 the	 standard	 of	 cohesiveness,	 and	 more	 generally,	whether	cohesiveness	is	also	affected	by	changes	in	the	political	economy.	This	would	instruct	us	on	the	level	of	resilience	of	a	democratic	political	culture	in	the	face	of	such	deep	 changes,	 but	 also	 allow	 us	 to	 further	 specify	 the	 dynamic	 relationship	 between	cohesiveness	and	pluralism.	 If	we	 found,	 for	 instance,	 that	cohesiveness	remains	high	despite	low	commitments	to	political	pluralism,	this	would	rather	confirm	the	idea	that	there	 exists	 a	 trade-off	 between	 both	 dimensions.	 If	 we	 find,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 that	American	 partisans	 fail	 to	 uphold	 both	 the	 standards	 of	 cohesiveness	 and	 pluralism,	this	would	rather	comfort	the	idea	of	a	complementarity	between	both	dimensions.		These	and	many	further	questions	will	have	to	await	future	research.	For	now,	however,	I	hope	to	have	shown	the	relevance	of	partisan	discourse	for	the	present	and	future	 of	 democratic	 politics	 and	 that	 it	 is	worth	 our	 time	 to	 rigorously	 evaluate	 the	factors	which	foster	or	obstruct	democratic	forms	of	partisanship.							 					
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Appendix	1:	Comparative	fieldwork	account		In	 this	 appendix,	 I	 offer	 the	 reader	 a	 more	 detailed	 account	 of	 my	 fieldwork	experiences	in	both	France	and	Hungary.	I	learned	a	lot	about	my	country	cases	simply	
being	in	both	countries	for	a	total	of	seven	months,	and	having	to	organise	and	conduct	these	 group	 discussions.	 I	 attended	 many	 political	 events,	 including	 local	 town	 hall	meetings,	 local	 party	 section	 meeting,	 a	 national	 party	 congress,	 party-sponsored	conferences,	and	several	organised	exchanges	of	party	elites	and	grass	root	activists.	I	also	 conducted	 a	 number	 of	 informal,	 one-on-one	 interviews	 with	 party	 members,	scholars,	journalists,	and	political	analysts.	To	keep	track	of	all	of	these	events,	I	kept	a	detailed	fieldwork	journal,	in	which	I	accounted	for	my	experiences.	To	this	extent,	this	appendix	is	the	product	of	participant	observation,	a	method	of	data	collection	that	can	be	defined	as	"the	process	of	learning	through	exposure	to	or	involvement	in	the	day-to-day	 or	 routine	 activities	 of	 participants	 in	 the	 researcher	 setting"	 (Schensul	 &	LeCompte,	1999).		The	research	process	in	both	countries	was	dramatically	different:	smooth	and	uncomplicated	 in	 France,	 cumbersome	 and	 sometimes	 unpleasant	 in	 the	 case	 of	Hungary.	In	the	following	sections	I	aim	to	underline	differences	in	these	experiences,	how	 I	 adapted	 to	 them,	 and	what	 they	 taught	me	 about	 the	 political	 context	 in	 each	country.	 I	 first	 talk	about	 the	process	of	recruiting	participants	 in	both	countries,	and	then	the	process	of	conducting	focus	groups.		
I.	RECRUITING	PARTICIPANTS		
1.	General	method	of	recruitment	and	evaluation	of	its	success	
a.	Recruitment	strategy	
I	 mostly	 recruited	 participants	 from	 the	 five	 relevant	 youth	 organisations	 in	
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both	 countries.	 In	 France	 these	 included	 the	 PS's	 Mouvement	 des	 Jeunes	 Socialistes	(MJS)	 and	 the	 UMP's	 Jeunes	 Populaires	 (JP).	 In	 Hungary	 these	 included	 the	 MSzP's	
Societas,	 the	Fidesz's	Fidelitas	 and	 the	KDNP's	 Ifjúsági	Kereszténydemokrata	Szövetség	(IKSZ).	 Most	 targeted	 groups	 were	 local	 party	 sections	 with	 relatively	 young	demographics,	whether	local	sections	of	these	youth	organisations,	or	party	university	sections	for	instance.	A	smaller	number	of	groups	were	composed	of	leaders	from	the	youth	organisations	that	were	acquainted	with	each	other,	or	party	members	employed	by	 the	party	and	 that	knew	each	other	 through	work	 (see	Figure	35	 for	 the	different	'types'	of	groups	interviewed).		
	
Figure	 35:	 Distribution	 of	 groups	 according	 to	 type	 of	 partisan	 organisation	 participants	
were	recruited	from	I	 first	contacted	grass-root	partisans	with	a	sufficient	 level	of	responsibility	 to	act	as	intermediaries	between	myself	and	a	given	party	section,	mostly	heads	of	local	or	university	 party	 sections,	 or	 leaders	 of	 the	 youth	 organisations.	 In	 both	 France	 and	Hungary	 I	 could	 find	 a	 large	 number	 of	 people	 to	 contact	 on	 the	 websites	 of	 either	parties'	 youth	 organisations.	 All	 five	 youth	 party	 organisations	 provided	 points	 of	contact	for	each	local	district	section	in	Paris	and	Budapest	on	their	websites,	generally	the	 email	 address	 of	 the	 district	 section	 leader.	 	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	my	 stay	 in	 both	countries,	my	 first	 step	was	 to	 send	 out	 emails	 to	 these	 contacts.152		 I	 presented	 the	project	 in	general	 terms,	picturing	an	 interest	 in	 the	political	opinions	of	young	party	members,	and	especially	in	their	positioning	within	the	public	debates	that	emerged	in	French	or	Hungarian	political	life	since	the	last	national	elections.	Potential	participants	were	then	asked	if	they	would	care	to	take	part	in	the	study,	and	invite	other	members	
																																								 																					
152	See	Appendix	3	for	the	template	emails.	
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of	their	local	party	section	for	a	group	discussion.		Because	much	of	 the	 youth	organisations'	 activities	 are	 today	 coordinated	via	social	media	and	especially	Facebook,	I	also	created	a	separate	Facebook	account	from	my	own	for	the	purpose	of	this	research.	This	account	was	used	both	to	stay	informed	about	various	events	organised	by	local	party	sections,	and	to	find	further	sections	and	party	 members	 to	 contact.	 Finally,	 as	 groups	 started	 being	 conducted,	 I	 also	participated	 in	 different	 types	 of	 political	 events	 and	 met	 more	 party	 members	 in	person.	These	either	accepted	to	be	contacted	directly	about	the	project,	or	to	give	me	contacts	they	thought	would	be	useful.		In	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	 sample	 reflecting	 the	 diversity	 of	 currents	 within	 the	Hungarian	and	French	political	mainstream,	I	made	a	consciou	effort	to	contact	heads	of	 sections	with	diverse	political	 orientations	 in	France,	 and	 from	different	parties	 in	Hungary.	As	could	be	expected,	heads	of	sections	generally	recruited	participants	with	similar	 orientations	 to	 their	 own.	 This	 resulted	 in	 rather	 homogeneous	 groups	 from	this	perspective.	In	France,	with	regard	to	young	socialists	for	instance,	it	was	essential	for	me	not	to	recruit	participants	solely	from	the	Mouvement	des	Jeunes	Socialistes	(MJS).	The	MJS	was	created	in	1993	as	an	organisation	that	is	politically	independent	from	the	PS,	but	nevertheless	permanently	affiliated	with	the	French	Socialist	Party.	As	a	result,	it	has	its	own	internal	currents,	separate	from	those	of	the	PS,	and	the	line	of	the	MJS	is	openly	 to	 the	 left	of	 the	PS	as	a	whole.	 If	 I	had	solely	recruited	 from	the	MJS,	 I	would	thus	 have	 over	 represented	 the	 PS's	 left	wing.	 I	 therefore	 also	 recruited	 in	 local	 and	university	sections	of	the	PS,	which	were	more	likely	to	hold	reformist	views,	as	well	as	among	the	more	centrist,	social-democratic	currents	in	the	MJS.		In	 France,	 the	 situation	 was	 more	 straightforward	 on	 the	 right	 side	 of	 the	political	 spectrum.	 Indeed,	 the	 Jeunes	Populaires	 are	 not	 independent	 from	 the	 UMP.	Thus	while	it	is	possible	to	be	a	young	member	of	the	PS	without	being	part	of	the	MJS,	and	 vice-versa,	 any	 UMP	 party	 member	 younger	 than	 30	 years	 old	 is	 automatically	considered	 a	 Jeune	 Populaire.	 	 Not	 only	 do	 the	 Jeunes	 Populaires	 vote	 for	 the	 same	currents	 as	 their	 elders,	 but	 the	 divisions	 among	 the	 youth	 organisation	 also	 reflect	more	 accurately	 the	 divisions	within	 the	 party	 as	 a	whole.	 I	 also	made	 sure	 that	 the	different	 currents	 within	 the	 UMP	 would	 be	 represented	 in	 my	 sample	 of	 French	participants.		In	Hungary,	this	task	was	paradoxically	simplified	by	the	absence	of	established	currents	in	the	parties	under	study.	The	representation	of	diverse	political	orientations	on	both	sides	of	the	Hungarian	political	spectrum	was	ensured	by	the	fact	participants	
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were	recruited	not	only	 from	the	MSzP	and	Fidesz,	but	also	 from	their	close	electoral	allies	 or	 sister	 organisations,	 Együtt/PM	 and	 DK	 on	 the	 left,	 and	 the	 KDNP	 on	 the	right.153	
b.	Success	of	recruitment	strategy	
This	 initial	 strategy	of	 recruitment	generated	very	different	 results	 in	 the	 two	countries	 under	 study.	 In	 France,	 the	method	 proved	 particularly	 efficient.	 Out	 of	 89	individual	activists	initially	contacted,	41	answered	my	email,	and	20	accepted	to	help	me	organise	a	group	discussion.154	These	 interviews	were	then	all	conducted	within	a	period	 of	 six	 weeks.	 This	 is	 a	 good	 'turnout',	 especially	 considering	 the	 fact	 that	 I	offered	 no	 financial	 incentive	 to	 participants	 (this	 is	 common	 in	 many	 focus	 group	studies,	see	for	instance	Duchesne	&	Haegel,	2004;	Gamson,	1992;	Perrin,	2006;	White,	2011b).	The	 intermediaries	who	accepted	 to	participate	expressed	a	 great	 amount	of	trust	 in	 my	 work.	 With	 one	 exception,	 they	 all	 accepted	 to	 help	 organise	 a	 group	without	 meeting	 me	 beforehand	 or	 knowing	 more	 about	 my	 project	 than	 what	 I	described	 in	 my	 email.	 I	 did	 also	 not	 have	 to	 involve	 my	 personal	 networks	 in	 the	recruitment	 process.	 None	 of	 these	 intermediaries	 knew	 me	 beforehand,	 and	 I	 was	never	introduced	to	potential	interviewees	via	pre-existing	common	acquaintances.	In	three	 cases	 only,	 one	 group	 facilitated	 the	 set	 up	 of	 another,	 with	 participants	suggesting	further	activists	I	could	contact.		In	Budapest,	the	recruitment	process	proved	far	more	complicated.	I	contacted	191	party	 activists	 via	 email.	 67	 answered	 and	18	 of	 these	 exchanges	 led	 to	 a	 group	interview.155	This	means	that	I	had	to	contact	over	twice	the	number	of	partisans	than	in	France	in	order	to	obtain	a	similar	number	of	groups.	Conducting	these	18	groups	in	
																																								 																					
153	For	a	detailed	description	of	the	party	landscape	in	both	countries,	see	Chapter	2,	III,	1,	a.		154	Only	14	of	 the	20	groups	 conducted	 in	France,	 and	14	of	 the	18	groups	 conducted	 in	Hungary,	were	used	for	the	purpose	of	 this	research.	The	main	reason	for	this	 is	 that	 I	needed	a	comparable	number	of	groups	from	each	party	and	country,	and	in	France	I	could	only	interview	seven	UMP	groups.	In	order	to	make	 the	 number	 of	 groups	 equal	 for	 each	 party,	 I	 decided	 not	 to	 analyse	 a	 number	 of	 the	 groups	conducted	among	members	of	the	three	other	parties.	I	selected	the	groups	to	eliminate	before	I	analysed	the	transcripts,	not	on	the	basis	of	my	results.	I	chose	to	keep	those	28	groups	that	I	considered	the	most	comparable,	and	eliminate	those	that	stood	out,	or	were	faulty	in	one	way	or	another.	For	instance	I	did	not	take	 into	 account	 some	 groups	 I	 conducted	 in	 both	 countries	with	 party	 sympathisers,	 given	 that	most	other	groups	were	conducted	with	members.	I	took	out	those	groups	that	were	far	shorter	than	others.	 I	also	privileged	groups	 that	 involved	 larger	numbers	of	participants	 (4-5)	 rather	 than	 fewer	 (2-3)	as	 the	conversation	did	not	pick	up	as	well	 in	the	 latter	category.	 In	Hungary,	 I	privileged	groups	 from	the	two	main	parties	under	study	(Fidesz	and	MSzP)	rather	than	their	satellite	parties	(KDNP	and	Együtt/PM).	The	overall	 objective	 I	 kept	 in	mind	 in	doing	 this	 selection	was	 to	 constitute	 final	 samples	 that	would	be	 as	homogenous	as	possible,	and	as	comparable	as	possible	across	countries	and	parties.		155	On	how	I	selected	14	out	of	these	18	Hungarian	groups	for	my	analysis,	see	footnote	154.		
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Hungary	also	required	over	three	months,	so	twice	the	amount	of	time	that	I	needed	in	France.	Finally,	the	recruitment	process	involved	far	more	personal	networking	than	in	France.	Six	out	of	the	18	willing	intermediaries	asked	to	meet	me	before	the	group	was	conducted,	 and	 for	 14	 of	 these	 18	 interviews	 I	 had	 to	 proceed	 through	 being	recommended	 by	 a	 third	 person.	 Out	 of	 these	 14	 recommendations,	 four	 came	 from	activists	I	had	already	interviewed,	one	interview	leading	to	another.	For	the	remaining	ten	 groups,	 I	 had	 to	 contact	 and	 meet	 a	 number	 of	 journalists,	 scholars,	 political	analysts	and	higher	profile	politicians,	who	 then	put	me	 in	 relation	with	young	party	activists	 that	 they	 were	 acquainted	 with.	 Budapest	 being	 a	 small	 world,	 these	 were	often	individuals	that	I	had	already	sent	an	email	to,	but	without	any	success.		
c.	Reasons	for	participation	
I	 can	 only	make	 an	 informed	 guess	 on	 the	 reasons	why	 these	 young	 partisans	decided	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 study,	 as	 this	 is	 not	 a	 question	 that	 was	 raised	 directly	during	 the	 interviews.	Generally	 speaking,	because	politics	 is	 such	a	 central	 aspect	of	these	citizens'	lives,	they	may	have	perceived	participation	in	the	group	discussion	as	a	continuation	of	their	political	engagement,	as	an	additional	expression	of	their	activism.	Allowing	heads	of	 local	sections	to	recruit	the	groups	themselves	also	had	advantages	in	 this	 sense.	 I	 likely	 gave	 these	 individuals	 an	 opportunity	 to	 express	 a	 form	 of	authority	over	their	team	by	inviting	them	to	the	talk.	This	may	have	played	in	favour	of	the	 recruitment	 process	 especially	 among	 very	 young	 and	 newly	 constituted	 teams.	Second,	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 young	 party	 members	 knew	 they	 would	 be	 participating	with	 others	 from	 their	 local	 section	 may	 have	 created	 an	 incentive	 to	 take	 part,	 by	bridging	their	own	political	engagement	with	a	contribution	to	the	group.		Specific	 emails	 participants	 sent	 back	 and	 exchanges	 with	 activists	 before	 or	after	 interviews	 suggest	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 more	 specific	 motivations.	 Some	interviewees	 expressed	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 topic	 of	 the	 focus	 group.	 A	 young	 French	socialist,	Fabien,	wrote	me	the	following:		Fabien:	I	 find	your	research	topic	very	interesting,	especially	because	populist	parties	 have	 managed	 to	 gather	 a	 large	 vote	 among	 young	 Europeans	 (...)	 I	would	 be	 very	 interested	 in	 the	 reasons	 that	 led	 you	 to	 choose	 this	 topic	 of	research,	and	what	you	aim	to	do	with	the	study	once	it	is	finished.	I	hope	you	can	answer	me,	or	that	we	can	talk	about	it	when	we	meet.			 Similarly,	three	of	my	Hungarian	intermediaries	were	post-graduate	students	in	the	 social	 sciences,	 and	 had	 already	 been	 involved	 in	 some	 form	 of	 data	 collection	process.	 Not	 only	 did	 they	 express	 an	 interest	 for	 my	 topic	 of	 research,	 but	 they	
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explicitly	 stated	 that	 they	 would	 also	 participate	 out	 of	 solidarity	 with	 a	 fellow	researcher.			 Others	 seemed	 to	 consider	 the	 group	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 testify	 of	 their	experience	 as	 party	 members,	 with	 this	 expression	 of	 academic	 interest	 being	perceived	 as	 a	 form	of	 validation	 of	 their	 own	 action.	 Benoît,	 a	 young	UMP	member,	expressed	this	well	in	his	email	to	me:		Benoît:	 I	 thank	 you	 sincerly	 for	 having	 chosen	 (our	 constituency).	 Indeed,	 I	have	responsibilities	in	a	rather	poor	district,	where	we	are	fighting	on	a	day-to-day	basis	to	win	back	the	electorate.	Our	engagement	is	very	different	from	the	one	of	young	people	in	the	west	of	Paris.	I	can	assure	you	that	you	will	learn	a	lot	on	the	engagement	of	young	people,	and	on-the-field	activism.		 In	 Hungary,	 some	 activists	 appeared	 to	 expect	 not	 only	 validation,	 but	 also	some	form	of	political	recognition	and	visibility	out	of	their	participation	in	the	study.	These	potential	participants	seemed	to	consider	the	study	as	a	way	of	communicating	their	point	of	view	to	the	Western	part	of	Europe.	This	was	even	more	the	case	among	Fidesz	supporters,	who	regularly	positioned	 themselves	as	ambassadors	of	 their	own	party,	 with	 a	 duty	 to	 correct	 what	 they	 perceived	 as	 misrepresentations	 of	 their	government's	actions	in	the	Western	press	and	public	opinion.	The	following	response	from	Fidelitas	member	Endre	to	one	of	my	initial	emails	suggests	this	attitude:		Endre:	 I'm	 happy	 to	 participate	 in	 correcting	 the	 negative	 Western	 views	concerning	 our	 country,	 for	 (Westerners)	 not	 only	 to	 hear	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	left-liberal156	media	orientated	by	foreign	multinationals.			 In	fact,	this	was	a	major	differences	between	my	French	and	Hungarian	groups.	In	 Hungary	 participants	 often	 approached	 the	 study	 as	 a	 platform	 from	which	 their	party	and	its	message	would	be	given	visibility	and	publicity.	In	France,	party	members	rather	seemed	to	participate	out	of	curiosity,	desire	to	help,	or	to	have	an	opportunity	to	share	their	experiences	as	party	members.		
2.	Understanding	differences	in	the	French	and	Hungarian	recruitment	
experiences		 This	 last	 difference	 is	 also	 important	 to	 explain	 the	 greater	 difficulties	 I	 had	 to	recruit	participants	 in	Hungary	as	 compared	 to	France.	The	 fact	 that	Hungarians	 saw	my	 study	 as	 a	 platform	 from	which	 their	 party	would	 be	 visible	was	 a	 double-edged	sword.	On	the	one	hand	they	could	participate	out	of	a	desire	to	enhance	their	party's																																									 																					
156	In	Hungarian	'balliberális'	in	Hungarian,	assembling	the	word	'left'	and	'liberal'.	It	is	mostly	used	by	the	Fidesz	in	a	pejorative	sense	to	designate	the	Left.		
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reputation.	 On	 the	 other	 hand	 they	 could	 refuse	 to	 participate	 because	 they	 were	worried	 that	 their	message	would	 get	 distorted	 and	 their	 image	 tarnished.	My	 study	could	be	as	well	perceived	as	a	political	opportunity	than	as	a	political	threat.			 Fidesz	members	especially	were	concerned	 that	 I	 could	be	a	 critical	observer,	one	 that	 would	 ask	 questions	 they	 did	 not	 want	 to	 answer,	 write	 about	 them	 in	 a	critical	manner,	and	ultimately,	harm	the	party's	reputation.	Given	the	fire	under	which	Fidesz	has	been	from	EU	institutions	and	the	Western	press	more	generally,	 this	 is	 in	fact	 hardly	 surprising.	 Several	 foreign	 correspondents	with	whom	 I	met	 in	 Budapest	testified	 of	 the	 difficulty,	 if	 not	 impossibility	 for	 them	 to	 interview	 Fidesz	 party	members.	At	the	time,	one	of	them	told	me	that	no	Fidesz	official	had	been	interviewed	in	Budapest	by	a	 foreign	correspondent	since	the	2010	elections,	and	I	could	not	 find	any	information	contradicting	her	point.157		 I	received	evidence	that	such	suspicions	led	many	potential	Fidesz	participants	to	 turn	 down	 my	 invitation	 at	 first.	 The	 first	 signals	 came	 not	 from	 the	 grass-root	members	 I	 initially	 contacted,	 but	 from	 the	 higher	 ranks	 of	 the	 Fidesz	 hierarchy.	Following	my	 first	wave	of	 emails,	 I	 received	more	positive	 responses	 from	 the	 right	than	the	left	side	of	the	political	spectrum.	Within	ten	days	I	already	had	a	number	of	meetings	planned	with	Fidesz	activists,	 individually	or	 in	groups.	At	 that	point,	 it	did	not	 seem	 that	 I	 would	 have	 any	 particular	 problems	 with	 Fidesz	 participants.	Approximately	two	weeks	after	my	arrival,	I	received	an	email	from	a	party	member	at	a	national	level	of	responsibility	in	the	Fidesz	youth	party	organisation	(Fidelitas).	I	had	not	contacted	this	person,	or	been	in	communication	with	him	before.	His	message	was	succinct,	containing	barely	more	than	the	following:		Koppány:	 Zsuzsa	 Molnár	 has	 transferred	 your	 request,	 in	 which	 you	 ask	 for	help	with	your	 research.	Please,	 send	me	 the	 list	of	questions	 that	you	would	like	to	ask,	and	I'll	help	organise	the	focus	groups.		 Given	the	position	of	this	man	in	the	Fidelitas	hierarchy,	this	email	put	me	in	a	difficult	situation.	Not	responding	at	all	could	have	increased	the	party's	suspicion,	and	condemned	my	efforts.	On	 the	other	hand	 it	was	 	not	possible	 to	send	back	 the	exact	discussion	guidelines,	as	these	could	have	been	forwarded	to	potential	participants	and	introduced	a	bias	in	my	research.	I	sent	an	email	back	with	a	general	description	of	the																																									 																					
157	According	 to	 this	 foreign	correspondent,	 this	excludes	 interviews	given	 in	Brussels,	or	abroad.	 In	her	opinion,	Fidesz	officials	were	less	worried	abroad	because	they	were	also	less	directly	under	the	fire	of	the	national	press.	She	also	told	me	that	in	these	cases,	Fidesz	politicians	were	also	confronted	to	journalists	who	are	less	well	informed	about	Hungarian	affairs.	Foreign	correspondents,	contrarily	to	most	journalists	abroad,	 are	 specialists	 of	 Hungarian	 politics,	 and	 often	 speak	Hungarian.	 To	 this	 extent,	 they	 are	 also	 a	more	direct	threat.		
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study,	 although	 a	 more	 detailed	 one	 than	 the	 one	 sent	 to	 potential	 participants.	 I	emphasised	 especially	 the	 comparative	 dimension	 of	 the	 study,	 and	 gave	 a	 few	examples	 of	 the	more	 specific	 topics	 of	 public	 policy	 that	 I	 intended	 to	 discuss	with	party	members.			 Koppány	did	not	answer	this	email,	but	I	did	find	out	that	my	response	had	not	been	 to	 his	 satisfaction.	 Over	 the	 following	 two	 days,	 four	 out	 of	 five	 of	 the	 Fidesz	activists	 who	 had	 agreed	 to	 meet	 with	 me	 cancelled	 our	 appointment.	 One	 had	 an	urgent	professional	obligation	in	the	countryside.	Others	were	overwhelmed	with	work.	All	 of	 them	 suggested	 that	 I	 write	 to	 the	 central	 office	 of	 the	 youth	 organisation	 for	further	help,	as	in	the	following	email	by	Naómi:				Naómi:	In	the	meantime	I	became	aware	of	the	fact	you	have	sent	this	letter	to	many	 other	 people	 as	 well,	 therefore	 I	 kindly	 ask	 you	 to	 turn	 to	 the	 Central	office	of	Fidelitas	at		fidelitas@fidelitas.hu,	or	at	any	of	the	contacts	given	on	the	site	 of	 Fidelitas,	 because	 that	 is	 from	 where	 this	 will	 be	 coordinated.	 This	solution	will	be	simpler	 for	you	 too,	because	you'll	be	able	 to	work	 in	a	more	focused	manner.					 Another	 activist,	 Lajos,	 was	 more	 explicit	 about	 his	 need	 for	 hierarchical	approval:		Lajos:	 I'm	 sorry,	 being	 leader	 of	 a	 Fidelitas	 group	 and	 representing	 therefore	Fidelitas,	I	cannot	give	out	an	opinion	without	the	leaders'	permission.	Please,	turn	to	the	central	office	of	Fidelitas,	they	will	most	probably	willingly	help!	You	can	find	the	contacts	on	the	www.fidelitas.hu	site!		 Approximately	a	month	later,	I	obtained	a	confirmation	that	a	number	of	grass-root	 activists	 had	 received	 an	 email	 from	 their	 hierarchy	 at	 about	 that	 time,	discouraging	 them	 from	participating	 in	 the	research.	This	 information	came	 from	an	acquaintance	of	mine,	Benjamin.	He	was	trying	to	convince	Simon,	a	 friend	of	his	and	Fidesz	activist,	to	get	in	contact	with	me.	Simon	motivated	his	refusal	by	the	fact	he	had	received	 an	 email	 a	 few	 weeks	 earlier,	 advising	 against	 me.	 Two	 additional	intermediaries	 -	 a	 journalist	 working	 for	 one	 of	 the	 main	 pro-Fidesz	 weeklies	 in	Budapest,	and	a	young	Fidelitas	activist	with	national	level	responsibilities	-	confirmed	that	I	had	been	the	object	of	suspicion	within	the	Fidesz.	While	I	managed	to	convince	both	 of	 them	 of	 the	 validity	 of	 my	 research,	 they	 reported	 being	 confronted	 to	resistance	when	they	tried	to	talk	their	party	activist	acquaintances	into	participating.			 The	 hierarchy	 may	 have	 thought	 that	 I	 was	 a	 journalist,	 someone	 coming	'undercover'	 from	 the	 opposition,	 or	 simply	 a	 'westerner'	 who	would	 a	priori	 cast	 a	critical	eye	on	their	party.	While	 I	did	not	have	the	chance	to	read	the	email	 that	was	sent	 out	 by	 the	 Fidesz	 hierarchy	 to	 potential	 participants,	 Benjamin	 reported	 that	 it	
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referred	to	me	as	a	'fake',	pretending	to	be	someone	that	I	was	not.	The	hierarchy	may	have,	 more	 generally,	 been	 of	 the	 impression	 that	 they	 could	 not	 control	 the	spontaneous	 group	 discussions	 I	 suggested	 to	 organise.	 If	 I	 had	 done	 one-on-one	interviews,	 for	 instance,	 they	 could	have	 tried	 to	discuss	 the	questions	 and	negotiate	them	in	advance.	With	group	discussions,	they	had	no	real	way	to	monitor	and	manage	the	 process.	 If	 many	 of	 my	 initial	 contacts	 were	 far	 less	 suspicious,	 they	 were	most	likely	unwilling	to	purposefully	disobey	the	instructions	they	were	subsequently	given.			 After	I	received	this	email	from	the	Fidelitas	hierarchy,	it	took	me	several	weeks	of	lobbying	before	Fidesz	members	accepted	to	participate	in	the	study.158	I	met	with	a	number	 of	 people—right-wing	 journalists,	 researchers,	 and	 other	 people	 with	influence	 within	 the	 party—to	 talk	 about	 the	 project,	 and	 convince	 them	 of	 its	academic	merit.	 I	 insisted,	 especially,	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 information	would	 only	 be	used	for	research	purposes,	and	that	all	names	would	remain	anonymous.	I	hoped	that	news	would	spread,	for	my	reputation	to	change,	and	to	indirectly	gain	the	trust	of	the	hierarchy	itself.			 Whether	a	consequence	of	this	strategy	or	not,	I	have	evidence	that	at	some	point	the	Fidesz	hierarchy	reversed	its	position	and	engaged	its	members	to	participate.	After	several	 weeks	 of	 struggle,	 with	 no	 groups	 at	 all,	 there	 was	 a	 turnaround.	 Group	discussions	with	 the	Fidesz	 snowballed	 in	a	 small	period	of	 time.	Many	of	 those	who	did	 end	 up	 organising	 groups	 were	 in	 fact	 among	 the	 activists	 that	 I	 had	 initially	contacted,	 and	 who	 had	 declined	 after	 the	 party	 hierarchy	 contacted	 them.	 If	 they	'changed	 their	mind',	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 at	 some	 point	 in	 time	 they	 also	 obtained	 a	 go-ahead	 from	 people	 that	 were	 higher	 up	 in	 the	 hierarchy.159	Among	 the	 last	 Fidesz	groups	 I	 conducted,	 there	 were	 a	 number	 of	 more	 highly	 positioned	 activists	 of	 the	youth	 party	 organisations.	 They	 no	 doubt	 knew	 about	 the	 suspicion	 I	 had	 been	 the	object	of.	I	even	started	being	invited	to	Fidesz	organised	events,	and	treated	as	some	sort	 of	 a	 'special	 guest'.	 It	 seemed	 to	me	 as	 if	my	 study	 transited	 from	 the	 status	 of	
																																								 																					
158	Two	of	my	initial	contacts	did	accept	to	organise	groups	quite	quickly,	and	this	after	my	email	exchange	with	 Koppány.	 They	 showed	 no	 particular	 signs	 of	 suspicion.	 It	 is	 most	 likely,	 therefore	 that	 these	instructions	 from	 the	 higher	 ranks	 of	 the	 youth	 organisation	were	 not	 sent	 to	 all	 local	 sections.	 All	 the	other	groups,	however,	were	conducted	only	several	weeks	later.	159 	One	 striking	 example	 concerns	 Naómi,	 the	 head	 of	 a	 local	 Fidelitas	 section.	 While	 she	 had	enthusiastically	 responded	 to	my	 first	 email,	 she	was	one	of	 the	activists	 to	write	back	a	 couple	of	days	later,	claiming	she	could	not	take	part	anymore.	In	all	likelihood,	she	was	one	of	those	to	receive	the	email	discouraging	 activists	 to	 participate.	 Approximately	 two	 months	 later	 she	 invited	 me	 very	 warmly	 to	participate	 in	 a	 meeting	 held	 by	 her	 section,	 after	 which	 I	 conducted	 a	 discussion.	 In	 the	 meanwhile,	several	 individuals	 that	 she	 could	 consider	 trust-worthy,	 one	 higher	 profile	 Fidesz	 politicians	 and	 a	journalist	from	a	right-wing	weekly	magazine,	had	recommended	me	to	her.		
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'political	threat'	to	the	status	of	'political	opportunity'.			 While	such	 forms	of	resistance	were	 less	apparent	with	MSzP	party	members,	 I	was	 also	 faced	with	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 suspicion	 from	potential	 left-wing	 participants.	Levente,	one	of	my	intermediaries	for	this	party,	found	it	difficult	to	convince	potential	participants.	Some	of	his	acquaintances	openly	voiced	fear	that	I	would	perhaps	be	an	undercover	journalist,	an	informer	for	the	Fidesz	government,	or	perhaps	even	for	DK,	their	electoral	allies!	The	slow	process	of	recruitment	among	young	socialists,	however,	also	seemed	to	result	from	a	great	amount	of	inertia,	and	the	smaller	network	of	young	party	members	 in	 this	 ageing	 reformed	 communist	 party.	 It	 sometimes	 took	 up	 to	 a	month	of	email	exchanges	between	the	point	when	I	obtained	a	formal	approval	from	an	intermediary,	and	the	group	discussion	itself.	As	for	recruitment	among	the	smaller	parties	 I	 contacted—the	 KDNP	 on	 the	 right,	 Együtt/PM	 and	 DK	 on	 the	 left—it	 was	relatively	 fluid.	 Activists	 from	 these	 parties	 showed	 no	 particular	 signs	 of	 suspicion	towards	me.			 With	hindsight,	it	is	the	way	my	research	was	perceived	that	explains	best	these	differences	between	my	French	and	Hungarian	 experiences	of	 recruitment.	 In	France	my	position	as	a	neutral	researcher	was	quite	easily	accepted	a	priori	by	participants.	In	 this	situation,	 taking	part	 in	 the	study	was	seen	as	an	opportunity	 to	contribute	 to	the	progress	of	knowledge	on	youth	partisan	engagement,	a	topic	which	the	activists	I	contacted	 held	 dear.	 In	 Budapest,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 potential	 participants	 rarely	apprehended	 this	 research	 as	 a	 scientific	 endeavour	 they	 could	 add	 to.	 Participation	was	instead	first	perceived	as	politically	relevant	and	consequential.	It	was	either	seen	as	an	opportunity	to	push	a	certain	political,	or	as	a	potential	threat	to	the	party's	image.	This	dichotomy	I	was	somehow	locked	into	is	best	understood	in	the	light	of	Hungary's	highly	 polarised	 political	 landscape.	 At	 present	 one	 can	 only	 take	 sides	 in	 Hungarian	politics.	Because	 I	 gave	no	 signs	of	political	 support	 to	 either	party,	 because	 activists	had	no	guarantee	that	I	was	with	them,	I	was	easily	suspected	of	being	against	them.			 In	 this	 regard,	 intermediaries	 often	 reported	 that	 their	 fellow	 party	 members	were	 unwilling	 to	 'take	 the	 risk'	 of	 participating.	 It	 seems	 that	 a	 number	 of	 Fidesz	participants	 felt	 they	 needed	 to	 ask	 for	 the	 approval	 of	 their	 hierarchy	 before	participating.	This	 is	how	 the	 information	went	up	 the	Fidesz's	hierarchical	 ladder	at	first:	 a	 potential	 participant	 forwarded	 my	 email	 and	 asked	 her	 superiors	 for	permission	to	participate.	Fidesz	participants	were	not	prepared	to	disobey	their	party	hierarchy	 once	 they	were	 told	 not	 to	 talk	 to	me.	 Considering	 the	 next	 parliamentary	elections	 were	 to	 be	 held	 approximately	 six	 months	 later,	 party	 executives	 and	
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potential	participants	may	have	been	particularly	worried	of	my	 interviewees'	words	being	twisted,	or	important	information	about	the	party	being	involuntarily	leaked.			 This	anxiety	of	partisans	is	most	likely	grounded	in	their	day-to-day	experiences	of	Hungarian	politics.	Leaks	 in	 the	media	by	 investigative	 journalists	and	members	of	the	 opposition	 have	 regularly	 sparked	 political	 scandals	 over	 the	 last	 few	 years.	 In	trusting	 an	 ill-intentioned	 stranger,	 Hungarian	 partisans	 could	 be	 involved	 in	 the	revelation	of	information	that	would	harm	their	party.	Levente,	an	MSzP	member	who	helped	me	a	lot	to	gain	access	to	the	party,	shared	this	feeling	with	me.	He	said	that	as	party	members	they	do	not	even	know	what	they	are	allowed	to	say,	they	do	not	know	what	 information	 could	 potentially	 endanger	 their	 party's	 image	 if	 they	 were	overheard	 or	 recorded	 by	 the	wrong	 person.	 Hungarian	 partisans	 are	 very	 aware	 of	their	 image	precisely	because	they	are	 in	a	context	where	their	rivals	are	ready	to	do	anything	in	order	to	destroy	their	reputation.160		 For	the	partisans	I	talked	to,	being	at	the	origin	of	a	leak	or	a	scandal	could	have	affected	their	political	career.	They	could	have	been	held	responsible	by	their	hierarchy	for	their	negligence.	This	is	a	risk	that	partisans	were	not	ready	to	take.	If	we	consider	the	 results	 of	 my	 group	 interviews,	 this	 is	 in	 fact	 unsurprising.	 In	 such	 a	 polarised	environment,	one	can	only	be	a	friend	or	an	enemy,	there	is	no	neutral	middle	ground.	In	some	ways,	I	became	myself	the	object	of	the	partisan	suspicion	that	I	uncovered	in	my	interviews.	In	this	context,	it	was	my	responsibility	to	turn	things	around,	and	show	Hungarian	partisans	that	they	could	trust	me.		
II.	CONDUCTING	FOCUS	GROUPS	AND	RELATING	TO	PARTICIPANTS	
1.	General	line	of	conduct	In	practice,	both	the	location	and	time	of	the	group	discussions	were	left	open	to	my	intermediaries.	The	email	did	suggest	that	the	encounter	could	take	place	in	a	bar	or	 café	 of	 the	 groups	 choice.	 Meeting	 in	 a	 public	 space,	 with	 music,	 drinks	 and	sometimes	food	was	likely	to	ensure	the	more	informal	and	relaxed	atmosphere	that	I	
																																								 																					
160	The	most	emblematic	example	concerns	a	speech	made	by	ex-Prime	Minister	Ferenc	Gyurcsány	in	May	2006	during	the	MSzP's	party	congress.	The	sound	bites	that	were	leaked	by	Magyar	Rádio	on	September	17,	2006	(especially	"We	lied	morning,	day	and	night",	"	We	have	obviously	lied	throughout	the	past	one	and	
a	half-two	years")	sparked	mass	protests	in	Hungary	and	riots	in	Budapest.	Over	the	years,	this	speech	took	on	 a	 quasi-mythical	 character	 in	 Hungary,	 and	 has	 been	 systematically	 brandished	 by	 the	 Right	 as	unquestionable	evidence	of	the	Left's	duplicity.	
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intended.	This	may	have	also	 increased	the	trust	of	Hungarian	participants	especially,	showing	them	that	I	did	not	intend	to	ask	them	anything	'secretive'	that	they	could	not	have	 talked	 about	 in	 public.	 12	 out	 of	 the	 14	 French	 groups	 and	 11	 out	 of	 the	 14	Hungarian	 groups	 took	 place	 in	 the	 evening	 in	 such	 public	 spaces.	 The	 remaining	groups	were	conducted	in	the	buildings	of	local	party	sections	or	in	party	headquarters.	In	certain	cases	due	to	the	group's	time	constraints,	the	discussion	started	before	every	participant	 had	 arrived.	 Individuals	 that	 had	 not	 confirmed	 their	 participation	 in	advance	sometimes	also	joined	the	group.	In	all	cases	new	arrivals	were	encouraged	to	join	the	discussion	and	given	instructions	if	necessary.	The	 attitude	 I	 had	 towards	 participants	 sought	 to	 preserve	 the	 right	 balance	between	 the	 familiarity	 and	 display	 of	 empathy	 that	 was	 necessary	 to	 gain	 my	participants'	 trust,	 and	 the	 neutrality	 and	 distance	 demanded	 from	 my	 position	 as	researcher.	The	first	of	these	attitudes	came	naturally.	Being	from	a	similar	age	group	was	of	great	help	to	create	a	form	of	proximity.	The	fact	that	I	was	present	in	a	number	of	events	allowed	me	to	meet	some	of	the	same	partisans	repeatedly	before	conducting	a	group	and	to	become	more	familiar	to	them.	To	preserve	a	form	of	academic	distance,	I	kept	my	dress	code	purposefully	strict	and	neutral.	I	used	the	formal	'vous'	in	France	and	'ön'	in	Hungary	unless	my	interlocutor	adopted	a	more	familiar	tone	to	address	me.		I	 presented	my	own	project	 in	 general	 terms.	 For	 instance	 in	 France,	 I	would	say	"I	am	working	on	the	political	opinions	of	young	party	members,	and	especially	on	how	they	perceive	the	differences	between	Left	and	Right,	and	the	conflict	between	the	PS	and	the	UMP	in	France.	I	base	my	study	on	collective	interviews	like	these.	I	will	also	be	 leading	 these	 types	 of	 interviews	 in	 Hungary,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 comparing	 the	structure	of	political	competition	in	a	new	and	an	old	European	democracy”.	 Insisting	on	 this	 last	 comparative	 perspective	 was	 useful,	 especially	 in	 Hungary.	 It	 put	 each	country	 case	 in	 perspective	 and	 gave	 a	 more	 scientific	 aura	 to	 my	 approach.	 At	 all	points	of	the	process	I	avoided	to	emphasise	that	I	aimed	to	evaluate	the	compliance	of	partisans	to	democratic	standards.	This	information	could	have	led	my	participants	to	pre-empt	 my	 results,	 and	 adapt	 their	 responses	 accordingly.	 This	 minimal	 form	 of	deception	was	therefore	both	necessary	and	proportionate	to	the	purpose	of	my	study.			In	 each	 case,	 I	 can	 assume	 that	 participants	 gave	 their	 informed	 consent	 to	participate.	At	 the	beginning	of	each	 interview	I	would	present	myself,	and	especially	the	fact	that	I	was	writing	a	PhD	at	the	LSE	on	the	political	opinions	of	young	European	party	members.	 I	explicitely	asked	whether	participants	accepted	to	be	recorded,	and	stressed	 that	 their	 names	 and	 personal	 information	 would	 remain	 anonymous.	 I	
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generally	tried	to	push	back	more	detailed	discussions	about	the	project	to	the	end	of	the	 interview,	 and	 refrained	 from	giving	 too	much	 information	 on	 the	 content	 of	 the	interview	 itself.161	Beyond	what	 I	 told	 them	myself	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 interview,	they	were	 already	 informed	 by	 the	 group	 leader	who	 I	 had	 sent	 an	 email	 about	 the	project.	In	the	email	sent	to	intermediaries,	I	also	invited	questions,	suggested	to	meet	before-hand	 to	 discuss	 potential	 issues,	 and	 specified	 that	 the	 data	 collected	 would	remain	anonymous	and	only	be	used	for	academic	purposes.162	Between	the	first	point	of	 contact	 and	 the	 actual	 group,	 there	 was	 often	 a	 gap	 of	 several	 weeks.	 Potential	participants	 would	 have	 had	 the	 time	 to	 check	 my	 credentials	 on	 the	 internet,	 ask	questions	and	make	up	their	mind	as	to	whether	or	not	to	participate.		If	 I	 was	 asked	 whether	 I	 had	 spoken	 to	 other	 members	 of	 the	 same	 party	 I	answered	 yes;	 I	 avoided	 entering	 into	 any	 details	 on	 who	 exactly	 had	 already	participated,	 except	 when	 it	 appeared	 absolutely	 necessary	 to	 obtain	 additional	contacts.	I	would	not	stress	the	fact	that	I	was	also	talking	to	members	of	the	political	opposition,	 but	 would	 answer	 honestly	 if	 participants	 asked	 me	 specific	 questions	about	 this.	 There	were,	 in	 fact,	 real	 chances	 for	 participants	 to	 discover	 this	 through	other	 channels.	 In	 Paris	 especially,	 partisans	 from	 both	 parties	 under	 study	 often	navigated	 in	similar	circles.	As	shown	 in	Chapter	5,	 it	was	 far	 from	exceptional	 that	a	young	MJS	knows,	or	even	is	friends	with,	a	young	JP.163	Also,	my	professional	Facebook	account	was	used	 for	both	parties.	Despite	 settings	 that	 ensured	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	privacy,	 it	 still	 made	 apparent	 my	 interest	 in	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum.		Dissimulating	this	aspect	of	my	work	would	not	have	been	proportionate	to	the	aim	of	my	study,	and	could	have	easily	backfired	if	participants	had	obtained	knowledge	about	this	through	other	channels.		It	 remained	 important,	 however,	 that	 participants	would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 place	me	 on	 one	 side	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	 rather	 than	 another.	 As	 a	 general	 rule,	 this	required	that	I	remain	strictly	in	the	role	of	a	neutral	researcher.	During	the	discussions,	I	said	as	 little	as	possible	and	refrained	 from	switching	from	the	role	of	moderator	to	the	one	of	active	participant.	If	asked	explicitely	about	my	political	orientations	I	would	
																																								 																					
161	In	 one	 case,	 the	 head	 of	 section	 had	 already	 heard	 about	 the	 content	 of	 the	 group	 through	 another	young	 partisan,	 who	 had	 participated	 previously.	 However,	 she	 did	 not	 communicate	 to	 the	 other	participants	any	more	than	what	was	in	the	initial	email.	162	For	a	template	of	this	email,	see	Appendix	3.		163	I	had	once	a	socialist	partisan	on	the	phone,	Cédric,	who	happened	to	be	having	a	coffee	with	Nicolas,	a	young	 UMP	 member.	 It	 turned	 out	 I	 had	 also	 contacted	 this	 second	 partisan	 by	 email	 a	 few	 days	beforehand!	
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emphasise	my	position	as	researcher,	and	the	fact	that	I	was	not	supposed	to	adopt	a	partisan	attitude	given	the	situation.		
2.	Application	in	France	and	Hungary	These	lines	of	conduct	proved	easily	applicable	during	the	French	fieldwork.	As	a	general	rule,	participants	were	not	expecting	for	me	to	take	sides	and	in	most	cases,	they	accepted	as	a	given	my	position	as	a	neutral	researcher.		For	instance,	participants	did	not	have	any	particular	 issue	with	the	fact	that	I	was	also	 talking	 to	 their	political	opponents.	Because	participants	did	not	conceive	of	interpartisan	dialogue	as	either	 impossible	or	problematic,	 they	also	did	not	question	the	neutrality	of	my	position	on	the	basis	of	my	communication	with	both	sides	of	the	political	 spectrum.	 In	 four	 instances	 party	 members	 did	 ask	 me	 directly	 about	 my	political	 affiliation.	 This	 happened	 three	 times	 with	 young	 socialists,	 and	 once	 with	young	conservatives.	In	all	but	one	case,	this	was	done	after	the	group	was	finished,	and	in	a	rather	informal	way,	out	of	curiosity	if	anything.	As	mentioned	above,	I	emphasised	my	position	as	a	neutral	researcher	and	added	that	I	was	not	a	member	of	any	political	party.	 This	 was	 sufficient	 in	 two	 cases	 to	 change	 the	 topic	 of	 conversation.	 Twice	however	they	insisted	on	knowing	more	about	my	orientation	on	the	left	or	on	the	right.	To	this	I	answered	that	I	felt	disillusioned	about	politics	and	had	no	clear	view	were	my	affiliations	lay	as	a	result.164	Only	once	was	I	asked	about	my	political	affiliation	before	the	discussion.165	Again	I	delayed	to	the	end	and	repeated	the	same	general	stance.		In	Hungary	relating	to	participants	was	complicated	by	the	fact	that	I	was	often,	especially	 among	Fidesz	participants,	 suspected	 to	 be	politically	 hostile	 to	 the	 line	 of	my	 interlocutor.	 Moreover,	 intermediaries	 often	 asked	 to	 meet	 with	 me	 before	organising	a	group,	and	this	most	evidently	to	verify	my	trustworthiness.	This	put	me	in	a	 situation	where	 I	had	 to	gain	 the	 trust	of	people	who	were	expecting	me	 to	 take	sides,	 and	 this	 without	 fulfilling	 these	 expectations.	 In	 this	 situation,	 stressing	 my	Franco-Hungarian	dual	nationality	revealed	particularly	useful.	My	Hungarian	origins,	the	 fact	 that	 I	 could	 hold	 a	 simple	 conversation	 in	 Hungarian,	 made	 me	 more	sympathetic	 to	 Fidesz	 participants.	 For	 instance,	 one	 Fidesz	 member	 answered	 my																																									 																					
164	In	 one	 instance	 this	 sparked	 an	 interesting	 conversation	with	 a	 young	 socialist,	 whom	 I	 asked	what	difference	would	it	have	made	to	the	conversation	whether	he	thought	I	located	myself	on	the	left	or	on	the	right.	He	said	that	he	would	probably	have	been	more	offensive	in	his	arguments	if	he	knew	I	was	on	the	right,	and	more	relaxed	and	conciliatory	if	he	had	thought	I	was	on	the	left.		165	By	a	group	of	only	two	young	socialists	that	I	have,	as	a	consequence	of	this	small	number,	not	included	in	the	results	of	this	study.		
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initial	 email	 by	 saying	 "I	 hope	 that	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 study	 you	 will	 manage	 to	
reconnect	with	your	Hungarian	roots”.	On	both	sides	of	the	political	spectrum,	the	story	of	my	family	was	systematically	a	topic	of	enquiry	and	conversation.166	While	 Fidesz	 participants	 would	 have	 been	 more	 suspicious	 of	 a	 complete	foreigner,	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 was	 not	 a	 resident	 Hungarian,	 that	 I	 was	 not	 socialised	 in	Budapest,	and	that	my	level	of	Hungarian	was	not	completely	fluent,	also	helped	me	in	certain	 ways.	 If	 I	 had	 been	 fully	 Hungarian,	 I	 would	 have	 been	 suspected	 to	 have	 a	clearly	 defined	 partisan	 preference.	 In	 the	 present	 political	 context,	 Hungarians	who	have	an	interest	in	politics	either	violently	reject	the	Fidesz	government	or	are	strongly	supportive	 of	 it.	 There	 is	 no	 apartisan	 space	 in	 politics,	 even	 for	 academics	 or	journalists.	 As	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 with	 no	 shared	 ground	 between	 partisans,	without	the	sense	of	a	common	political	community,	one	needs	to	take	sides.	I	therefore	constantly	 threaded	 a	 thin	 line.	 Too	 foreign,	 I	 would	 have	 been	 seen	 as	 necessarily	supportive	 of	 the	 Left	 and	 critical	 of	 the	 Right.	 Too	 Hungarian,	 I	 would	 have	 been	demanded	to	express	a	partisan	commitment.		The	discussion	guidelines	were	generally	well	understood	by	participants,	and	provided	 for	 a	 fruitful	 basis	 of	 discussion	 in	 both	 countries.	 It	 is	 legitimate	 to	 ask,	however,	whether	 the	 suspicion	 I	was	 the	object	of	 in	Budapest	may	have	 influenced	the	 attitudes	 of	 participants	 during	 the	 discussions.	 It	was	 certainly	 the	 case,	 among	Fidesz	 groups	 especially,	 that	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 in	 each	 discussion	 looked	particularly	 on	 his	 guard,	 and	 said	 very	 little.	 One	 out	 of	 six	 Fidesz	 groups	 also	happened	in	particularly	tense	conditions.167	Notwithstanding	this,	I	witnessed	far	less	suspicion	during	the	discussions	than	what	I	was	expecting,	given	the	difficult	recruitment	process.	In	fact,	most	participants	in	both	countries	gave	me	the	impression	that	they	enjoyed	the	discussions.	A	number	of	 participants	 were	 amused	 by	 the	 cards,	 and	 made	 remarks	 assimilating	 the	discussion	to	a	'game'	(such	as	'Are	we	going	to	play	poker?'	or	'are	you	going	to	give	us	good	 and	 bad	 points?').	 Some	 of	 them	 explicitly	 stated	 that	 the	 cards	 had	made	 the	
																																								 																					
166	This	 not	 fully	 without	 political	 intent,	 however.	 Fidesz	 participants	 often	 made	 the	 guess	 that	 my	father's	family	had	emigrated	in	1956.	Crucially,	the	legacy	of	this	revolution	is	today	highly	politicised,	the	Right	 in	Hungary	 establishing	 a	 continuity	 between	 resistance	under	 communism	and	opposition	 to	 the	current	MSzP.	 If	members	of	my	 family	were	1956	emigrates,	which	 they	are	not,	 this	would	 likely	have	given	me	some	further	credential	for	right-wing	activists.			167	This	was	a	group	with	5	participants,	Krisztoff,	Bogdan,	Hektor,	Hajni,	and	Tibor,	and	it	took	place	in	a	local	 Fidelitas	 section.	 There	 were	 many	 more	 activists	 in	 a	 nearby	 room,	 and	 other	 party	 members	regularly	entering	the	room	during	the	course	of	the	discussion.	The	participants	seemed	particularly	tense,	as	if	they	were	being	watched,	and	their	discourse	contrived.		
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exercise	 particularly	 interesting.	 In	 both	 countries,	many	participants	 insisted	 on	 the	fact	 that	 the	 interview	had	been	an	opportunity	 for	 them	to	 talk	about	and	reflect	on	the	 more	 substantive	 side	 of	 their	 political	 engagement.	 They	 said	 that	 this	 is	something	which	 they	 did	 not	 always	 find	 the	 time	 and	 space	 to	 do,	 and	which	 they	missed	 in	 their	 day-to-day	 activism.168	A	 number	 of	 intermediaries	 in	 both	 countries	even	told	me	they	would	try	to	use	a	similar	system	to	organise	discussions	with	their	fellow	 activists	 in	 the	 future!169	Finally,	 after	 these	 discussions,	 there	 were	 almost	always	 one	 or	 two	 participants	 expressing	 interest	 in	 reading	 the	 study	 once	completed;	some	were	also	curious	in	knowing	what	my	preliminary	conclusions	were,	and	 what	 were	 my	 experiences	 with	 the	 opposite	 political	 camp,	 or	 with	 my	 other	country	case	study.170	It	 is	 understandable	 that	 the	 Hungarian	 discussions	 in	 themselves	 happened	smoothly,	 despite	 a	 particularly	 tense	 context.	 At	 the	 point	 when	 intermediaries	accepted	me	organise	a	group,	they	had	already	entered	a	relation	of	trust	with	me.	As	for	 the	 fact	 that	 Hungarian	 activists	 appeared	 to	 view	 participation	 as	 a	 mean	 of	promoting	 their	 party,	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 distort	 the	 comparison	 of	 their	discourse	with	 that	 of	 French	 participants.	 Indeed,	 the	 lack	 of	 self-critical	 standpoint	among	Hungarian	participants	can	be	understood	 in	 itself	as	a	result	of	 this	research,	rather	than	as	a	form	of	bias.																																																 																					
168	Alexis,	 an	 UMP	 activist	 told	 me	 for	 instance	 that	 "there	 should	 be	 more	 debates	 like	 these,	 more	introspection	on	our	own	thoughts,	on	how	we	feel	about	these	things".	Similarly,	another	Jeune	Populaire,	Pierre,	emphasised	"I	found	it	very	interesting,	because	talking	among	each	other	allows	us	to	have	a	better	idea	of	the	opinions	we	hold	on	these	different	topics”.	One	MSzP	activist,	Margit,	asked	me	whether	she	could	take	a	picture	of	the	cards	after	the	discussion.	She	said	that	she	wanted	to	think	about	the	topics	on	her	own,	as	the	discussion	made	her	realise	that	she	still	had	much	to	learn	about	the	policy	suggestions	of	her	own	party.	169	In	Hungary,	one	Fidesz	 intermediary,	Mihály,	even	asked	me	for	the	 list	of	 topics	after	the	discussion,	saying	that	he	hoped	to	use	the	themes	again	to	organise	discussions	with	other	activists.		170	Speaking	of	my	experiences	with	socialist	groups	in	France	for	instance,	a	young	right-wing	activist,	Loïs,	told	me	 that	 "it	would	 be	 interesting	 to	 see	 their	 point	 of	 view	 on	 these	 cards,	 and	 how	 their	 opinions	diverge	from	ours	on	the	question	of	consensus,	etc..”	
	
292		Appendix	2:	The	population	under	study		In	 the	 following	sections,	 I	 give	more	 information	on	 the	demographics	of	 the	population	 under	 study.	 I	 discuss	 selection	 bias	 issues,	 representativeness,	 and	differences	in	the	composition	of	my	French	and	Hungarian	samples.		
I.	DEMOGRAPHIC	CHARACTERISTICS	 	
Figure	36	below	offers	an	overview	of	the	main	demographic	characteristics	of	the	 population	 under	 study.	 The	 following	 numbers	 are	 limited	 to	 the	 28	 groups	analysed	in	this	study,	amounting	to	a	total	of	117	participants.												
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Figure	 36:	 Distribution	 of	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 participants	 according	 to	 age	 groups,	
gender,	occupation	and	level	of	reponsibility	in	the	youth	organisation	of	the	party			A	first	characteristic	of	this	group	is	that	overrepresents	the	upper-middle	class	and	 the	 educated	as	 compared	 to	 the	 general	population	 in	both	 countries.	All	 of	my	interviewees	 were	 in	 the	 process	 of	 completing,	 or	 had	 completed,	 their	 higher	education.	None	were	unemployed,	and	very	few	were	in	a	lowly	qualified	employment.	Men	were	also	two	to	three	times	more	numerous	than	woman	in	both	countries.	Most	of	the	local	leaders	that	I	initially	contacted	being	men,	they	may	well	have	themselves	invited	 men	 more	 systematically	 than	 women	 to	 the	 discussion.	 Finally,	 the	 groups	most	 certainly	 overrepresented	 the	 most	 active	 and	 engaged	 among	 young	 party	members.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 financial	 incentive,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 only	 the	 most	politicised	would	have	found	an	interest	in	contributing.171	Heads	of	local	sections	will	
																																								 																					
171	Focus	 group	 studies	 use	 financial	 incentives	 not	 only	 to	 motivate	 potential	 participants,	 but	 also	 to	reduce	 selection	 biases,	 linked	 to	 interest	 in	 the	 study.	 This	 is	 especially	 the	 case	 in	 studies	 that	 aim	 at	getting	the	'lay	citizen'	to	talk	politics	in	a	focus	group	setting.	The	absence	of	a	financial	incentive	would	limit	 participants	 to	 only	 the	 most	 politicised,	 and	 run	 counter	 the	 very	 purpose	 of	 these	 studies	 (for	instance	Duchesne	&	Haegel,	2004;	Gamson,	1992;	Perrin,	2006;	White,	2011b).	
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also	have	found	it	easier	to	ask	the	'inner	circle'	of	their	teams	to	participate,	those	that	are	most	 engaged	 in	 the	day-to-day	activity	of	 the	 section.	 In	addition,	 they	may	also	have	sought	to	select	the	most	'interesting'	members	in	order	to	give	the	best	possible	image	of	their	section.172		Many	 of	 these	 demographic	 traits	 reflect	 already	 existing	 tendencies	 among	members	of	political	parties.	As	the	literature	on	political	participation	has	repeatedly	shown,	political	engagement	is	very	much	conditioned	by	one's	economic,	cultural	and	social	 capital.	 In	 contemporary	 Western	 Europe,	 party	 members	 are	 still	disproportionately	male,	better	educated,	and	with	a	higher	level	of	income	than	the	lay	citizen,	 and	 this	 despite	 a	 trend	 towards	 greater	 representativeness	 since	 the	 1990's	(Scarrow	&	Gezgor,	2010;	Widfeldt,	1995).	The	demographic	composition	of	the	youth	party	organisations	under	study	in	France	are	in	line	with	these	general	tendencies.	As	Bargel's	 data	 shows,	 between	 2003	 and	 2005,	 only	 37%	 of	members	 of	 the	MJS	 and	31%	 of	 the	 Jeunes	 Populaires	 were	 women.	 60%	 of	 the	 MJS	 and	 54%	 of	 the	 Jeunes	
Populaires	were	students,	against	46,3%	of	the	15-29	age	group	in	France	at	the	time.	Among	the	parents	of	these	young	partisans,	white	collars	and	the	self-employed	were	heavily	 overrepresented	 compared	 to	 the	 overall	 population,	 and	 manual	 workers	widely	 underrepresented	 (Bargel,	 2009,	 pp.	 274;	 288-290).	While	 similar	 data	 is	 not	available	 for	 youth	 organisations	 in	 Hungary,	 they	 are	 also	 likely	 to	 fall	 in	 line	 with	these	general	demographic	traits.		It	is	also	important	to	emphasise	that	a	perfectly	'representative'	sample	would	have	been	both	difficult	 to	obtain,	 and	unnecessary	 for	 the	purpose	of	my	study.	The	population	of	focus-group	studies	seldom	obeys	the	criterion	of	the	probability	sample	dominant	 in	 quantitative	 research	 (see	 Gamson's	 failed	 attempt	 at	 producing	 a	probability	 sample,	 despite	 considerable	 financial	means	 and	 188	 participants	 in	 his	focus	 groups,	 Gamson,	 1992,	 pp.	 189-190).	 It	 is	 especially	 difficult	 for	 the	 scholar	 to	control	 the	 demographics	 of	 his	 population	when	 he	 relies	 on	 intermediaries	 for	 the	recruitment	of	groups	-	as	I	did	in	my	own	study.		More	 generally	 speaking,	 studies	 that	 rely	 on	 qualitative	 methods	 rely	 on	 a	critical	 case	 logic,	 rather	 than	 on	 a	 logic	 of	 representativeness,	 to	 select	 cases.	 In	my	case,	what	matters	 is	 that	 I	can	argue	that	the	norms	that	my	participants	uphold	say	
																																								 																					
172	One	head	of	a	 local	UMP	section	 in	Paris	told	me	afterwards	quite	explicitly	that	he	had	invited	those	that	had	 'the	most	to	say'	within	his	team,	and	several	 intermediaries	 in	Budapest	also	hinted	at	the	fact	they	had	sought	to	select	particularly	interesting	people	for	the	discussion.	This	attitude	can	be	expected	to	have	played	out	among	other	intermediaries	as	well	
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something	about	partisanship	more	widely	within	each	national	context.	It	would	have	been	both	unrealistic	and	unnecessary,	 for	 instance,	to	try	to	conduct	groups	in	every	major	city	in	France	and	Hungary,	smaller	towns,	rural	areas,	etc.	Choosing	to	focus	on	Paris	and	Budapest	in	each	case	is	perfectly	adequate	to	the	purpose	of	my	study.	Given	especially	 the	 centralised	nature	 of	 both	France	 and	Hungary,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 capital	 that	partisans	are	 likely	 to	be	most	 in	 touch	with	national	 level	politics	and	politicians.	 In	this	sense,	they	are	more	likely	to	carry	the	discourse	that	is	most	influential	in	French	and	Hungarian	politics.		
II.	COMPARING	THE	HUNGARIAN	AND	FRENCH	SAMPLES	
Here	 I	 discuss	 differences	 in	 the	 demograhics	 of	 my	 French	 and	 Hungarian	population	 samples,	 differences	 that	 are	 apparent	 in	 Figure	 36	 above.	 Hungarian	activists	were	on	average	older	 than	 the	French.	They	were	 less	 likely	 to	be	students	and	more	likely	to	be	employed.	There	were	a	greater	number	of	party	members	with	national	 level	 responsibilities	 in	 France	 as	 compared	 to	 Hungary.	While	 none	 of	 the	French	interviewees	held	a	local	electoral	mandate	or	were	on	an	electoral	list	for	the	upcoming	 local	 elections,	 5	 of	 the	 Hungarian	 participants	 were	 in	 one	 of	 these	situations.	 This	 imbalance	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 types	 of	 groups	 among	 which	 I	conducted	discussions.	As	shown	in	Figure	35	in	Appendix	1,	two	of	the	discussions	in	Hungary	were	conducted	among	groups	of	colleagues	working	for	the	party,	while	this	case	never	occurred	in	France.	And	while	only	two	of	the	French	groups	involved	solely	semi-professional	politicians,	this	was	the	case	of	four	Hungarian	groups.		It	 is	only	possible	 to	 speculate	on	whether	 these	different	demographics	have	had	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 variations	 I	 uncovered	 in	 the	 course	 of	 this	 PhD.	 As	 detailed	 in	Chapter	2,	we	have	limited	knowledge	on	the	ideological	variations	internal	to	partisan	organisations.	May's	law	of	curvilinear	disparity	would	lead	us	to	think	that	grass-root	members	 are	 more	 radical	 than	 senior	 members	 of	 political	 parties.	 On	 this	 topic	however,	 the	 empirical	 political	 sciences	 have	 not	 reached	 conclusive	 and	 clear-cut	conclusions:	 while	 some	 studies'	 results	 support	 May's	 law,	 others	 invalidate	 it.	 	 If	May's	law	does	apply	to	Hungarian	and	French	partisans,	then	the	fact	I	had	a	slightly	more	 senior	 group	 in	 Hungary	 would	 have	 'biased'	 the	 Hungarian	 sample	 towards	more	moderation	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 French	 one.	 If	May's	 law	 is	 reversed,	 then	 the	Hungarian	sample	is	'biased'	towards	more	radicalism.		I	contend,	however,	that	even	if	these	differences	in	samples	have	introduced	a	
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distortion	 in	 one	 direction	 or	 another,	 both	 samples	 remain	 characteristic	 of	 youth	party	 membership	 in	 both	 countries.	 Not	 only	 did	 I	 apply	 the	 same	 recruitment	strategy	 in	 both	 countries,	 but	 the	 intermediaries	 for	most	 of	 the	 Hungarian	 groups	were	 part	 of	 the	 first	wave	 of	 emails	 I	 had	 sent:	 	 as	 in	 France,	mostly	 heads	 of	 local	sections	 of	 the	 party	 youth	 organisation.	 While	 there	 may	 have	 been	 some	 self-selection	 of	 better	 positioned	 activists	 in	 each	 party,	 this	 self-selection	 would	 most	likely	only	marginally	explain	the	overall	imbalance	between	the	French	and	Hungarian	samples.	 I	 rather	 think	 that	 if	 I	obtain	a	more	senior,	professional,	and	higher-ranked	cohort	 in	Budapest	 than	 in	Paris,	 this	 also	 reflects	different	demographics	within	 the	French	and	Hungarian	organisations	I	recruited	from.		This	 is	 plausible	 given	 what	 we	 know	 of	 East-West	 differences	 in	 party	membership	 composition.	Parties	 in	CEE	are	known	 for	being	even	 further	 cartelised	than	 their	 Western	 European	 equivalents,	 with	 a	 greater	 dependence	 on	 state	resources,	 and	 weaker	 and	 less	 numerous	 grass-root	 members	 (Kopecký,	 2007).	 To	this	 extent,	 not	 only	 is	 there	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 greater	 proportion	 of	 career	 motivated	individuals	engaging	with	political	parties	in	CEE,	but	it	is	also	most	possibly	easier	to	progress	in	the	hierarchy	given	the	smaller	number	of	potential	candidates	to	positions	of	 responsibility.	 This	 later	 point	 was	 especially	 striking	 for	 the	 smaller	 parties	 I	recruited	 from,	 as	 these	 had	 either	 no	 specific	 youth	 branch	 or	 a	 small	 one	 that	was	created	only	very	 recently.	As	a	 result,	most	of	 the	activists	 I	met	 from	 these	 smaller	parties	 were	 de	 facto	 founding	 members,	 or	 at	 least	 executives,	 of	 these	 youth	organisations.	 In	 larger	parties	 it	was	also	 far	more	 common	 in	Hungary	 for	 activists	with	 responsibilities	 at	 the	 local	 level	 to	 also	 hold	 a	 position	 higher	 up	 in	 the	 youth	organisation	 hierarchy.	 Bruter	 and	 Harrison's	 comparative	 survey	 on	 youth	 party	memberships	 in	Europe	confirms	this	general	explanation	for	the	cases	of	France	and	Hungary	(Bruter	&	Harrison,	2009b).	Among	their	 interviewees,	only	13.2%	of	young	French	party	members	were	motivated	by	the	idea	of	having	a	political	career—rather	than	by	political	 ideals	or	the	desire	to	socialise	with	others—against	45.5%	of	young	Hungarian	party	members	(Bruter	&	Harrison,	2009b,	p.	1272).		If	 Hungarian	 party	 members	 are	 in	 general	 more	 career-oriented,	 then	 the	differences	in	the	demographic	composition	of	my	French	and	Hungarian	samples	will	not	 have	distorted	my	 results	 in	 any	 significant	way.	Whatever	 differences	 I	 uncover	between	the	patterns	of	speech	of	my	French	and	Hungarian	participants,	I	can	expect	that	 they	 reflect	 more	 general	 differences	 between	 young	 partisans	 in	 France	 and	Hungary.		
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I.	TEMPLATE	EMAIL	FOR	RECRUITING	PARTICIPANTS	IN	FRANCE	Dear	...,	I	am	Lise	Herman,	and	I	am	doing	research	on	the	political	engagement	of	young	people	 in	 Europe,	 at	 the	 European	 Studies	 department	 of	 the	 London	 School	 of	Economics	 and	 Political	 Science	(http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/home.aspx).	 I	 am	contacting	you	because	 I	have	 a	 particular	 interest	 in	 the	 political	 opinions	 of	 (young	socialists/conservatives/students,	 etc.),	 and	 especially	 in	 their	 positioning	within	 the	public	debates	that	have	emerged	in	French	political	life	since	the	election	of	François	Hollande.	 	As	(head	of	section,	president	of	a	group,	etc.)	your	help	and	advice	 in	this	matter	would	be	particularly	valuable	to	me.	First,	I	will	be	in	Paris	from	the	beginning	of	February	for	2	months,	and	would	be	 delighted	 to	 meet	 you	 during	 this	 period	 to	 know	 more	 about	 your	 political	engagement	and	opinions.	Specifically,	I	hope	you	can	participate	in	a	group	discussion	that	I	will	be	organising	with	3	or	4	other	young	members	of	your	(organisation,	party,	etc).	 These	 discussions	 will	 have	 an	 informal	 feel	 to	 them	 and	 should,	 I	 hope,	 be	pleasant	and	friendly!	They	will	take	place	around	a	glass	of	beer	or	a	cup	of	coffee	at	a	time	and	in	a	place	that	is	convenient	for	your,	your	headquarters	or	a	local	café	in	your	neighbourhood	for	instance.	As	in	an	interview	I	will	be	asking	questions,	but	you	can	answer	 them	while	you	talk	with	others.	Moreover,	 if	you	would	 like	 to	compose	this	group	yourself,	that	is	suggest	to	some	of	your	friends	to	participate,	this	is	absolutely	possible.	Whatever	shape	or	form	your	participation	should	take,	it	would	contribute	to	the	progress	of	our	knowledge	on	youth	party	organisations	in	Europe,	a	rather	under-researched	 area.	 Your	 contribution	 will	 be	 completely	 anonymous,	 and	 will	 only	 be	used	for	academic	purposes.	
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Whether	you	would	wish	or	not	to	contribute	yourself	to	this	study,	I	would	be	very	grateful	if	you	could	spread	the	word	among	the	political	activists	that	you	know;	after	this	email	you	will	find	a	short	message	that	would	be	easy	to	circulate.	Finally,	I	wanted	to	ask	you	whether	it	would	be	possible	for	me	to	take	part	in	some	of	your	meetings	from	early	February	onwards.	If	this	is	easily	feasible,	please	let	me	know	when	and	where	 you	 generally	 hold	meetings,	 and	when	 it	would	be	more	convenient	for	you	for	me	to	join.	In	any	case,	we	will	probably	meet	some	time	during	the	next	 few	month,	as	 I	will	be	 taking	part	 in	 the	public	events	of	 the	(Jeunes	populaires/MJS).	 If	you	or	your	friends	wish	to	participate	in	this	project,	or	if	have	any	questions,	simply	send	me	an	email	 at	 l.herman@lse.ac.uk;	 if	 you	would	 like	me	 to	 call	 you	 back,	 please	 also	 leave	your	phone	number.	I	am	also	reachable	by	phone	at	+44	402	106	702	until	the	31rst	of	January	and	at	06	52	91	15	10	from	the	1rst	of	February	onwards.	I	hope	to	hear	from	you	soon!	All	the	best,	Lise	Herman	
I.	TEMPLATE	EMAIL	FOR	RECRUITING	PARTICIPANTS	IN	HUNGARY		Dear....		 I	am	Lise	Herman,	a	Franco-Hungarian	doctoral	student	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	 and	 Political	 Sciences.	My	 research	 aims	 at	 characterizing	 and	 comparing	the	 political	 commitments	 of	 young	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 citizens.	 I	 am	 more	specifically	interested	in	young	people	who	feel	close	to	a	given	political	party,	on	any	given	side	of	the	political	spectrum,	and	in	their	positioning	within	the	public	debates	that	have	emerged	in	Hungarian	political	life	since	the	last	elections.	As	you	correspond	to	this	profile,	I	would	like	to	invite	you	to	participate	in	my	study.				 I	have	already	done	my	French	fieldwork,	and	I	am	now	in	Budapest	for	a	couple	of	weeks	 to	complete	 the	Hungarian	part	of	my	 fieldwork.	During	 this	 time,	 I	hope	 to	talk	 to	as	many	young,	politically	active	Hungarians	as	possible.	More	specifically,	my	research	is	based	on	collective	interviews	that	last	around	one	hour	and	a	half,	with	3	to	5	partisans	of	the	same	political	party	(In	France	I	conducted	approximately	18	such	
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interviews).	 The	 discussions	 I	 hope	 to	 organise	will	 be	 of	 an	 informal	 nature	 and	 in	Hungarian.	 Although	 I	 am	 not	 completely	 fluent,	 I	 can	 understand	 the	 language	 very	well.	The	discussions	will	happen	around	a	glass	or	a	cup	of	coffee	at	a	 time	and	 in	a	place	 that	 is	 convenient	 for	 you,	 your	 headquarters	 or	 a	 local	 café	 in	 their	neighbourhood	for	instance.	While	I	will	have	questions	to	ask	to	the	group,	the	same	as	 the	 ones	 asked	 in	 France,	 these	 should	 lead	 to	 a	 rather	 free	 and	 autonomous	discussion	 among	 participants.				 I	would	be	grateful	 if	 you	 could	help	me	organise	 such	a	 group	discussion,	 one	that	would	 involve	 you	 and	 a	 number	 of	 other,	 young	 activists	 that	 are	 close	 to	 you.	Don't	hesitate	to	send	this	email	to	participants	who	could	be	interested.	If	you	find	it	helpful,	I	am	also	happy	to	meet	with	you	one-on-one	beforehand	to	discuss	the	matter.		Whatever	shape	or	form	your	participation	should	take,	 it	would	contribute	to	the	progress	of	Western	European	knowledge	on	Hungarian	politics.	Although	we	do	hear	 about	 Hungary	 in	 France	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 especially	 from	 the	 press,	 I	believe	that	it	is	important	to	communicate	the	opinions	and	experiences	of	individuals	who	actually	live	here.	These	discussions	will	only	be	used	for	academic	purposes,	and	the	personal	information	of	the	participants	will	remain	completely	anonymous.	If	you	or	your	friends	wish	to	participate	in	this	project,	or	if	have	any	questions,	simply	send	me	an	email	at	 l.herman@lse.ac.uk;	if	you	would	like	me	to	call	you	back,	please	also	 leave	your	phone	number.	 I	 am	also	 reachable	by	phone	on	+36	70	2691	773.		 Finally,	I	wanted	to	ask	you	whether	it	would	be	possible	for	me	to	take	part	in	some	 of	 your	 meetings	 from	 early	 September	 onwards.	 If	 this	 is	 easily	 conceivable,	please	 let	me	know	when	and	where	you	generally	hold	meetings,	and	when	it	would	be	more	convenient	for	you	that	I	come	by.	I	am	hoping	for	a	positive	response	on	your	part	and	thank	you	in	advance	for	any	help.		All	the	best,	
 Lise	Herman			
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Appendix	4:	Discussion	guidelines	
	Introduction:	Hello	everyone.	I	am	Lise	Herman.	I	am	of	Hungarian	origin,	so	my	father	 is	 Hungarian	 but	 I	 was	 born	 in	 France	 and	 that	 is	where	 I	 grew	 up.	 I	 did	my	higher	 education	 in	 Paris	 and	 London,	 and	 I'm	 currently	 doing	 a	 PhD	 at	 the	 London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.	My	research	project	 is	a	comparison	of	 the	French	 and	 Hungarian	 structures	 of	 political	 competition,	 and	 I	 am	 particularly	interested	in	the	worldviews	of	young	political	activists	in	both	countries.	In	the	Spring	I	already	completed	 the	French	part	of	my	 fieldwork,	 in	Paris.	What	 I'm	 interested	 in	here,	 in	 Hungary,	 is	 how	 young	 party	 members	 think	 about	 politics,	 what	 are	 their	political	opinions.	For	instance,	I	know	that	there	have	been	strong	political	debates	in	this	 country	 in	 the	 last	years.	The	 type	of	 things	 that	 I	will	 ask	you	about	 is	how	you	position	yourself	within	these	debates.173	(Wait	for	questions)	I	would	like	to	record	this	discussion,	so	that	I	can	then	work	on	your	responses.	Do	you	authorize	me	to	do	this?	Of	course	your	names	will	remain	anonymous	and	the	data	will	only	be	used	for	own	research.		(Wait	for	answers,	turn	on	recorder)	"We'll	start	by	a	small	round.	If	you	could	each	tell	me	in	turn:	your	name,	so	I	can	 address	 you	 during	 the	 discussion,	 your	 age,	 what	 is	 your	 main	 occupation	(working,	studying,	etc),	how	long	you	have	been	member	of	the	(PS/UMP/Fidesz,	etc),	and	what	position	you	have	in	the	party	organisation.	Finally,	I	would	love	to	know	why	
																																								 																					
173	This	introduction	is	adapted	for	my	Hungarian	groups	-	but	the	introduction	for	the	French	groups	was	very	similar.		
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you	 decided	 to	 become	 a	 party	 activist,	 what	 were	 the	 motivations	 behind	 your	engagement".174	(Wait	for	answers)175		Instructions:	"Thank	you.	I'm	going	to	give	each	of	you	12	cards.	Please	have	a	look	at	them	and	let	me	know	when	you	are	done”.	(Wait	until	participants	signal	that	they	are	done)	"What	I	would	like	you	to	do	is	classify	the	cards	according	to	how	much	conflict	or	 consensus	 you	 believe	 there	 is	 between	 the	 (UMP/Fidesz)	 and	 the	 (PS/MSzP)	 on	these	different	topics	of	policy.	Feel	free	to	classify	them	the	way	you	want:	in	several	categories,	on	a	progressive	scale,	or	even	not	to	classify	some	of	them	if	you	think	they	don't	fit	your	categories”.	
If	was	asked	whether	I	meant	the	party	in	government	or	their	own	political	ideas:	"We'll	start	by	the	parties	in	government.	But	during	the	discussion	you	can	talk	about	how	that	may	diverge	from	your	own	opinions	if	you	wish”.	(Wait	until	participants	signal	that	they	are	done)		Part	 1:	 "Lets	 start	with	 the	most	 consensual	 topics	 and	 go	 towards	 the	more	conflictual	ones.	Can	someone	volunteer	to	talk	about	a	choice	he/she	has	made?"	
Follow	up	questions,	if	necessary176:	"Do	you	all	agree	with	what	....	just	said?	You	should	feel	free	to	intervene	and	to	express	a	different	opinion	if	you	feel	like	it"	"Can	you	elaborate	 further?	On	what	specific	aspect	of	 this	 issue	do	you	 think	there	is	a	consensus/conflict	between	political	parties?"	
																																								 																					
174	This	 part	 of	 the	 discussion	 was	 removed	 from	 the	 transcripts	 and	 NVivo	 file	 made	 available	 to	examiners	to	secure	the	anonymity	of	participants	(see	Appendix	7).	All	names	given	by	participants	were	also	changed	 to	preserve	 their	anonymity.	This	applies	 to	 the	examples	cited	 in	 this	 thesis,	and	 the	data	made	available	to	examiners.		175	After	 participants	 had	 introduced	 themselves	 I	 sometimes	 asked	 them	a	 few	 additional	 questions	 on	their	local	party	structure,	day-to-day	activism,	or	the	structure	of	the	youth	organisation.	This	was	mostly	to	 further	my	own	knowledge	of	 the	 internal	workings	of	 the	parties,	 but	 this	 information	was	 scarcely	used	 in	 my	 thesis.	 The	 same	 goes	 for	 participants'	 accounts	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 which	 they	 decided	 to	become	party	members.		176 	These	 questions	 have	 been	 asked	 only	 when	 participants	 did	 not	 raise	 them	 spontaneously	 in	conversation,	or	when	necessary	to	get	the	conversation	going.		
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"Please,	 feel	 free	 to	 take	 up	 a	 knew	 topic	 whenever	 you	 feel	 like	 you've	sufficiently	talked	about	this	one"	"So	how	would	you	describe	the	position	of	your	party	on	this	question?"	"So	how	would	you	describe	the	position	of	your	opponents	on	this	question?"	
(Wait	for	all	twelve	cards	to	have	been	discussed)		Part	2:	"If	we	consider	the	classification	of	these	topics	overall,	do	you	think,	in	your	 personal	 opinion,	 that	 the	 balance	 between	 areas	 of	 agreement	 and	 areas	 of	disagreement	 is	 right	 between	 political	 parties?	 Do	 you	 think	 that	 the	French/Hungarian	 political	 space	 would	 need	 more	 political	 disagreement	 between	political	parties?	Or	would	France/Hungary	 rather	need	 less	disagreement,	 and	more	areas	of	consensus	between	political	parties?177	(Wait	for	questions	to	have	been	answered	by	all	or	most	participants)	
	Part	 3:	 "Finally,	 do	 you	 often	 talk	 with	 people	 that	 are	 of	 different	 political	convictions	to	your	own?	Can	you	tell	me	a	bit	about	these	experiences?"	(Wait	for	questions	to	have	been	answered	by	all	or	most	participants)		
																																											 																					
177	In	France,	participants	had	a	clearer	separation	between	'consensual'	and	'conflictual'	topics,	which	also	created	two	relatively	distinct	parts	in	the	discussion	of	the	cards	themselves.	For	this	reasons,	I	generally	divided	this	second	part	of	the	discussion,	on	partisans'	normative	assessments	of	political	agreement	and	disagreement,	 in	 two	parts	 in	 the	case	of	France.	For	 instance,	once	participants	had	discussed	all	of	 the	topics	that	they	considered	as	'consensual',		I	would	ask:	"If	we	consider	all	the	cards	that	you	classified	as	consensual,	 would	 you	 say	 that	 it	 is	 a	 good	 thing	 that	 there	 exists	 an	 agreement	 between	mainstream	parties	on	 these	 topics?	Or	on	 the	 contrary	would	you	prefer	 there	be	more	dissensus	between	 the	 two	main	 parties	 on	 these	 questions?"	 Similarly,	 once	 participants	 had	 answered	 these	 questions	 and	 then	discussed	 the	 topics	 they	 classified	 as	 conflictual,	 I	 would	 ask:	 "	 If	 we	 consider	 all	 the	 cards	 that	 you	classified	as	conflictual,	would	you	say	that	it	is	a	good	thing	that	there	exists	these	disagreements	between	mainstream	 parties	 on	 these	 topics?	 Or	 on	 the	 contrary	 would	 you	 prefer	 there	 be	 more	 consensus	between	the	two	main	parties	on	these	questions?"		
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Appendix	5:	The	coding	process	
I.	DEFINITIONS	AND	GENERAL	PROCESS	
In	this	appendix	I	describe	the	coding	process	by	which	I	analysed	the	verbatim	transcripts	of	the	28	group	discussions.	The	terms	and	definitions	that	I	use	are	those	developed	 in	 Saldaña's	 Coding	 Manual	 for	 Qualitative	 Researchers,	 a	 well-accepted	reference	for	the	analysis	of	textual	data	(Saldaña,	2013).	Coding	in	qualitative	analysis	may	be	defined	as	the	process	by	which	codes	are	associated	with	portions	of	text—a	word,	 a	 sentence,	 or	 a	 paragraph—throughout	 the	 data.	 In	 this	 context,	 a	 code	 is	generally	 "a	 word	 or	 short	 phrase	 that	 symbolically	 assigns	 a	 summative,	 salient,	essence-capturing,	 and/or	 evocative	 attribute"	 (Saldaña,	 2013,	 p.	 3)	 to	 the	portion	of	data	 it	 is	 associated	 with.	 The	 same	 codes	 are	 used	 repeatedly,	 and	 different	 codes	often	used	simultaneously	throughout	the	data	set.	Counting	these	occurrences	and	co-occurrences	 allows	 for	 the	 identification	 of	 recurrent	 patterns	 and	 themes,	 and	 thus	facilitate	 the	 formulation	 of	 rules,	 correlations	 and	 explanations	 emerging	 from	 the	data.	 It	 also	 allows	 to	 identify	 variations	 in	 these	 patterns	 across	 different	 groups	 of	speakers.			The	coding	was	carried	out	using	NVivo,	a	Computer	Assisted	Qualitative	Data	Analysis	 Software	 (CAQDAS).	 Although	 similar	 software	 (Atlas	 TI	 and	 QDA	 minor	particularly)	 can	 be	 used	 to	 perform	 quantitative	 content	 analysis	 -	 for	 instance	through	 the	 investigation	 of	 statistical	 regularities	 in	 key-word	 usage,	 grammatical	constructions	 or	 word	 co-occurrences	 -	 this	 research	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 CAQDAS	 to	perform	 coding	 in	 any	 automatised	 way.	 This	 software	 nevertheless	 performs	important	 functions	 in	 the	 coding	 of	 textual	 data.	 First,	 it	 facilitates	 a	 process	traditionally	 performed	with	pen	 and	pencil	 by	qualitative	 researchers:	 coding	 is	 not	only	 accelerated	 by	 the	 use	 of	 software,	 it	 is	 also	 rendered	 more	 systematic	 and	accessible	 for	 review.	 NVivo	 for	 instance	would	 allow	 for	 the	 systematic	 removal	 or	modification	of	a	given	code	throughout	the	dataset,	and	produces	a	neat	display	when	multiple	 codes	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 same	 unit	 of	 text.	 Second,	 once	 the	 cycles	 of	
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coding	 are	 complete,	 connecting	 codes	 and	 identifying	 patterns	 in	 the	 data	 is	 greatly	facilitated	by	the	use	of	such	software.	NVivo	for	instance	performs	'coding	queries'	to	identify	portions	of	texts	in	which	certain	codes	co-occur,	and	produces	hierarchies	and	networks	to	display	coding	systems	visually.		While	the	coding	scheme	that	I	applied	to	transcripts	was	inspired	both	by	the	theoretical	 framework	 for	 this	 study	 and	 the	 discussion	 guidelines	 for	 the	 group	interviews,	 the	development	of	any	 final	 set	of	 codes	 is	necessarily	 the	 result	of	both	inductive	 and	 deductive	 strategies.	 In	 the	 process	 of	 coding,	 I	 thus	 first	 submitted	portions	 of	 the	 data	 to	 several	 phases	 of	 what	 is	 commonly	 termed	 'initial	 coding'	before	 applying	 consistently	 a	 final	 set	 of	 codes	 to	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 data.	 'Initial	coding'	 is	 a	 common	 process	 of	 textual	 analysis,	 during	 which	 "some	 codes	 will	 be	merged	 together	 because	 they	 are	 conceptually	 similar;	 infrequent	 codes	 will	 be	assessed	for	their	utility	in	the	overall	coding	scheme;	and	some	codes	that	seemed	like	good	ideas	(...)	may	be	dropped	altogether"	(Saldaña,	2013,	p.	207).	 In	the	case	of	this	analysis,	 I	 first	developed	a	coding	scheme	on	 the	basis	of	my	 theoretical	 framework,	worked	on	a	small	part	of	the	French	data,	and	then	consistently	applied	it	to	12	of	the	French	 transcripts.	The	guidelines	 for	coding	were	 then	adapted	on	 the	basis	of	 their	compatibility	 with	 the	 Hungarian	 data,	 also	 through	 a	 phase	 of	 initial,	 exploratory	coding	of	a	limited	number	of	transcripts	from	the	Hungarian	fieldwork.	I	then	applied	this	final	coding	scheme	to	the	entirety	of	the	data,	and	thus	re-coded	'from	scratch'	the	transcripts	that	had	already	been	coded.		In	extracting	results	from	this	coding	process,	I	compared	the	occurrences	and	co-occurrences	 of	 different	 codes	 according	 to	 nationality	 (whether	 the	 groups	were	conducted	 in	 France	 or	 Hungary)	 and	 according	 to	 partisan	 affiliation	 (whether	 the	groups	were	affiliated	to	the	PS,	the	UMP,	the	MSzP	or	the	Fidesz).	 In	this	way,	 it	was	possible	 to	 establish	 variations	 in	 patterns	 of	 speech	 across	 partisan	 groupings	 of	different	nationalities	and	political	 affiliation.	 In	my	 three	empirical	 chapters,	 I	 relied	on	 these	 numbers	 and	 on	 a	 large	 number	 of	 examples	 from	 the	 interviews	 as	 my	primary	evidence.	 In	 conjunction,	 their	 analysis	 allowed	me	 to	highlight	variations	 in	the	compliance	of	different	partisan	groupings	to	the	standards	established	in	Chapter	1.		
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II.	AN	OVERVIEW	OF	THE	STEPS	OF	CODING	FOR	EACH	TRANSCRIPT	
In	this	section	I	offer	an	overview	of	the	steps	I	followed	to	code	each	transcript.	I	list	and	detail	them	in	chronological	order:		-	Phase	1,	Group	characteristics:	As	a	first	step,	I	applied	a	series	of	codes	to	the	
whole	transcript	to	assign	a	number	of	basic	attributes	to	it.	This	included,	for	instance,	the	country	in	which	the	interview	was	conducted	(France	or	Hungary),	the	party	that	my	 participants	 belonged	 to	 (PS,	 UMP,	 MSzP	 or	 Fidesz)	 and	 the	 type	 of	 partisan	grouping	concerned	(for	instance	a	local	section	of	the	party,	or	a	group	of	more	senior	elites	from	the	group	organisations,	etc.).	Coding	these	general	characteristics	allowed	me	 to	 identify	 patterns	 of	 coding	 and	 therefore	 of	 speech	 across	 different	 types	 of	groups,	especially	according	to	participants'	nationality	and	partisan	affiliation.		-	 Phase	 2,	 Biographical	 information:	 As	 a	 second	 step,	 I	 focused	 on	 the	information	that	participants	gave	when	they	 introduced	themselves	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	 interviews.	 I	 coded,	 for	 instance,	 information	 about	 the	 gender,	 occupation,	 or	position	within	 the	 party	 of	 participants.	 This	 allowed	me	 to	 gather	 this	 information	more	easily	at	later	stages	in	order	to	present	it	in	the	thesis	itself	(for	this	information,	see	Chapter	2	and	Appendix	2	especially).		-	Phase	3,	Comments	about	instructions:	As	a	third	step,	I	focused	on	the	ways	in	 which	 my	 different	 participants	 reacted	 to	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 cards,	 and	 the	instructions	for	the	discussion	more	generally.	I	coded	when	participants	had	a	positive	reaction	 to	 the	 cards,	 when	 they	 asked	 questions,	 and	 if	 they	 did,	 what	 types	 of	questions	they	asked.	As	I	outline	in	Chapter	3	of	the	thesis,	these	reactions	were	useful	to	 understand	 some	 of	my	 participants’	 issues	with	 their	 own	 partisan	 identity,	 and	thus	provided	indirect	information	on	the	cohesiveness	of	partisans'	claims.		-	Phase	4,	Justifications	for	card	classifications:	The	fourth	step	was	the	longest	of	all,	as	it	concerned	the	bulk	of	each	interview	where	participants	talked	about	their	card	classifications.	I	applied	a	series	of	codes	to	each	substantiated	justification	for	the	classification	 of	 a	 given	 card	 given	 by	 one	 or	 several	 participants.	 I	 define	 a	substantiated	justification	as	a	claim	made	in	favour	of	the	point	covered	by	each	code	that	is	backed-up	by	participants	with	at	least	one	argument.	Each	argument	or	series	of	arguments	would	itself	go	through	a	series	of	coding	steps:			 -	Phase	4.1,	Cards	or	topic	under	discussion:	Here	I	would	simply	code	for	the	 card	 or	 topic	 being	 discussed.	 The	 information	 collected	 during	 this	 step	 was	mostly	used	in	Chapter	3	on	partisan	cohesiveness.		
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	 -	 Phase	 4.2,	 Assessments	 of	 conflictuality:	 Second,	 I	 would	 code	 for	 the	general	assessment	given	by	one	or	several	participants	on	the	degree	of	conflictuality	of	the	topic	under	discussion	-	for	instance,	whether	they	considered	it	a	 'Consensual'	or	a	 'Conflictual'	 topic.	The	 information	collected	during	 this	 step	was	mostly	used	 in	Chapter	 3	 on	 partisan	 cohesiveness,	 but	 also	 in	 chapter	 5	 on	 partisans'	 approach	 to	political	disagreement	and	agreement.		 -	 Phase	 4.3,	 Justifications	 for	 assessments:	 Third,	 I	 would	 code	 for	 the	justifications	that	partisans	would	offer	to	assess	a	given	topic	as	either	conflictual	or	consensual,	 and	 especially	 whether	 they	 would	 talk	 about	 the	 differences	 and	similarities	 in	 the	 ideas	 of	 political	 parties	 or	 in	 their	 practices.	 The	 information	collected	during	this	step	was	mostly	used	in	Chapter	3	on	partisan	cohesiveness.		 -	 	Phase	4.4,	Actors	emphasised:	Fourth,	I	would	code	for	the	actors	that	partisans	 talked	about	when	 justifying	 the	consensual	or	conflictual	nature	of	a	given	topic:	mostly	 their	own	party,	mostly	 their	opponents,	or	 comparing	 the	platforms	of	both	parties.	The	information	collected	during	this	step	was	mostly	used	in	Chapter	3	on	partisan	cohesiveness,	but	also	in	Chapter	4	on	respect	for	political	opponents.			 -	Phase	4.5,	Knowledge:	Fifth,	if	relevant,	I	would	code	for	instances	when	participants	would	either	refer	to	their	ignorance	of	a	certain	topic	to	justify	their	weak	ability	 to	 justify	 their	 position,	 and	 instances	when	 participants	would	 refer	 to	 their	particular	expertise	in	a	given	domain	to	give	credential	to	their	justification.			 -	 Phase	4.6,	 Judgements	of	 self	 and	opponents:	 Finally,	 I	would	 code	 for	the	 criticisms	 and	 judgements	 that	 participants	 would	 formulate	 against	 their	 own	party	 and	 their	 opponents	 in	 the	 process	 of	 talking	 about	 the	 differences	 and	similarities	between	party	platforms	on	a	given	issue.	For	instance,	I	would	code	here	for	instances	where	participants	criticised	the	practices	of	opponents,	their	intentions,	or	their	unwillingness	to	fulfil	the	common	good.	The	information	collected	during	this	step	was	mostly	used	in	Chapter	4	on	respect	for	political	opponents.	-	Phase	5,	Assessments	of	the	value	of	political	agreement	and	disagreement:	As	a	 fifth	 step,	 I	would	move	on	 to	 the	next	 step	of	 the	discussion,	 in	which	 I	would	ask	participants	to	formulate	a	normative	judgement	on	the	state	of	partisan	conflictuality	in	 their	 own	 political	 system.	 The	 information	 collected	 during	 this	 step	was	mostly	used	in	Chapter	5,	on	partisan	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement.			-	Phase	6,	Experiences	of	 interpartisan	dialogue:	Finally,	 I	would	code	 the	 last	part	 of	 the	 discussion,	 in	 which	 participants	 would	 talk	 about	 their	 own	 personal	
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experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue.	I	coded	here	especially	for	whether	participants	accounted	 for	 negative	 or	 positive	 experiences	 in	 this	 context.	 The	 information	collected	during	this	step	was	mostly	used	in	Chapter	5,	on	partisan	attitudes	towards	political	agreement	and	disagreement.			-	Transversal	codes,	Key	passages:	This	series	of	codes	was	used	throughout	the	whole	 coding	 process,	 and	 thus	 throughout	 the	 six	 phases	 listed	 above,	 to	 highlight	passages	 from	 the	 transcripts	 that	 I	 found	particularly	 striking.	 These	 allowed	me	 to	make	a	pre-selection	of	 interesting	examples	 from	which	 I	 selected	 the	passages	 that	were	translated	and	integrated	in	the	body	of	this	dissertation.			
	
III.	CODING	GUIDELINES	
1.	Preliminary	remarks	to	the	codebook	Below	 I	provide	 the	 codebook	used	 for	 the	 coding	process	 -	 in	other	words,	 I	provide	definitions	for	each	code	that	I	applied.	In	theory,	this	codebook	could	be	used	by	a	third	person	to	re-code	my	data	and	thus	verify	my	coding.	It	could	also	be	used	to	code	new	interviews	conducted	according	to	the	same	discussion	guidelines.	Or	it	could	be	adapted	to	analyse	partisan	cohesiveness	on	the	basis	of	other	types	of	data.		
Step	1:	Group	
Characteristics	
Step	2:	Biographical	
details	of	participants	
Step	3:	Comments	
about	instructions	
Step	4:	Justidication	of	
card	classidication	
Step	4.1.	Cards	or	topics	under	discussion	
Step	4.2.	Assessments	of	conlictuality	
Step	4.3.	Justiication	of	assessments	
Step	4.4.	Actors	emphasised	
Step	4.5	Knowledge	
Step	4.6.	Judgement	of	self	and	opponents	
Step	5:	Assessment	of	
the	value	of	condlict	
and	consensus	
Step	6:	Experience	of	
interpartisan	dialogue	
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Coding	 requires	 that	 the	 social	 scientist	 interpret	the	data	at	hand.	To	apply	a	given	code	to	a	portion	of	text,	one	needs	to	make	an	assessment	on	the	content	of	this	portion	of	text,	and	thus	to	interpret	it.	My	own	work	does	not	escape	this	general	rule.	Undeniably,	 some	of	my	 codes	 have	 required	more	 interpretation	 than	 others.	When	participants	would	pick-up	the	card	'Employment	and	unemployment	policies'	and	talk	about	it,	I	could	easily	apply	the	corresponding	code.	But	even	there,	I	needed	to	decide	whether	the	participant	had	sufficiently	developed	an	argument	about	this	specific	card	to	warrant	being	coded.	Other	codes	demanded	more	interpretation.	To	distinguish,	for	instance,	between	cases	were	participants	talked	about	the	ideas	of	political	parties	and	their	practices	 for	 instance	was	not	 always	 straightforward.	This	 also	means	 that	 the	reader	 can	 expect	 a	 small	 measure	 of	 inconsistency	 in	 my	 coding.	 My	 own	interpretation	 of	 the	 text	 has	 most	 likely	 oscillated	 over	 the	 period	 of	 four	 months	during	which	 I	 conducted	my	 final	 cycle	 of	 coding.	 If	 I	were	 to	 re-code	my	data,	 it	 is	plausible	 that	 I	would	 obtain	 slightly	 different	 results.	 This	would	 also	 be	 the	 case	 if	someone	else	were	to	code	my	data	on	the	basis	of	this	codebook.		Notwithstanding	 the	 above,	 I	 am	 confident	 that	 my	 general	 results,	 and	especially	 the	general	variations	 in	partisan	compliance	 that	 I	have	uncovered,	would	be	verified	with	subsequent	cycles	of	coding.	As	shown	in	my	three	empirical	chapters	and	in	Appendix	6,	the	variations	I	find	between	the	patterns	of	speech	of	French	and	Hungarian	 participants,	 and	 between	 parties	 within	 a	 given	 country,	 are	 consistent	across	 all	 of	 the	 indicators	 that	 I	 consider.	 The	 quantitative	 results	 from	 the	 coding	process	 are	 also	 only	 an	 indication	 of	 trends	 that	 I	 have	 assessed	 from	 a	 qualitative	point	of	view,	drawing	on	representative	examples	 from	different	groups	of	partisans	in	 my	 empirical	 chapters.	 While	 one	 could	 find	 slightly	 different	 numbers,	 and	 thus	certain	variations	between	different	groups	 to	be	a	bit	more	or	 less	pronounced	with	another	cycle	of	coding,	I	am	positive	that	these	general	trends	would	still	hold.178			Before	I	detail	my	codebook,	here	are	a	number	of	guidelines	that	may	help	the	reader	to	go	through	it:				-	 I	 proceed	 in	 the	 order	 of	 the	 steps	 described	 above,	 and	 thus	 provide	definitions	for	each	code	applied	according	to	this	order.		-	Most	 of	 the	 codes	 I	 describe	 here	 are	 applied	when	 at	 least	 one	participant	makes	a	substantiated	claim	that	supports	the	argument	associated	with	a	given	code.	I	
																																								 																					
178	If	I	were	to	publish	this	thesis	in	the	future,	I	would	nevertheless	perform	this	additional	cycle	of	coding	for	the	sake	of	additional	academic	rigor.		
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define	a	 substantiated	 justification	as	a	 claim	made	 in	 favour	of	 the	point	 covered	by	each	 code	 that	 is	 backed-up	 by	 participants	 with	 at	 least	 one	 argument.	 When	 the	words	'at	least	one	participant'	are	associated	with	a	code	description,	this	means	that	if	other	participants	backed-up	the	first	speaker	with	the	same	argument,	a	single	code	would	be	applied	to	the	portion	of	text	relevant	to	this	dialogue.		-	When	a	given	code	is	indented	under	another	code,	this	means	that	the	former	is	a	'sub-code'	and	the	latter	a	'primary'	code.	A	'sub-code'	is	defined	as	a	"second-order	tag	 assigned	 after	 a	 primary	 code	 to	 detail	 or	 enrich	 the	 entry,	 depending	 on	 the	volume	 of	 data	 you	 have	 or	 specificity	 you	 may	 need	 for	 categorisation	 and	 data	analysis"	 (Saldaña,	 2013,	 p.	 77).	 To	 give	 an	 example,	 I	 applied	 two	 different	 codes	depending	on	whether	participants	criticised	their	opponents	on	their	practices	or	on	their	 intentions.	 These	 codes	 were	 then	 primary	 codes	 for	 a	 number	 of	 sub-codes,	refining	 these	 categories.	 For	 instance,	 the	 code	used	 for	 criticisms	on	 intentions	has	two	 sub-codes,	 one	 applied	when	 participants	 target	 their	 opponents'	 preoccupation	with	 political	 interests,	 and	 another	 when	 participants	 targeted	 their	 opponents'	preoccupation	with	personal	 interests.	Any	portion	of	 text	 that	 is	 coded	with	 a	 given	sub-code	is	also	coded	with	its	primary	code.		-	I	place	the	mention	'or'	in	front	of	codes	or	subcodes	when	these	are	exclusive	of	each	other.	On	the	other	hand,	I	place	the	mention	'and'	in	front	of	codes	or	subcodes	when	these	can	be	cumulative.		-	In	line	with	this	last	point,	it	should	be	clear	to	the	reader	that	many	of	these	codes	have	been	applied	simultaneously	to	a	given	portion	of	text.	This	is	what	allowed	me,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 this	 process,	 to	 identify	 variations	 in	 the	 patterns	 of	 speech	 of	participants	 according	 to	nationality	 or	 partisan	 affiliations,	 and	 to	 extract	 important	information	related	to	the	co-occurrences	of	certain	codes.		
2.	The	codebook	
	 Phase	1:	Group	characteristics	
These	are	the	codes	applied	to	the	whole	transcript	to	assign	a	number	of	basic	attributes	to	it.			 Phase	1.1:	Country		 FRANCE	(Applies	to	the	entirety	of	all	French	transcripts)		 or	HUNGARY	(Applies	to	the	entirety	of	all	Hungarian	transcripts)	
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	 Phase	1.2:	Position	on	political	spectrum		 	 LEFT	(Applies	to	the	entirety	of	all	transcripts	of	group	discussions	involving	members	of	a	party	that	self-defines	as	being	on	the	left	in	a	given	national	context).			 	 	 MSzP/Együtt	 (Sub-code	 of	 LEFT,	 Applies	 to	 the	 entirety	 of	 all	 MSzP	 or		 Együtt/PM	transcripts)		 	 	 PS	(Sub-code	of	LEFT,	Applies	to	the	entirety	of	all	PS	transcripts)	 		 	 or	 RIGHT	 (Applies	 to	 the	 entirety	 of	 all	 transcripts	 of	 group	 discussion	 involving	members	of	a	party	that	self-defines	as	being	on	the	right	in	a	given	national	context)		 	 	 Fidesz	 (Sub-code	 of	 RIGHT,	 Applies	 to	 the	 entirely	 of	 all	 Fidesz	 and	 KDNP		 transcripts)		 	 	 UMP	(Sub-code	of	RIGHT,	Applies	to	the	entirety	of	all	UMP	transcripts)		
	 Phase	1.3:	Type	of	group	EXECUTIVES	 (Applies	 to	 the	 entirety	 of	 all	 discussions	 happening	 among	 groups	 of	participants	who	have	local	or	national	responsibilities	in	the	youth	party	organisation,	and	know	each	other	through	this	medium)		 	 or	LOCAL	SECTION	 (Applies	 to	 the	entirety	of	 all	discussions	among	participants	 that	belong	to	the	same	local	party	or	youth	party	section)		 or	 PARTY	 EMPLOYEES	 (Applies	 to	 the	 entirety	 of	 all	 discussions	 happening	 among	party	employees	that	know	each	other	through	working	for	the	party)		 		
	
	 	 	
Phase	1:	Group	
Characteristics	
1.	Country	
FRANCE	
HUNGARY	
2.	Position	on	political	
spectrum	
LEFT	 PS	MSzP	
RIGHT	 UMP	Fidesz	
3.	Group	Type	
LOCAL	SECTION	
EXECUTIVES	
PARTY	EMPLOYEES	
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Phase	2:	Biographical	information	about	participants179	
These	are	the	codes	that	focus	on	the	information	that	participants	gave	when	they	introduced	themselves	at	the	beginning	of	the	interviews.			 	 AGE	(Applies	to	first	mention	by	participants	of	their	age)		 	 and	GENDER	(Applies	to	first	mention	by	participants	of	their	name)		 	 MAN	(Sub-code	of	GENDER,	Applies	to	all	masculine	names)		 	 or	WOMAN	(Applies	to	all	feminine	names)		 	 and	OCCUPATION	(Applies	to	first	mention	by	participants	of	their	occupation)		 	 STUDENT	(Sub-code	of	OCCUPATION,	applies	to	first	mention	by	participants	of	being	a	student)		 	 or	WORKER	(Sub-code	of	OCCUPATION,	applies	to	first	mention	by	participants	of	being	employed	or	self-employed)	and	PARTY	RESPONSIBILITY	(Applies	to	first	mention	by	participants	of	their	position	or	level	of	responsibility	within	the	party)	or	 GRASS-ROOT	 (Sub-code	 of	 PARTY	 RESPONSIBILITY,	 applies	 to	mentions	 by	participants	that	they	are	simple	activists	in	the	party)	or	 LOCAL	ELITE	 (Sub-code	 of	 PARTY	RESPONSIBILITY,	 applies	 to	mentions	 by	participants	that	they	have	local	level	responsibilities	in	the	party	itself	or	in	its	youth	organisation)	or	NATIONAL	ELITE	(Sub-code	of	PARTY	RESPONSIBILITY,	applies	to	mentions	by	participants	that	they	have	national	level	responsibilities	in	the	party	itself	or	in	its	youth	organisation)	NON-MEMBER	 (Sub-code	 of	 PARTY	 RESPONSIBILITY,	 applies	 to	 mentions	 by	participants	that	they	are	not	members	of	the	party)	and/or	PARTY	EMPLOYEE	(Sub-code	of	PARTY	RESPONSIBILITY,	applies	to	first	mentions	by	participants	of	being	employed	by	the	party)	
																																								 																					
179	These	 codes	 are	 included	 in	 the	NVivo	 file	 deposited	 online	 for	 the	 use	 of	my	 thesis	 examiners	 (see	Appendix	7).	However,	for	reasons	of	privacy,	I	have	removed	from	both	the	transcripts	and	the	NVivo	data	the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 interviews	 in	 which	 participants	 introduce	 themselves.	 To	 this	 extent,	 the	corresponding	NVivo	code	are	not	attached	anymore	to	any	specific	portion	of	text	in	the	accessible	NVivo	file.		
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Phase	3:	Comments	about	instructions	
These	are	the	codes	that	 focus	on	the	ways	 in	which	my	different	participants	reacted	 to	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 cards,	 and	 the	 instructions	 for	 the	 discussion	more	generally.				 NO	 CONSENSUAL	 CARDS	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 questions	 the	instructions	 by	 emphasising	 that	 they	 are	 not	 able	 to	 find	 consensual	 topics	 among	those	discussed)			 and/or	 POSITIVE	 REACTION	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 has	 a	 positive	reaction	 to	 the	 instructions,	 either	 through	 complimenting	 the	 author	 about	 the	 card	game	idea,	or	making	jokes	about	it)		 and/or	QUESTIONING	CRITERIA	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	asks	questions	about	 the	criteria	according	to	which	they	are	supposed	to	classify	 the	cards.	 In	 these	cases,	 participants	 would	 generally	 suggest	 two	 possible	 logics	 of	 classification.	 For	instance,	 one	 according	 to	 their	 own	beliefs	 concerning	what	 the	 opposition	between	Left	and	Right	should	be,	and	the	other	according	to	the	position	defended	officially	by	political	 parties	 in	 the	 public	 sphere.	 Or	 one	 according	 to	 the	 ideals	 or	 values	 that	political	parties	defend,	the	other	according	to	their	practices)			 			 	 	
Phase	2:	
Biographical	details	
of	participants	
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Phase	4:	Justifications	for	card	classifications	
These	are	 the	 codes	applied	 to	 the	bulk	of	 each	 interview,	where	participants	talked	about	their	card	classifications.	I	applied	a	series	of	codes	to	each	substantiated	justification	 for	 the	classification	of	a	given	card	given	by	one	or	several	participants.	Each	argument	or	series	of	arguments	would	itself	go	through	a	series	of	coding	steps.			Phase	4.1:	Cards	or	topics	under	discussion		These	are	the	codes	applied	that	describe	the	cards	or	topic	being	discussed.		
	 Equivalent	cards	in	France	and	Hungary		 PUBLIC	 SERVICE	 	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	justification	 for	 their	 classification	 of	 the	 card	 'Reform	 and	 maintenance	 of	 the	 public	service')		 EU	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	 justification	 for	 their	classification	of	the	card	'Relations	to	the	European	Union')		 MINORITIES	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	gives	a	substantiated	justification	for	their	classification	of	the	card	'National	and/or	Religious	Minorities)		 JUSTICE	 AND	 SECURITY	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	justification	for	their	classification	of	the	card	'Justice	and	Security')		 EMPLOYMENT	 POLICY	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	justification	 for	 their	 classification	 of	 the	 card	 'The	 fight	 against	 unemployment	 and	employment	policy')		 PUBLIC	 MORALITY	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	justification	for	their	classification	of	the	card	'Public	Morality')		 INDUSTRIAL	 POLICY	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	justification	 for	 their	 classification	of	 the	 card	 'Industrial	 policy,	 agricultural	 policy	 and	protectionism')	
Phase	3:	Comments	about	
instructions	
ABSENT	CONSENSUS	
POSITIVE	REACTIONS	
QUESTIONING	CRITERIA	
	
314	
	 FISCAL	POLICY	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	gives	a	substantiated	justification	for	 their	 classification	 of	 the	 card	 'Fiscal	 policy,	 social	 policy	 and	 redistribution	 of	wealth')		 PUBLIC	 FINANCE	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	justification	 for	 their	 classification	 of	 the	 card	 'Financing	 the	 public	 debt	 and	 deficit	 -	improving	accounts')		 ECOLOGY	 (Applied	when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	 justification	 for	their	classification	of	the	card	'Ecology	-	Green	politics')		 Cards	particular	to	the	French	fieldwork		 GENDER	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	 justification	 for	their	classification	of	the	card	'Sexual	Minorities	and	societal	change')		 IMMIGRATION	(Applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	gives	a	substantiated	justification	for	their	classification	of	the	card	'Legal	and	Illegal	immigration).	
	 Cards	particular	to	the	Hungarian	fieldwork		 INSTITUTIONS	(Applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	gives	a	substantiated	justification	for	their	classification	of	the	card	'Institutional	Reform')		 NATION	 IN	 POLITICS	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 gives	 a	 substantiated	justification	for	their	classification	of	the	card	'The	Nation	in	politics')		 Common	topics	that	came	up	in	discussions	but	were	not	on	the	cards		 CITIZEN	ENGAGEMENT	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	talks	about	the	question	of	citizen	and	youth	political	engagement)		 GENERATION	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 talks	 about	 the	 question	 of	generations	or	generational	change)		 MEDIA	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	talks	about	the	question	of	the	role	of	the	media	in	politics)		 POLITICAL	CULTURE	(Applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	talks	about	the	question	of	national	political	culture)		 FOREIGN	 COMPARISON	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 talks	 about	 political,	economic	 or	 social	 developments	 in	 other	 countries	 as	 a	 point	 of	 comparison	 to	 their	own).			 HISTORY	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	talks	about	the	question	of	the	country's	history)		 OTHER	PARTIES	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	talks	about	other	parties	than	the	two	mainstream	parties)		
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		 Phase	4.2.	Assessments	of	conflictuality	The	following	codes	correspond	to	the	judgements	participants	make	as	to	the	conflictual	 or	 consensual	 nature	 of	 the	 cards	 that	 were	 distributed	 to	 them.	 Any	 of	these	codes	are	therefore	necessarily	simultaneously	coded	with	one	of	the	Topic	Code	listed	in	Phase	4.	1.				 	 UNIDIMENSIONAL	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 develops	 a	 categorical	argument	 to	 classify	 a	 given	 card	 as	 a	 topic	 of	 partisan	 disagreement	 or	 partisan	agreement.	 By	 this	 I	 mean	 that	 they	 insist	 only	 on	 either	 the	 differences,	 or	 the	similarities,	between	the	platforms	of	political	parties	on	this	given	topic)		 	 CONFLICTUAL	 (Sub-code	 of	 UNIDIMENSIONAL,	 applied	when	 at	 least	 one	participant	develops	a	categorical	argument	 to	 justify	why	 they	consider	a	
Phase	5.	1.		
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Hungary	
INSTITUTIONS	NATION	IN	POLITICS	
Additional	
topics	
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given	topic	as	conflictual;	or	 insist	solely	on	what	differentiates	his	party's	positions	from	the	position	of	his	opponents	on	a	given	topic)	
	 	 or	CONSENSUAL	(Sub-code	of	UNIDIMENSIONAL,	applied	when	at	least	one	participant	develops	a	categorical	argument	 to	 justify	why	 they	consider	a	given	 topic	 as	 consensual;	 or	 insist	 solely	 on	 the	 similarities	 between	 his	party's	positions	and	the	position	of	opponents	on	a	given	topic)	
	 	 or	MIXED	(Applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	develops	a	nuanced	argument	about	 their	 classification	 of	 a	 specific	 card.	 By	 this	 I	mean	 that	 they	 recognise	both	 elements	 of	 consensus	 and	 conflict	 on	 given	 topic;	 or	 insist	 both	 on	similarities	 and	 differences	 between	 the	 position	 of	 their	 own	 party	 and	 the	position	of	their	opponents	on	a	given	topic)		
	
	 Phase	4.3.	Justifications	for	assessments		 	 The	 following	 codes	 correspond	 to	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 participants	 justify	 their	assessment	of	the	conflictual	or	consensual	nature	of	a	given	topic.	Depending	on	the	type	of	assessment	made	(see	4.2),	 they	are	simultaneously	coded	with	a	given	 topic	code	 listed	 in	4.1	above,	and	simultaneously	coded	with	the	codes	CONFLICTUAL,	CONSENSUAL	or	MIXED.		 	 a.	Justifying	unidimensional	assessments	
	 	 IDEAS	 (Co-coded	 with	 CONFLICTUAL	 or	 CONSENSUAL,	 applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	participant	 develops	 an	 argument	 to	 classify	 a	 given	 card	 as	 a	 topic	 of	 partisan	disagreement	or	partisan	agreement,	insisting	mostly	on	the	differences	or	similarities	in	the	ideas	of	rival	parties	to	justify	their	assessment)		 	 WORLDVIEWS	(Sub-code	of	 IDEAS,	applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	develops	an	argument	to	classify	a	given	card	as	a	topic	of	partisan	disagreement	or	partisan	agreement,	 insisting	mostly	on	 the	more	abstract	principles,	 values	and	normative	commitments	that	bring	partisans	together	or	sets	them	apart	on	this	given	topic)		 	 DIAGNOSIS/OBJECTIVES	(Sub-code	of	IDEAS,	applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	develops	an	argument	to	classify	a	given	card	as	a	topic	of	partisan	disagreement	or	partisan	agreement,	insisting	mostly	on	the	differences	or	similarities	in	the	types	of	problems	that	parties	are	 likely	 to	 identify	as	needing	to	be	solved,	or	 the	 types	of	objectives	that	parties	wish	to	achieve	through	policy)	
	 	 PRACTICES	 (Co-coded	with	 CONFLICTUAL	 or	 CONSENSUAL,	 applied	when	 at	 least	 one	participant	 develops	 an	 argument	 to	 classify	 a	 given	 card	 as	 a	 topic	 of	 partisan	
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disagreement	or	partisan	agreement,	insisting	mostly	on	the	differences	or	similarities	in	the	practices	and	policies	of	rival	parties	to	justify	their	assessment)		 	 SPECIFIC	 (Sub-code	of	PRACTICES,	 applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	develops	an	argument	to	classify	a	given	card	as	a	topic	of	partisan	disagreement	or	partisan	agreement,	insisting	mostly	on	the	differences	or	similarities	in	the	specific	practices	of	 political	 parties	 to	 justify	 their	 assessment	 -	 for	 instance	 specific	 policies,	 laws,	political	decisions,	speeches,	etc)		 	 GENERAL	(Sub-code	of	PRACTICES,	applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	develops	an	argument	to	classify	a	given	card	as	a	topic	of	partisan	disagreement	or	partisan	agreement,	insisting	mostly	on	the	differences	or	similarities	in	the	general	practices	of	 political	 parties	 to	 justify	 their	 assessment	 -	 for	 instance	 the	 types	 of	 policies,	discourses,	or	ways	of	doing	things	of	parties)		 	 INVERSION	 (Co-coded	 with	 CONFLICTUAL,	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 develops	 an	argument	 to	 classify	 a	 given	 card	 as	 a	 topic	 of	 partisan	 disagreement,	 insisting	 on	 the	reversal	by	mainstream	parties	of	traditional,	Left-Right	platforms	on	a	given	question)		 	 	 b.	Justifying	mixed	assessments		 	 CONFLICTUAL	IDEAS	VS	CONSENSUAL	PRACTICE	(Co-coded	with	MIXED,	applied	when,	in	 expressing	 a	 qualified	 judgement	 as	 described	 above,	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 insists	that	 there	 exists	 on	 a	 given	 topic	both	differences	 in	 the	 ideas	 that	parties	defend,	 and	similarities	in	the	political	practice	and	policies	that	parties	put	in	place)		 	 or	 CONSENSUAL	 IDEAS	 VS.	 CONFLICTUAL	 PRACTICE	 (Co-coded	 with	 MIXED,	 applied	when,	 in	 expressing	 a	 qualified	 judgement	 as	 described	 above,	 at	 least	 one	 participant	insists	that	there	exists	on	a	given	topic	both	similarities	in	the	ideas	that	parties	defend,	and	differences	in	the	political	practices	and	policies	that	parties	put	in	place)		 	 or	CROSS-CUTTING	DISAGREEMENT	(Co-coded	with	MIXED,	applied	when,	in	expressing	a	qualified	judgement	as	described	above,	at	least	one	participant	insists	that	parties	are	internally	divided	on	a	given	question,	or	that	political	oppositions	on	a	given	question	do	not	strictly	respect	traditional	lines	of	inter-party	debate)	
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	Phase	4.4.	Actors	emphasised	The	following	codes	correspond	to	the	actors	participants	emphasise	when	they	justify	the	conflictual	or	consensual	nature	of	the	cards	that	were	distributed	to	them.	Any	 of	 these	 codes	 are	 therefore	 generally	 simultaneously	 applied	with	 some	 of	 the	codes	listed	in	4.1	to	4.3.		 	 SELF-FOCUSED	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 mainly	 talks	 about	 their	 own	party's	ideas	or	practices	when	justifying	the	conflictual	or	consensual	nature	of	a	given	topic)		 	 or	OPPONENT-FOCUSED	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	mainly	talks	about	their	own	opponents'	ideas	or	practices	when	justifying	the	conflictual	or	consensual	nature	of	a	given	topic)		 	 or	COMPARISON	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	develops	a	comparison	between	their	 opponents'	 ideas	 or	 practices	 and	 their	 own	 when	 justifying	 the	 conflictual	 or	consensual	nature	of	a	given	topic)	
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		 	Phase	4.5.	Knowledge	These	 are	 the	 codes	 that	 I	 applied	when	 participants	 talked	 about	 their	 own	ignorance	or	expertise	about	a	certain	topic	when	discussing	it.	These	codes	were	thus	simultaneous	to	many	of	those	described	above	from	4.1	to	4.4.		 	 IGNORANCE	(Applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	 justifies	 the	 fact	 they	do	 little	 to	no	justification	for	their	assessment	of	the	conflictual	or	consensual	nature	of	the	topic	they	are	referring	 to	by	 the	 fact	 that	 they	are	 too	 ignorant,	or	 lack	expertise,	about	 the	 topic	itself)		 	 EXPERTISE	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 justifies	 his	 ability	 to	 talk	 about	 a	given	topic,	or	about	the	ability	of	another	participant	to	talk	about	a	given	topic,	by	the	fact	 that	 they	have	specific	expertise	on	 this	same	 topic	 -	because	of	 their	 job,	diploma,	etc.)	
		 Phase	4.6.	Judgements	of	self	and	opponents	These	 are	 the	 codes	 applied	 to	 the	 judgements	 that	 participants	 made	concerning	their	own	party	and	their	opponents.	Because	these	judgements	were	made	in	the	process	of	talking	about	the	differences	and	similarities	between	party	platforms	on	the	twelve	issues	discussed,	these	codes	are	generally	simultaneously	applied	with	some	of	the	codes	listed	in	41	to	4.5.			 CRITICISM	OF	OPPONENTS	(Applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	casts	a	negative	 judgement	on	their	political	opponents)	
Phase	4.4.	Actors	
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	 	 FLAWED	PRACTICES	(Sub-code	of	CRITICISM	OF	OPPONENTS,	applied	when	at	least	one	participant	casts	a	negative	judgement	on	their	political	opponents	by	emphasising	flaws	in	their	practices)		 	 INCOHERENCE	 (Sub-code	 of	 FLAWED	 PRACTICES,	 applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	participant	casts	a	negative	judgement	on	their	political	opponents	by	emphasising	incoherencies	in	their	practices)		 	 INEFFICIENCY	 (Sub-code	 of	 FLAWED	 PRACTICES,	 applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	participant	casts	a	negative	judgement	on	their	political	opponents	by	emphasising	the	inefficient	nature	of	their	practices,	or	their	lack	of	realism)		 	 LACK	 OF	 POLITICAL	 WILL	 (Sub-code	 of	 FLAWED	 PRACTICES,	 applied	 when	 at	least	 one	 participant	 casts	 a	 negative	 judgement	 on	 their	 political	 opponents	 by	emphasising	their	lack	of	political	will	or	vision)		 	 IRRESPONSABILITY	(Sub-code	of	FLAWED	PRACTICES,	applied	when	at	least	one	participant	casts	a	negative	judgement	on	their	political	opponents	by	emphasising	their	irresponsibility,	lack	of	professionalism	or	carelessness)		 	 and/or	ILL	INTENTIONS	(Sub-code	of	CRITICISM	OF	OPPONENTS,	applied	when	at	least	one	 participant	 casts	 a	 negative	 judgement	 on	 their	 political	 opponents	 by	 denouncing	the	lack	of	integrity	of	opponents'	motivations)		 	 POLITICAL	 INTERESTS	 (Sub-code	of	 ILL	 INTENTIONS,	 applied	when	at	 least	 one	participant	casts	a	negative	judgement	on	their	political	opponents	by	denouncing	the	 lack	 of	 integrity	 of	 opponents'	 motivations,	 emphasising	 especially	 their	tendency	to	favour	certain	groups	in	society	to	the	detriment	of	others	for	electoral	purposes,	 or	 to	 be	 driven	 solely	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 be	 elected	 or	 to	 please	 their	electorate)		 	 PERSONAL	 INTERESTS	 (Sub-code	of	 ILL	 INTENTIONS,	 applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	casts	a	negative	judgement	on	their	political	opponents	by	denouncing	the	 lack	of	 integrity	 in	opponents'	motivations,	denouncing	especially	 their	quest	for	material	gain	or	the	fact	that	their	opponents	are	driven	solely	by	the	desire	to	further	their	personal	power.	Accusations	of	corruption,	nepotism	and	clientelism	fall	under	this	code)	and/or	 THREAT	 TO	 THE	 COMMON	 GOOD	 (Sub-code	 of	 CRITICISM	 OF	 OPPONENTS,	applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 casts	 a	 negative	 judgement	 on	 their	 political	opponents	by	denouncing	the	harmful	or	threatening	nature	of	their	opponents	or	their	opponents'	practices	with	regard	to	the	common	good)		 and/or	 MORAL	 DEFFICIENCY	 (Sub-code	 of	 NEGATIVE	 JUDGEMENT	 OF	 OPPONENT,	applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 attributes	 'immorality',	 'amorality'	 or	 'evil'	 as	 a	defining	characteristic	of	the	personality	of	political	opponents)		 PRAISE	OF	OPPONENTS	 (Applied	when	at	 least	one	participant	 casts	a	positive	 judgement	on	their	political	opponents)		 SELF-CRITICISM	(Applied	when	at	least	one	participant	casts	a	negative	judgement	on	their	own	party)		 SELF-PRAISE	 (Applied	when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 casts	 a	 positive	 judgement	 on	 their	 own	party)		
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Phase	5:	Assessments	of	the	value	of	conflict	and	consensus	
The	 following	 codes	 relate	 to	 the	 part	 in	 the	 discussion	 following	 the	justification	by	participants	of	their	card	classification.	Here	I	would	ask	participants	to	formulate	 a	 normative	 judgement	 on	 the	 state	 of	 partisan	 conflictuality	 in	 their	 own	political	system.		 VALUE	 OF	 DISAGREEMENT	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 develops	 a	 substantiated	argument	 emphasising	 the	 positive	 value	 of	 disagreement	 between	 political	 parties,	 or	 the	negative	value	of	excessive	agreement	between	political	parties)		 VALUE	 OF	 AGREEMENT	 (Applied	 when	 at	 least	 one	 participant	 develops	 a	 substantiated	argument	emphasising	the	positive	value	of	agreement	between	political	parties,	or	the	negative	value	of	excessive	disagreement	between	political	parties).		
	
Phase	6:	Assessments	of	
the	value	of	consensus	
and	condlict	
VALUE	OF	DISAGREEMENT	
VALUE	OF	AGREEMENT	
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Phase	6:	Experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue	
This	 series	 of	 codes	 applied	 to	 the	 last	 part	 of	 the	 discussion,	 in	 which	participants	would	talk	about	their	own	personal	experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue.			 	 POSITIVE	or	NEUTRAL	EXPERIENCE	(Applied	when	a	participant	accounts	in	positive	or	neutral	terms	for	one	of	their	personal	experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue)		 	 NEGATIVE	EXPERIENCE	(Applied	when	a	participant	accounts	in	negative	terms	for	one	of	their	personal	experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue)	
	
Transversal	codes:	Key	passages	
This	series	of	codes	was	used	to	highlight	passages	 from	the	transcripts	 that	 I	found	 particularly	 striking.	 These	 allowed	me	 to	 make	 a	 pre-selection	 of	 interesting	examples	from	which	I	selected	the	passages	that	were	translated	and	integrated	in	the	body	of	this	dissertation.		KEY	 FIDESZ	 (Applied	 when	 I	 found	 particularly	 interesting	 passages	 in	 Fidesz	 transcripts	 for	future	use)	KEY	MSzP	(Applied	when	I	found	particularly	interesting	passages	in	MSzP	transcripts	for	future	use)	KEY	PS	(Applied	when	I	found	particularly	interesting	passages	in	PS	transcripts	for	future	use)	KEY	UMP	(Applied	when	 I	 found	particularly	 interesting	passages	 in	UMP	transcripts	 for	 future	use)	 				
Phase	7.	Experience	of	
interpartisan	dialogue	
POSITIVE	EXPERIENCE	
NEGATIVE	EXPERIENCE	
	
323		Appendix	6:	Cross-country	comparison	of	the	coding-based	evidence		In	this	appendix	I	present	 in	a	comparative	fashion	the	coding-based	evidence	for	both	French	 and	Hungarian	patterns	of	 speech.	 It	 confirms	 the	 general	 variations	that	 I	have	shown	to	exist	between	French	and	Hungarian	patterns	of	speech:	French	participants	 uphold	 the	 standards	 of	 cohesiveness	 and	 commitment	 to	 political	pluralism	better	than	Hungarian	participants,	and	this	on	all	of	the	criteria	considered	in	my	empirical	chapters.		
I.	THE	COHESIVENESS	OF	PARTISAN	CLAIMS	
In	the	following	sections	I	examine	in	a	comparative	fashion	the	extent	to	which	the	discourse	of	French	and	Hungarian	participants	complies	with	the	three	criteria	of	partisan	cohesiveness:	the	normative	criterion,	the	executive	criterion	and	the	criterion	of	differentiation.	
	 1.	The	normative	criterion	As	 emphasised	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 the	 first	 criteria	 to	 evaluate	 whether	 partisans	uphold	the	standard	of	cohesiveness	is	the	extent	to	which	they	put	forward	visions	of	the	 common	 good	 that	 citizens	 can	 aspire	 to.	 One	 indicator	 that	 my	 data	 allows	 to	consider	is	participants'	relative	emphasis	on	either	the	ideas	or	the	actions	of	political	parties	when	they	accounted	for	partisan	agreements	or	disagreements	on	the	twelve	cards	under	discussion.	As	Figure	37	 indicates,	French	participants	draw	on	practice-related	and	ideational	dimensions	of	party	platforms	in	a	rather	balanced	way:	53.7%	and	46.3%	total	assessments	 respectively.	Hungarian	participants,	on	 the	other	hand,	tend	 to	 decribe	 partisan	 positions	 more	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 types	 of	 political	 practices	parties	 advocate	 or	 perform	 than	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 ideas:	 62.3%	 and	 37.7%	 of	 total	assessments	respectively.	
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Figure	 37:	 Dimensions	 of	 partisan	 platforms	 emphasised	 by	 French	 and	 Hungarian	
participants	to	justify	their	card	classification	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure		
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	 The	 coding	 category	 IDEAS	 was	 further	 refined	 to	 take	 into	 account	 levels	 of	abstraction	of	the	ideas	participants	evoked.	The	code	WORLDVIEWS	was	used	where	participants	referred	 to	more	abstract	principles,	values	and	normative	commitments	that	 motivate	 parties.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 I	 associated	 the	 code	DIAGNOSTICS/OBJECTIVES	when	participants	referred	to	the	types	of	problems	parties	were	 likely	 to	 identify	 as	 needing	 remedy	 through	 policy,	 or	 the	 types	 of	 objectives	parties	wished	 to	 achieve	 through	policy.	As	 shown	 in	Figure	38,	when	 talking	about	the	 ideas	 of	 political	 parties,	 French	 participants	 evoke	 more	 often	 the	 abstract	principles	 and	 values	 that	 underlie	 policy	 proposals	 than	 they	 do	 assessments	 of	problems	to	be	solved	by	government	or	political	objectives	(56.5%	and	43.5%	of	total	assessments	 respectively).	 Hungarian	 participants	 displayed	 the	 opposite	 tendency,	with	 a	 lesser	 share	 of	 idea-related	 arguments	 referring	 to	 abstract	 principles	 as	compared	 to	 more	 concrete,	 policy-related	 ideas	 (52.8%	 and	 47.6%	 of	 total	assessments	respectively).	
	
Figure	 38:	 Ideational	 dimensions	 of	 partisan	 platforms	 emphasised	 by	 French	 and	
Hungarian	participants	to	justify	their	card	classification	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
	 	
2.	The	executive	criterion		Another	condition	for	parties	to	fulfil	the	standard	of	cohesiveness	is	that	they	link	their	normative	ideals	to	concrete	practices	of	government.	This	section	considers	two	indicators	for	this	criterion	in	the	coding	data.				
43.5%	 56.5%	
100%	
52.8%	 47.6%	
100%	
0	
50	
100	
150	
200	
250	
DIAGNOSTICS/	OBJECTIVES	 WORLDVIEWS	 Total	
N
um
be
r	
of
	in
st
an
ce
s	
co
de
d	 FRANCE	HUNGARY	
	
326	
'Mixed'	arguments	 	The	 executive	 criterion	 requires	 that	 partisans	 identify	 their	 party's	 policy	choices	as	deriving	 from	a	certain	 idea	of	 the	common	good,	and	as	a	means	to	reach	normative	goals.		To	make	this	connection	and	establish	these	links,	it	is	first	necessary	that	 partisans	 view	 the	 ideas	 and	 practice	 related	 dimensions	 of	 party	 platforms	 as	distinct.	 I	 thus	 consider	 here	 instances	 when	 participants	 make	 this	 distinction	between	the	ideas	and	practices	of	political	parties	explicit.	One	such	indication	comes	with	some	of	participants	judgements	on	the	conflictual	nature	of	a	given	topic.	Indeed,	in	some	cases,	participants	qualified	their	judgement	by	emphasising	different	degrees	of	partisan	disagreement	according	to	those	aspects	of	partisan	platforms	considered:	their	ideas	or	their	practices.		While	 these	 judgements	 were	 broadly	 coded	 as	 MIXED	 (as	 opposed	 to	CONFLICTUAL	or	CONSENSUAL),	two	further	sub-codes	are	relevant	here.	First,	I	coded	the	 assessments	 of	 participants	 'CONSENSUAL	 IDEAS	 VS.	 CONFLICTUAL	 PRACTICE'	when	 they	established	commonalities	between	parties	on	 the	basis	of	 their	 ideas	and	distinguished	 them	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 actions.	 Second,	 I	 coded	 the	 assessments	 of	participants	 CONFLICTUAL	 IDEAS	 VS	 CONSENSUAL	 PRACTICE	 when	 they	 establised	commonalities	 between	parties	 on	 the	basis	 of	 their	 actions	 and	distinguish	 them	on	the	basis	of	their	ideas.180	As	 Figure	 39	 shows,	 these	 types	 of	 arguments	 are	 on	 average	 used	 close	 to	twice	more	often	by	French	participants	than	they	are	by	Hungarian	ones	(107	against	57	instances	coded	respectively).	Differences	are	even	starker	if	one	considered	solely	the	 code	 CONFLICTUAL	 IDEAS	 VS.	 CONSENSUAL	 PRACTICE,	 used	 over	 three	 times	more	often	in	French	groups	(50	against	16	instances	coded	respectively).		
																																								 																					
180 	A	 third,	 sub-category	 of	 'Mixed'	 assessments	 was	 labelled	 CROSS-CUTTING	 CLEAVAGES,	 when	participants	 identified	 topics	 on	 which	 parties	 were	 internally	 divided.	 This	 category	 is	 however	 less	relevant	to	the	'executive'criteria	here.			
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Figure	 39:	 Arguments	 used	 by	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 participants	 in	 their	 'Mixed'	
assessments	of	partisan	disagreement	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
Co-occurences	of	ideas-	and	practice-	related	codes	Another	indicator	is	the	extent	to	which	participants	draw	on	both	parties	ideas	and	 their	actions	when	accounting	 for	partisan	disagreements	on	a	specific	 topic.	For	this	purpose,	I	identified	co-occurences	of	the	codes	'IDEAS'	and	'PRACTICE'	(referred	to	 as	 IDEAS	 AND	 PRACTICES	 in	 Figure	 40),	 and	 co-occurences	 of	 the	 codes	'WORLDVIEWS'	 and	 'SPECIFIC'181	(referred	 to	 as	 WORLDVIEWS	 AND	 SPECIFIC	 in	Figure	40).	If	we	consider	the	share	of	the	codes	'IDEAS'	and	'ACTIONS'	co-occurring	on	the	 total	number	of	 instances	coded	either	 IDEAS	or	PRACTICE	(referred	 to	as	 IDEAS	and/or	 PRACTICES	 in	 Figure	 40),	 these	 are	 on	 average	 slightly	 more	 present	 in	transcripts	 of	 French	 groups	 than	 they	 are	 in	 Hungarian	 ones	 (28.0%	 and	 26.1%	respectively).	 This	 is	 also	 the	 case	 for	 the	 co-occurence	 of	 the	 codes	 'WORLDVIEWS'	and	'SPECIFIC'	(8.6%	and	5.7%	respectively).	
																																								 																					
181	SPECIFIC	 is	 one	of	 the	 sub-codes	of	PRACTICE,	 and	 refers	 to	 instances	when	participants	 evoked	 the	specific	policy	proposals,	policies,	 laws,	or	decisions	or	political	parties.	 It	differs	 to	 this	extent	 from	the	subcode	GENERAL,	another	subcode	of	PRACTICES,	which	refers	 to	 instances	where	participants	evoked	the	ways	parties	more	generally	address	a	given	problem,	the	types	of	measures,	instruments	and	methods	they	rely	on.	
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Figure	 40:	 Co-occurence	 of	 ideas-	 and	 practice-related	 codes	 in	 French	 and	 Hungarian	
transcripts	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
	 3.	The	criterion	of	differentiation	Finally,	partisans	 should	be	able	 to	differentiate	 their	platforms	 from	 those	of	their	opponents	in	order	to	meet	the	standard	of	cohesiveness.	In	the	following	sections	I	 consider	 several	 indicators	 to	 compare	French	and	Hungarian	patterns	of	discourse	on	this	measure.		
Comparison	The	 most	 straightforward	 indicator	 for	 differentiation	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	partisans	adopt	a	comparative	perspective	when	accounting	for	partisan	agreements	or	disagreements.	 Indeed,	 when	 participants	 compared	 party	 platforms,	 they	 were	 also	more	likely	to	make	explicit	the	points	of	convergence	or	divergence	between	political	parties,	and	thus	to	detail	what	exactly	differentiates	or	draws	together	political	parties	on	a	given	topic.		As	Figure	41	demonstrates,	French	participants	are,	overall,	more	likely	to	both	adopt	a	comparative	perspective	than	their	Hungarian	counterparts	(53.6%	and	43.8%	
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of	 total	 assessments	 respectively).	 While	 the	 other	 two	 types	 of	 assessments	 are	equally	distributed	between	self-focused	and	opponent	focused	assessments	in	France	(both	at	23.2%	of	total	assessments),		Hungarian	participants	are	on	average	far	more	likely	 to	 focus	 on	 their	 opponents	 than	 they	 are	 to	 focus	 on	 themselves	 (39.6%	 and	16.7%	respectively).		
	
Figure	 41:	 Actors	 emphasised	 by	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 participants	 in	 the	 course	 of	
justifying	their	card	classification	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
Avowals	of	ignorance	and	reliance	on	expert	knowledge	Another	 indicator	 for	 partisan	 differentiation—or	 rather	 of	 its	 lack—comes	with	participants	admitting	that	they	do	not	know	the	position	of	their	own	party	or	of	their	 opponents	on	 a	 given	question	 (instances	 coded	 IGNORANCE).	 Indeed,	 this	 also	means	that	participants	cannot	say	in	what	ways	their	own	platform	differs	from	that	of	their	 opponents.	 A	 related	 indication	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisans	 refer	 to	 their	expertise	in	a	given	subject	to	legitimate	their	discourse	(instances	coded	EXPERTISE).	This	 indicates	 that	 knowing	 about	 partisan	differences	 in	 a	 certain	 policy	 area	 is	 not	seen	to	belong	to	the	 'common	knowledge'	of	partisans.	More	generally,	both	types	of	
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evidence	indicate	that	being	able	to	speak	about	what	differentiates	and	draws	together	political	 parties	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 course	 for	 partisans.	 As	 table	 6	 indicates,	 only	 in	Hungarian	groups	did	I	witness	explicit	avowals	of	ignorance	-	an	average	of	once	per	group,	 or	 participants	 stressing	 their	 own	 expertise.	 French	 participants	 did	 not	 use	these	kinds	of	arguments.	
	
Table	6:	References	by	Hungarian	participants	to	their	political	ignorance	or	expertise	
II.	PLURALISM	IN	PARTISAN	ATTITUDES	TOWARDS	POLITICAL	OPPONENTS	
In	Chapter	4	 I	demonstrated	 that	 the	attitudes	of	French	participants	 towards	political	opponents	are	more	respectful	 than	Hungarian	ones.	This	section	will	offer	a	more	precise	picture	of	 the	extent	to	which	this	 is	 the	case.	 I	proceed	in	 line	with	the	order	of	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	 starting	with	 the	 types	of	 criticisms	addressed	 to	opponents,	 following	 with	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 participants	 recognise	 the	 principled	nature	 of	 their	 opponents,	 and	 finishing	 with	 the	 relation	 participants	 establish	between	their	opponents	and	the	common	good.		
1.	Types	of	criticism:	intentions	and	practices	Starting	with	the	overall	degree	of	praise	and	criticism	that	participants	address	to	 either	 their	 opponents	 or	 their	 own	 party,	 Figure	 42	 reveals	 stark	 differences	between	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 groups.	 Hungarian	 participants	 criticise	 their	opponents	 over	 30%	 more	 than	 French	 ones	 and	 indulge	 in	 self-praise	 twice	 more	often.	 French	participants	 are,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 close	 to	 three	 times	more	 likely	 to	indulge	in	self-criticism	than	their	Hungarian	counterparts.		
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Figure	42:	Praise	and	criticism	by	French	and	Hungarian	participants	of	their	own	party	and	
their	opponents	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	While	being	self-critical	may	be	seen	as	part	of	a	partisan's	"negative	capacity",	the	degree	of	criticism	towards	opponents	is	no	straightforward	indication	of	pluralist	or	anti-pluralist	attitudes.	A	more	relevant	sign	 is	 the	extent	 to	which	partisans	 focus	on	 the	 intentions	 or	 practices	 of	 their	 opponents	 to	 criticise	 them.	 As	 Figure	 43	indicates,	 there	 is	 a	 close	 to	 equal	 distribution	 between	 both	 types	 of	 criticisms	 in	Hungarian	groups,	with	52.2%	of	these	dedicated	to	intentions,	and	47.8%	to	practices.	French	participants,	on	the	other	hand,	are	over	two	times	more	likely	to	criticise	the	practices	of	their	opponents	as	compared	to	their	intentions.			
	 	
Figure	 43:	 Criticisms	 by	 French	 and	Hungarian	 participants	 of	 their	 opponents'	 intentions	
and	practices	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
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If	one	further	considers	the	criticisms	of	opponents	focused	on	the	intentions	of	opponents,	it	is	also	noteworthy	that	the	accusations	made	in	Hungarian	groups	are	of	a	more	serious	nature	than	in	French	ones	(see	Figure	44	below).	Indeed,	only	26%	of	these	among	French	participants	 focus	on	 the	personal	motivations	of	opponents,	 for	instance	 their	 quest	 for	 material	 interest	 or	 personal	 influence.	 French	 participants	tend	to	focus	instead	on	the	political	motivations	of	their	opponents,	accusing	them	in	most	cases	of	adopting	certain	policies	or	making	certain	discourse	out	of	pure	concern	for	electoral	support.	While	such	accusations	imply	that	opponents	are	more	concerned	with	re-election	 than	with	 the	good	of	 the	community	overall,	 it	 is	also	more	morally	justifiable	for	a	politician	to	seek	re-election	-	which	he	may	still	do	out	of	belief	in	his	own	program	-	than	it	is	for	him	to	seek	his	own	personal	advancement.	The	proportion	is	 reversed	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Hungarian	 groups,	 with	 two	 thirds	 of	 such	 criticisms	denouncing	 the	personal	motivations	 of	 opponents,	 and	 the	 remaining	 third	 focusing	on	their	political	motivations.		
	
Figure	 44:	 Types	 of	 criticisms	 by	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 participants	 of	 their	 opponents'	
intentions	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
2.	The	principled	nature	of	opponents	If	one	examines	the	extent	to	which	participants	recognise	the	principled	nature	of	 their	 opponents,	 French	 participants	 appear	more	 likely	 to	 do	 so	 than	 Hungarian	participants	 (see	Figure	45).	 Indeed,	 in	47%	of	 the	 cases	where	 they	 talk	 about	 their	opponents	 they	 also	 evoke	 their	 ideas.	 This	 is	 even	more	 than	when	 they	 talk	 about	their	own	platforms,	in	which	case	they	only	evoke	the	principles	they	defend	in	31.6%	of	 the	 cases.	This	proportion	 is	 reversed	 in	 the	 case	of	Hungarian	participants:	when	
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they	evoke	their	opponents	they	talk	about	their	ideas	in	only	31%	of	the	cases,	against	52.7%	of	the	cases	when	they	are	talking	about	their	own	platforms.				
	
Figure	45:	References	by	French	and	Hungarian	participants	to	the	ideas	of	their	opponents	
and	of	their	own	party	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	Instances	 where	 participants	 explicitly	 negated	 the	 principled-nature	 of	 their	opponents	were	not	specifically	coded	for.	It	is	nevertheless	clear	from	the	qualitative	analysis	 of	 the	 transcripts	 that	 this	 was	 quite	 a	 common	 discursive	 strategy	 among	Hungarian	participants,	and	one	that	was	only	very	seldom	used	in	French	groups.		
3.	Opponents	and	the	common	good	Finally,	we	can	compare	the	extent	to	which	participants	in	France	and	Hungary	directly	 question	 their	 opponents'	 ability	 to	 reach	 the	 common	 good,	 either	 through	accusing	 them	 of	 a	 form	 of	 amorality	 or	 immorality,	 or	 through	 criticising	 them	 for	intentionally	undermining	basic	principles	or	 common	 interests	 that	 form	part	of	 the	common	 good	 at	 large.	 As	 Figure	 46	 below	 indicates,	Hungarian	 participants	 use	 the	first	 type	of	 argument	20	 times	more	often	 than	French	participants,	 and	 the	 second	type	of	argument	close	to	eight	times	more	frequently.		
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Figure	 46:	 Criticisms	 by	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 participants	 of	 their	 opponents'	 ability	 to	
further	the	common	good	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	Another	 indicator	 on	 this	 criterion	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 card	 'PUBLIC	MORALITY'	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 conflictual	 or	 consensual	 topic.	 Indeed,	 this	provides	an	indication	of	the	extent	to	which	the	question	of	morality	was	politicised	in	the	groups	under	study,	whether	this	is	a	topic	on	which	participants	sought	to	picture	their	 own	 party	 as	 virtuous	 and	 their	 opponents	 as	 deprived	 of	 moral	 scruple.	 As	shown	in	Figure	47,	French	participants	classified	this	card	as	consensual	in	half	of	the	cases,	against	a	22.4%	average	of	consensual	card	classification	overall.	This	is	also	one	of	the	topics	they	were	least	likely	to	classify	as	conflictual:	they	did	so	in	only	23.7%	of	cases,	 against	 a	 51.8%	 average	 of	 conflictual	 card	 classifications.	 Hungarian	participants	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 classified	 this	 card	 as	 conflictual	 in	 74%	of	 the	 cases,	slightly	above	an	average	 for	all	 cards	of	72.1%.	They	 saw	 the	 topic	as	 consensual	 in	18%	of	the	cases,	only	slightly	above	the	16.1%	average	for	all	card	classifications.			
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Figure	47:	Assessments	by	French	and	Hungarian	participants	of	partisan	disagreement	on	
the	card	PUBLIC	MORALITY	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	
III.	PLURALISM	IN	PARTISAN	ATTITUDES	TOWARDS	POLITICAL	AGREEMENT	AND	
DISAGREEMENT	
The	 evidence	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 5	 already	 indicates	 the	 more	 favourable	attitude	 of	 French	 participants	 towards	 political	 disagreement	 as	 compared	 to	Hungarian	 participants.	 The	 coding	 data	 presented	 here	 confirms	 this	 general	 idea.	 I	first	 present	 the	 general	 balance	 of	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 partisans'	 normative	judgements	 on	 partisan	 agreement	 and	 disagreement,	 and	 then	 compare	 their	experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue.		As	shown	in	Figure	48,	French	participants	are	close	to	four	times	more	likely	to	either	praise	political	disagreement	or	criticise	political	agreement	than	are	Hungarian	participants	below	in	the	 last	section	of	 the	 interviews.	On	the	other	hand,	Hungarian	participants	are	about	30%	more	likely	to	either	value	political	agreement	or	criticise	political	disagreement.	Crucially,	 these	differences	are	only	partly	an	 indication	of	 the	ethical	 disposition	 of	 partisans.	 As	 shown	 above,	 Hungarian	 participants'	 critical	attitude	towards	the	polarisation	of	their	own	party	system	may	be	seen	as	a	positive	sign	 in	 itself.	 	 The	 data	 nevertheless	 also	 reflects	 the	 greater	 capacity	 of	 French	participants	to	recognise	the	value	of	political	disagreement.		
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Figure	48:	Value	associated	by	French	and	Hungarian	participants	to	political	disagreement	
and	agreement	
N.B:	See	the	note	under	Figure	5	for	an	explanation	of	how	to	read	this	figure	This	 picture	 is	 also	 reinforced	 by	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 French	 and	Hungarian	participants	experience	interpartisan	dialogue.	As	shown	in	Figure	49,	over	two-thirds	 of	 the	 experiences	 recounted	 by	 French	 participants	 are	 positive	 or	described	in	neutral	terms.	Many	of	these	accounts	include	statements	that	participants	have	benefited	from	these	exchanges,	and	on	the	value	of	exchanging	with	citizens	with	different	 convictions	 more	 generally.	 In	 contrast,	 close	 to	 half	 of	 the	 experiences	Hungarian	participants	 account	 for	 are	negative,	 and	many	of	 these	 accounts	 include	blaming	opponents	for	the	difficult	nature	of	these	exchanges.			
	
Figure	 49:	 References	 by	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 participants	 to	 their	 positive	 or	 negative	
personal	experiences	of	interpartisan	dialogue	
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337		Appendix	7:	Access	to	data			I	 have	 set	 up	 a	 password	 protected	website	 to	 offer	 examiners	 access	 to	 the	transcripts	of	my	interviews,	the	final	NVivo	file	with	my	coding	data	and	a	PDF	version	of	 this	 thesis	 manuscript.	 My	 advisors	 will	 provide	 the	 examiners	 with	 the	 link,	username	and	password.		N.B:	I	have	collected	this	data	under	the	condition	that	all	personal	information	concerning	my	participants	would	be	kept	anonymous,	and	that	the	interviews	would	be	used	solely	for	the	purpose	of	my	research.	For	this	reason:	1	 -	 Access	 to	 this	 data	 will	 not	 be	 offered	 in	 the	 final	 version	 of	 this	 thesis,	deposited	in	the	LSE	Library.		2	 -	 Neither	 the	 transcripts,	 nor	 the	 NVivo	 file	 contain	 the	 first	 part	 of	 each	interview,	in	which	I	asked	questions	to	my	participants	about	their	personal	trajectory,	age,	occupation,	and	position	within	the	political	party.		3	-	Point	2	above	entails	that	while	the	codes	that	I	used	to	code	this	personal	information	have	remained	in	the	NVivo	file	(see	Phase	2	of	coding	process,	Appendix	5),	these	codes	do	not	refer	to	any	specific	portion	of	data	anymore.		4	-	Point	2	above	also	entails	that	the	coding	results	in	the	NVivo	data	file	may	be	 slightly	 different	 than	 those	 indicated	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Indeed,	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	discussion	 in	 which	 participants	 would	 introduce	 themselves	 would	 sometimes	 also	give	way	to	political	discussions,	and	in	some	cases,	to	me	associating	some	of	the	codes	used	 in	 this	 thesis	 to	 the	 discourse	 of	 participants.	 Because	 this	 section	 of	 the	interviews	is	now	gone,	these	instances	coded	will	also	not	show	up	in	coding	queries.	5	 -	 I	 do	not	 include	 in	 this	 digital	 appendix	 the	 recordings	 of	 the	 discussions.	Although	 I	 could	have	 removed	 the	 first	part	of	 these	 recordings	 in	 line	with	point	2	above,	participants	do	occasionally	address	each	other	by	name.	If	my	examiners	would	require	access	 to	one	or	several	recordings	 they	can	contact	either	of	my	supervisors	who	will	let	me	know.	Names	in	the	recordings	could	be	blurred	out	for	this	purpose.		
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6	-	No	use	of	this	data	by	a	third	party	can	be	made	without	prior	authorisation	from	the	participants	to	this	study,	and	myself.		
